Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 4 June 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw a slightly injured man and damage from shelling at a mosque in non-government-controlled Donetsk city, as well as an injured man and damage from shelling to his house in non-government-controlled Uzhivka.
• The Mission saw fresh damage caused by small-arms-fire to an apartment building in non-government-controlled Dokuchaievsk.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission observed the presence of unexploded ordnance in government-controlled Novoluhanske.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. *

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 170 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and in areas south-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

During the day on 4 June, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard an outgoing explosion at an assessed distance of 500m south-east while facilitating the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 80), compared with the previous reporting period (about 180 explosions). Almost all of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-north-east of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and at southerly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Man slightly injured and fresh damage from shelling at a mosque in Donetsk city

On 4 June, at the Akhat-Jami Mosque on Marshala Zhukova Avenue in the Oktiabrskyi micro-district on the north-western edge of Donetsk city, about 1km from the nearest forward positions of the armed formations, the SMM saw a man in his forties with a small scab on his back. He told the SMM that while outside the mosque on the morning of 4 June with about 70 other people (mixed genders and age) to attend preparations for the Eid al-Fitr, a Muslim holiday which marks the end of Ramadan, he had heard on two occasions a scraping sound followed by an explosion and that he had been hit by a small sharp object.

In the garden about 10m south of the mosque, the SMM saw a fresh, shallow crater and an oily black substance near it, as well as a piece of broken glass 2m away. About 15m north of the mosque, the SMM saw a white car splattered with mud and an oily black substance with its rear window missing and front right-side tyre deflated and two small holes visible in it. The SMM assessed that the crater and damage to the car had been caused by a single round (type of weapon undetermined) fired from a northerly direction. A man in his fifties told the SMM that the car had been parked near the abovementioned crater when it was hit and that it had subsequently been moved.

On the west-facing side of the mosque, the SMM observed fresh damage to a portion of its roof and guttering near the south-west-facing corner of the building. It also saw pieces of splintered wood, broken plastic guttering, insulation material and cement dust scattered in a radius of about 3-4m on the ground below, as well as two small pieces of shrapnel. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by another round of an undetermined weapon fired from a northerly direction.

Man injured and damage due to shelling to his house in Uzhivka

On 4 June, at a hospital in Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), led by members of the armed formations, the SMM saw a 57-year-old man with bandages on his head and upper body who said he was a resident of Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and that he had been injured when his house (at 43 Haharina Street) was shelled on the evening of 1 June. Medical staff told the SMM that the man had been admitted to the hospital on 1 June with shrapnel injuries to his liver, colon, small intestine, appendix, right arm, left leg and right side of his face. At 43 Haharina Street in Uzhivka on 3 June, the SMM had seen that the west-facing side of the roof of a one-storey house was recently damaged and that the house’s west-facing outer wall had fresh cracks and plaster work damage which were being repaired by three men. About 120m south of the house, the SMM saw a fresh crater. In both cases, the SMM was unable to assess the weapon type or direction of fire. A resident (man, in his sixties) of a neighbouring house told the SMM that shelling had occurred on the evening of 1 June.

Fresh damage caused by small-arms-fire to an apartment building in Dokuchaievsk

At 5 Polova Street on the north-western edge of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed a fresh hole in the west-facing outer wall of the enclosed balcony of an apartment on the third floor of a five-storey residential building and a corresponding fresh hole in the inner wall, assessed as caused by a round of small-arms fire. Two residents (a 35-year-old woman, and a 36-year-old man) of the apartment told the SMM that the damage occurred on the evening of 2 June while the woman was alone at home (for similar observations, see SMM Daily Report 4 June 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 3 June, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded an illumination flare at an assessed range of 2-3km east-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). During the day on 4 June, positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard 29 undetermined explosions and about 100 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 1-2km north-north-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 4 June, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

4 June

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

1 June

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 25 April 2019).

2 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of nine multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

4 June

The SMM saw:

• eight tanks (T-64) at the train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk);
• four surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) near Yurkivka (86km north of Donetsk);
• five MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in and six MLRS (BM-21) near Nova Astrakhan (82km north-west of Luhansk); and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) near Hryhorivka (formerly Leninske, 46km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

2 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 24 tanks and three surface-to-air missile systems in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 23 May 2019);
• ten tanks, seven self-propelled howitzers or mortars and 13 towed howitzers or mortars in a training area near Miusynsk (see above) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 23 May 2019); and
• 21 tanks in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 25 May 2019).

3 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 18 towed howitzers (ten 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) fitted with a self-propelled mortar (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) turret near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Other weapons observed[4]

Non-government-controlled areas

2 June

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 20 self-propelled howitzers or mortars and 26 towed howitzers or mortars in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

4 June

The SMM noted that the site was abandoned and that seven mortars (four 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and three PM-38, 120mm) and 54 tanks (T-64) remained missing.

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

4 June

The SMM noted that all weapons were present.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

3 June

The SMM noted that 33 towed howitzers (2A65) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

3 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (BMP variants) near civilian houses on the western outskirts of Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk).

4 June

The SMM saw:

• on two occasions an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and
• an APC (BTR-60) near Pyshchevyk (25km north-east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

1 June

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured combat vehicle near Sentianivka.

4 June

The SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) in a compound in Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk).

Presence of unexploded ordnance in Novoluhanske

On 3 June, on the western edge of Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as a projectile from an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), in the grass 1m from a local road. About 300m south-west, the SMM saw two pieces of UXO, assessed as mortar rounds, partially buried in the asphalt of a local road with their tailfins visible and with the area around them cordoned off with red-and-white tape. Later on the same day, members of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine told the SMM that they had disposed of the two pieces of UXO. The SMM returned to the location and observed that they were no longer present. About 130m south-east of where the UXO were, the SMM saw a stick with a red-and-white ribbon in a nearby field, assessed as a mine hazard sign.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines between Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and Yuzhna Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and in Spartak (non-government-controlled, 9km north of Donetsk), to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to the water distribution network near Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk), and to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna.

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM saw four cars (one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “DPR” plates) and two buses (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine, and ten cars (three with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation, as well as two with “DPR” plates) and a bus with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine.

SMM monitored the security situation in south-east Kherson region

On 2 June, the SMM observed a calm situation in coastal areas near Henichesk (176km east of Kherson). On 3 June, the SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 4 June 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations only allowed the SMM to proceed after about 30 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 3-4 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying over Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk).[7]
• On 4 June, two SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as due to probable jamming, while flying near Zaporozhets (non-government-controlled, 71km south of Donetsk) and Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol). 10

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[5] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The Mission noted that two sites in government-controlled areas were abandoned.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.