Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 30 January 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM observed fresh damage from shelling at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, as well as military presence in the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line; it also saw a high number of weapons, including about 60 tanks, beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas.
• It continued to observe long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and operations of essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere.*
• The SMM observed that the wooden boxes at the Myronivskyi reservoir had been removed.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 75 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded mainly at south-easterly and south-westerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and in areas south-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM camera at the DFS recorded ceasefire violations, including explosions assessed as impacts, as close as 100-500m from the camera.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 165 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 25 explosions). More than two thirds of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north and west-north-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

Fresh mortar impacts at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area

On 30 January, at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw nine fresh impacts, assessed as caused by mortar rounds, as well as nine tailfins of 120mm mortar rounds and two fuse tips located within a 4m radius of the impacts. At the same checkpoint, the SMM also saw fresh shrapnel marks on a north-facing concrete block (which had been moved 1m south of its regular position) and dents and fresh shrapnel damage on a north-facing wall of a prefabricated container. The Mission also observed the tailfin of a 120mm mortar round and fuse tip fragments 2m north of the concrete block. About 10m south of the same checkpoint, the SMM saw for the first time a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) (tailfin of a 120mm mortar round) covered with a used tire and tree branches and an improvised red square mine hazard sign with “Stop, Mines” written in Russian 2m south from the UXO, as well as the tailfin of a 120mm mortar round embedded in the asphalt of the road,. The SMM also saw three fresh mortar impacts and fragments of the tailfin of a 120mm mortar round nearby. The SMM assessed that all the above mortar rounds were fired from a west-north-westerly direction. An unarmed member of the armed formations told the Mission that there had been shelling in the early afternoon hours of 29 January.

On the evening of 29 January, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded five projectiles in flight (all from north to south) at an assessed range of 2-4km east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). In the morning of 30 January, positioned near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and 12 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km east and north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Inside the Zolote disengagement area (south of the northern edge), the SMM saw three armed soldiers and a military truck  and two other soldiers about 200m west of the above soldiers.

Positioned on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two shots at an assessed range of 3-5km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

29 January

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) close to residential areas in Zoloti Pisky (12km north-west of Donetsk);
• a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in a residential area in Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk); and
• a mortar (a probable 2B11) stationary near Talakivka (90km south of Donetsk).

30 January

The SMM saw:

• two towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) being transported south on road H-21 near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

29 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• three stationary mortars (2B11) in Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk) and
• seven stationary self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 15 January 2019).

30 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• a stationary tank (T-64) near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

29 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm), two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and a surface-to-air-missile system (9K35) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 30 January 2019).

The SMM saw:

• four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) stationary on road H-21 near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

30 January

The SMM saw:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) being transported south on road H20 near Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk) and
• three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) and three tanks (T-72) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne.

Non-government-controlled areas

29 January

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 58 tanks (55 T-72 and three T-64) at a training area near Ternove (see above);
• nine mortars (2B11), four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35), ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1), three tanks (T-64) and six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) at a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk); and
• 18 towed howitzers (eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and ten 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) at a compound in Zelenyi Hai (49km south-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

29 January

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on top, two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variants), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) and an armoured combat vehicle (undetermined variant) in Krasnohorivka and
• an APC (BMP-1KSh) near Shchastia.

Non-government-controlled areas

30 January

The SMM saw:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) in Mykhailivka (30km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two fresh craters, assessed as impacts of mortar (82mm) rounds next to road T0504, about 3.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

Long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska

At 10:10 on 30 January, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) the SMM saw about 2,500 people queuing to travel toward government-controlled areas and no people queueing in the opposite direction. About two hours later, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed about 600 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 200 people queuing to travel in the opposite direction.  

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and water pipelines near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) as well as to enable an inspection of water wells at the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Wooden boxes removed at Myronivskyi reservoir in Donetsk region

The SMM observed that the two dark green square wooden boxes (and connected wires) previously seen at the metal gates of a sluice on the northern side of the Myronivskyi reservoir and close to a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Roty (government-controlled, 66km north-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 15 January 2019) were no longer there. An unarmed soldier told the SMM that the boxes had been removed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces on 23 January.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example SMM Daily Report 25 January 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia, an armed member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.

Other impediments:

• On 29 January, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to signal interference, while flying over government- and non-government-controlled areas north and north-east of Donetsk as well as in areas south-east of Luhansk.[5]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk was not operational. Winter weather conditions limited the observation capabilities of some SMM cameras.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its   camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.