Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine, based on information received as of 19:30hrs, 8 October 2015

This report is for the media and general public.

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”. The SMM verified the withdrawal of some tanks in the Luhansk region, as stipulated in the Addendum to the Package of measures. Its monitoring was restricted by the parties and security considerations*. The situation in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions was relatively calm, although the SMM heard several explosions.  

Positioned 8km north-west of “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard two explosions 5-7km to the north-north-west and west-north-west at 11:55 and 11:58hrs, respectively. Seven kilometres north-west of the city centre, the SMM – between 11:48 and 12:37hrs – heard 12 explosions emanating from a location 5-7km away[1].

Positioned 2km west of “Lugansk People’s Republic” (“LPR”)-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard what it assessed to be 20-30 outgoing 122mm artillery rounds. The SMM estimated that the firing had emanated from an “LPR” combat training ground 1km to the south-east.

The SMM revisited all Ukrainian Armed Forces storage sites in the Luhansk region to which tanks had been withdrawn as stipulated in the Addendum. All tanks previously recorded were present.

The SMM revisited two “DPR” heavy weapons holding areas whose locations corresponded with respective withdrawal lines. The SMM noted at the first holding area that six anti-tank guns (100mm MT-12 Rapira) – missing since 12 August – remained missing. At the second holding area, one previously-recorded self-propelled artillery piece (122mm 2S1 Gvozdika) was missing. The SMM was prevented from verifying the serial numbers of the seven weapons remaining:* five self-propelled howitzers (122mm 2S1 Gvozdika) and two anti-tank guns (100mm MT-12 Rapira). The SMM attempted to revisit four Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas. It found that three of them were abandoned. Previously, the SMM had recorded five 2S3 Akatsiya 152mm self-propelled artillery pieces, four 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer pieces, and four MT-12 Rapira 100mm anti-tank guns, respectively. Observing that the unpaved approach road to the fourth holding area had been unused for some time, the SMM assessed the risk of mines as high, did not enter the area and therefore could not ascertain if the four 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzers previously recorded there were present.

In areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in the Luhansk region, the SMM observed the following military hardware: one main battle tank (MBT) in the area of government-controlled Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk); one MBT in the area of  government-controlled Sievierodonetsk (74km west of Luhansk); five tracked infantry fighting vehicles (IFV - BMP-2) in the area of government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km north-west of Luhansk); an additional IFV (BMP-2) mounted with an anti-tank guided missile system (9K111 Fagot) in the area of government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km north-west of Luhansk); a stand-alone anti-tank guided missile system (9K111 Fagot) in the area of government-controlled Novotoshkivske (53km north-west of Luhansk); nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1, 122mm Gvozdika) in the area of  "LPR"-controlled Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk); and, 22 MBTs (T-64) in the area of "LPR"-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

In addition, an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle spotted – in violation of respective withdrawal line – three MBTs close to “DPR”-controlled Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

In “LPR”-controlled Sverdlovsk (61km south-east of Luhansk), an “LPR” “commander” told the SMM that three “LPR” members had been injured in mine incidents in the past two weeks, each losing a leg as a result.

Near “LPR”-controlled Obozne (18km north of Luhansk), the SMM facilitated and monitored a window of silence on 7 and 8 October, during which the Luhansk Electricity Company Network conducted repair work on power lines. The lines provide electricity to more than 80,000 people in "LPR"-controlled areas. Repair work will continue for another two weeks.

In “LPR”-controlled Molodohvardiisk (35km south-east of Luhansk) on 7 October, the manager of an internally displaced persons (IDP) centre currently housing 47 people told the SMM that many IDPs previously living there had returned home; those remaining, she said had done so because their houses had been damaged. A number of IDPs from government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and government-controlled Artemivsk (67km north-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that they would only return home in the event of a lasting peace. They added that they were concerned about the possible reception they might receive upon returning home because they had settled in an “LPR”-controlled area.

At the Kalanchak and Chaplynka crossing points (77 and 70km south-east of Kherson, respectively) on the administrative boundary line with Crimea, district police and the border guard shift commander, respectively, told the SMM on 7 October that many drivers passing through the checkpoints had both officially and unofficially complained about activists searching their vehicles. Activists at both crossing points told the SMM that drivers generally agreed to have their vehicles searched. The border guard shift commander at Kalanchak told the SMM on 7 October that four drivers attempting to cross the administrative boundary line had the previous day refused to allow activists to search their vehicles. He said in one instance, activists had smashed the rear window of one car. A Right Sector member confirmed the allegation to the SMM but claimed the action had come after the car had driven over an activist’s foot.

Corroborating earlier media reports, a police spokesperson in Lviv told the SMM that an explosion – causing no injuries – had occurred at the Polish consulate in Lviv on the night of 7 October. The SMM noted no damage at the consulate.

An IDP from Donbas – and a member of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community – told the SMM on 7 October in Lviv that members of the LGBT community in areas not controlled by the government were persecuted, forcing them either to hide their identity or flee the area. He added that in Lviv he hides his sexual orientation to avoid discrimination.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Odessa, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by the parties and security considerations, including mine threats, damaged infrastructure, and the unpredictability of the situation in Donbas. Armed individuals continue to prevent the SMM from monitoring most areas close to the border with the Russian Federation in parts of Luhansk region not controlled by the Government.

Denied access:

• “DPR” members at a heavy weapons holding area only allowed the SMM to observe weapons from a distance of approximately 15-20m, thereby preventing the SMM from verifying the weapons’ serial numbers.

Other impediments:

• All UAV flights were exposed to heavy video and data jamming over “DPR”-controlled areas east and north-east of Mariupol and north of Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol).

[1] For a complete breakdown of incidents, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.