Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 6 August 2019

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw deminers from the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and from non-government-controlled areas working inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The SMM saw demining activities near Petrivske and accessed its camera site for the first time since 22 June 2018. 
• It saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region and in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
• Anti-tank mines were spotted near Talakivka, Pikuzy and Staromykhailivka, some for the first time.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs of water pipelines and power lines, as well as the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a non-government-controlled checkpoint near Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 60) compared with the previous reporting period (27 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north and south-east of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), including in areas 2-3km from the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), and at southerly and south-easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including no explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (one explosion).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On the morning of 6 August, the SMM observed ten deminers of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine holding prodding sticks and metal detectors and cutting vegetation in areas up to 125m north-west of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) towards the northern edge of the disengagement area.

On the same day, the SMM saw ten deminers from non-government-controlled areas using prodding sticks and metal detectors and cutting vegetation in areas of about 60m west of the southern wooden ramp on the broken section of the bridge.

At the southern wooden ramp of the broken section of the bridge, the SMM saw two senior members of the armed formations and two others wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them. Near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, it also saw up to six members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them.[2] 

During the same day, the SMM saw that pedestrians continued crossing the bridge without interruption while demining activities were conducted inside the disengagement area.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 5 August, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 3-5km south-south-east (unable to be assessed whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On 6 August, the SMM saw three sappers of the armed formations with metal detectors sweep a 400m-long section of a road leading from Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) to Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), near the north-eastern edge of the disengagement area near Petrivske, where the SMM camera is also located. The SMM accessed its camera site for the first time since 22 June 2018.

On the same day, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) observed again two anti-tank mines laid across the road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk), about 150m north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as well as 33 anti-tank mines about 225m further east across the same road, all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

5 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) about 2km south of Druzhba (76km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

5 August

The SMM saw seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Mykhailivka (74km south-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

5 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 16 self-propelled howitzers (ten 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and six 2S3 (five of these were also observed by an SMM patrol, see Daily Report 6 August 2019), a surface-to-air-missile system (9K35 Strela-10), six towed howitzers (D-30) and an anti-tank guided missile system (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) in the area of the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

6 August

The SMM saw seven towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) near Oknyne (53km north-west of Luhansk).  

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region:

5 August

The SMM noted that 21 towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) and 28 towed howitzers (D-30) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

3 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Hnutove (20km north-east of Mariupol).

5 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk);
• an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) in a residential area on the western edge of Popasna (69km west of Luhansk); and
• two APCs (BTR-70) in a residential area in Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk).

6 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable IFV (BMP-1) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk).

The SMM saw:

• three IFVs (BMP-variant) and two APCs (type undetermined) on the south-eastern edge of Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

5 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• a combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2) and 14 IFVs (BMP-1) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk); and
• an IFV near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines near Talakivka, Pikuzy and Staromykhailivka

On 3 August, about 5km east of Talakivka (government-controlled, 17km north-east of Mariupol), an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 15 previously observed anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across a road leading to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and in an adjacent field. The same UAV spotted for the first time four anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid on the same road on the north-western edge of Pikuzy.

On 6 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two previously seen anti-tank mines near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk) laid across the road towards Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, near Berezove (government-controlled, 31km south-west of Donetsk) and near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) citing “demining activities and security issues”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations asked the SMM to provide its patrol plan; when the SMM refused to do so its passage was denied and it consequently returned to government-controlled areas. When the SMM returned to the aforesaid checkpoint an hour and a half later, it was allowed to proceed.                                                 

Other impediments:

• On 5 August, on two occasions, an SMM-long range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk).[6]
• On 6 August, on two occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk).7

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one site continued to be abandoned. 

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position.