Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 15 March 2019
This report is for the media and the general public.
Summary
Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
The SMM continued to observe hardship faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line.
The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk and Donetsk regions.
Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its access was also restricted at a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and at a checkpoint near Novolaspa.*
Ceasefire violations[1]
In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 160 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (72 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol); at southerly and easterly directions of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), in areas close to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) and the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk); and at southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).
In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 180 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west and north-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), south-west of Troitske (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north-east of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).
Disengagement areas[2]
In the early morning hours of 15 March, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km south-south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.
On the night of 14-15 March, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded two projectiles in flight, at an assessed range of 1-3km east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day on 15 March, positioned in Zolote and on the western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and three shots of small-arms fire near the disengagement area.
Positioned near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]
Withdrawal of weapons
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.
Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites
Government-controlled areas
15 March
The SMM saw:
a tank (T-64) on a flatbed trailer near Polkove (38km north of Mariupol), and
three tanks (T-72) on flatbed trailers near Andriivka (61km south of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
15 March
The SMM saw a tank (type undetermined) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).
Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]
At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region
15 March
The SMM noted that:
four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were present and
12 anti-tank guns (D48, 85mm), 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S3, Akatsyia, 152mm) and 113 towed howitzers (45 D-20, 152mm; 56 2A36, Giatsint-B, 152mm; and 12 2A65 MSTA-B 152mm) were again missing.
Weapons permanent storage sites
At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region
15 March
The SMM noted that 14 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) continued to be missing.
Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]
Government-controlled areas
14 March
An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:
two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (a BMP-2 and a BMP variant), five armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR variant) close to residential houses near Troitske, and
two IFVs (BMP-1) near Novoselivka (66km south of Donetsk).
An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two APCs (a BTR-60 and a Saxon) near Loskutivka (72km west of Luhansk).
15 March
The SMM saw:
an APC (Saxon) in Nyzhnoteple (26km north of Luhansk),
an IFV (BMP-2) in the western outskirts of Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk)
an IFV (BMP-2) on a flatbed trailer in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk),
an APC (BTR-80) near Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), and
an APC (BTR-70) at a checkpoint near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk).
Non-government-controlled areas
On 14 March, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an electronic warfare system (P-15 1RL13 Flat Face-A) at an airfield near Rozivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).
Presence of unexploded ordnance
The SMM saw for the first time four unmarked pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) rounds, imbedded in asphalted roads in populated areas north-west and north-east of the Donetsk central railway station (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre): the first located approximately 2km north-west of the railway station, approximately 35m from the nearest residential building and 20m from a bus stop; the second about 70m further west; the third about 900m north-east of the railway station and about 60m from the nearest building; and the fourth about 400m further north-east and 10m away from the nearest building.
About 2km north-east of Orlivske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw for the first time an explosive remnant of war imbedded in the centre of an asphalted road often used by local residents and the SMM.
About 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw that two previously observed pieces of UXO, assessed as 152mm artillery rounds, were no longer present (see SMM Daily Report 15 March 2019). At the same checkpoint, a member of the armed formations told the SMM that the armed formations had removed the UXO on 15 March.
Hardship for civilians at checkpoints along the contact line
At 12:00, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a member of the armed formations punching a civilian (male, 40 years old) three times, and then kicking him once while he was down on the ground. After the member of the armed formations walked away from him, two first aiders attended to him and helped him sit on a bench in the nearby shelter.
At the same time, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM saw around 500 people queuing to exit and around 800 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas.
SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure
The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a deteriorated water supply network near Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk); power lines in Novozvanivka (government-controlled, 70km west of Luhansk) and in Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM also facilitated repairs at the pumping station near Vasylivka, on which about 1.2 million residents rely for their access to water, and to a power line in Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk) and was informed that the repairs at both locations had been concluded. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.
The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.
*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.
Denial of access:
A member of the armed formations denied the SMM entry into a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region, citing “security” reasons.
At a checkpoint near Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the village, citing “ongoing special operations in the village”.
Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:
The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge.
Delay:
At a checkpoint near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers refused to allow the SMM to access the village, citing orders from their commander. The SMM informed the JCCC. After about 30 minutes, they granted the SMM access.
[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.
* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.
[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.
[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.
[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that five such sites continued to be abandoned.
[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.