Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 30 May 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw fresh damage from shelling to civilian properties in non-government-controlled Sentianivka.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near non-government-controlled Pervomaisk.
• The Mission observed trench extensions in and near the Petrivske disengagement area.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The Mission’s freedom of movement was also restricted at checkpoints near non-government-controlled Zaichenko and Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including about 120 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 140 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas south-east and south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 120 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (five explosions). About half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas around the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Damage from shelling to civilian properties in Sentianivka

On 29 May, the SMM saw damage to six houses in Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk), three of them on the northern side of Shevchenka Street and three on the street’s southern side.

On the street’s northern side, at No. 18A, the SMM saw two shattered west-facing window panes of a summer kitchen located about 2m north of an inhabited one-storey house as well as impact marks on the west-facing walls of the summer kitchen and of the house. In a field about 50m north of the house, the Mission saw two craters. It assessed them as fresh; however, it could not determine the type of weapon or the direction of fire. At No. 18B, the SMM saw two shattered east-facing window panes of an inhabited one-storey house. At No. 14, it saw two impact marks as well as seven shattered outer panes of two windows on the south-facing brick wall of an inhabited one-storey house.

About 2m south of the house at 16 Shevchenko Street, the SMM saw a destroyed concrete base of a wooden electric pole. It assessed the damage as fresh and caused by shelling; however, it could not determine the weapon used or the direction of fire.

On the street’s southern side, at No. 5, the Mission saw two holes in a north-facing metal gate about 3m west of an inhabited one-storey house. At No. 7, it saw two impact marks in a north-facing concrete fence about 5m west of an inhabited one-storey house. At No. 9, the SMM saw two cracked north-facing window panes of an inhabited one-storey house.

The Mission assessed all the above-mentioned damage to houses as fresh and caused by shrapnel. A man and a woman (in their thirties/forties) who introduced themselves as residents of the street told the Mission that they had heard shelling early in the morning on the same day.

Small-arms fire directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Pervomaisk

While conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the Mission heard 20 bursts of small-arms fire about 800m east-north-east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 200m north-east of its position. The SMM landed the UAV safely and left the area.*

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 29 and 30 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 23 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east. During the day on 30 May, positioned on the eastern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the Mission heard 17 undetermined explosions and 15 shots of small-arms fire. All the above-mentioned ceasefire violations were assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery. 

On 27 May, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed that a previously reported trench, assessed as belonging to the armed formations, that protruded through the northern edge of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), about 350m west of the area’s eastern edge (see SMM Daily Report 18 September 2018) had been extended by about 13m inside the area. The imagery also revealed an 18m extension of a trench inside the disengagement area, near previously reported positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (see SMM Daily Report 12 September 2018).

Outside the Petrivske disengagement area, about 0.8-1.6km east of its eastern edge, the imagery revealed extensions, about 30m and 40m in length respectively, of two previously reported trenches (see SMM Daily Report 22 May 2019), which were assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

During the day on 30 May, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

29 May

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a tank (T-64) in a compound in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

30 May

The SMM noted that 13 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) remained missing.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

30 May

The SMM saw 31 tanks (T-64) and noted that 80 tanks (T-64), 26 self-propelled howitzers (20 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and six 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 18 towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) and six towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) remained missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

29 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk) and
• an IFV (BMP variant) near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a fresh crater, assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round, in a field about 200m south of positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces east of Troitske.

30 May

The SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

Mines near Marinka and Olenivka

On 25 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time about 60 anti-tank mines laid in a field running in a south-easterly direction south of road H15 about 400m east of the most forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). In the same field, the UAV also spotted ten previously observed anti-tank mines (seen in imagery from 30 March 2018).

On 27 May, on the north-western outskirts of Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), on the northern edge of a road leading west to Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time ten anti-tank mines. About 200m west of this location, the same UAV spotted for the first time 25 anti-tank mines laid on the same road, in addition to three anti-tank mines spotted by an SMM mini-UAV on 28 May 2019.

Mine signs near Novohnativka, Starohnativka and Luhanske

The Mission saw for the first time: a mine hazard sign (a red plate with “Danger mines!” in Ukrainian and English) next to a local road leading to an agricultural compound about 1.5km north-east of Novohnativka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk); an improvised mine hazard sign affixed to a tree at a junction of local roads about 3.5km north-west of Starohnativka (government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk); and a warning board and an improvised mine hazard sign (“Stop mines!” in Ukrainian and “Danger Mines” in English) next to a local road about 3km east of Luhanske (government-controlled, 59km north-east of Donetsk).

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

The SMM also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about two hours, the SMM saw 53 cars (19 with Ukrainian, 11 with Russian Federation and one with Lithuanian licence plates, as well as 21 with “DPR” and one with “Abkhaz” plates), 25 covered-cargo trucks (18 with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and six with “DPR” plates), two buses with Russian Federation licence plates and 37 pedestrians (mixed ages, including four children) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw 44 cars (ten with Ukrainian, 24 with Russian Federation and three with Lithuanian licence plates, and seven with “DPR” plates), seven covered-cargo trucks (three with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates), six buses (two with Russian Federation licence plates and four with “DPR” plates) and eight pedestrians (mixed ages, including four children) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 50 minutes, the SMM saw two pedestrians entering Ukraine and a pedestrian exiting Ukraine.

Arson attack at an Alfa-Bank branch in Lviv

The Mission continued to follow up on an arson attack at a branch of Alfa-Bank bank in Lviv (see SMM Daily Report 30 May 2019). On 30 May, the SMM saw that the interior of the bank was extensively damaged by fire: interior walls were covered in soot and scorch marks and almost all of the ceiling panels were lying shattered on the floor. The SMM saw workers conducting repair works inside.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 27 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “demining activities”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM, allowing it to proceed only after about 80 minutes.

Other impediments:

• On 30 May, on four occasions, SMM mini-UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as probably caused by jamming, while flying over areas near Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol).[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The Mission noted that one site was abandoned

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.