Latest from the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), based on information received as of 19:30, 26 February 2019

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Bullets flew over the heads of SMM patrol members in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling to a functioning school in Sakhanka and houses in Zolote-1/Soniachnyi.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the disengagement area near Zolote.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of and repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a heavy weapons holding area in Donetsk region, at a compound in Samiilove, at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk and at a checkpoint in Popasna.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 170 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (220 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), south-south-east and south of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly and westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 23 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (53 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded west-north-west and north of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and adjacent to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Small arms fired near the SMM in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

While monitoring adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, an SMM patrol, positioned on the village’s western edge, heard about five shots of small-arms fire about 200m west-north-west, followed by the sound of bullets flying over their heads and hitting a tree about 5-10m south-east. (See SMM Spot Report 26 February 2019.) The Mission members took cover on the ground and then inside the vehicles. The SMM saw Luhansk Water Company employees, who had been conducting the repair works, take cover as well (see below SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure). Shortly before this incident, the SMM had heard about 30 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km west-north-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as 18 undetermined explosions and about 15 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Damage caused by shelling to school in Sakhanka

In the yard of a functioning school at 3 Vartazarovoi Street in Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM observed two fresh craters and damage to school properties, assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a south-south-westerly direction. About 2m from the first crater (10m south of the school building), the Mission saw a hole in a water pipeline used for heating, assessed as caused by shrapnel. About 10m north-east of the second crater, the Mission saw a west-facing entrance door of the school building dislodged from its doorframe. A man, who said that he was a resident of the village, told the SMM that between 08:00 and 08:30 on 25 February, while in the neighbourhood of the school, he had heard explosions and then seen the abovementioned damage at the school. He added that there had been no pupils present at the time of shelling as the school had been closed for the holidays. In front of the school, the SMM observed fresh tracks of undetermined vehicles on a road leading west into a field. (About 1.5km west of the school, the Mission had previously observed positions of the armed formation.)

Damage caused by shelling to houses in Zolote-1/Soniachnyi

In Zolote-1/Soniachnyi (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), on 24 February, the SMM saw a shattered south-facing window of an inhabited two-storey house at 2 Vysoka Street and fresh damage (multiple holes) to the south-facing side of the roof of a single-storey inhabited house at 4 Vysoka Street. The Mission observed five fresh craters nearby, three of which were less than 15m south of the houses, assessed as caused by rounds of undetermined weapons fired from a south-easterly direction. A resident of the former house told the SMM that at around 05:30 on 24 February, while at home, his house had been damaged by shelling (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 26 February 2019).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 25 February, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 1-2km east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). In the early hours of 26 February, the camera recorded four projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-5km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 26 February, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a previously observed tailfin of a mortar (possibly 82mm) round on the ground 1-1.5m west of the road and about 270m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (see SMM Daily Report 27 December 2018).

Positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

26 February:

The SMM saw:

• a towed howitzer (type unknown) being transported by a truck moving north near Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) moving south near Krasnohorivka (24km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• a tank (T-64) near Novoselivka (99km north of Donetsk).

26 February

The SMM saw:

• 32 tanks (T-64) stationary at the railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk);
• seven IFVs (two BMP-2, one BMP-1 and the remainder BMP variants) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk); and
• two IFVs near Novooleksandrivka (65km west of Luhansk).

25 February

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

-           two armoured personnel carriers (BTR variant) in Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk) about 20m from the nearest house.

Non-government-controlled areas

24 February

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Nyzhnie Lozove (59km north-east of Donetsk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Nadarivka (64km west of Luhansk);
• 16 IFVs (BMP-1) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk); and
• an IFV (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk).

Recent impact craters

On 25 February, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted at least seven fresh impact craters, assessed as caused by mortar (120mm) rounds, in and near Vodiane. Two of them were spotted near destroyed houses and the remainder near positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces east of the village. About 3km east of Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and about 1.3km south-east of the aforementioned positions, the UAV spotted at least 50 fresh impact craters, assessed as caused by probable mortar (82mm or 120mm) rounds, near positions of the armed formations.

Presence of mines

On 24 February, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 40 previously observed anti-tank mines (undetermined mines) laid across on road M03 between Svitlodarsk and Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk)(see SMM Daily Report 21 June 2018).

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of and repair works to water pipelines at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and a water pipeline near Shumy (government-controlled, 41km north of Donetsk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS. Following the occurrence of ceasefire violations in the area (see above), representatives of the Luhansk Water Company told the SMM that repairs and assessments of water pipelines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka had been suspended.

Border areas outside of government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for 30 minutes, the SMM saw 25 cars (three with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates, as well as 17 with “DPR” plates and one with plates marked with a green-and-white striped flag and the letters “ABH”) entering Ukraine. The Mission also saw eight cars (five with Russian Federation and two with Ukrainian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw eight cars (two with Russian Federation licence plates, and six with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and ten cars (three with Russian Federation, two with Ukrainian and one with Lithuanian licence plates, and four with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian license plates) and a bus (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about ten minutes, the SMM saw three cars (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine and four cars (three with Ukrainian licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 25 February 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• Three armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM entry into a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, citing “orders” not to allow the Mission to enter the area without written permission.
• Three armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM entry into a compound on the eastern edge of Samiilove (non-government-controlled, 89km south of Donetsk).
• Four armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol) denied the SMM passage through the checkpoint towards the town or west, citing “ongoing special forces operation”. The Mission saw civilian vehicles crossing the checkpoint in all directions.
• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) did not allow the SMM to proceed south-west on road T0405, citing orders from his commander.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments

• An SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as jamming, while flying over areas north and north-east of Donetsk region.[5]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka, at Oktiabr mine and in Svitlodarsk were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.