Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 27 August 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw that the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area continued to be dismantled.
• An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system in violation of withdrawal lines near non-government-controlled Chystoe Ozero.
• The Mission saw anti-tank mines for the first time near civilian houses in government-controlled Pisky.
• An SMM long-range UAV spotted a train in non-government-controlled Khartsyzk.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints in non-government-controlled Zaichenko and Nova Marivka.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, more explosions (95), compared with the previous reporting period  (32 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), in areas north of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), and in areas north-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) and all of the explosions were recorded in areas east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and south-west of Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 26 August, on the northern edge of the metal section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk) about 240m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations, inside of the disengagement area, the SMM saw metal scaffolding for the first time. A member of the armed formations (wearing an armband with “JCCC” written on it) told the SMM that the scaffolding had been installed to facilitate repairs to the bridge. [2]

On 27 August, inside of the disengagement area, the Mission saw at least 20 deminers of the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine, as well as eight members of the Stanytsia Luhanska Forestry Service, conducting demining activities and clearing vegetation west of the road, about 300-400m north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. It also saw at least five members of the SES using a crane and a dump truck to remove structural components from the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge.

On the same day, inside the disengagement area, between the former forward position of the armed formations near the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the Mission saw a senior member of the armed formations as well as six members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them. The SMM also saw at least eight members of the armed formations removing structural components from their former forward position and relocating sand-filled tyres to a location beside a previously observed blue container about 40m south of the broken section of the bridge.

Other disengagement areas[3]

In the early morning hours of 27 August, the SMM camera in Popasna recorded three undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km east-south-east as well as a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 3-5km east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote but within its 5km periphery. About ten minutes later, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded an illumination flare at an assessed range of 2-3km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On 27 August, about 350m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM again saw a spool wire stretched across the T-1316 road, rendering it impassable. About 50m further north, the SMM saw for the first time ten signs with “Mines!” written in Russian on both the eastern and western edges road.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

26 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Chystoe Ozero (14km south-west of Donetsk).

27 August

The SMM saw 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

27 August

The SMM saw six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) south-west of Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk).

Heavy weapons permanent storage site

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

27 August

The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

23 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (three BMP-2 and a probable BMP variant) near Novomykhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk).

24 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol).

26 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted four IFVs (three BMP-1 and a BMP-2) near Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM saw an armoured reconnaissance vehicle near Yasnobrodivka (25km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

25 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) and three armoured communication vehicles (R-145) on three APCs (two MT-LB and a BTR-80) in Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk);
• an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk); and
• an ACV near Pryvitne (11km north of Luhansk).

26 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two probable ACVs near Chyrylianske (formerly Oktiabrske, 62km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014, and
• an ACV in Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk).

Presence of mines near Vodiane and in Pisky and mine hazard sign near Nova Marivka[5]

On 24 August, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 21 anti-tank mines laid across road T-0519 about 2km north of Vodiane (government-controlled, 19km north-east of Mariupol) and again spotted 50 anti-tank mines on its south-eastern edge. On 26 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 25 anti-tank mines laid in two rows on the edge of a road and extending south-west to the wall of an abandoned civilian house in Pisky (government-controlled, 11km north-west of Donetsk), as well as ten additional anti-tank mines laid across the same road in a single line about 100m east-south-east of the previous mines.

On 27 August, on a road east of Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw again trees laid across the road with a sign reading “Stop! Mines” as well as a sign reading “No passage” on the southern side of the road, both in Russian.

Train carrying cargo north-west through Khartsyzk

In the early morning hours of 27 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a train consisting of two locomotives and 60 half-full cargo wagons moving north-west towards the train station in Khartsyzk (non-government-controlled, 26km east of Donetsk), about 50km north-north- west of the border with the Russian Federation.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the drilling of a well near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) and to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), and to power lines near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). A representative of the electrical company “DTEK” told the SMM that repairs to power lines near Chermalyk had been completed.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for an hour, the SMM saw 18 cars (five with Ukrainian, six with Russian Federation, and one with Lithuanian licence plates, as well as six with “DPR” plates), 22 covered cargo trucks (ten with Ukrainian licence plates and 12 with “DPR” plates), nine buses (one with Georgian licence plates and eight with “DPR” plates), and 34 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) entering Ukraine. It also saw 22 cars (three with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 11 with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates, two fuel tankers with Ukrainian licence plates, two buses (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates), a motorcycle (plates not identified), and 23 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) exiting Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for 30 minutes, the SMM saw two pedestrians (a man and woman in their 60-80s) entering Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 24 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “ongoing demining activities”.
• At a checkpoint south of Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to the settlement, citing “risks to the security of the SMM.”
• On a road east of Nova Marivka, the SMM saw trees laid across the road as well as a mine hazard sign, preventing passage to the settlement.
• About 350m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM’s passage was prevented by a spool wire stretched across the road T-1316.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to proceed only after 19 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 26 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over areas between Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) and Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).[6]

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Between the evenings of 26 and 27 August, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] In the SMM Daily Report of 24 August 2019, 12 anti-tank mines seen near Shchastia were inaccurately reported as located south of the bridge. The mines were located about 160m north of the bridge.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.