Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 7 June 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
- The SMM recorded an undetermined explosion inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.
- It saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near residential houses in Chernenko.
- The Mission saw mines near Pisky, Lozove, and Travneve, some for the first time, and unexploded ordnance in Pikuzy and near the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk.
- It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
- The SMM saw people apply for passports of the Russian Federation in Antratsyt and Dokuchaievsk.
- It monitored the announcement of a court verdict regarding the attack of Kateryna Handziuk.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The SMM’s freedom of movement was also restricted in non-government-controlled southern Donetsk region at a checkpoint near Shevchenko.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 110 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including explosions, were recorded at southerly and south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), southerly and south-easterly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), and easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (16), compared with the previous reporting period (50 explosions). Nearly all the ceasefire violations, including explosions, were recorded at southerly and easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).
Disengagement areas[2]
While in Popasna on the morning of 7 June, the SMM recorded ten bursts, four shots, and one undetermined explosion outside of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) but within 5km of its periphery.
At 22:47 on 7 June (outside the reporting period), the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) recorded one undetermined explosion at a range of 1-2km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area.
During the day on 7 June, positioned near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation. [3]
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Government-controlled areas6 June
An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) less than 50m from residential houses on the northern outskirts of Chernenko (86km south of Donetsk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:
Government-controlled areas
5 June
An SMM mini-UAV spotted six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).
6 June
An SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Kalynove (35km north of Donetsk).
An SMM mini-UAV spotted five anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) at the railway station in Rubizhne.
7 June
The SMM saw twenty tanks (T-72) at the railway station in Rubizhne.
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]
Government-controlled areas
6 June
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
- two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type undetermined) near Pervomaiske (17km north-west of Donetsk);
- two ACVs (type undetermined) near Novoselivka Druha (23km north of Donetsk); and
- an ACV near Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk).
An SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near Chernenko.
7 June
The SMM saw:
- an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
- an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Pyshchevyk; and
- a self-propelled anti-aircraft gun (ZSU-23-4 Shilka) near Lomakyne (15km north-east of Mariupol).
Non-government-controlled areas
6 June
The SMM saw a surveillance radar system (PSNR-5 Kredo, 1RL133) on the western edge of Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 3 May 2019).
Presence of mines near Pisky, Lozove and Travneve and unexploded ordnance in Pikuzy and near the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk
On 6 June, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 90 anti-tank mines laid across a road leading from Pisky (government-controlled, 11km north-west of Donetsk) to Lozove (non-government-controlled, 13km west of Donetsk) as well as in an adjacent field, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. About 1km south of the aforementioned mines, the same UAV spotted for the first time 98 anti-tank mines laid on the same road, assessed as belonging to the armed formations. On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted 30 anti-tank mines laid across a road on the southern edge of Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk).
On 6 June, the SMM again saw a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as the tailfin of a 120mm mortar round, embedded in the middle of an asphalt road used daily by civilians between the entry-exit checkpoint near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and a checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).
On 7 June, the SMM saw for the first time a piece of UXO assessed as an unexploded RPG-7 grenade embedded in an asphalt courtyard in front of the House of Culture in the centre of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol).
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure
The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, and to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).
The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
People apply for passports in Antratsyt and Dokuchaievsk
On 6 June, in Antratsyt (non-government-controlled, 55km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw about 50 people (mixed ages and genders) queuing outside of a building on Pushkina Street. A woman (about 50 years old) managing the queue told the SMM that people were queuing to apply for passports of the Russian Federation and “LPR passports.”
On 7 June, in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw four people (two women in their thirties and forties, two men in their thirties and sixties) queuing outside of a building at 19 Nezalezhnosti Ukrainy Street. They all told the SMM that they were submitting applications for “DPR passports” so they can apply for Russian Federation passports in the future.
Court verdict regarding the attack of Kateryna Handziuk
The SMM monitored the announcement of a court verdict at the District Court in Pokrovske (103km south-east of Dnipro) in the case of five defendants accused of attacking Kateryna Handziuk, a Kherson city council official and civil society activist who died on 4 November 2018. She had suffered severe injuries in a 31 July 2018 acid attack (see SMM Daily Report of 5 November 2018). The judge accepted a previously-agreed plea bargain under which the defendants pled guilty to part two of article 121 (intentional grave bodily harm, committed in a way that has a special torment or committed by a group of persons) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine, taking into account article 69 (mitigating circumstances). The judge then sentenced the defendants to prison for sentences ranging from 3 to 6.5 years.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 4 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
- At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage westward towards Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Mariupol), citing sniper activity in the area and orders from his superiors.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Other impediments:
- On two occasions, SMM mini- and mid-range UAVs experienced signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 21km south of Donetsk).
- On two occasions, SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).[5]
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ positions.