Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 11 April 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw gunfire damage and a crater at a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government controlled areas.
• It saw unexploded ordnance near Debaltseve and the Donetsk Filtration Station and mines in Trokhizbenka.
• The SMM saw mine hazard signs in Krasnyi Lyman and Pryshyb and demining activities in Volnovakha.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a checkpoint near Zaichenko.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 500), compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). Over half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and areas south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), both of which are in the vicinity of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), as well as in areas south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 77km south of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 260), compared with the previous reporting period (about 380 explosions). Over half of ceasefire violations were recorded in easterly, north-easterly, and south-easterly directions of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Gunfire damage and a crater at a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 10 April, at School No.4 located at 4 Myru Street in the south-eastern outskirts of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk), about 1.3km east of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a large (35x35cm) hole in a west-facing window of a one-storey school building assessed as fresh and caused by shrapnel and a crater in a yard 35m west of it (direction of fire and type of weapon could not be assessed). It also saw a smaller hole in a third-floor west-facing window of a three-storey school building located 5-7m east assessed as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. An employee (female, 45 years old) of the school told the SMM that classes had been in session when she had heard shelling in the morning of 9 April and that pupils and staff took cover in the school shelter until the afternoon. When the SMM was present on 10 April, classes had resumed. The school was previously damaged by small-arms fire on 17 January 2019 (see SMM Daily Report 22 January 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned about 3km south-west of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard 16 explosions and 12 bursts of small-arms fire (unable to be assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as three undetermined explosions and seven shots of small-arms fire all originating 1-2km south-west which were assessed as outside the disengagement area. Positioned about 3km north of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 106 shots of small-arms fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. [3]

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

9 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of three tanks (type undetermined) north of Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

9 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a probable tank (type undetermined) east-north-east of Svobodne, in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014 (see above).

11 April

The SMM saw three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), three self-propelled howitzers (2S1, Gvozdika 122mm) and four tanks (T-72) at a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

10 April

The SMM noted that:

• 52 tanks (T-64), 22 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and three self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona, 120mm) remained missing and
• eight self-propelled mortars (2S9) were present and six tanks (T-72) were present for the first time.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Luhansk region

10 April

The SMM noted that four mortars (one 2B9 Voloshka, 82mm and three BM-37, 82mm) remained missing. It also noted weapons present for the first time.

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

11 April

The SMM noted that nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and eight towed howitzers (D-30) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

10 April

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk);
• three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Vesele (21km north of Donetsk); and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

11 April

The SMM saw:

• a trench digger (type unidentified) in the yard of a civilian house along with freshly-dug trenches extending 70m towards a checkpoint near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-70) in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); and
• six infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (three BMP-1 and three unidentified) and an armoured ambulance (MT-LB-S) near Popasna (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 April 2019).

Non-government-controlled areas

10 April

An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted four IFVs (BMP variants) near Kozatske (86km south of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014 (see above).

Presence of mines in Trokhizbenka and unexploded ordnance near Debaltseve and the Donetsk Filtration Station

On 10 April, the SMM again saw ten anti-tank mines (TM-62) on road 1315 about 50m north-west of a destroyed bridge in Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk).

On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as rockets from a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (probable BM-21, Grad 122mm), and several other objects, assessed as remnants of BM-21 rockets, lying on the ground on both sides of road M03 on the north-western edge of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM assessed that the UXOs are not recent.

On 11 April, the SMM saw again three pieces of UXO assessed as rockets from an MLRS (probable BM-21) embedded in roads in the vicinity of the DFS. Two rockets were embedded in road H-20 about 160-230m south-west of the DFS and one rocket was embedded in road M-04 about 900m south-south-east of the DFS. About 70m north-east of the previous observations, embedded in a sandy surface between lanes of road M-04, the SMM saw an unexploded high-explosive anti-tank warhead (HEAT).

Mine hazard signs in Krasnyi Lyman and Pryshyb and demining activities in Volnovakha

For the first time, the SMM saw seven red square signs with “MINES” written in Russian, assessed as mine hazard signs. One sign was next to a checkpoint of the armed formations on the northern edge of Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk) and the other six were located on both sides of road T-13-15 near a checkpoint of the armed formations on the south-eastern outskirts of Pryshyb (non-government-controlled, 34km north-west of Luhansk).

Near Volnovakha (government-controlled, 53km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw four members of an international demining organization conducting demining and UXO-clearing activities near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water conduits near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, to a water pipeline near Travneve (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Donetsk), and to power lines near Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), and Khoroshe (non-government-controlled, 36km west of Luhansk). The SMM also facilitated repairs to power lines near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk) and Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk) and was told by senior personnel that the repairs have been completed, providing electricity to about 1,300 civilians. The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 8 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two different occasions, at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) after the SMM refused to show its patrol plan.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons