Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 13 March 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission saw anti-tank mines for the first time near Novoselivka, Shyroka Balka, as well as in an area between Marinka and Oleksandrivka. 
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk and Donetsk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its access was also restricted in Verkhnoshyrokivske and at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however fewer explosions (about 90), compared with the previous reporting period (120 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas north, south-south-west and south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, however more explosions (110), compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-north-west of Kirovsk (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 12-13 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east and south-south-east (all assessed as inside the disengagement area) and 13 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-5km in directions ranging from east-north-east to east-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). The same camera recorded six projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).   

During the day on 13 March, positioned in three locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard about 75 ceasefire violations assessed as near the disengagement area. Positioned south of Zolote-5/Mykhailivika (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk) on the same day, the SMM also heard 22 undetermined explosions and about 45 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km north-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Damage to roof and an impact crater near Novoluhanske

On 12 March, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted damage to the roof of a building, assessed as caused by artillery or mortar impacts, in the north-western part of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union's pig farm near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Luhansk). The same UAV also spotted a crater next to a power pylon 200m north of the aforementioned building, assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round (all observations not seen in imagery from 16 February 2019).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air-missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), a probable anti-tank gun (MT-12) and two mortars (probable120mm) in a field near Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk), as well as at least 40 ammunition crates next to the mortar.

13 March

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) on a road near Vedenske (33km north-east of Mariupol), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014. 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 19 tanks (T-72) in a training area near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

13. March

The SMM noted that:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) and 12 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were present and
• four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), 47 towed howitzers (35 2A65, 12 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), 20 anti-tank guns (MT-12), five surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) and four towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

13 March

The SMM noted that 33 tanks (T-72) three mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12) remained missing.

At permanent storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

13 March

The SMM noted that:

• 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 23 tanks (14 T-72 and nine T-64) remained missing.  

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk) and
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) close to residential houses in Vodiane.

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), fitted onto an armoured recovery vehicle (VT-55), in Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time a small bunker and a trench about 30m from a residential house in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets.

13 March

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) with a mounted heavy-machine-gun in Kapitanove (49km north-west of Luhansk);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) with a mounted heavy-machine-gun in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk); and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) near Sentianivka and
• an APC (BTR-80) and a trench digger (PMZ-3) near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines and mine hazard signs  

On 12 March, a mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 92 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows running north to south for at least 200m in a field about 4km north-east of Novoselivka and 38 anti-tank mines laid in three rows about 2km south of the aforementioned mines. The same UAV also for the first time spotted at least 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) in a single line along a treeline near Shyroka Balka.

On the same day, a mid-range UAV spotted 300 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in a line of 500m near Vodiane and 50 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) about 1km north of the aforementioned mines (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 13 February 2019) .

On 13 March, the SMM saw an anti-tank mine (TM-62) for the first time about 20m south of road H-15 between the forward position of the armed formations near Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) and the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), close to previously observed mines. In the vicinity of the aforementioned checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the SMM saw for the first time four anti-tank mines (TM-62M) about 15m north of road H-15 close to previously observed mines (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 5 March 2019).

About 5m north of a road from Marinka to Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a rectangular mine hazard sign for the first time with yellow and red colour and inscriptions that included “Warning! Access (passage) to this territory is dangerous” in Ukrainian. On the southern outskirts of Taramchuk (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk), 5m north-west of the road, the SMM saw for the first time a square shaped mine hazard sign, red and yellow in colour with a skull and crossbones and “Danger Mines” written in Ukrainian and Russian. About 15-20m north of road T-0509 near Zhukova Balka (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time two square shaped mine hazard signs, red and white in colour with “Danger Mines” written in Russian and English, attached to a wire fence about 250m apart.

In Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw that a previously observed mine hazard sign had been removed, now leaving an area east of Slavne confirmed by the SMM as hazardous without markings indicating the presence of mines.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and inspections to power lines in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km north-west of Luhansk) and repairs to an electric transformer near Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM saw four cars (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and one covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. While present the SMM also saw 28 cars (seven with Ukrainian, nine with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates and 11 with “DPR” plates) and 55 trucks (52 covered cargo and three tanker trucks) (24 with Ukrainian, 13 with Belarusian, seven with Russian Federation and two with Lithuanian licence plates and nine with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM noted an unusually long 2km line of trucks waiting to exit Ukraine. Two drivers in the line told the SMM that they had already been waiting 14-18 hours to exit.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two occasions at a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “orders from superiors”. The SMM was therefore unable to reach Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol). The SMM observed civilian vehicles passing the checkpoint without restrictions in both directions.
• At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access, citing the need for permission from senior members of the armed formations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.