

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

ENGLISH only

25 June 2003

Intervention WG B: "Comprehensive Security"

The discussion of comprehensive security should lead to an appropriate response to the highly complex nature of the security risks and challenges, that is the „new types of risks“ we face. Comprehensive security in the OSCE region has not yet become reality. There are areas of disquieting armed confrontation and others, where stability still needs a foreign military and civil presence for its guarantee. Today, comprehensive security can only be achieved by taking into account global security challenges.

We are not starting from scratch. The existing CSBM instruments of risk reduction prove a solid basis for transparency, reliability and predictability in inter-state relations and in the politico-military conduct. They do not become outdated by additional new risks or changes in alliances. However, in order to keep them as topical as ever they need to be reviewed regularly and we need to be prepared, where appropriate, to carefully adapt them to new developments in military posture, technology and strategy. CSBM should not necessarily become outdated by the "Revolution in Military Affairs" nor by the need for multi-national Rapid Reaction Forces. Regional arms control including the ACFE-Treaty balances military capabilities and continues to enhance our security.

Let me concentrate on two major cross-dimensional types of risks: weak/failing states and armed action by non-state actors. These can be considered as significant root causes for various risks to security and stability not only in the OSCE region but also in adjacent regions.

Weak or failing states are prone to become exporters of instability affecting entire regions as a source of migration and/or as safe havens for insurgents or terrorists. Poor control over security structures and armed contingents or even over parts of the territory may trigger chain reactions leading to the formation of, and uncontrolled armed actions by, irregular armed groups benefitting from the security vacuum thus provided. Insufficient control over military stockpiles, arms production and transfer, inadequate control over conventional weapons and toxic precursors to WMD further increase the risk of exacerbating the conflict situation characterised by asymmetric types of armed actions by non-state actors. Adhering to non-proliferation and existing bans of WMD remains a core element of security.

Small arms and light weapons are the preferred type of weapon for non-state-actors including terrorists. ManPADS for one are the most obvious in their potential to disrupt civil aviation. The strict control of SALW production, stockpiling and transfer

might prove helpful to dry up arms supply to irregulars and non-state actors. It is an anachronism if OSCE standards in this field including export criteria were only applicable for transfers inside the OSCE region only. Exports to destinations outside the area also need to become transparent and subject to strict criteria. In addition, the creation or consolidation of efficient integrated border control regimes could help to reduce their circulation.

The Code of Conduct entails an enormous set of standards and norms, which, if applied thoroughly, not only helps to foster and promote the civil democratic control of armed and security forces and their strict adherence to the rule of law, but can also be of assistance to reforms of the security sector as a whole. This also constitutes an active element in the prevention of spill-over effects. At no time should armed and security forces have to be considered as part of an existing security problem. They have in fact to be part of the solution. We therefore advocate enhancement of co-operation projects fostering the implementation and wider acceptance of the Code of Conduct beyond the OSCE region.

How can the existing politico-military instruments be better implemented on the ground? We firmly believe, that the politico-military dimension of SALW and the Code should, where appropriate, be integrated in field-missions adding respective personnel. Consequently, the politico-military competence of field missions could be enhanced and the practical co-operation measures could be better organised and evaluated. This would also increase the visibility and thereby importance and acceptance of the politico-military acquis within a conflict situation.

The debate about „comprehensive security“ could be the right time and place to also reiterate the questions related to civil-military co-operation aspects. Conflicts in recent years have demonstrated the need for concerted action of civil, security and military forces in order to assure the success of external assistance missions. We should try to look at risk-reduction-lessons learnt from such experiences in the light of the discussion of comprehensive security. This would also help to direct our view to OSCE-adjacent regions in which almost every aspect of the new security challenge is evident.