Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 23 April 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw fresh damage to a house in non-government-controlled Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and to two sheds in government-controlled Chermalyk.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw fresh craters and pieces of unexploded ordnance near Molodizhne.
• The Mission continued efforts to locate its long-range UAV that crashed near the contact line in Donetsk region on 19 April.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted near Zaichenko and near Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 160 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), at easterly, southerly and westerly directions of Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk) and south-east of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk). On the evening and night of 22-23 April, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded in total 73 ceasefire violations, including nine undetermined explosions and 24 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 0.3-1km south and south-west.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 40 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north-east, west-south-west and north-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) (see also the disengagement areas section).

 

Fresh damage to civilian properties in Chermalyk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

The SMM followed up on reports of damage to civilian properties in Chermalyk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

At 46 Naberezhna Street in Chermalyk, about 300m west from the contact line, the Mission saw several fresh marks on the south-east-facing brick wall of a shed located about 15m south of an inhabited one-storey house. It assessed the damage as fresh and caused by small-arms fire or shrapnel; however, it could not determine the direction of fire. Next to the above-mentioned shed, the SMM also saw burned remnants of another wooden shed. The Mission could not determine the cause of damage. A man (in his fifties), who introduced himself as the owner of the property, told the SMM that on the evening of 22 April, while he had been at the house, he had heard explosions and small-arms fire in the area and that afterwards he had seen that the wooden shed was on fire.

At 25 Krylova Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the Mission saw a hole in a west-facing window of a one-storey inhabited house. It assessed the damage as fresh and caused by a bullet (calibre undetermined).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 22 April, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded 13 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). During the day on 23 April, positioned 1km north of Kalynove-Borshchuvate, the Mission heard 26 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 4-5km north-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

23 April

The SMM saw a towed howitzer (type undetermined) in Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

23 April

The SMM saw that 15 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 15 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were present, and that 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) and nine tanks (T-72) continued to be missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

21 April

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a 100m-long trench (not seen in imagery from 9 January 2019), running from east to west, about 1km south of Pivdenne (formerly Leninske, 40km north-east of Donetsk), reducing the distance between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations from about 290m to 170m; as well as a 20m-long trench running from east to west (not seen in imagery from 28 October 2018) about 300m south of Pivdenne, both assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and
• an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) near Zalizne (42km north-east of Donetsk).

22 April

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an aircraft communications automatic jamming station (R-934B) near Novomykhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and
• an ACV near Chermalyk.

23 April

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Fresh impact craters and unexploded ordnance near Molodizhne

The Mission saw two fresh craters on both sides of a local road leading from Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) to the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote, about 2.5km north-east of Molodizhne and about 250m south of the disengagement area’s southern edge. The SMM observed at least ten additional fresh craters in a field 40m south-east of the road and numerous fresh craters in a field 40m north-west of the same road. It assessed the craters as caused by 82mm mortar rounds. On the road, the Mission saw two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO) embedded in the tarmac which it assessed as 82mm mortar tailfins.

Presence of mines

On 22 April, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted three rows of at least 36 anti-tank mines across road H-21 about 200m east of the bridge near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

Ongoing recovery efforts of lost SMM long-range UAV

On 21 April, the Mission flew two mid-range UAVs over areas west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and north-east of Novhorodske (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk) where its long-range UAV is assessed to have crashed on 19 April (see SMM Spot Report 19 April 2019). The SMM was unable to locate any debris from the long-range UAV.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to power lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). The SMM monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the DFS.

The SMM also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the removal of a reported piece of UXO from the yard of a house in Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk).

SMM monitoring and facilitating the distribution of coal in Travneve

The Mission continued to monitor and facilitate adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the delivery of coal disbursements by an international humanitarian organization in Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM monitored security situation south-east of Kherson region

On 21 and 22 April, the Mission observed calm situations at the crossing points between Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson), Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Coordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 23 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), and west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “mine clearance activity”. While present, the SMM saw civilian vehicles passing through the checkpoint in both directions.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM for about 35 minutes before allowing the Mission to proceed through the checkpoint into non-government-controlled areas.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]  The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.