Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 2 August 2019

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw deminers from government- and non-government-controlled areas working simultaneously inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• It observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
• The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs of power lines and a phenol sludge reservoir.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations; however, there were more explosions (43) compared with the previous reporting period (17 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations, including 17 explosions, were recorded in north-easterly and south-easterly directions of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). All ceasefire violations were recorded during the day time.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations (in total four explosions) compared with the previous reporting period (20 explosions). All the ceasefire violations were recorded at north-westerly directions of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

Inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a demining team of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine, comprised of ten people and three vehicles (including an armoured vehicle), on the northern edge of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk). It observed SES deminers carrying metal detectors and prodding sticks in field areas, from the northern edge of the broken section of the bridge up to about 125m north, about 30m on each side of the road leading to the northern edge of the disengagement area. The SMM saw deminers from non-government-controlled areas accompanied by three members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them)[2], prodding the ground with sticks and cutting shrubbery with hatchets in fields on the western side of the bridge from the northern edge of the broken section of the bridge, extending south to the river.

At the broken section of the bridge, the SMM saw three senior members of the armed formations.

During the same day, the SMM saw that pedestrians continued crossing the bridge without interruption while demining activities were conducted inside the disengagement area. The Mission also observed that the shuttle bus continued operating between the entry-exit checkpoint and the broken section of the bridge.

Other disengagement areas[3]

Positioned at the western edge of Kalynove-Borshchuvate, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km north-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), but within its 5km periphery.

Positioned at the northern edge of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard two explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area near Petrivske, but within its 5km periphery.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

1 August

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) at a compound in Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske, 42km south-east of Donetsk) and
• three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in a training area near Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

1 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) at a compound near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

1 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• ten tanks (T-72) and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk) and
• three tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Svobodne in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

2 August

The SMM saw:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) on the western edge of Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• three IFVs (BTR-4) equipped with anti-missile cages in a residential area of Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk);
• at least two IFVs (BMP-1) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BMP-1) at the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote.

Non-government-controlled areas

1 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP variant) and five armoured combat vehicles in Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck in a compound in the eastern outskirts of Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). Positioned near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), Kamianka and Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 110 ceasefire violations, including 39 undetermined explosions, assessed as near the DFS and the pumping station in Vasylivka.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• Eight armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM entry into a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, citing the need of pre-approved permission to enter the site.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On eight occasions, on the evening and night of 1-2 August, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over government- and non-government controlled areas of Donetsk region.[5]
• SMM mini-UAVs experienced signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, on four occasions while flying over areas near Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk), on one occasion over Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), and on one occasion over Novohnativka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk).[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4]           The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position.