Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 10 March 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 8 and 9 March, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and significantly fewer in Luhansk region.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 9 and 10 March, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed fresh shrapnel damage in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and fresh impact craters near Popasna.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Petrivske disengagement area. It observed for the first time anti-tank mines on a road in the southern part of the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. Its access was also restricted in non-government-controlled areas, including at checkpoints near Novolaspa and Novoazovsk and at a heavy weapons holding area in Donetsk region.*
• In Kyiv, the Mission monitored a gathering and later saw a car partially covered with soot.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 8 and 9 March, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 185 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly and south-westerly directions of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), at south-easterly and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at south-westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk). During the day on 9 March, positioned in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard three explosions assessed as outgoing rounds and about 40 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all at an assessed distance of 1km south of the nearest civilian house in the village (for recent observations of damage caused by shelling in Pikuzy, see SMM Daily Report 4 March 2019).

Between the evenings of 9 and 10 March, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 50 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-westerly and north-westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 8 and 9 March, the SMM recorded significantly fewer ceasefire violations (about 70 explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (about 930 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded on the morning of 9 March in an area between Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk), near the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations (see below Fresh impact craters observed near Popasna).

Between the evenings of 9 and 10 March, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 11 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-west of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk).

Fresh shrapnel damage in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

At 34 Poshtova Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), on 9 March, the SMM saw shrapnel damage to the north-north-east-facing side of a one-storey inhabited house and to an adjacent north-north-east-facing metal fence. About 4-5m north of the house, the Mission observed a fresh impact crater. The SMM was not able to assess the type of weapon used or the direction of fire. A resident of the house told the SMM that at around 19:00 on 7 March, while at home with his wife, he had heard a loud explosion nearby.

Fresh impact craters observed near Popasna

On 9 March, the SMM observed five to six fresh impact craters, assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds, in a field about 50m from the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (about 1.5km west of the nearest civilian house). The SMM heard over 60 undetermined explosions in the area earlier that day (see above).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 7 March, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near the road bridge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 9 March, the SMM observed for the first time six anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid out in a ditch extending across road T-1316, about 60m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area (for similar observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 28 February 2019).

During the day on 9 March, positioned about 1.5km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw two explosions assessed as impacts at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).[3] Shortly thereafter, the Mission observed two military vehicles – one IFV (BMP variant) and the other undetermined – near a previously observed position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces inside the disengagement area, about 550m south of the area’s northern edge and about 1.3km west of its eastern edge.

The same day, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

On 10 March, positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

9 March

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) moving north in Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk) and
• nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

9 March

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) east of Zaichenko with multiple  fresh marks from tracked vehicles (types mostly undetermined) nearby, including those assessed as tracks of an MT-LB-based chassis, running in both directions along a road leading to Roza (36km north-east of Mariupol).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

9 March

The SMM saw:

• three self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) near Novoaidar.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

9 March

The SMM noted that:

• four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were present for the first time and
• 31 self-propelled howitzers (28 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and three 2S1), 22 anti-tank guns (MT-12) and two self-propelled mortars (2S9) were again missing.

10 March

The SMM noted that:

• four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were present for the first time and
• two MLRS (BM-21) were missing for the first time.

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

10 March

The SMM noted that:

• 13 MLRS (BM-21) and eight anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

7 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type undetermined) near Popasna.

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• an ACV (type undetermined) near Lebedynske (16km east of Mariupol).

9 March

The SMM saw:

-  two IFVs (BMD variants) in the yard of a former school building in Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk).

10 March

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) and
• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and five IFVs (three BMP-2 and two undetermined variants) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

7 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• a military truck (KamAZ-4310) moving south on a road on the western edge of Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

8 March                                      

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) and a probable APC (MT-LB) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).

10 March

The SMM saw:

• two IFVs (BMP-2) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) and
• two IFVs (BMP-1 and BMP-2) and one APC (BTR-80) near Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines

On 8 March, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time at least 40 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) in a field about 50m south-west of road H-21, west of Vesela Hora.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

On 9 March, the SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to damaged power lines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. On 9 and 10 March, the Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 9 March, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw seven cars (three with Russian Federation and one with Ukrainian licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and 25 cars (13 with Russian Federation, five with Ukrainian and one with Georgian licence plates, and six “DPR” plates), 13 covered cargo trucks (six with Ukrainian licence plates, and seven with “DPR” plates) and a bus (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The following day, while at the same border crossing point for 30 minutes, the SMM saw 13 cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and 11 with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and 13 cars (eight with Russian Federation and one with Ukrainian licence plates, and four “DPR” plates) and a bus (with Russian Federation plates) exiting Ukraine.

On 9 March, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for 20 minutes, the SMM saw four pedestrians (two men and two women, aged 20-30) entering Ukraine and two pedestrians (a man and a woman in their sixties) exiting Ukraine.

On 10 March, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for 30 minutes, the SMM observed no cross-border traffic.

Gathering in Kyiv

In Kyiv, on 9 March, the SMM monitored a pre-announced gathering by National Corps at Independence Square. The Mission saw about 600-700 people (mostly young men), some of whom were holding flags of National Corps, and heard them expressing opposition to the government. Later in the day, the SMM followed up on reports that smoke grenades had been thrown in front of the presidential administration building. The SMM saw that the side of a car parked in front of the building was partially covered with soot, assessed as caused by a smoke grenade. The Mission observed about 40-50 police officers present in the area. It did not observe further incidents.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 8 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 9 March, an armed member of the armed formations at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk) denied the SMM access to the village.
• On 10 March, the SMM was unable to visit a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region. The site was locked and no personnel were present.
• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM access to the town, citing “ongoing special police operation”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Conditional access:

• On 9 March, at a checkpoint near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to pass only upon being escorted by a car of the armed formations during its patrol of the settlement.

Delay:

• On 9 March, at a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from proceeding to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). After about 40 minutes, he allowed the SMM to pass through the checkpoint.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.