Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 4 October 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission observed damage to civilian properties caused by shelling and gunfire in Chermalyk. It recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and near the Zolote disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as near Zaichenko and near Izvaryne and Sievernyi, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed multiple launch rocket systems in violation of the agreed withdrawal lines near Khrustalnyi. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. It also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and maintenance of critical water and electrical infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, as well as demining in the area of Zolote-2/Karbonit. In Kyiv, the Mission monitored the security situation in and around the Parliament building during proceedings in relation to legislation concerning local governance of areas outside of government control in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 70 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (60 explosions).

On the evening of 3 October, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven explosions and eight bursts, all 3-7km at south-south-west, south-west and west. On the evening and night of 3-4 October, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk recorded two undetermined explosions, about 130 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and from south to north) and six bursts, all 3-4km east-north-east and east. The following day, while in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions 4-8km south-south-west and south-west.

On the evening and night of 3-4 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded an undetermined explosion, 86 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south), a burst and a muzzle flash, all 2-4km at easterly directions.

During the day on 4 October, positioned on the north-western edge of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions and 18 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 0.5-1km north-west and north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (41), compared with the previous reporting period (about 105 explosions).

On the evening and night of 3-4 October, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded ten undetermined explosions, about 110 projectiles in flight (mostly from west-north-west to east-south-east), two bursts and 16 muzzle flashes, all 2-5km at south-westerly directions.

The SMM followed up on reports of damage caused by shelling and gunfire. On 3 October, at 37 Lenina Street in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), the Mission saw debris consisting of wood and roof tiles piled up in a yard. It also saw that the roof of a barn had been recently repaired. A woman (in her seventies), who said she lived in a house at the same address, told the SMM that the roof of the barn had been hit during shelling in the afternoon on 28 September and had since been repaired. The Mission assessed the debris pattern to be consistent with damage caused by an explosion of a rocket propelled grenade; however, it could not determine the direction of fire.

At 39 Lenina Street, the SMM saw two bullet holes in the east-south-east-facing wall of a house. The Mission saw a bullet lodged in one of the holes which it assessed as a probable 5.45mm round fired from an easterly direction. The SMM assessed the damage as not fresh. A woman (in her sixties), who said she lived at the address, told the SMM that her house had been hit by small-arms fire on multiple occasions and that the damage observed by the Mission had been caused in early September 2018.

About 200m north-west of 39 Lenina Street, the SMM saw two large pieces of metal that had been torn off from a south-south-west facing fence. The Mission saw pockmarks on the fence and that parts of the fence’s concrete base had been chipped off. It also saw shrapnel damage to a tree 5m north-north-east of the fence. The SMM assessed the damage as fresh and caused by a round of an undetermined weapon fired from a south-westerly direction. Less than 500m east of the above-mentioned impact sites, the Mission observed a recently extended 400m trench (see below).

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 3 October, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an explosion assessed as an impact of an undetermined weapon, a projectile in flight and a muzzle flash, all 1-2km east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 4 October, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an impact of an undetermined weapon and an undetermined explosion 3-4km south-south-west (both assessed inside the disengagement area), as well as an explosion assessed as an impact of an undetermined weapon 1-2km south-south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same day, positioned south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons 1-3km north-north-west assessed as outside the disengagement area. Positioned at the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 300m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, for about ten minutes, the Mission saw a blue light flashing every few seconds about 800m south. A member of the armed formations in Luhansk city told the Mission that the armed formations used laser equipment.

On the same day, positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 3 October, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw 12 surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) stationary on flatbeds at a railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 3 October, an SMM long-rage UAV spotted two tanks (T-64) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Zelenyi Hai (49km south-west of Luhansk), four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), 16 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 32 towed howitzers (ten D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm; 15 2A65 Msta-B 152mm and seven 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Khrustalnyi.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft gun[2] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, on 3 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1) and two probable armoured personnel carriers (APC) (undetermined variants) near Komuna (56km north-east of Donetsk), an APC (BTR variant) in Novoselivka (16km west of Luhansk), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in Luhansk city. On 4 October, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-70) near Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol) and an APC (BTR-80) near Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, 33km north-east of Mariupol).

In government-controlled areas, on 4 October, the SMM saw two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), one near Artema (26km north of Luhansk) and two near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk). On 3 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted about 400m of trenches (not visible in imagery from 22 September) extending from the existing positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Chermalyk.

The SMM saw a group of at least eight people wearing the logo of an international demining organization and conducting work near areas marked for mine clearance on the western side of the road from Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol) to Mariupol (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk).

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines between Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) and Dovhe (non-government-controlled, 22km north-west of Luhansk), the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), electrical infrastructure between Verkhnotoretske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) and Betmanove (non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk), the Petrivske pumping station near Artema and water wells near Slovianoserbsk (non-government-controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. It also continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining in the area of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited two border areas outside of government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about ten minutes, the Mission saw 38 cars (21 with Ukrainian and 14 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “LPR” and one with “DPR” plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates, 18 trucks (nine with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates, as well as seven with “LPR” and one with “DPR” plates) and seven pedestrians (five men and two women, aged 40-60) queuing to exit Ukraine. A member of the armed formation told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes, the SMM saw four pedestrians (one man and three women, aged 50-60) exiting Ukraine and two pedestrians (men, in their fifties) entering Ukraine. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

In Kyiv, the SMM saw that the square in front of the Parliament building was cordoned off by approximately 200 police and National Guard officers. Inside the building, the SMM monitored a plenary session during which Members of Parliament voted for extension of the law “On the Special Order of Local Self-Government in Certain Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions” until 31 December 2019.

The SMM followed up on reports of a Ukrainian State Border Guard Service officer suffering an eye injury on 3 October at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk). On 4 October, medical staff at a hospital in Dnipro told the Mission that a male officer had been admitted with an injury of the cornea of his eye. Medical staff added that the eye injury had been caused by an unidentified laser source and that with a series of medical treatments it was expected the officer would make a full recovery.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko, an armed member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders not to allow the SMM through”. The Mission saw civilian cars passing through the checkpoint in both directions.
• At a border crossing point near Sievernyi, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, saying that “the SMM’s visit was not announced in advance”.
• At a pedestrian border crossing point near Izvaryne, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, saying that “the SMM’s visit was not announced in advance”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC. [3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its long-range UAV due to signal interference[4] while flying in a non-government-controlled area between Lisne (46km south-west of Luhansk) and Rodakove (22km west of Luhansk). The SMM landed the UAV safely.
• On two separate occasions, the SMM temporarily lost communication with its mini-UAV due to signal interference[5] near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM landed the UAV safely.
• Staff at a school in Luhansk city refused to provide the SMM information without prior approval from senior members of the armed formations.

[1]  Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.