Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 7 May 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
- Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
- The Mission observed fresh damage caused by shelling to residential houses in Marinka.
- It recorded the presence of military hardware inside the Zolote disengagement area.
- The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas.
- The Mission continued to monitor the situation of civilians crossing the contact line.
- The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses. It also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.
- Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Novoazovsk.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 35 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 20 explosions). The highest numbers of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and south and south-south-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 460 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 60 explosions). More than two thirds of the ceasefire violations, including most explosions, were recorded at north-easterly and south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).
Positioned on the western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 75 explosions, including 34 assessed as outgoing artillery rounds at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east.
Fresh damage caused by shelling to residential houses in Marinka
On the eastern edge of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), at 128 Zhovtneva Street, the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage to a north-eastern facing metal fence about 2m of an inhabited single-storey house and a fresh crater in an asphalted road about 4m north-east of the same house (and about 600m west-south-west of an old industrial compound displaying a red and gold flag on the western edge of Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled). The SMM assessed the crater as caused by the impact of a fragmentation grenade (VOG-25 or VOG 25-P, 40mm) fired from a south-westerly direction. The SMM saw several members of the State Emergency Services conducting repairs to the roof of the same house (which was covered by a nylon sheet) and replacing asbestos sheets on the roof of another house at 137 Zhovtneva Street. One of them said that they were performing scheduled repairs in the area.
At 128a Zhovtneva Street, the SMM saw cracked glass in a north-west facing window and shrapnel damage to the north-west facing side of a single-storey house. It also saw cracked glass in a south-west facing window and in a south-west facing door of a summer kitchen (about 2m south-west of the same house), as well as fresh shrapnel damage to the south-west facing side of a small construction and to a tree in the garden (about 3m and 2m north-west of the same house, respectively). About 2m north-east of the house, the SMM observed freshly moved soil which, according to the owner of the house (woman, aged 60-70), was used to cover a crater in the yard. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire.
At 144 Zhovtneva Street (about 40m of the previous house), the SMM saw over 80 holes in a south-west facing metal fence about 2m south-west of an inhabited single-storey house and in two nearby parked cars. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire. Three residents of the abovementioned street (two men and a woman, aged 50-90) told the SMM that they had been in their houses (some of them with their families) when shelling had occurred in the morning hours of 3 May.
About 1.5km east-south-east of the abovementioned location, at 285 Heroiv Chornobylia Street, the SMM saw two collapsed south-eastern facing walls. It also saw about five members of the State Emergency Service replacing wooden sections of the roof of the same house. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire.
About 70m west of the abovementioned house, at 291 Heroiv Chornobylia Street, the SMM saw at least seven holes in the south-eastern and south-western-facing sides of a single-storey house (assessed as fresh and caused by shrapnel) and three shattered south-west-facing windows (covered by wooden panels), as well as fresh shrapnel damage to the plastic frame of one of the windows.
In the same area, the SMM saw a position of the Ukrainian Armed forces and that two houses were being used by them. Three residents of the above-mentioned street (three women, aged 30-80) told the SMM that they had been in their houses when shelling had occurred in the early morning hours of 3 May.
Disengagement areas[2]
On 4 May, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), next to previously observed positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) covered with camouflage netting along with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck, as well as an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (type undetermined) north of the railway tracks and west of road T-1316 (about 500 east-south-east of the abovementioned IFV), all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 17 April 2019).
On 7 May, positioned in three locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard 90 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire and about 193 explosions: 154 assessed as undetermined and 34 assessed as outgoing artillery rounds (see above), all assessed as within 5km of the disengagement area’s periphery.
Positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
In violation of withdrawal lines
Non-government-controlled areas
On 5 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three mortars (type undetermined) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).
7 May
The SMM saw:
- eight tanks (one T-34 and seven T-72), ten towed howitzers (five D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and five 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm), six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm ) and five surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) in the centre of Luhansk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 6 May 2019) and
- four tanks (two T-64 and two T-72), four towed howitzers (2A65), two self-propelled howitzers (2S1), two MLRS (BM-21) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) in the centre of Donetsk city (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 7 May 2019).
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Non-government-controlled areas
On 4 May, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 20 tanks (type undetermined), two pieces of anti-aircraft artillery (type undetermined) and three surface-to-air missile systems (type undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).
Other weapons observed:
On 4 May, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 16 self-propelled howitzers or mortars and 17 towed howitzers or mortars in a training area near Buhaivka.[4]
Weapons storage sites
At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region
On 6 May, the SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]
Government-controlled areas
4 May
Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:
- an ACV (type undetermined) near Hnutove (90km south of Donetsk);
- an ACV (type undetermined) north of the disengagement area near Zolote; and
- an ACV (type undetermined) near Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk).
4 May
An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:
- an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an IFV near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), and
- four IFVs (BMP-1) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk).
7 May
The SMM saw:
- four IFVs (BTR-80) near Buhas (44km south-west of Donetsk) and
- eight armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-80) near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
On 4 May, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a new 60m trench running north-east from a position of the armed formations near Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 92km south of Donetsk).
5 May
On 5 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four IFVs (two BMP-1 and two type undetermined) and a probable IFV (BMP variant) near Sentianivka.
On 6 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Kypuche (formerly Artemivsk, 46km west of Luhansk).
7 May
The SMM saw:
- six IFVs (BMP-2) and six APCs (BTR-80) in the centre of Luhansk city (see above), and
- two armoured recovery vehicles (BREM-1), two APCs (BTR-80) and four IFVs (two BMP-1 and two BMP-2) in the centre of Donetsk city (see above).
Mines seen near Orikhove
On 4 May, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 82 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in two rows in a field south of Orikhove.
Situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints
In the morning of 7 May, at a checkpoint of the armed formations on road H-15 near in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw about 200 vehicles and about 200 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 100 vehicles queuing in the opposite direction. In the afternoon, at the same location, the Mission saw about 100 vehicles queuing to travel towards non-government-controlled areas and about 120 vehicles queuing in the opposite direction.
In the morning of the same day, at the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on road H15 near Marinka, the SMM saw 80 cars and around 150 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas, as well as 12 buses stationary between the abovementioned checkpoint of the armed formations in Kreminets and the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka. In the afternoon, at the same location, the Mission saw no cars queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and 25 vehicles as well as 100 people queuing in the opposite direction.
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure
The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and Popasna, as well as to damaged houses in Marinka and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).
Border areas outside government control
On 7 May, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM saw seven cars (two with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three with “DPR” plates) and a mini-van (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine, and ten cars (three with Ukrainian, two with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as four with “DPR” plates), a mini-van (with Ukrainian licence plates) and three covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.
On 6 May, while at a border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw no pedestrians or traffic entering or exiting Ukraine.
SMM monitored the security situation in south-east Kherson region
On 5 and 6 May, the Mission observed calm situations at a Ukrainian State Border Guard Service security post in Valok (188km south-east of Kherson) and at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea (see SMM Daily Report 1 May 2019).
The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 6 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denials of access:
- At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations again denied the SMM entrance to the town, citing ongoing operation in the area.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
- The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[4] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their type.
[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.