Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 25 July 2019

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw damage from small-arms fire to a shop in Dokuchaievsk, reportedly on 18 July.
• The Mission continued to monitor the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska and observed an assessment of the broken section of the bridge in preparation for future repairs.
• It saw anti-tank mines and fresh craters inside of the disengagement area near Zolote.
• The SMM saw for the first time unexploded ordnance in Nova Marivka and a remnant of a rocket-propelled grenade in Verkhnoshyrokivske.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure, including repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and Popasna.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (11), compared with the previous reporting period (32 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including nine of the explosions, were recorded in areas east of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), north of Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), and at westerly directions of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, and no explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (three explosions). Over half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east of Buhaivka (non-government-controlled, 37km south-west of Luhansk) (assessed as live-fire exercises outside of the security zone) and east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Damage from small-arms fire to a shop in Dokuchaievsk

At a shop on Lenina Street in the north-western part of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a hole in a south-south-west-facing wall, assessed as recent and caused by small-arms fire, as well as a corresponding scorch mark on the floor inside the shop. A worker at the shop (a woman in her thirties) told the SMM that she had been at work on the afternoon of 18 July when she heard shooting and left. She showed the SMM a bullet (7.62mm) that she said she had found with the damage when she returned to work the next day (for previous observations on Lenina Street, see SMM Daily Report of 17 July 2019).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 25 July, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM saw four engineers from government-controlled areas and two engineers from non-government-controlled areas convene at the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk) and inspect the bridge together, including the steel section of the bridge over the river. The engineers from government-controlled areas told the SMM that they had completed a full technical assessment of the entire bridge in preparation for future works and that there was a mutual understanding with the engineers from non-government-controlled areas about the technical requirements to repair the bridge.

On the same day, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw three Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) [2] on the northern edge of the broken section of the bridge, a senior member of the armed formations near the former forward position of the armed formations south of the broken section of the bridge, and at least eight members of the armed formations (wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them) between the former forward position and the checkpoint of the armed formations inside the disengagement area. On the afternoon of the same day, at the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP), the SMM observed about 1000 people (mixed ages and genders) queuing to enter government-controlled areas. Five women (in their seventies) told the SMM that they had been queuing to enter government-controlled areas for 3-4 hours.

Outside of the disengagement area, the SMM camera near the Prince Ihor Monument (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded a vehicle with “JCCC” written on the sides and hood transporting over 50 mine hazard signs.

On the evening and night of 24-25 July, while in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 24 July, positioned on the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers walk into the disengagement area. A senior official of the Ukrainian Armed Forces told the SMM that the soldiers were conducting a visual inspection of the T-1316 road. About an hour later, the SMM saw the three soldiers exit the disengagement area. On the same day, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw for the first time three anti-tank mines in vegetation about 5m west of the road between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations, as well as an 82mm mortar tailfin embedded in the ground on the eastern edge of the road. About 1km north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM saw five craters on the T-1316 road and four on the western side of the road, assessed as fresh and caused by 120mm mortar rounds. About 350m north of the checkpoint, the SMM again saw a spool wire stretched across the T-1316 road, rendering the road impassable. For the first time, near the spool wire, the SMM spotted a mine hazard sign and blue tape on a tree about 4m north-east of the road.

On the evening and night of 24 July, the SMM camera on the northern edge of Popasna recorded five projectiles in flight at an assessed distance of 2-4km east-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. During the day on 25 July, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two shots of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 1km north-north-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[4]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

24 July

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a probable armoured combat vehicle (ACV) near Vodiane (19km north-east of Mariupol).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted 12 armoured personnel carriers (APC) (11 probable BTR-70 and a BTR-60) in Avdiivka.

25 July

The SMM saw:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and
• seven IFVs (BMP-1) on the northern outskirts of Popasna.

Non-government-controlled areas

25 July

The SMM saw two APCs (MT-LB) on the southern outskirts of Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Nova Marivka and remnant of exploded rocket-propelled grenade in Verkhnoshyrokivske

In Nova Marivka (non-government-controlled, 64km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time an unburned 12.7mm incendiary round laying in the middle of the main road about 10m north of a residential house.

On the same day, on a road west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw for the first time a remnant of an exploded rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) lying in the centre of the road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna and near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, to a water pipeline near the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk, to electrical infrastructure near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk), and to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about two hours, the SMM saw 37 cars (nine with Ukrainian, ten with Russian Federation, one with Georgian, and one with Lithuanian licence plates, as well as 16 with “DPR” plates), one refrigerator truck and one milk tanker truck (with Ukrainian licence plates), four buses (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “DPR” plates), and six pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 13 cars (five with Ukrainian, four with Russian Federation, and one with Lithuanian licence plates, as well as three with “DPR” plates) and 23 pedestrians (three females, mixed ages, and 20 males, aged 35-55) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report of 20 July 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), on two occasions, an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “demining activities” on both occasions.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On five occasions, SMM mini-UAVs experienced signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying over areas near Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol), and Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).
• On the evening of 24 July, an SMM long-range UAV experienced signal interference on two occasions while flying over Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk), once assessed as caused by jamming and once assessed as caused by probable jamming.  The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over Petrivka (government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk). [6]    

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.