Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 18 April 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• A man was injured due to the detonation of an explosive device in Fedorivka.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed long queues of civilians at the Stanytsia Luhanska entry exit-checkpoint.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted in non-government-controlled Shevchenko and near Novolaspa and Yasne, as well as near a border crossing point outside of government control in Leonove,  Luhansk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 110), compared with the previous reporting period (30 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and south and south-south-west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (80 explosions). More than two thirds of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east of Hannivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and the majority of explosions were recorded east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Man injured due to the detonation of an explosive device in Fedorivka

The SMM followed up on reports of a man injured on 6 April due to the detonation of an explosive device near Fedorivka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Mariupol). On 18 April, at a hospital in Mariupol, the SMM saw a man (aged 60-70) whose right hand had been amputated just above the wrist (which was covered by a bandage). He told the SMM that the explosion had occurred in the afternoon hours of 6 April as a result of the detonation of a grenade. On 8 April, medical staff at the same hospital told the SMM that the man had had surgery on 6 April during which his hand had been amputated. A police representative in Fedorivka also told the SMM that the explosive device had been assessed as a grenade. A man (aged 48) who said he had witnessed the incident said that he had found an unexploded device at an abandoned farm near the village in the afternoon of 6 April. According to the interlocutor, the two men had decided to place the unexploded device into the lake; however, when the unexploded device had not detonated, the device had been removed from the water and at that moment it had exploded.

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned on the eastern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 7-10km east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area). Positioned in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 4-6km north (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

18 April

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) in a field off a local road near Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

16 April

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), five towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122 mm) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city;
• seven MLRS (BM-21) in a compound near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 21 March 2019);
• seven MLRS (BM-21) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 9 April 2019); and
• 15 MLRS (BM-21) close to residential buildings near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 9 April 2019).

17 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted four tanks (T-64) north of Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

16 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 11 tanks (T-64), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 12 towed howitzers (D-30) in a training area near Miusynsk;
• six surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and eight tanks (T-72) at the former Luhansk international airport about 10km south of Luhansk city (see above); and
• seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 24 towed howitzers (six D-30, eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm and ten 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Khrustalnyi.

Weapons storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

18 April

The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Non-government-controlled areas

16. April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Pakhalivka (40km west of Luhansk), as well as for the first time a trench about 200m north-east of the IFV extending for about 800m north within a treeline;
• an armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) and a probable communications vehicle (type undetermined) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) and three armoured combat vehicles (types undetermined) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk); and
• two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (a BTR-80 and an MT-LB) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Luhansk city.

17 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck near Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk);
• 12 IFVs (nine BMP-1 and three probable BMP variants) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on an APC (MT-LB) near Dovhe; and
• an APC (BTR-80) and an IFV (BMP variant) in Novoselivka.

Mine hazard signs near Myrne, Krasnohorivka and Vuhlehirsk, as well as demining activities in Myrna Dolyna

On 17 April, the SMM saw for the first time 20 mine hazard signs (with “Stop, Mines” written in Ukrainian) and two other signs (with “Attention, demining operation is ongoing in this area” written in Ukrainian) on the southern edge of road T-0512 about 4.5km east of Myrne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol).

The following day, in a field on the eastern edge of road H-20 at the exit for Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 24km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw a mine hazard sign (“Careful, mines” written in Ukrainian and Russian) attached to a wire stretched between two bushes.

On the western edge of a local road about 4.5km north-west of Vuhlehirsk (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM again saw a mine hazard sign (with “Stop, Mines” written in Russian).

The Mission saw about 15 people in protective gear bearing the logo of an international organization in a field 50m west of a local road in  Myrna Dolyna (government-controlled, 67km north-west of Luhansk)

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), as well as to a water pipeline near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and to power lines near Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk). The SMM also monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and facilitated the operation of the DFS.

Long queues of civilians at Stanytsia Luhanska entry exit-checkpoint

At 12:35, at the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw about 500 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas. At 13:30, at the same checkpoint, the SMM saw about 400 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas. At 12: 30, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw around 40 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and around 20 people queuing in the opposite direction.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• While in Shevchenko (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, preventing the Mission from continuing northward.
• On the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM entrance to the village, citing ongoing “security operations” in the area.
• On the southern edge of Yasne (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations (of whom one was armed) prevented the SMM from entering the village, citing “security reasons”.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 6km north of the border crossing point near Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, non-government-controlled, 82km south of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage towards the border crossing point, citing “the presence of unexploded ordnance” and the need for “prior permission” to visit it.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations stopped the SMM for about 90 minutes before allowing it to proceed east through the checkpoint, citing “orders from a superior” and “ongoing demining activities”.

Other impediments:

• On 16 April, an SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its dual GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Yesaulivka (non-government-controlled, 61km south of Luhansk) and Myronivskyi (government-controlled, 62km north-east of Donetsk).

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons