Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 27 May 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
- The Mission saw fresh damage from small-arms fire to civilian properties in non-government-controlled Dokuchaievsk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
- The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas.
- The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to and the operation of critical civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 90 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 50 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including about half of the explosions, were recorded in areas south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (23), compared with the previous 24 hours (nine explosions).
Damage from small-arms fire to civilian properties in Dokuchaievsk and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
On 27 May, at an apartment located on the ground floor of a multi-storey residential building at 102 Lenina Street in the north-western part of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a hole in the lower part of a south-facing window pane and another hole in the upper part of the window frame. The Mission assessed the damage as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. At the apartment, a woman (in her sixties) who introduced herself as a relative of the apartment’s owner told the Mission that she had spotted the damage on the evening of 26 May as she walked past the building.
On the same day, at a shop located on the ground floor of a four-storey residential building at 4 Myru Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a hole in a north-facing window pane as well as a 7.62mm bullet on the floor. The Mission assessed the damage as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. A woman (in her fifties) who introduced herself as a shop assistant told the Mission that she had spotted the damage earlier in the morning.
Disengagement areas[2]
On the evening of 26 May, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded three projectiles in flight at an assessed distance of 0.5-3km east and south-east, within 5km of the periphery of the disengagement area.
Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.[3]
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Non-government-controlled areas
27 May
The SMM saw:
- 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) and
- four MLRS (BM-21) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
26 May
An SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) and a probable surface-to-air missile system (type undetermined) near Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
25 May
An SMM mini-UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Shyroke (34km south-east of Luhansk).
Weapons permanent storage sites
At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region
27 May
The SMM noted that 18 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), six mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm) and 37 tanks (33 T-72 and four T-64) remained missing.
At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region
27 May
The SMM noted that all weapons were present.
Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]
At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region
27 May
The SMM saw four surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) and noted that four MLRS (BM-21), 67 towed howitzers (55 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and 12 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), 20 anti-tank guns (MT-12) and eight surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) remained missing.
At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region
27 May
The SMM noted that eight towed howitzers (six 2A65 and two D-30) remained missing.
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]
Government-controlled areas
26 May
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
- an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk);
- two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) near Novoselivka Druha (36km north-east of Mariupol); and
- two ACVs in Pobeda (27km west of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
22 May
An SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time two trenches, totalling 50m, about 3km north-west of Vuhlehirsk (49km north-east of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 5 March 2019).
25 May
An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a probable infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) in Sosnivske (35km north-east of Mariupol).
26 May
An SMM long-range UAV spotted:
- 13 armoured personnel carriers (APC) (four BTR variants and nine MT-LB), 22 IFVs (BMP-1) and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in Donetsk city’s Leninskyi district (4km south of Donetsk city centre); and
- two ACVs near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk).
An SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time five 25m-long trenches in a field about 2km north-west of Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) dug next to existing trenches (seen in imagery from 4 May 2018).
Fresh craters near Sosnivske
On 25 May, in fields north of Sosnivske, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time at least 50 craters (not seen in imagery from 21 April 2019) assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds. Some of these craters were as close as 5-10m from residential areas.
Mines near Veselohorivka, Marinka and Novooleksandrivka
On 24 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 200 anti-tank mines (type undetermined) in six rows running north to south about 3km north-west of Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).
On 25 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted again 34 anti-tank mines on the northern edge of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk): 18 were laid out in two rows across a road leading to Donetsk city (non-government-controlled), about 35m south-east of the nearest residential houses; four were laid across the same road about 200m further east-north-east; and 12 (four of which were fixed to a wooden board) laid on a side road located between the above-mentioned two sets of anti-tank mines. About 1.2km east of these mines, in a field north of the above-mentioned road, the UAV spotted 17 anti-tank mines assessed as belonging to the armed formations (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 7 March 2019 and SMM Daily Report 19 March 2019).
The same UAV also spotted for the first time 18 anti-tank mines on the northern side of road H15 next to the most forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 27 March 2019).
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure
The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a gas distribution station near Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).
The SMM also facilitated the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).
SMM facilitated and monitored transfer of body from government-controlled to non-government-controlled areas
The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the transfer of a body from government-controlled to non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region.
Border areas outside government control
While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 80 minutes, the SMM saw 15 cars (four with Ukrainian and six with Russian Federation licence plates, and five with “DPR“ plates), a bus with “DPR” plates and 11 pedestrians entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw 20 cars (two with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, and 11 with “DPR“ plates), four covered-cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates), two buses (with “DPR“ plates) and two pedestrians exiting Ukraine.
While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 60 minutes, the SMM saw six cars (three with Ukrainian licence plates and three with “DPR“ plates), eight covered-cargo trucks (five with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) and a bus with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw six cars (one with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) and a bus with Ukrainian licence plates exiting Ukraine.
The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 27 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
Other impediments:
- On the night between 26 and 27 May, an SMM long-range UAV experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as due to jamming, while flying along the contact line over government and non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.[6]
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.
[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The Mission noted that two sites in government-controlled areas were abandoned
[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.
[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.