Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 30 August 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near non-government-controlled Tavrycheske.
- The SMM saw that the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area continued to be dismantled.
- The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the disengagement area Zolote and observed military hardware inside the Petrivske disengagement area.
- The SMM saw a weapon in violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled Mariupol.
- It monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Prymorske. In government-controlled Shchastia, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer told the SMM to stay there and the Mission could only leave the area after about two hours.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 160), compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly and southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), at easterly and southerly directions of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol) and at south-easterly and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions (11), compared with the previous reporting period (12 explosions). All ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north-east of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).
Small-arms fire assessed as directed at SMM UAV near Tavrycheske
Positioned about 700m north-east of Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 76km west of Donetsk), while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard about 30 bursts of small-arms fire about 1.8 km west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was also flying about 1.8 km west. Five minutes prior, the same mini-UAV had experienced signal interference near the same settlement, assessed as caused by probable jamming.* [2]
Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area
On 29 August, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw four workers with a crane cutting trees about 50m south of the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk). The SMM saw five workers from non-government-controlled areas continuing dismantling the roof and southern part of the former forward position of the armed formations immediately south of the broken section of the bridge and a pile of tyres near the previously observed blue container (with “JCCC” written on it).[3] Later, on the same day, the Mission observed thick black smoke rising, assessed as caused by burning tyres, from the area of the former forward position of the armed formations.
On 30 August, the SMM saw two personnel of the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine carrying out demining activities about 100m west of the road north of the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The SMM saw seven workers from non-government-controlled areas shovelling dirt and sand, removing ammunition boxes filled with sand and wooden pillars from the roof of the former forward position of the armed formations.
On 29 and 30 August, the Mission continued observing dismantling of structural components of the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge.
The Mission saw up to three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) between the southern edge of the broken section of the bridge and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge.
Other disengagement areas[4]
During the day on 30 August, positioned on the western edge of Pervomaisk, the SMM heard seven outgoing explosions at an assessed range of 5-7km north-east, which it was unable to assess as inside or outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). Positioned on the eastern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 10-15km east-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.
On 29 August, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (probable BTR-80) inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), about 1km east of its western edge and about 800m north of its southern edge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Government-controlled areas
29 August
An SMM mini-UAV spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) on the northern edge of Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk)
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
30 August
The SMM saw two tanks (T-72) mounted on flatbed trucks on the northern edge of Mariupol.
Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]
At a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region
30 August
The SMM noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152 mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were present and that six self-propelled howitzers (2S3) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12) remained missing.
Weapons permanent storage sites
At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region
30 August
The SMM noted that 18 tanks (T-72) and seven mortars (M120-15 Molot 120mm) were missing.
Indications of military presence in the security zone[6]
Government-controlled areas
29 August
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
- two probable infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk);
- two IFVs (BMP-2 and a BMP variant) in Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk); and
- an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) on the eastern outskirts of Mariupol.
New trench extensions near Vodiane
On 25 August, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of two new trench extensions (not visible in imagery from 11 August 2019): one 400m in length about 2.6km south-east of Vodiane (government-controlled, 19km north-east of Mariupol) assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and the second one 210m in length about 1.3km south-east of Vodiane.
Presence of anti-tank mines near Dokuchaievsk and Shchastia
The Mission saw for the first time five anti-tank mines (TM-62) on the side of a road near a checkpoint of the armed formations on the northern edge of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk).
The SMM again saw 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows across road H-21 south of the bridge in Shchastia, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. It also observed that 12 previously observed anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid on the western lane of the road H-21 north of the bridge near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) were no longer present.
SMM facilitation of repairs to and operation of essential civilian infrastructure
The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). It also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).
The SMM also monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).
The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily of 24 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
- At a checkpoint on the western edge of Prymorske (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), three armed members of the armed formations did not allow the SMM to proceed towards Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33 km north-east of Mariupol), citing “demining activities in the area”.
- After the SMM flew a mini-UAV in the area of the bridge near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at a checkpoint north of the same bridge told that the patrol to stay there while he clarified with his superiors whether to let the Mission leave without deleting the UAV imagery. After about two hours of waiting due to this, the situation was clarified and the SMM could leave the area without having deleted the imagery.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Conditional access:
- At a checkpoint north of the bridge near Shchastia, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer denied the SMM passage towards the bridge by car and only allowed it to proceed further on foot (see above).
Other impediments:
- While conducting a mini-UAV flight north-east of Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 76km west of Donetsk), the SMM heard small-arms fire assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV, which landed safely. Five minutes prior, the same UAV had experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming (see above).[7]
- An SMM mini UAV experienced signal interference while flying near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, non-government-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk), assessed as caused by probable jamming.
- Medical staff at a hospital in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) refused to provide the SMM information about a civilian casualty without permission from senior members of the armed formations.
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.
[3] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.
[4] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[5] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.
[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.