Latest from OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine based on information received as of 19:30 (Kyiv time), 24 July 2015

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM monitored the implementation of the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements”. Its monitoring was restricted by third parties and security considerations*. Fighting continued at and around Donetsk airport and in areas to the east and north-east of Mariupol. The SMM observed weapons’ movements in “Lugansk People’s Republic”- and in government-controlled areas, in violation of respective withdrawal lines.

While at the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination (JCCC) observation point at “Donetsk People’s Republic” (“DPR”)-controlled central railway station (8km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed 64 incoming and outgoing explosions in areas approximately 4 to 8km north, north-east, south, south-west and north-west of the SMM’s position.[1]. From an observation point in government-controlled Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol) the SMM heard small-arms fire, automatic grenade launcher (AGL) and 120mm mortar rounds (mostly outgoing) fired 4 to 6km north and north-east of its position. Near government-controlled Lebedynske (16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard outgoing 120mm mortar rounds fired 2km south-east of their position, as well as small-arms fire and AGL, from an area 4 to 5km north of its position.

Residents in Kominternove (23km north-east of Mariupol) told the SMM the village was shelled on the night of 20 July. The SMM analysed a crater in the village and assessed it as likely to have been caused by an 82mm mortar shell fired from an east-north-east direction. The SMM saw shrapnel impacts on walls and broken windows at the location.

In government-controlled Novohorodske (35km north-east of Donetsk) at approximately 12:30 on 24 July, the SMM observed a residential building on fire, said by Ukrainian Armed Forces JCCC officers at the scene to have been caused by recent shelling. Ukraine Armed Forces personnel were working to extinguish the fire. The SMM spoke to the three elderly people residing in the building, none of whom were injured. The SMM noted that the building was close to Ukrainian Armed Forces positions.

In Luhansk, the situation was relatively calm, though the SMM - in an area 9km west of government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) - did hear explosions and small-arms fire coming from an area 7-10km to the south-west.

The SMM met with residents (eight men and women, ranging from middle-aged to elderly) of “LPR”-controlled Partizanka (50km south-east of Luhansk), who told the SMM that much-needed medicines and medical services were not available in the village. They added that the availability of goods in stores has increased slightly over the last two months, with products coming from the Russian Federation, though high prices make these goods almost unaffordable for local residents.

In “LPR”-controlled Alchevsk (40km south-east of Luhansk), the chief engineer of the iron and steel works factory told the SMM that production had restarted one week ago following suspension in August 2014. According to him, it produces 10-20% of its pre-August 2014 output and has 12,500 staff, half of whom work part-time.

The SMM revisited seven Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas. At three sites, all weapons previously recorded were missing. At two other sites, the SMM could access the sites but was not allowed to observe the presence of weapons*. Four weapons, previously recorded at another site, were missing. At another site, two weapons previously recorded were missing.

In “LPR”-controlled areas, the SMM observed approximately 20 main battle tanks (MBT) (T-64, 125mm calibre) at an “LPR” training area between Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) and Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk). The SMM - having previously observed the site (see SMM Daily Report 4 July) - assessed the training area to be expanding geographically.

The SMM observed the following weapons’ movements and presence in areas that are in violation of respective withdrawal lines. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw four MBTs (T-72), two of which were of 125mm calibre.

In Odessa, the SMM monitored a rally at the regional police headquarters of 25 anti-Maidan demonstrators (mostly women, aged between 30 and 65 years), many of whom are relatives of those killed during the events of 2 May 2014. They demanded police protection at court from what they claimed was abuse by pro-Maidan groups. The proceedings concern the prosecution of a defendant for the 2 May 2014 events. Later, at a hearing at the aforementioned court, the SMM observed police escort ten anti-Maidan activists past an assembled (though peaceful) crowd of 40 pro-Maidan activists (aged from 20-50 years, 40% women).

The SMM went to a branch of Ukrinbank in central Kyiv following media reports of an explosion. The SMM observed an impact to the building and damage to windows assessed by the SMM to have been likely caused by a rifle grenade.

The SMM continued to monitor the situation in Kharkiv, Dnepropetrovsk, Kherson, Chernivtsi, Ivano-Frankivsk and in Lviv.

* Restrictions on SMM monitoring, access and freedom of movement:

The SMM is restrained in fulfilling its monitoring functions by restrictions imposed by third parties and security considerations, including the presence – and lack of information on the whereabouts – of mines, and damaged infrastructure. The security situation in Donbas is fluid and unpredictable and the ceasefire does not hold everywhere. Self-imposed restrictions on movement into high-risk areas have impinged on SMM patrolling activities, particularly in areas not controlled by the government. Most areas along the Ukraine-Russian Federation international border, particularly those controlled by the “LPR”, have ordinarily been placed off limits to the SMM. SMM UAVs cannot operate in the Luhansk region as it is beyond their range.

Denied access:

At two Ukrainian Armed Forces heavy weapons holding areas, the SMM was given access to the sites but was prevented from observing whether any weapons, previously recorded at these locations, remained on site.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the attached table.