Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 5 August 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
- Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Avdiivka.
- The SMM saw deminers from government- and non-government-controlled areas working inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
- It heard ceasefire violations assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area.
- The Mission saw long queues at checkpoints along the contact line.
- The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs of power lines, as well as the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a non-government-controlled checkpoint near Zaichenko.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (27) compared with the previous 24 hours (13 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (one) compared with the previous 24 hours (four explosions).
Small-arms fire assessed as directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Avdiivka
On 5 August, positioned on the eastern edge of Avdiivka, while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard 75 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 1.6km north-north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which at the time was flying in the same area. The SMM safely landed the UAV. While leaving the area, the SMM heard an additional ten shots of small-arms fire also at an assessed distance of 1.6km north-north-east of its position.*
Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area
On the morning of 5 August, the SMM saw a demining team of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine, comprised of ten people and three vehicles (including an armoured vehicle) entering the disengagement area. It observed aforesaid deminers holding prodding sticks and metal detectors and cutting vegetation, as well as conducting demining activities in areas of about 125m on both sides of the road, from the northern edge of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) towards the northern edge of the disengagement area.
On the same day, the SMM saw nine members of the armed formations, including three wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them, heading from the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge towards the broken section of the bridge.[2] During the day, the SMM saw deminers from non-government-controlled areas using prodding sticks and metal detectors in an area west of the southern wooden ramp on the broken section of the bridge and a member of the armed formations standing nearby.
On the evening of the same day, following the closure of the entry-exit checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the checkpoint of the armed formations at 18:00, the SMM heard two explosions, assessed as controlled detonation of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the vicinity of the wooden ramp on the broken section of the bridge inside the disengagement area.
Other disengagement areas[3]
On 4 August, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area and three projectiles, assessed as outside the disengagement area, but within its 5km periphery.
On 5 August, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw a freshly dug, sand-bagged position, about 170m south of its northern edge and about 1km west of its eastern edge, assessed as belonging to the armed formations. Approximately 500-700m further south-west, the SMM saw another similar freshly dug, sand-bagged position facing the aforesaid position, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Government-controlled areas
5 August
The SMM saw three multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a stationary convoy in Smolianynove (61km north-west of Luhansk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
5 August
The SMM saw five self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) loaded on rail carriages at a train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]
Government-controlled areas
5 August
The SMM saw:
- an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
- an IFV (BMP-2) near Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk);
- an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) inside a concrete shelter, under camouflage net, outside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk);
- an IFV (BMP variant) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk);
- two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); and
- an IFV (BMP variant) and an APC (BTR variant) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).
Non-government-controlled areas
1 August
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of two armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) in the eastern outskirts of Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).
Situation at checkpoints along the contact line
On 5 August, at a checkpoint on highway H-15 near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM again saw at least 350 cars queueing to travel towards government-controlled areas and at least 80 cars in the opposite direction. At a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw 60 cars queuing to travel towards non-government-controlled areas and about 100 cars and ten minivans in the opposite direction. Two women (one in her fifties and one in her seventies) told the Mission that they had been waiting to pass to government-controlled areas since 04:00.
SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure
On 5 August, the SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
- On 5 August, at a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), four armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) citing “an ongoing operation in the area”.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Delay:
- On 5 August, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again delayed the SMM passage with no specific reason provided and allowed it to proceed only after 39 minutes of waiting at the checkpoint.
Other impediments:
- While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 75 shots of small-arms fire about 1.6km north-north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely.
- On three occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).[5]
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.
[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.
[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position.