Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 25 October 2015

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”, including the Addendum. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. Donetsk and Luhansk regions remained largely calm, despite some explosions. The SMM observed no security incidents in relation to Election Day. The SMM visited Debaltseve and observed few civilians and the presence of armed groups.

Donetsk region remained largely calm despite explosions being recorded by the SMM. On 24 October, the SMM heard a total of five explosions from its position at the “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk); the SMM heard no explosions from this location on 25 October. Near a Ukrainian Armed Forces position to the south of Kamianka (18km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard a loud explosion at 14:55hrs on 24 October but could not determine ammunition type or the location.

In carrying out its responsibilities under the Addendum to the Package of measures, on 23 October, the SMM revisited one designated Ukrainian Armed Forces weapons storage site, which corresponded with respective withdrawal lines. There were discrepancies between the serial numbers and the quantity of weapons in the inventory and those observed at the site.

On 24 October, the SMM visited three designated Ukrainian Armed Forces weapons storage sites for the first time whose locations corresponded with respective withdrawal lines and recorded the serial numbers of weapons. Although the numbers of weapons matched the inventory list provided to the SMM, there was a discrepancy between the serial numbers of weapons in the inventory and those of weapons at these sites.

On 24 October, the SMM re-visited five designated “DPR” weapons storage sites, the locations of which corresponded with respective withdrawal lines. At the first site SMM recorded all serial numbers, which matched those provided in the inventory. At the second and third sites, the SMM recorded all serial numbers, and noted discrepancies between these and the numbers provided in the inventory. At the fourth site, as the SMM was recording serial numbers, a “DPR” “commander” told the SMM to hand over its weapons withdrawal form containing the serial numbers of weapons and leave the site*. The SMM subsequently left the area.  At the fifth site the SMM found all weapons previously recorded were present.

In “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (37km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM met with representatives of the DTEK company (responsible for maintenance of power lines), the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), and “DPR” members to facilitate the co-ordination of safe access and demining to enable the repair of a 5km-long stretch of power lines between government-controlled Artemove (40km north of Donetsk) and Horlivka.

The SMM facilitated dialogue that enabled some displaced persons to accompany the SMM to their homes in government-controlled Pisky (11km north-west of Donetsk). In government-controlled Selydove (41km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM spoke with 24 persons (16 women, eight men) displaced from Pisky, some of whom complained of looting and occupation of their homes. Approximately 6km west of Pisky, the SMM observed a military truck moving from the area of Pisky carrying four uniformed persons and loaded with furniture, mattresses and window frames. In Pisky, the SMM saw damage to houses and apartments, some of which was caused by shelling, although other damage was assessed to have been caused by criminal activity. Doors, windows and some furniture had been removed from some apartments, piles of clothes and small personal items such as photographs, and rubbish littered the streets. In Pisky, the SMM also observed military positions and accommodation in private residences.

The SMM visited “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (55km north-east of Donetsk) for the first time in over a month and assessed that while much of the destruction observed earlier had been repaired, many dwellings remained damaged. The SMM observed very few residents and the presence of armed groups, including persons wearing “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”) insignia. The duty manager at the train station informed the SMM that only cargo traffic was being handled. At the station, the SMM observed a cargo train which appeared to be carrying anthracite passing through, headed south-west.

In government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM observed a calm Election Day and no security incidents.

The overall situation in Luhansk region was relatively calm despite two explosions heard on 24 October near government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk).

On 24 October, the SMM observed a convoy of four trucks with Russian Federation white licence plates escorted by “police” near “LPR”-controlled Khriashchuvate (10km south-east of Luhansk) moving toward “LPR”-controlled Krasnodon (43km south-east of Luhansk).

On 25 October, the SMM travelled to the border crossing points in “LPR”-controlled Chervonopartyzansk (93km south-east of Luhansk) and Dovzhanske (110km south-east of Luhansk) and spoke to “border guards” at the Ukraine-Russian Federation border despite being prevented from travelling there on 24 October.

The SMM revisited six Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas, whose locations corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines, and observed all previously recorded weapons to be present at three areas. The SMM observed heavy weapons to be absent at three other areas: two towed howitzers (152mm, 2A65 Msta-B) were absent at one area (as noted on 27 August and 9 July); one towed howitzer (152mm, 2A65 Msta-B) was absent at another area (as noted on 9 July); and five multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (122mm, BM-21 Grad) were absent at another area (two, as noted on 12 July and three as noted on 24 September, when the SMM concluded that the area had been abandoned). The SMM was not able to access a seventh area as freshly dug trenches blocked the access road*. The SMM had reported this area as abandoned on 12 July, when all six MLRS (122mm, BM-21 Grad) were absent.

The SMM revisited four “DPR” heavy weapons holding areas whose locations corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines. At one area, “DPR” members denied the SMM access*. At a second area, all weapons previously recorded were present. No “DPR” members were present at a third area, and the SMM was only able to see one weapon from a distance, and did not move closer due to the possible presence of landmines*. At another site, the SMM found no changes since the last visit on 19 October when six 120mm mortars were absent.

In areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed on 24 October in “DPR”-controlled Ternove (57km east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 45 main battle tanks (MBT) (T-64 and T-72). In “LPR”-controlled areas 12 howitzers (D30), 16 military-type trucks and two armoured personnel carriers (APCs) at a training area in Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk); at the same location, the SMM observed on 25 October nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1, 122mm calibre). In government-controlled areas on 25 October, in the area of Chabanivka (67km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw four MLRS (Grad BM-21) stationary and covered with camouflage and four stationary howitzers (Akatsiya, 152 mm calibre) in the area of government-controlled Popasna (60km north-west of Luhansk).

In Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Kherson, Odessa, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, and Kyiv, the SMM observed no security incidents on Election Day.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, and damaged infrastructure. The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable. Self-imposed restrictions on movement into high-risk areas have impinged on SMM patrolling activities, particularly in areas not controlled by the government. Members of the “LPR” continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring most areas close to the border with the Russian Federation.

Denied access:

• On 24 October, while recording the serial numbers of weapons at a “DPR” weapons storage site, a “DPR” “commander”, in violation of the Addendum told the SMM to hand over its weapons withdrawal form and leave the site. The SMM left the area.
• On 24 October, in violation of the Addendum, two “LPR” “border guards” in “LPR”-controlled Parkhomenko (29km east of Luhansk) stopped the SMM and said that it needed permission to travel toward the Ukraine-Russian Federation border. “LPR” members escorted the SMM from the area.
• On 25 October, armed persons denied the SMM access to a “DPR” heavy weapons holding area.