Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 5 September 2018

This report is for the media and the general public.

#The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. It followed up on reports of a civilian casualty as a result of an explosion of a heavy-machine-gun round in Shchastia. The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area and new military positions inside the Petrivske disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and in Verkhnoshyrokivske.* It observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines including in Buhaivka, Miusynsk and Khrustalnyi. The Mission’s long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted a convoy of trucks on a dirt road near the border with the Russian Federation where there are no border crossing facilities in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, in the middle of the night. It continued to monitor the situation at the closed entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska where it observed construction works and road repairs. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water infrastructure near Zolote, Pervomaisk and Krasnyi Lyman.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including one explosion, compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions).

During the evening and night of 4-5 September, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 46 projectiles in flight (the majority from north to south) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 3-5km at directions ranging from north-east to east-south-east.

During the evening and night of 4-5 September, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded three projectiles in flight, an explosion assessed as an airburst and two muzzle flashes, all 1-5km south and south-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations (35 explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (12 explosions) (see disengagement section below for more details).

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty. At a hospital in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), medical staff told the SMM that a man (26 years old) had been admitted just after midnight on 4 September with injuries that included a fractured left hand and shrapnel injuries to his chest, abdomen and an eye, all as a result of an explosion. Medical staff added that he had been transferred to a hospital in Sievierodonetsk (government-controlled, 74km north-west of Luhansk) for surgery the same day. A police officer in Novoaidar (government-controlled, 49km north-west of Luhansk) told the SMM that the victim had been on duty at the thermal power plant in Shchastia when he had sustained injuries as a result of an explosion of a 12.7mm heavy-machine-gun round. In Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the man’s father told the SMM that his son had found a heavy-machine-gun round in a room at the Shchastia power plant and that it had exploded.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the morning of 5 September, positioned at a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on road T1316, approximately 400m from the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard seven explosions 150-200m south-south-east. The SMM assessed four of the explosions as outgoing mortar rounds (type undetermined) and the remaining as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). Positioned about 5km north-west of the abovementioned checkpoint, the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions 5-6km south-east of its position (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

The same morning, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, between 08:35 and 10:13, nine explosions assessed as impacts of grenades fired from an automatic grenade launcher 1.4-1.6km south-east and south-south-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area. (See SMM Spot Report 6 September 2018.)

Positioned about 1.5km north of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM also heard 13 explosions 2-2.5km north-west, assessed as the same explosions heard above, as well as two undetermined explosions 2-2.5km west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On 4 September, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted new construction on an existing bunker (not visible on imagery before 22 August 2018) and a recently-dug 50m trench (not visible on imagery before 25 August 2018), both assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and located about 800m and 130m respectively from the northern edge, inside the Petrivske disengagement area.  The same SMM mid-range UAV again spotted 24 anti-tank mines laid across the road north of the Petrivske disengagement area between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk).

During the day on 5 September, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska and near the Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, in non-government-controlled areas, on 4 September, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (type unknown) near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) and a probable piece of towed artillery near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk). (The aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 68 armoured combat vehicles (type unknown) near Buhaivka.) On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) and five MLRS (BM-21) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk). On 5 September, the SMM saw six MLRS (BM-21) near Izhevka (66km north of Donetsk).

Aerial imagery also revealed the presence on 4 September of four tanks (type unknown) near Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, 90km south-east of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in non-government-controlled areas, on 4 September, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 20 tanks (ten T-72 and ten T-64), ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 12 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Miusynsk. Also on 4 September, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 18 towed howitzers (ten 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and eight D-20, 152mm) at a compound in Khrustalnyi (57km south-west of Luhansk), 18 tanks (T-64), seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 15 towed howitzers (D-30), seven mortars (PM-38, 120mm) and 12 surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), ten tanks, one towed howitzer (D-30) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) at a training area near Shymshynivka (see also aerial imagery below), as well as 16 tanks, 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 12 towed howitzers (D-30), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), seven mortars (PM-38) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at a training area near Buhaivka (see aerial imagery below). On 5 September, the SMM saw ten tanks at a training area in Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

On 4 September aerial imagery revealed the presence of 22 tanks (type unknown) and a surface-to-air missile system (type undetermined) near Buhaivka, nine tanks (type unknown) near Shymshynivka, 41 tanks (type unknown) near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) and 45 tanks (type unknown) near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Izhevka.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas in Donetsk region, the SMM saw for the first time 12 towed howitzers (D-20) and noted that 29 self-propelled howitzers (25 2S1 – three for the first time – and four 2S9 Nona, 122mm – all for the first time), four towed howitzers (D-30) – two for the first time – and three MLRS (BM-21) – all for the first time – were missing.

In non-government-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines in Donetsk region, the SMM saw six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and noted that 12 mortars (11 PM-38 and one 2B11 Sani, 120mm) remained missing.

The SMM revisited two permanent storage sites whose locations were beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and noted that 18 tanks (ten T-72 and eight T-64), 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12) and nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) remained missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In non-government-controlled areas, on 5 September, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-80) at a checkpoint in Donetsk city.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a convoy of trucks on a dirt road near the border with the Russian Federation where there are no border crossing facilities in the middle of the night. On 4 September, at 00:01 an SMM long-range UAV spotted a convoy of ten KAMAZ canvas-covered cargo trucks and four escort vehicles (one escort vehicle at the front of the convoy and three parked at the back), all parked in a single file line, oriented north, on an unpaved dirt road north-east of Manych (non-government-controlled, 76km east of Donetsk). About 10-15 people were walking around between the parked vehicles. After about 30 minutes, at 00:30, all the trucks moved towards the international border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation via the dirt road that leads across the border, while the four escort vehicles remained in Ukraine and drove north. (For previous similar observations, see SMM Daily Report 9 August 2018.)

The SMM observed that the entry-exit checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge remained closed. The SMM saw no pedestrians present at the entry-exit checkpoint or at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge. The SMM continued to observe ongoing construction works of shelters and road repairs.

The SMM observed demining activities. On road H-21 between non-government-controlled areas of Shakhtarsk (50km east of Donetsk) and Hirne (55km east of Donetsk), the SMM saw 17 men wearing clothes marked with “MChS” walking on both sides of the road with metal detectors and demining tools. On a road leading from road T0519 to Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw about ten people wearing clothing bearing the logo of an international demining organization walking on the western side of the road and surveying the area for mines. A member of the organization told the SMM that they would be marking off mined areas.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair and maintenance works to water systems near Zolote, Pervomaisk, and Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 31 August 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, four members of the armed formations (two visibly armed) told the SMM that it could not access the site without “permission” from the armed formations.
• On two separate occasions, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from proceeding through the checkpoint, citing the “security of the SMM patrol”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia, a member of the armed formations told the SMM that there had been no demining activities in the area and that there were mines on the bridge. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• Staff at two different schools in non-government-controlled areas in Luhansk region told the SMM that it needed permission from the armed formations to visit the schools.
• On 3 September, for the majority of the flight, an SMM longrange UAV was jammed while flying near the following settlements in government-controlled areas of Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk), Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk), Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), Hladosove (51km north-east of Donetsk), Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), Zoloti Pisky (12km NW of Donetsk), Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), Berezove (31 south-west of Donetsk) and Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk) as well as settlements in non-government-controlled areas of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk), Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk), Olenivka (23km south-west of Donetsk), and Staromykhailivka (15km west of Donetsk).[5]

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Kriakivka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.