Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 9 August 2019

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed damage from gunfire at a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM saw that demining works continued inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs to water pipelines and electric lines.
• The SMM saw people in queue and others holding “LPR passports” in Alchevsk.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued, including at non-government-controlled checkpoints near Verkhnoshyrokivske and Staromykhailivka.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (35), compared with the previous reporting period (14 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), in areas south-west of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), including up to 1km north-east of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), and at south-westerly and westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).  

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations (and no explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions). All ceasefire violations were recorded inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Damage from gunfire at a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 8 August , at 3 Myru Street, in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM again observed damage to the three-storey brick building of a functioning school. The Mission saw two holes in two west-facing windows – one located on the first floor, the other located on the top floor. It also saw scratches on the wallpaper and a hole in the concrete wall opposite of the first window as well as a hole in the concrete wall and a scratch on the wooden door frame opposite of the second window, all assessed as the ricochets of two bullets. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by small-arms rounds. The nearest positions of the armed formations are located around 700m north of the school; it is the twelfth time that the Mission has reported on damage at this school since the beginning of the year.

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 8 and 9 August, between 18:30 and 18:45, the Mission heard four explosions, assessed as controlled detonations of explosive devices, near the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk). These explosions occurred after the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) outside the disengagement area and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (inside the disengagement area) had been closed (at 18:00).

On 9 August, the SMM saw 11 deminers of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine conducting demining activities on both sides of the road, about 100m north of the broken section of the bridge. About 50m north of the northern edge of the broken section, the Mission also saw a truck full of rocks, a steam roller and a vehicle with 15 workers widening the pavement of the road leading to the bridge with asphalt.

The SMM saw at least six deminers from non-government-controlled areas clearing vegetation and conducting demining activities in areas west of the southern wooden ramp on the broken section of the bridge. It also saw a senior member of the armed formations and two others wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.[2]

During the same day, the SMM saw that pedestrians continued crossing the bridge without interruption. The Mission also observed that the shuttle bus continued operating between the EECP and the broken section of the bridge.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the evening and night of 8-9 August, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two bursts, two illumination flares, two muzzle flashes and 20 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to east), all at an assessed range of 1.5-4km south-east and south-south-east (all assessed as inside the disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

9 August

The SMM saw seven self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

7 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• eight multiple launch rocket systems in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) and
• four self-propelled howitzers in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).

8 August

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

9 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (T-64) and a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) at a compound in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

The SMM saw three towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

7 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 21 tanks and a surface-to-air missile system in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) and
• 21 tanks in a training area near Kruhlyk (see above).

8 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 12 tanks (a T-64 and 11 T-72, including one with its barrel removed) in a training area near Shymshynivka (see above) (For previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 18 July 2019).

Other weapons observed[4]

Non-government-controlled areas

7 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 18 self-propelled howitzers or mortars and 28 towed howitzers or mortars in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

7 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• for the first time, a trench about 5km south-east of Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) (not seen in previous imagery from 19 July 2019) and
• three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (BMP-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

8 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two APCs (BTR-80) in a compound in Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk) and
• eight IFVs (five BMP-1 and three BMP-2) near Novozvanivka (see above).

9 August

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BTR-4) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Stepove (30km north-east of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) loaded on a truck near Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk);
• an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM) loaded on a truck near Artema (26km north of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

7 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of four armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) and new trench extensions (not seen in previous imagery from 7 July 2019) in a training area near Novoselivka (see above).

8 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1), two ACVs (type unknown) and an APC (MT-LB) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk);
• a probable armoured reconnaissance command vehicle (BRDM-2) near Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BTR-80) at a compound in Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

Presence of anti-tank mines and probable unexploded ordnance (UXO)

On 8 August, about 2km north-east of Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), an SMM long-range UAV again spotted nine anti-tank mines, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, laid across the western lane of dual-lane road H-21 leading to the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk). 

On 9 August, the SMM again saw 78 anti-tank mines laid across a road leading from Pisky (government-controlled, 11km north-west of Donetsk) to Lozove (non-government-controlled, 13km west of Donetsk), all assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

On the same day, the SMM saw for the first time a probable piece of UXO in the middle of an asphalt road, about 200m of a residential area in the north-western edge of Lastochkyne (government-controlled, 19km north-west of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs of water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), near Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled 16km north-east of Donetsk) as well as of power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk); and to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) as well as maintenance works to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire in order to enable a transfer of funds from non-government- to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region, related to water payments.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour and 15 minutes, the SMM saw 25 cars (six with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, 15 with “DPR” plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates and 12 pedestrians (mixed ages and gender) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 70 cars (11 with Ukrainian and 17 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 42 with “DPR” plates), 12 covered cargo trucks (four with Ukrainian and four with Belarusian licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates and 18 pedestrians (mixed ages and gender) exiting Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 15 minutes, the SMM saw a man entering Ukraine.

People apply for “LPR passports” in Alchevsk

In Alchevsk (non-government-controlled, 40km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed about 30 people (mixed ages and genders) queuing in front of a building, including a woman (35 years old) who told the Mission that she had been waiting for an hour and that only four or five applications were accepted by the office each day. A man (25 years old) told the SMM that he applies for a “passport” issued by the armed formations in order to subsequently apply for a Russian Federation passport as he has lived and worked in the Russian Federation since 2014. The SMM saw a woman (55 years old), a boy (14 years old) and three men (25-35 years old) coming out of the aforesaid building holding an “LPR passport” in their hands.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations, two visibly armed, denied the SMM passage on two separate occasions, citing an “order from their superior” and asking for “a trip ticket”.
• At a checkpoint in Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.                                                 

Other impediments:

• On the night of 8-9 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming while flying over areas near Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and Metalist (non-government-controlled, 7km north-west of Luhansk). [6]
• On 9 August, an SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference while flying over Novoselivka (government-controlled, 37km north-east of Mariupol) assessed as caused by probable jamming.6

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Petrivske was not operational.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.