Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 2 November 2015

This Report is for the media and the general public

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”, including the Addendum. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. The SMM observed an intense exchange of fire around Donetsk airport. The situation in Luhansk region remained relatively calm with no firing incidents recorded. For the first time over seven months, the SMM could reach a border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne, despite several restrictions to its freedom of movement, including denial access to a certain location.

At the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) observation post at Donetsk railway station (“Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard a thirty-minute lasting intense exchange of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, as well as two explosions (one undetermined and another caused by an 82mm mortar round) 4-5km north-north-west of its position – assessed to be areas of government-controlled Butovka mine and “DPR”-controlled Spartak (12 and 10km north-west of Donetsk, respectively) [1]. Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Spartak, the SMM also heard intense small-arms fire 1.2km north-north-west of its position.

The chief of Volnovakha district police told the SMM that earlier in the day a 62-year-old woman had been killed by a trip wire explosion while walking on the roadside near a checkpoint in government-controlled Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk). Employees of the regional morgue confirmed a fatality at the checkpoint to the SMM, adding that the body had not yet been delivered to the morgue.  

In Luhansk region the situation remained relatively calm with no firing incidents recorded by the SMM.

In government-controlled Svatove (127km north-west of Luhansk), from a temporary checkpoint approximately 200m east of an ammunition depot which exploded on 29 October (see SMM Daily Report 31 October), the SMM observed that ten demining team personnel were on-site – Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel prevented the SMM from reaching the location, citing security concerns. The SMM also saw 20-30 depleted combustion chambers of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) in the surrounding area. On the way to government-controlled Milovatka (120km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM noticed tens of exploded and unexploded fragments of MLRS rockets in the surrounding fields at distances between 500m and 5km from the ammunition depot. In Milovatka, a female resident (in her sixties) told the SMM that the explosion had disrupted the gas supply to the village, but it had been restored on the previous day.

On the “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled side of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM continued to facilitate electrical repair work and observed adherence to exchanged security guarantees for the repair work (see SMM Daily Report on 27 October). The SMM observed that Luhansk Energy Association company was felling trees to access and repair electrical pylons east of the bridge.

The SMM could reach the Ukraine-Russian Federation border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne (53km south-east of Luhansk) for the first time since March 2015. Meanwhile, between “LPR”-controlled Krasnodon (43km south-east of Luhansk) and Izvaryne, three individual groups respectively stopped and/or delayed the SMM for a total of 40 minutes, as well as “LPR” “border guards” demanded to escort the SMM vehicles and denied its access to “LPR”-controlled Korolivka (59km south-east of Luhansk)*. At the crossing point staffed by “LPR” “border guards”, the SMM observed a new layer of asphalt on the road and around 50 civilian vehicles, three trucks and three buses – with Ukrainian and Russian Federation car licence plates –   waiting to enter the Russian Federation.

In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, in the Donetsk region, the SMM revisited three Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent weapons storage sites whose locations corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines. At all three sites, the SMM found all previously-recorded weapons present.

The SMM has made an attempt to visit two “DPR” permanent weapons storage sites at the co-ordinates provided with the inventory, but it was unable to locate them.

In Luhansk region, the SMM revisited two Ukrainian Armed Forces and two “LPR” permanent weapons storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines, and found all weapons previously recorded present.

The SMM revisited seven Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas, whose locations corresponded with respective withdrawal lines. The SMM noted that weapons were absent from four out of seven areas. The SMM observed that two towed howitzers (152mm 2A65 Msta-B) were absent at one area and one towed howitzer (152mm 2A65 Msta-B) was absent at the second area. At the third and fourth areas, seven and five MLRS (122mm BM-21 Grad) respectively had previously been recorded as absent in July and September respectively.

The SMM also revisited four “DPR” heavy weapons holding areas, whose locations corresponded with respective withdrawal lines. The SMM noted that weapons were absent from two out of four areas. The SMM observed that one anti-tank gun (100mm MT-12 Rapira) was absent at one area, and two (MLRS) (122mm BM-21 Grad) were absent at the second area.

In areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed 20 main battle tanks (MBTs) in training ground in "LPR"-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk). The SMM was unable to check serial numbers to verify the withdrawal of weapons in accordance with the Minsk package.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed one howitzer (122mm D-30) towed by a military-type truck in the area of “LPR”-controlled Luhansk city, moving west. Likewise, the SMM unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) observed five self-propelled howitzers (122mm 2S1 Gvozdika) in the area of “DPR”-controlled Rodnykove (70km north-east of Mariupol).

The UAVs spotted 14 MBTs in the area of government-controlled Hranitne (27km north of Mariupol) beyond the respective withdrawal lines.

The SMM spoke to the Head of the Dnepropetrovsk Forensic Bureau to follow up on information received from a Ukrainian Armed Forces commander about the death of a soldier on 30 October during an alleged firing incident in government-controlled Pisky (11km north-west of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 31 October). The interlocutor confirmed to the SMM that the soldier had been killed in the said incident, adding that he had died of multiple gunshot wounds to the thorax. 

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kharkiv, Odessa, Kherson, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. Armed individuals continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring most areas close to the border with the Russian Federation in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.

Denied access:

• At a checkpoint in government-controlled Berdianske (18km east of Mariupol), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel did not allow the SMM to proceed further.
• “LPR” “border guards” escorting the SMM prevented it from proceeding to “LPR”-controlled Korolivka (59km south-east of Luhansk), citing activities of the “border guard” in that area.

Delayed access:

• While driving on the M04 highway from to “LPR”-controlled Krasnodon to Izvaryne, at two separate locations, three separate groups stopped and/or delayed the SMM for a total of 40 minutes. An “LPR” “customs officer” stopped the SMM at a checkpoint close to “LPR”-controlled Uralo-Kavkaz (45km south-east of Luhansk). Subsequently, two “LPR” “border guards” – driving a vehicle with Russian Federation licence plates from the direction of Krasnodon – arrived and asked whether the SMM had special permission to access the border zone. Following a five-minute drive from the checkpoint toward Izvaryne, the escorting “LPR” “border guards” stopped the SMM and shortly after, two men in civilian clothes – driving a vehicle with Russian Federation license plates from the direction of Izvaryne – approached and showed “LPR” “ministry of state security” “IDs”. They allowed the SMM to proceed further after they received a phone call.

Conditional access:

• At one “DPR” heavy weapon holding area, armed individuals delayed the SMM for 50 minutes and allowed only two SMM members to access the area.
• At a checkpoint close to “LPR”-controlled Uralo-Kavkaz, “LPR” “border guards” allowed the SMM to proceed to the “LPR”-controlled border zone along the Ukraine-Russian Federation border on condition of accepting an escort.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.