Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 16 November 2015

This report is for media and the general public.

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”, including the Addendum. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*.The security situation remained volatile in parts of Donbas, in particular around Donetsk airport where the SMM recorded 145 explosions. In Luhansk region a number of training-related ceasefire violations were recorded.  

Positioned at a “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled location 6km north-west of Donetsk, the SMM heard and saw a number of ceasefire violations: between 8:30 and 13:21hrs, 141 undetermined explosions and multiple bursts of small arms and anti-tank guns, occurring at locations 4-5km south-west and 5-7km west, and four impacts at a distance of 4km west-south-west of its position.[1] In the vicinity of “DPR”-controlled Samsonove (80km south-east of Donetsk, 51km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions approximately 10km south of its position. In “DPR”-controlled Telmanove (50km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 4km east-south-east of its position. The SMM assessed that all these explosions emanated from known “DPR” training sites.

In Luhansk region, the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions approximately 16km west of its position in “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk). The SMM assessed that all these explosions emanated from known “LPR” training sites.  

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum, the SMM revisited five Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent weapons storage sites whose locations corresponded to the respective withdrawal lines and found that all previously recorded weapons were present at the four sites. The quantity of weapons and serial numbers matched the inventory, except for one main battle tank (MBT). At the fifth site, eight previously-recorded MBTs (seven T-72 and one T-64) listed in the inventory were missing.

The SMM revisited a “DPR” permanent weapons storage site whose location corresponded to the withdrawal lines, and observed that all previously recorded weapons were present.

Regarding the withdrawal of heavy weapons, neither concerned “DPR” members, nor “LPR” members have yet provided the requested inventory or locations of designated permanent storage sites for these weapons as requested by the SMM on 16 October. The Ukrainian military authorities have also yet to provide such information. Nonetheless, the SMM revisited locations that are beyond the respective withdrawal lines and are known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they did not comply with the specific criteria set out in the 16 October notification.

In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited three holding areas. The SMM observed: at one area, 17 towed anti-tank guns (Rapira MT-12, 100mm); at a second area, 29 MBTs. The SMM noted that the third area, where it previously had observed five self-propelled howitzers (Akatsyia 2S3, 152mm), had been abandoned since 24 July.

In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited two holding areas. At the first holding area, it observed two self-propelled artillery pieces (122mm 2S1 Gvozdika) and six howitzers (152mm, 2A65 Msta-B). At the second area, the SMM observed four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm).

In addition, also beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM saw a Ukrainian Armed Forces convoy consisting of two MBTs (T-64) loaded on trailers in the area of government-controlled Novodaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

At various locations, both inside and outside the security zone, the SMM observed other weapons and military hardware. It observed: in the area of “LPR”-controlled Samsonivka (31km south-east of Luhansk) 24 Kamaz military-type trucks (four out of the 24 trucks were transporting armed individuals); in the area of government-controlled Novoaidar, a Ukrainian Armed Forces convoy consisting of 18 small, medium-size and large military trucks with one armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and four anti-aircraft guns (ZU232) on a truck; three armoured personnel carriers (one BTR-60 and two BTR-70) in the area of government-controlled Nizhnia Vilkhova (28km north-east of Luhansk); and in the area of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), two BMP-1 on a military truck.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to essential infrastructure. In “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM met with representatives of the DTEK company (responsible for maintenance of power lines), the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), and “DPR” members to facilitate the co-ordination of safe access and demining to enable the repair of a 5km-long stretch of power lines between government-controlled Artemove (40km north of Donetsk) and Horlivka. All interlocutors agreed to start demining in Horlivka on 17 November.

The SMM visited a number of crossing points along the Ukraine-Russian Federation border. In “DPR”-controlled Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 85 civilian cars and ten civilian cargo trucks waiting to cross into the Russian Federation. North-east of “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol), the SMM observed 16 civilian cargo trucks with Russian Federation plates waiting to cross into the Russian Federation.

The SMM observed impediments to the movement of civilians. On the “LPR”-controlled side of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw at the “LPR” checkpoint approximately 100 people (different gender and age) waiting to cross the bridge; and on the other side of the bridge at the Ukrainian checkpoint, 100 people waiting to cross in the opposite direction. On the government-controlled side of the bridge, approximately 80 people (different gender and age) were waiting to cross into “LPR”-controlled areas. According to people in the queue, wait time was three to five minutes. The SMM saw a tent at the first government checkpoint at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, where the Ukrainian Emergency Service Agency was distributing winter clothes to people. At the first government checkpoint on the H15 highway from Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) to Donetsk, the SMM saw 300 civilian cars lined up to cross into government-controlled areas. No vehicles were observed queuing in the opposite direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Dnepropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Lviv and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. ”LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring most areas close to the border with the Russian Federation in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.

Denial of access:

-        At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint in government-controlled Staryi Aidar (20km north-west of Luhansk), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM passage, citing security concerns. The SMM left after some ten minutes.

-        At a checkpoint in “LPR”-controlled Sokilnyky (38km north-west of Luhansk), “LPR” armed members denied the SMM passage, citing security reasons. The checkpoint “commander” said that prior to the SMM’s arrival, they had heard gun fire.

Conditional access:

-        At a checkpoint 15 kilometers south of "“LPR”-controlled Rovenky (55km south of Luhansk), two armed “LPR” members stopped the SMM and insisted on checking the patrol plan. They told the SMM that there was an on-going demining operation in the area. After contacting their superior, the armed men allowed the SMM to proceed five minutes later.

Delays:

• At a “DPR” heavy weapons holding area, the SMM was initially not allowed to enter the site. According to armed “DPR” members at the site, the SMM should have  informed about its visit two hours in advance. The SMM was then requested to show passports, which the SMM refused. After contacting their superior, the armed “DPR” members allowed the SMM to access the site after a delay of five minutes.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.