Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 22 March 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The SMM observed damage to functioning schools in Holmivskyi and Donetsk city.
- The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
- The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas.
- It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission observed long queues of people, up to 1,500, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas and elsewhere, including near non-government-controlled Zaichenko.
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, however more explosions (about 275), compared with the previous reporting period (about 190 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at north-westerly and north-easterly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), at south-easterly and north-easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) (including 122 explosions), as well as at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 380 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 700 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded north and north-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk) (230 explosions), as well as in and near the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).
Damage to functioning schools in Donetsk City and Holmivskyi
In the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of the city centre) at 1 Samarska Street, the SMM saw a fresh impact (15cm hole) 30cm above ground in the north-west facing side of a functioning school building, assessed as having been caused by heavy-machine-gun fire. School staff told the SMM that shooting had occurred on 21 March in the early morning, and that pupils had been in attendance at the time, but refused to answer any further questions without permission from senior members of the armed formations.
At 13 Shkilnyi Avenue in Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed a 1cm hole and several cracks in the second-floor window on the northern side of a functioning school. As the SMM was not allowed to enter the school, it could not assess the type of weapon or the direction of fire. School staff told the Mission that the damage had been caused by a bullet in the late afternoon of 20 March and that there had been no pupils in the school at the time. The school staff member added that, according to instructions received from senior members of the armed formations, they were neither allowed to let the SMM enter the school nor to talk to the SMM.
Disengagement areas[2]
During the evening of 21 March, the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded 11 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 0.7-2km north-west, all assessed as inside the disengagement area, as well as 22 impact explosions at an assessed range of 1.5-3km north-west (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area).
Positioned at several locations near the Zolote disengagement area during the day of 23 March, the SMM heard 74 undetermined explosions, as well as 20 shots of small arms fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
Weapons in violation
Government-controlled areas
22 March
The SMM saw two anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:
Non-government-controlled areas
21 March
An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a tank (T-64) near Lutuhyne (20km south-west of Luhansk).
An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (T-64) and five mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).
Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[3]
At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region
22 March
The SMM noted that six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), one towed howitzer (2A65 MSTA-B, 152mm) and 12 mortars (11 PM-38, 120mm and one 2B11, Sani, 120mm) were again missing.
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]
Government-controlled areas
21 March
An SMM long-range UAV spotted two armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).
22 March
The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (Kozak) in Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
22 March
The SMM saw:
- two infantry fighting vehicles (BMP variant) in Boikivske (67km south-east of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.
Presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Donetsk City
The SMM observed, for the first time, two pieces of UXO, assessed as MLRS (BM-21) rockets, partially hidden in shrubbery in soft ground on the northern side of Stratonavtiv Street in a residential area in non-government-controlled Kyivskyi district of Donetsk city, 25m apart from each other. The Mission did not observe any fencing or mine hazard signs near the UXO.
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the high voltage Mykhailivka-Almazna power line near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).
The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).
Situation at entry-exit checkpoints
At the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw around 450 people queuing to exit and around 1,000 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. A Ukrainian State Border Guard Service officer told the SMM that the increase was due to the fact that some people believed that the entry-exit checkpoint would be closed for ten days starting from 25 March. He said that he was not aware of any such plans. At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed around 500 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and around 150 people queuing in the opposite direction. At the same checkpoint, a member of the armed formations told the SMM that the increase in people was due to the fact that some people believed that the exit-entry checkpoint would be closed on 25 March.
The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 22 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
- At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) two armed members of armed formations again denied the SMM passage to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “risks to the security of the SMM”.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
- North of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place in the past 24 hours and that the road south of the bridge was still mined.
Other impediments:
- At a school in the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of city centre) school staff told the SMM that it needed prior permission from senior members of the armed formations to talk to the school staff (see above).
- At a school in Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) school staff told the SMM that, according to instructions received from senior members of the armed formations, the staff were neither allowed to let the SMM enter the school nor to talk to the SMM (see above).
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that three such sites continued to be abandoned.
[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.