Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 6 May 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• A man died after a metal object exploded in Velyka Novosilka.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• It continued to monitor the situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to civilian infrastructure and damaged houses. It also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka.

• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The SMM was also restricted at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Kozatske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 20), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 70 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), at easterly directions of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and at southerly directions of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 60), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 70 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and in areas south-south-east of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk).

A man died in Velyka Novoselivka after a metal object exploded

In Velyka Novosilka (government-controlled, 74km west of Donetsk) the head of the police station told the SMM that a man (in his thirties) had died on 4 May after a metal object he had found exploded as he had been trying to disassemble it at his house. He added that the man collected scrap metal. At the hospital in Velyka Novosilka the head of the intensive care unit told the SMM that the man had been brought to the hospital on 4 May with fatal trauma injuries to his head, hands and legs consistent with explosion wounds. At 43 Ohorodnyi Lane, where the deceased man reportedly lived, the SMM observed a funeral procession.

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned near the disengagement areas near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3] 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

6 May

The SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) in Starobilsk (85km north of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 May

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a probable mortar (120mm) and three tanks (probable T-64) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

6 May

The SMM saw three MLRS (9P138 Grad-1, 122mm), three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six towed howitzers (three D-20, 152mm and three D-30 Lyagushka,122mm), three towed mortars (120mm), six tanks (three T-64 and three T-72) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12, Rapira, 100mm) in the centre of Donetsk city.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

6 May

The SMM saw:

    -  six towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near the train station in Rubizhne          (84km north-west of Luhansk); and

    - five surface-to-air missile systems (9K37) near the train station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

4 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) in a field east of Kurakhove (40km west of Donetsk); and
• an IFV (BMP-2) in Heorhiievka (27km south-west of Donetsk).

5 May

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an APC (Saxon) in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

4 May

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP-1) near Lobacheve.

Mine hazard signs near Stepove

The SMM observed for the first time two red mine hazard signs with the words “Stop.Mine” written in Russian on wooden posts on the northern edge of road T-1303 about 2.2km north of Stepove (non-government-controlled, 27km west of Luhansk).

Situation of civilians at entry-exit checkpoints

The SMM observed at least 50 people (mixed gender, in their sixties to eighties) with canes struggling to climb the wooden ramps of the bridge near Stanytsia Luhanska when crossing the contact line. Three pedestrians (in their forties) told the Mission that it had taken them about 60 to 90 minutes to cross the contact line between the entry-exit checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge. At different entry-exit checkpoints interlocutors told the SMM that they are informed about the new electronic permits, which do not have an expiry date. Some added that they had already applied for these new permits.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), the water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), as well as damaged houses in Marinka and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and monitored the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk). Positioned near Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM observed de-miners from the State Emergency Service drive towards the DFS.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre on Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 6 May 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Kozatske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage towards Porokhnia (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol). A second armed member of the armed formations told the SMM that it was not allowed to proceed because a unit of the armed formations was located immediately east of the checkpoint. He added that only civilians listed as living in Porokhnia were allowed to travel east past this checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that no demining activities had taken place. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera at Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.