Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 27 October 2015

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”, including the Addendum. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. There was an increase in fighting around the area of Donetsk airport. Luhansk region remained relatively calm. The SMM observed civilians crossing the bridge in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska. An “LPR” “border guard” prevented the SMM from visiting the border zone.

The SMM heard over 20 explosions, anti-aircraft and small-arms fire between 08:03 and 16:07hrs[1] - the vast majority of which occurred at locations north-west of its position at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) observation post at “Donetsk People’s Republic”-controlled Donetsk railway station, 6km north-west of Donetsk).[2] At the JCCC observation post, the SMM saw that Ukrainian Armed Forces officers were absent. According to the Ukrainian Armed Forces officers at the JCCC headquarters (HQ) in government-controlled Soledar (77km north-east of Donetsk), they had left the night before due to security concerns. At the JCCC HQ, the Russian Federation Armed Forces Chief of Staff informed the SMM that the Russian Federation JCCC officer at Donetsk airport was withdrawn from that location during the night due to security concerns.

Due to the SMM’s security concerns (explosions and small-arms fire at Donetsk airport), the SMM could not reach nearby “DPR”-controlled Spartak (10km north-west of Donetsk) to verify reports of overnight shelling.

The overall situation in Luhansk region remained relatively calm. Whilst in Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard over 60 explosions at a distance approximately 10km to the north-west. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer at the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska attributed this to training in government-controlled Petrivka (27km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed civilians crossing the bridge at government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) between “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled and government-controlled areas for the first time since March 2015. The bridge was reopened following SMM facilitation of the partial repair and mine clearance of the bridge and adjacent roads in recent days (see SMM press release 27 October 2015). On the “LPR”-controlled side, the SMM saw over 50 people waiting to cross. Later, the SMM saw 200 people arriving on the government-controlled side. The SMM saw the Ukrainian Border Guard Service conducting a three-stage check at the first checkpoint: one for explosives by canine units, another by fiscal officers, and an identification check. Over a one-hour period, the SMM observed nine people having documents checked, as the queue grew to over 300 people. Government checkpoint personnel blamed delays on the first day of reopening and on using a new system, adding that they expected speedier processing times in the coming days.

At the “LPR”-controlled Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) checkpoint at the Ukraine-Russian Federation border, a “border guard” told the SMM to leave*.

At one Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding area, whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, the SMM observed all previously-recorded weapons were present.

The SMM revisited three “DPR” heavy weapons holding areas whose locations corresponded with the respective withdrawal lines. At two holding areas, all previously-recorded weapons were present. The third area was abandoned, with the one remaining weapon (100mm, MT-12 Rapira) the SMM observed on 24 October, now absent (see SMM Daily Report 26 October 2015). The area previously held six howitzers (122mm, D-30) and two (100mm, MT-12 Rapira) in total.

A Ukrainian Armed Forces commander at a checkpoint west of government-controlled Orikhove Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk) confirmed to the SMM on 27 October that the road connecting government-controlled Muratove (50km north-west of Luhansk) and Orikhove Donetske remains closed to civilians by Ukrainian Armed Forces due to security concerns. Two elderly men, who had spoken to the SMM on 25 October in nearby government-controlled Kriakivka (37km north-west of Luhansk), confirmed the closure, and said that residents now face long journeys on alternative routes.

The “head” of “city council” in “LPR”-controlled Irmino (54km west of Luhansk) and two male residents, who spoke to the SMM, said there was a lack of coal in the village.

In government-controlled areas, in violation of respective withdrawal lines, the SMM observed: four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS, Grad BM-21) in the area of Chabanivka (64km north-west of Luhansk) previously observed on 25 October, stationary and covered with camouflage; four stationary howitzers (Akatsiya, 152mm calibre) in the area of Popasna (68km north-west of Luhansk) previously observed on 25 October, (see SMM Daily Report 26 October 2015); and a convoy of six military trucks transporting three howitzers (Akatsiya, 152mm) near Novookhtyrka (46km north-west of Luhansk) moving in the direction of government-controlled Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk).

In areas beyond the withdrawal lines, in “DPR”–controlled Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) the SMM observed 45 main battle tanks (MBT) (T-64 and T-72), previously observed on 24 October (see SMM Daily Report 26 October 2015).

At a training area beyond withdrawal lines, in the area of “LPR”-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw nine howitzers (D-30, 122mm calibre), down from 12 observed on 24 October (see SMM Daily Report 26 October 2015), ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm calibre), three MBTs (type could not be identified due to distance) and five military-type trucks all in static positions. In the area of “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed what was assessed as a training exercise involving seven MBTs (T-64), three communications trucks and eight additional military-type trucks. In the area of “LPR”-controlled Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk), in an area that has been used for training purposes, the SMM observed 12 MBTs (T-64) in static positions.

In Chernivtsi city the SMM observed a protest of approximately 200 people (90% men, aged 25-50) organized by the Ridne Misto political party. The party leader and mayoral candidate – who according to exit polls should take part in the second round of elections – said the demonstration was in protest against a police search of the home of a party member who is also a deputy in the city council. He alleged the search was politically motivated. Three police were present at the protest. At a press conference, ministry of the interior representatives confirmed the search had taken place as part of an investigation into alleged election-related fraud.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, Kherson, Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. Armed individuals continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring most areas close to the border with the Russian Federation in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.

Denied access:

At the “LPR”-controlled Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) checkpoint at the Ukraine-Russian Federation border, a “border guard” took pictures of the SMM patrol leader’s identification documents and the patrol plan and told the SMM to wait until a “special unit” would escort the SMM to “LPR”-controlled Krasnodon (43km south-east of Luhansk). After some phone calls, the “LPR” “border guard” told the SMM to leave.

[1] All time references are on Kyiv time unless otherwise specified.

[2] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate”.