Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 5 November 2015

This Report is for the media and the general public

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”, including the Addendum. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. The SMM observed explosions and gunfire from its position at Donetsk railway station. Once again, “LPR” members prevented the SMM from accessing border areas not controlled by the Government in Luhansk region, in violation of both the SMM mandate and the Minsk Addendum.

Positioned 6km north-west of Donetsk, the SMM heard 18 explosions, as well as an exchange of small-arms and heavy machine-gun fire from locations 3-5km to the north, west, and north-west[1].

Following up on information supplied by a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer attached to the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) about alleged shelling the previous night in government-controlled Pisky (11km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed a fresh impact crater in the town. Following crater analysis, the SMM assessed that it had been caused by a 30mm automatic grenade launcher round, fired from the south, most probably from “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)”-controlled Volvo Centre area (9km west-north-west of Donetsk). While at the scene – just under half an hour – the SMM heard numerous explosions caused by incoming fire, accompanied by sporadic small-arms fire, south of Pisky.

Positioned in government-controlled Myrne (40km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard several explosions at locations to the south-east. The SMM assessed they had been part of training exercises in government-controlled Urzuf (40km west-south-west of Mariupol). A Ukrainian Armed Forces representative to the JCCC in Mariupol had earlier informed the SMM that such training would take place.

Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol), the SMM heard several loud explosions to the north-west. Residents told the SMM that the explosions were part of training exercises taking place near “DPR”-controlled Markyne (49km east-north-east of Mariupol).

Positioned near government-controlled Trokhizbenka (33km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard small-arms and heavy machine-gun fire, and a number of loud explosions, which it assessed to have occurred at a known training ground in the area.

In “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled Diakove (70km south of Luhansk), an “LPR” “border guard” “commander” did not allow the SMM to proceed to “LPR”-controlled Chervonyi Zhovten (82km south of Luhansk) on the Ukraine-Russian Federation border*. He said written permission from the “LPR” “ministry of state security” was required.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed: four howitzers (2A36 152mm) in the area of government-controlled Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk); 20 main battle tanks close to a training ground in the area of “LPR”-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk); and, nine self-propelled howitzers (122mm 2S1 Gvozdika) close to a training ground in the area of “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk). In all instances, the SMM was unable to check serial numbers on the weapons to verify their withdrawal in accordance with the Minsk Package of measures or its Addendum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in the area of government-controlled Borivske (65km north-west of Luhansk).

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, the SMM revisited four Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent weapons storage sites whose locations corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines. At the first site, serial numbers on two weapons did not match when compared to the previously-provided inventory, and two previously-recorded weapons were missing. At the second site, the serial numbers on seven weapons did not match with those provided in the inventory, and one weapon was missing. At the third site, the serial numbers on two weapons did not match with those provided in the inventory. At the fourth site, the serial number on one weapon did not match with that provided in the inventory. At an additional Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent weapons storage site – which the SMM visited for the first time – the serial numbers of the weapons present – which the SMM had earlier that day monitored being transported from the contact line – matched those in the previously-provided inventory.

The SMM visited one “DPR” permanent weapons storage site whose location corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines. The serial numbers of the weapons present – which the SMM had earlier that day monitored being transported from the contact line – matched those in the previously-provided inventory.

At the administrative boundary line (ABL) crossing point at Chonhar (162km south-east of Kherson), a Ukrainian Armed Forces commander told the SMM that his unit had shot down an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) close to the ABL on 30 October. He said after noting the UAV the previous few days flying at an altitude of 2,000-2,500m over areas close to Henichesk (177km south-east of Kherson), he had received an order to shoot it down.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Chernivtsi, Lviv and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. “LPR” members continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring many areas close to the border with the Russian Federation in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.

Denial:

• In “LPR”-controlled Diakove (70km south of Luhansk), an “LPR” “border guard” “commander” refused to allow the SMM to proceed to Chervonyi Zhovten on the Ukraine-Russian Federation border.
• Close to government-controlled Hranitne (47km north-east of Mariupol), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel refused to allow the SMM to proceed further north, saying the road ahead was cratered and mined.
• An SMM UAV experienced heavy dual GPS jamming over government-controlled areas, forcing it to return to base.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.