Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 29 August 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM saw that the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area continued to be dismantled.
- The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote.
- The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
- It monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however, fewer explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions). About 78 per cent of the total ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), whereas the majority of explosions were recorded at easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, however, fewer explosions (12), compared with the previous reporting period (19 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas east-south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).
Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area
On 28 August, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw four personnel of the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine holding prodding devices and shovels and inspecting the broken section of the bridge, as well as taking photographs of the elements of the bridge and its surrounding areas. The SMM saw four deminers from non-government-controlled areas dismantling the roof and carrying sandbags from the former forward position of the armed formations on a trolley towards the previously observed blue container (with “JCCC” written on it), [2] about 30m south near the said container, where the Mission saw around 30 sandbags, ten wooden logs and ten tyres. Inside the container, the SMM saw about 40 sandbags placed against its interior walls and ten on the roof of the container.
On 29 August, the SMM again saw six SES personnel carrying prodding devices and metal detectors, as well as four deminers from non-government-controlled areas carrying prodding devices going under the broken section of the bridge. Thereafter, the Mission saw four civilian engineers from government-controlled areas and two engineers from non-government-controlled areas carrying out an assessment of the broken section of the bridge.
On 28 and 29 August, the Mission continued observing dismantling structural components of the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge.
The Mission saw up to seven members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) on the southern edge of the broken section of the bridge and near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge.
Other disengagement areas[3]
In the early morning hours of 29 August, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. Positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), the Mission heard two undetermined explosions and about 20 shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at north-easterly directions at an assessed range of 500-700m, all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.
Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Non-government-controlled areas
27 August
An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) and 30 ammunition crates in a trench north-east of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
28 August
An SMM mini-UAV spotted two tanks (T-72) and six Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, one of whom was aiming their weapon at the UAV near Zoria (40km north-west of Donetsk).
29 August
The SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in Kulykivske (232km south-east of Dnipro).
Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]
At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region
29 August
The SMM noted that four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) were present and that six MLRS (BM-21) remained missing.
Weapons permanent storage sites[5]
At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region
29 August
The SMM noted that seven mortars (four 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and three PM-38, 120mm) and 54 tanks (34 T-64B1, nine T-64B and 11 T-64) were missing.
Indications of military presence in the security zone[6]
Government-controlled areas
27 August
An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:
- a probable armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) north-west of Katerynivka (64km west of Luhansk);
- a recent trench running from a treeline on the western edge of Katerynivka across a field to another treeline about 300m east (not seen in imagery from 19 July 2019);
- a recent trench running for about 50m north-east behind a building in the centre of Katerynivka, about 20m west of civilian houses (not seen in imagery from 19 July 2019); and
- a new trench running for about 35m north-east in a field about 60m west of civilian houses in the centre of Katerynivka (not seen in imagery from 29 May 2019).
29 August
The SMM saw:
- an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) near Popasna;
- an IFV near Zhelanne Druhe (29km north-west of Donetsk); and
- an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70) in Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).
Presence of anti-tank mines near Petrivske disengagement area
On 28 August, on the road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV again spotted 23 anti-tank mines laid in four rows (TM-62), about 150m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area near Petrivske, as well as an additional 11 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in two rows about 115m east from the previously-mentioned mines, all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 3 July 2019).
Situation at checkpoints along the contact line
At a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed about 200 cars and at least three minivans queuing to travel toward non-government-controlled areas and about 30 cars, three buses and four minivans queuing to travel in the opposite direction. At the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk, a representative of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine told the SMM that on 28 August, the EECP was closed from 13:00 to 14:00 due to reported gunfire near the settlement, and that the people waiting in queues were evacuated to a safe place. A representative of an international organization regularly present in the area also told the SMM that the EECP was closed for one hour.
SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure
The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline, to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to power lines near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk), Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk) and Hladosove (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk). It also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the drilling of wells and to enable repairs to a radio communication tower near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).
The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).
Public gatherings in Kharkiv, Kyiv and Chernivtsi commemorating “Ilovaisk battle”
On 25 August, at Molodizhnyi Park in Kharkiv, the SMM saw about 35 people (mixed ages and genders) gather to commemorate the “Ilovaisk battle”, which took place in August 2014. On 29 August, the SMM saw about 1,000 people (mixed ages and genders) gather at Mykhailivska Square in Kyiv city and, in Chernivtsi city, saw people gathering at gravesites and a cathedral. The SMM saw that the gatherings were marked by speeches and prayers.
SMM monitored the security situation in south-east Kherson region
On 28 and 29 August, the Mission continued to monitor the security situation along the Sea of Azov coast in Kherson region and at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea and observed a calm situation.
The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Dnipro.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 24 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
- At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing engineering works”.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Delay:
- At a weapons permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, three Ukrainian Armed Forces officers allowed the Mission to check the serial numbers of the weapons present at the site only after 45 minutes of waiting.
Other impediments:
- An SMM mid-range UAV experienced signal interference while flying near Vesele (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk), assessed as caused by probable jamming.[7]
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.
[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.
[5] The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.
[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.