

Working Group B,  
First Annual Security Review Conference  
(25-26 June 2003)

## Speaking Notes

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### **Comprehensive Security - The Future Role of Arms Control**

Mr. Co-ordinator, distinguished Delegations;

Let me first thank the OSCE Chairmanship for inviting me to present you some thoughts about today's topic - comprehensive security and the future role of arms control for the OSCE's politico-military dimension.

I see it as a great honour but also as an expression of the wish to have this subject covered from a perspective of a person once called a „dinosaur“ of the OSCE's politico-military dimension, with other words – in a perspective from where we come, and where we might go. Going back to the origins might help us to understand what instruments had been developed when and under what circumstances. It will enable us to assess their success, but also to ask whether these instruments are still adequate to a security situation which has changed so drastically over the past years. This experience may also be a guideline for our future efforts in arms control within the OSCE space.

Let me therefore address the issue from the following perspective:

- First, the conceptual framework for comprehensive security, military stability, and the role of arms control both in general terms, and within the OSCE framework;
- Second, a stocktaking of the achievements within the OSCE and their evaluation;
- And, finally, a look ahead to the new challenges and the answers we might have to find to address them accordingly, and
- Some conclusions.

#### **First, the conceptual framework**

When we would ask for a definition of “security” we would get a vast number of different answers. The term „security“ has over time undergone a significant widening, from the traditional understanding of countering military threats to coping with social tensions, ecological threats, spread of diseases, etc.

For the area of ”international security“, however, the approach taken within the United Nations Charter appears still valid, consistently referring to “international peace and security“. We may derive from it that the notion of “international security” has been closely linked to maintaining peace and preventing wars and other armed conflicts. This understanding has never been challenged since the Charter had been adopted. It is also applicable within the context of comprehensive security.

Security rests on two pillars: political stability and military stability.

- Political stability deals with the **causes of armed conflict**. It means that there is no incentive for armed conflict on the political level, be it because no major tensions exist which would induce their military solution, or be it because the peaceful solution of conflicts has become a regular and accepted pattern of international relations;
- Military stability means that no state within the system **could successfully employ military force**. If victory is uncertain, or even impossible, (offensive) war has ceased to be an instrument of politics in the Clausewitzian sense.

None of these two pillars can by itself be a solid basis for international peace and security without the other. They are indispensable, complementary and mutually re-enforcing factors. A comprehensive security policy therefore must also be understood not to allow instabilities in one or the other sphere.

This understanding has been also reflected in the OSCE's agenda and structures which duly reflect this distinction and complementarity within its two main bodies:

- the Permanent Council dealing with issues of – broadly speaking – “political stability“, and
- the Forum for Security Co-operation dealing with issues of – broadly speaking – “military stability“.

As the development of measures within the CSCE/OSCE framework has shown, military stability must not, however, be reduced to simplistic ideas of „military balances“, i.e. equal numbers of military hardware etc. While it is a necessary element of stability to prevent destabilising accumulation of arms, it is only one, namely the “static” component of stability. Beyond it, There are “dynamic” elements which need to be addressed, too.

Policies to achieve military stability have been encapsulated in the term “arms control” which had been introduced more than forty years ago. It was defined as an instrument of international security policy which pursued the following objectives:

- First, arms control should reduce the likelihood of war;
- secondly, arms control should reduce the scope and violence of war if it occurs;
- thirdly, it should reduce the political and economic costs of being prepared for war.

The basic principles which are valid still now were defined as follows:

- the recognition of the common interest, of the possibility of reciprocation and co-operation even between potential enemies with respect to their military establishments,
- the purpose of military force is not simply to win wars, but to deter aggression, while avoiding the kind of threat that may provoke desperate, preventive, or irrational military action on the part of other countries.
- a nation's military force, while opposing the military force of potentially hostile nations, is also bound to collaborate, implicitly if not explicitly, in avoiding the kinds of crises in which withdrawal is intolerable for both sides, in avoiding false alarms and mistaken intentions, and in providing reassurance that restraint on the part of the potential enemies would be matched by restraint on one's own side.

In contrast to its today's meaning, arms control was then perceived within a wider scope and as a significantly broader term. As it was stated, „Reductions or increases in certain kinds of military force, qualitative changes in weaponry, different modes of deployment, or arrangements superimposed on existing military systems have all been included in the original scope of arms control, as well as the idea of improved intelligence about each other's military doctrines and modes of deployment, or the provision of superior communication between governments in the event of military crisis“.

We easily recognise that some of these early conceptual considerations have found their manifestation within inter alia the Confidence- and Security Building Measures (CSBMs) developed subsequently within the CSCE/OSCE framework. The OSCE has become a comprehensive framework for arms control not only because of its comprehensive participation but also because of its comprehensive approach reflecting the original wide scope of arms control.

### **Second, the achievements and their evaluation**

The OSCE Participating States have over the decades developed an impressive tool-kit of measures which corresponds both to the mentioned objectives of arms control, as well as to its basic ideas and instruments which at the time they were presented as concepts would have been politically inconceivable, as for example the above mentioned “improved intelligence about each other’s military doctrines and modes of deployment”. What else are our doctrine seminars, or the regular information exchanges about deployed forces, defence planning, and the like? What else are the communications network and the Vienna Document’s risk reduction mechanisms, than the above-mentioned “provision of superior communication between governments in the event of military crisis” ?

Let me enumerate just the core documents which contain these achievements, as they are all known:

- First, the military provisions within the Helsinki Final Act which introduced the first Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) ever introduced and designed as such:
- The Stockholm Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs) and its further developments to the various versions of the Vienna Document until 1999;
- The CFE Treaty which had been given its mandate by the Vienna Follow-up meeting in 1989;
- The 1993 Documents on Defence Planning and on contacts and Co-operation which had been subsequently incorporated into the Vienna Document 1994;
- The 1993 Documents on Principles Governing Non-Proliferation and on Measures for Localised Crisis Situations;
- The 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security;
- The 2000 Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).

Furthermore, we have to mention the Open Skies Treaty which does not belong to the CSCE/OSCE framework in the formal sense but closely corresponds to a essential feature of CSBMs – mutual openness and transparency.

These achievements are significant in themselves, the more so because of their by and large positive implementation record by participating States. They are even more impressive when we compare them to the point of departure, when and where the whole process began.

### **Have our instruments succeeded?**

The answer must be given in the context of what the mentioned measures have mostly been designed for.

Most of the mentioned instruments to increase military stability in the OSCE space have had their roots and origins in the threat perceptions which had dominated the thinking on European security in the latest stage of the then East-West confrontation. Some of them, as for example the original CFE-Treaty, while being indispensable for military stability in itself, have, to a certain degree, even codified the East-West-divide beyond its real existence, calculating States as “Eastern” at a time when they came closer to, and finally even joined, the Western alliance. Indeed, only the adaptation of the CFE Treaty at the Istanbul Summit in 1999 has finally overcome the thinking in terms of a military equilibrium between East and West, which had outlived its strategic foundation for almost a decade.

Other instruments, like the Stockholm and the various Vienna Documents, were formally not linked to the East-West divide as they from the very beginning in principle had aimed at regulating military relations among individual States, concerning openness and transparency of military activities and later of holdings of every individual State, military contacts, etc.

However, there had been a common element throughout all these instruments. They had their roots in the threat perceptions of the time of their origins, dominated by scenarios of large-scale conventional armed conflict, with an inherent potential to escalate into higher form of conflict, and they had been designed to prevent this type of conflict.

From that perspective, they can be regarded as successful. None of such large-scale conventional conflicts has fortunately ever broken out between participating States. While we cannot assess how significant the contribution of these instruments had been for this important achievement, we can state that the instruments developed in the CSCE/OSCE framework have at least not failed to serve their basic purpose.

### **The new challenges and what answers?**

Parallel to that positive assessment, however, we have to consider that over the past decade, the same OSCE space has seen severe armed conflicts in the Balkans, in the Black Sea region, the Caucasus, Central Asia, etc. And we should not ignore that violent conflicts have taken place – often over decades – also within some Western European States, albeit on a smaller scope.

These conflicts have, however, been no longer of the type of large-scale conventional offensive operations the hitherto developed instruments were designed to prevent, but rather of the type commonly referred to as “low intensity“, “asymmetric” or “sub-conventional“ conflicts, “insurgencies” etc. Such conflicts are fought mostly within rather than between States, following a guerrilla concept rather than a conventional combined-weapons doctrine, fought mostly between infantry forces, and with heavy weapons in many cases employed, if at all, only by one side, etc.

There is also a close correlation to the phenomenon of terrorism. In conceptual terms, it is possible to draw a dividing line between “non-international armed conflicts” as regulated inter alia by the second 1977 Additional Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the one hand, and terrorism on the other. However, this dividing line has been frequently blurred by all sides participating in such conflicts – insurgents using terrorist strategies aimed at intimidating the civilian population; government forces doing the same under obviously illegitimate purposes as for example “ethnic cleansing”, or less obvious and under the pretext of seemingly legitimate reasons as for example restoring law and order, territorial integrity, and the like; and finally by a tendency to use the term “terrorists” for whatever forces for political purposes.

The question appears legitimate whether the OSCE participating States **have done enough**, over the past years, to address these changed circumstances and new challenges to military stability in the same way as they had successfully done so in the past with respect to preventing conventional armed conflicts, and in the developing – in response to the new challenges – of measures to increase political stability with respect to such critical issues as national minorities.

An assessment comes to a mixed result. First, the issue as such has not been completely ignored. Within the CSCE/OSCE framework, several attempts have been made to address phenomena related to that shift in the spectrum of possible instabilities in the military sphere. They include inter alia

- The Document on Measures for Localized Crisis Situations (1993);
- The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Issues of Security (1994);
- Some provisions within the 2000 Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), as for example the provisions concerning illicit trafficking; export criteria as for example the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in the recipient country; the internal and regional situation in and around

the recipient country, in the light of existing tensions or armed conflicts; the legitimate domestic security needs of the recipient country, and the like;

- The 2001 Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism

to name only some of the more prominent examples.

While these efforts are no small achievements in themselves, it appears, however, that the OSCE participating States have taken a kind of „patchwork“ approach vis-à-vis the task to counter the threats posed by the “new conflicts”, responding to one single challenge at a time it becomes blatantly manifest, as for example the question of SALW when it had begun to gain the attraction also in other fora, or the question of terrorism in particular after the terrible attacks in New York and Washington.

It may thus be worth exploring whether a coherent approach could be elaborated in the OSCE framework to address not only individual aspects of these “new conflicts“ which have had so devastating effects in the OSCE space over the past decade, but find out ways and means how to increase military stability in a more comprehensive setting.

It is obvious that such an approach cannot be undertaken in the same way as it could be taken in the field of conventional arms control. There, it could be based on the minimum understanding of the States entering negotiations to achieve consensus to mutually refrain from certain actions regarded by both as dangerous for military stability, and to engage in actions which increase military stability. This is true for nuclear arms limitation as much as for mutual contacts and co-operation, as enshrined in the Vienna Document. It cannot be easily envisaged to take the same approach to prevent sub-conventional “new conflicts” which involve at least on one side Non-State actors which we will not find around our negotiation tables.

We have to aim, therefore, at standards and measures which can be elaborated among States, to be applied within rather than among them. A valid point of departure can be seen in the mentioned Document on Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations, and in the Code of Conduct.

The Document on Stabilizing Measures for Localized Crisis Situations was developed to facilitate decision-making in the appropriate CSCE (now: OSCE) bodies and the search for specific measures for temporary application in support of the political process. Its catalogue is declared as “neither comprehensive nor exhaustive”. What makes it, however, a good point of departure is the fact that it explicitly refers to the possibility that of the parties involved in a crisis, some parties may not be States, and it also explicitly states that their participation in a crisis prevention, management and/or settlement process does not affect their status. While it thus in principle recognizes the challenges posed by the new types of conflicts, its catalogue of measures has, however, still been mostly shaped along the lines of traditional State-to-State measures, as for example information exchanges, notification of military activities, and the like. Other measures appear better applicable to the new types of conflict, as for example cease-fires, establishment of demilitarized zones, de-activation of certain weapons systems, and the like. The precondition for such measures is, of course, that a localized crisis situation has already escalated into armed conflict, i.e. they aim to prevent not the outbreak, but the resumption of hostilities.

The Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security is the most comprehensive document and bridges the gaps which had before existed between provisions regulating military and security policy matters in peacetime on the one hand and in actual armed conflicts on the other hand, as well as between issues of "external" and "internal" security. Some of its provision are of direct relevance for the subject, as for example that in the event of armed conflict, the States will seek to facilitate the effective cessation of hostilities. This would be true not only for “classical“ conflicts but also for “new” conflicts. Then, States are obliged not to tolerate or support forces uncontrolled by the authorities, i.e. non-state paramilitary forces which are a prerequisite for most of the “new conflicts”. The Code also emphasizes and strengthens adherence to the international laws of armed conflict, which would also pertain to law applicable in no-international armed conflicts. Finally, the Code gives clear guidelines for the use of armed forces to internal security missions.

These two Documents may be a good point of departure for further considerations how to cope with the phenomenon of the “new conflicts” in the OSCE space. On the one hand, they address these issues already, either implicitly, or even – in parts – explicitly. On the other hand, because they allow for the conclusion that the future for arms control in this field may not be sought in developing elaborated and sophisticated “measures” in the way the CSBMs or similar measures have been elaborated. It may be one of the weaknesses of the Document on Stabilizing Measures that it appears still too strongly attached to these “classical” measures. The Code of Conduct, in contrast, would allow for the conclusion that the future might rather consist of a mixture of basic principles to be adhered to, and rather generic descriptions of what adequate answers would be under given circumstances.

### **Conclusions:**

Do our findings mean that arms control would be increasingly irrelevant, with no more need for further measures to prevent armed conflicts on the conventional level, and inapplicable for sub-conventional “new conflicts” ?

I do not want to address the first part of this question as this has been covered by the other keynote speaker to this topic. For the second part, the answer might be “yes” if we would understand arms control exclusively in the sense of negotiated agreements between equal State partners. If we define arms control, however, by its basic objectives and principles, the picture may look different.

- The main objectives – preventing unnecessary escalation and limiting the damage caused by armed conflicts – are valid for whatever type of conflict, be they of an international or non-international character.
- The same is true for the main principles - the recognition of the common interest, of the possibility of reciprocation and co-operation even between potential enemies; avoiding the kind of threat that may provoke desperate, preventive, or irrational military action on the part of the other side; reassurance that restraint on the part of the potential enemies would be matched by restraint on one's own side.

The key issue would thus be no longer the development of classical “measures” regulating military issues in detail, as for example the procedures for inspections, but of generic mechanisms which allow for flexible application in accordance with the circumstances, while following the above-mentioned objectives and principles.

Finally, military stability must never be seen as an isolated issue. While it is true that issues of military stability can be solved best when not be overburdened by political questions, conflict prevention has to address both political and military stability at the same time. Preventing escalation is a necessary prerequisite for finding solutions for the underlying political questions. This is also true for the “new” conflicts. For the OSCE it would mean that the synergies between its two respective institutional pillars, the PC and the FSC, must be brought to bear for joint efforts in elaborating, in coordinated efforts, adequate instruments for enhancing both political and military stability to be successful not only in preventing “classical” conventional armed conflicts, but also the new type of sub-conventional “new conflicts”.