

Chairmanship: the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

692nd PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

1. Date: Wednesday, 26 September 2012

Opened: 10.10 a.m.
Suspended: 1.05 p.m.
Resumed: 3 p.m.
Closed: 3.20 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador Z. Dabik

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: SECURITY DIALOGUE

(a) *Presentation by Ambassador N. Todorčevski, Director of RACVIAC – Centre for Security Cooperation, entitled “Regional Cooperation – How the region of SEE responds to the security challenges outside of the region”*: Chairperson, Mr. N. Todorčevski, Mr. F. Klinser, Cyprus-European Union (with the acceding country Croatia; the candidate countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro and Serbia; the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate countries Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association country Norway, member of the European Economic Area; as well as Moldova and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/109/12), Montenegro (FSC.DEL/111/12), Turkey, Serbia (FSC.DEL/108/12 OSCE+), Austria, Bosnia and Herzegovina (FSC.DEL/113/12 OSCE+), Croatia, United Kingdom, United States of America

(b) *Presentation by Mr. L. Buhin, Demining Officer at the OSCE Office in Tajikistan, entitled “The OSCE Office in Tajikistan Mine Action Programme – Overview and Prospects”*: Chairperson, OSCE Office in Tajikistan (FSC.FR/1/12 OSCE+), Cyprus-European Union (with the acceding country Croatia; the candidate countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro and Serbia; the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate countries Albania and Bosnia and

Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association country Norway, member of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/110/12), Russian Federation, Croatia, Tajikistan, United Kingdom, United States of America, FSC Co-ordinator for Projects on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Hungary), Afghanistan (Partner for Co-operation)

Agenda item 2: GENERAL STATEMENTS

- (a) *“Caucasus 2012” military exercises, held in the Russian Federation from 17 to 23 September 2012:* Russian Federation, United States of America, France
- (b) *Financial contribution to the capacity development programme for the management of stockpiles of conventional ammunition in Serbia:* Norway (Annex 1), Serbia
- (c) *Financial contribution to the Montenegro Demilitarization Programme (MONDEM):* Luxembourg (Annex 2), Montenegro (FSC.DEL/112/12), FSC Co-ordinator for Projects on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Hungary)
- (d) *Response to a statement made by the Russian Federation at the 689th Plenary Meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation, held on 25 July 2012:* Georgia (Annex 3), Russian Federation, Turkey, Germany, Cyprus

Agenda item 3: DECISION ON THE USE OF THE OSCE
COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK BY PARTICIPATING
STATES OF THE DOCUMENT ON CONFIDENCE- AND
SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN THE NAVAL
FIELD IN THE BLACK SEA

Chairperson

Decision: The Forum for Security Co-operation adopted Decision No. 5/12 (FSC.DEC/5/12) on the use of the OSCE Communications Network by Participating States of the Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea, the text of which is appended to this journal.

Turkey

Agenda item 4: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *Postponement of reporting on the donors’ visit to Serbia conducted from 15 to 17 September 2012:* FSC Co-ordinator for Projects on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Hungary)

- (b) *Briefing by the Chairperson of the OSCE Communications Group on its 58th meeting, held on 20 September 2012:* Representative of the Conflict Prevention Centre
- (c) *Seminar on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, held near Zagreb from 18 to 20 September 2012:* Representative of the Conflict Prevention Centre, FSC Co-ordinator for the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (Germany)

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 3 October 2012, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/698
26 September 2012
Annex 1

Original: ENGLISH

692nd Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 698, Agenda item 2(b)

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF NORWAY

Mr. Chairperson,

I am happy to announce that the Kingdom of Norway has decided to donate 30,000 euros to the capacity development programme for the management of stockpiles of conventional ammunition in the Republic of Serbia. The donation is intended to provide assistance to the Government of Serbia in the demilitarization of ammunition filled with white phosphorus and napalm powder.

Norway is glad to be able to take part as a donor in this project and thus continue the specific tradition of co-operation between our two countries.

We ask you, Mr. Chairperson, to attach this statement to the journal of today's meeting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/698
26 September 2012
Annex 2

Original: ENGLISH

692nd Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 698, Agenda item 2(c)

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF LUXEMBOURG

The Montenegro Demilitarization Programme (MONDEM) was established in April 2007 following a request from the Republic of Montenegro for a capacity-building programme for SALW demilitarization and safe storage. It is a joint programme of the Government of Montenegro, the UNDP and the OSCE. Since its initiation, Luxembourg has continuously supported the MONDEM project with donations amounting to 100,000 euros (25,000 in 2007, 2008, 2010 and 2011) and will donate a further 25,000 euros in 2012.

We believe that the results achieved so far are impressive and we encourage all participating States to contribute to the third phase of the project, which will start next year.



692nd Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 698, Agenda item 2(d)

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF GEORGIA

Mr. Chairperson,

I would like to make a statement in response to the groundless accusations made against Georgia by the head of the Russian delegation at the FSC meeting on 25 July.

At the beginning I would like to say that the statement by the Russian representative was yet another attempt to justify the illegal military presence of Russian troops and the ongoing military build-up on occupied Georgian territory.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Now let me remind this distinguished audience, especially our Russian colleagues, that armed forces of the Russian Federation still remain in Georgia, where they are occupying 20 per cent of the country's territory. Russia has proceeded to recognize the regimes created with its political support and military backing, both in Abkhazia and in the Tskhinvali region. Under the pretence of concluding an inter-State agreement with these entities, which were created through ethnic cleansing, Russia has set up two military bases on the territory of Georgia and has used them for the deployment of over ten thousand servicemen. The ongoing build-up of offensive military capabilities in these bases includes the deployment of state-of-the-art command and control systems, tanks, and rocket-propelled artillery, as well as the training of assault and special operation troops.

As the international community is aware, Georgia has unilaterally pledged not to use force in its quest for territorial integrity. Russia, on the other hand, at the same time as questioning Georgia's intentions and accusing our country of heavy militarization, still refuses to reciprocate Georgia's pledge of non-use of force, in spite of calls by the international community for it to do so.

Contrary to the provisions of the 12 August 2008 ceasefire Agreement, Russia openly opposes the establishment of the international security and stability mechanisms in the territories under occupation. In addition, Russia constantly puts obstacles in the way of the International Geneva Discussions, which were designed to develop international security and stability arrangements in the occupied Georgian territory and to ensure the safe and dignified return of displaced persons.

Furthermore, by contrast with the Russian portrayal of our country as a heavily militarized State, Georgia in fact has the smallest army in the region. It should be emphasized that in the process of building a modern, NATO interoperable army, the Georgian Government has acted and is continuing to act in a fully transparent manner and in compliance with the relevant international arrangements.

As a sovereign democratic State Georgia actively co-operates with international partners and is active in building up and developing its defence capabilities, as indeed all democratic States have the legitimate right, if not the duty, to do.

Dear colleagues,

Given that Russia has grossly violated guiding principles of international law by launching large-scale military aggression against a sovereign neighbour, it is extremely cynical of it to accuse others of threatening regional security and stability.

Our long-standing position that Russia's armed incursion into Georgia in August 2008 constituted a premeditated act of aggression against a sovereign nation has now been publicly and evidently confirmed by many highest-level Russian officials on various different occasions. Today I would like to draw your attention to the "confession" made by President Putin on the fourth anniversary of the war, in which he acknowledged that Russia had had a plan to invade Georgia as early as 2006. "There was a plan, it's no secret in my opinion," he said during his meeting with the representatives of the Russian media. He continued as follows: "It was within the framework of this plan that the Russian side acted. The plan was prepared by General Staff at the end of 2006 or the beginning of 2007. It was approved by me and agreed with me." Putin also echoed a statement made by President Medvedev in November 2011 that the military aggression was intended to counter Georgia's aspirations with respect to NATO. Medvedev's statement had run as follows: "We have simply calmed some of our neighbours down by showing them that they should behave correctly with respect to Russia and with respect to neighbouring small States." He concluded with the following words: "For some of our partners, including the North Atlantic Alliance, it was a signal that before taking a decision about expansion of the Alliance, one should first think about geopolitical stability. I deem these to be the major lessons of the developments of 2008."

As Georgia and a number of other OSCE participating States have pointed out several times, Russia for many years armed, trained, and supported separatist militias in regions within Georgia's internationally recognized borders. President Putin has in fact admitted this, making the following statement in the course of the remarks quoted above: "Within the framework of this plan training of South Ossetian militiamen was carried out."

As we are all well aware, during the August 2008 war Georgian villages were ethnically cleansed, torched, and partially destroyed by "well-trained" government-controlled paramilitary groups as well as by units of regular Russian armed forces. Also, at the time Russia invaded Abkhazia/Georgia in August 2008, the region was not a theatre of any military activity. All responsibility under international law for the ethnic cleansing, torture, and mass killings of Georgians in the Tskhinvali region/Georgia and in Abkhazia/Georgia

rests with the Russian Federation. As you know, the facts of ethnic cleansing have been recognized by respected OSCE documents and by a number of international independent reports.

Alongside these developments, we have witnessed the Russian Federation blocking the work of international organizations in Georgia. In 2008 the Russian Federation vetoed the extension of the mandate of the OSCE Mission, and in 2009 that of the UN Observer Mission. Both had been operating on the ground in Georgia since the early 1990s. Moreover, the Russian side has spared no efforts to prevent any attempts to re-establish the OSCE and UN presence in Georgia.

The same approach has been applied by Russia to the European Union Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia. Although the EU is the only international organization on the ground in Georgia, the Russian Federation has consistently blocked its access to the occupied regions. The Georgian side, on the other hand, has co-operated in a fully transparent manner with the EUMM ever since its establishment in 2008, within such frameworks as those of the Memoranda of Understanding between the EUMM and the Ministries of Defence and Internal Affairs of Georgia respectively. I would like to take this opportunity to quote a passage from the statement released by the EUMM on 21 September: "There have been claims about a possible change in posture of Georgian security personnel at the South Ossetian Administrative Boundary Line. The EU Monitoring Mission has been intensively engaged in monitoring and assessing these reports with the deployment of extra patrols and has been checking the situation with the relevant authorities. The Mission has not observed any evidence to support these claims. However, the EUMM has further increased its patrolling to actively monitor the situation on the ground. The EUMM has at the same time observed a build-up of Russian Federation armed personnel along the South Ossetian Administrative Boundary Line. The Mission has raised its concerns about this activity with the relevant Russian command structures."

The fact that Russia denies monitoring bodies access to the occupied territory is a clear indication that Moscow has much to hide in these regions.

In its attempt to portray itself as a peacemaker striving for the demilitarization of the region and for the protection of ethnic minorities, Russia persistently lays blame on Georgia and the international community. However, the Kremlin's actions often contradict its words. With reference to the relevant UN resolutions and the EU's legally binding Common Position on Arms Exports, the Russian side has accused OSCE participating States of rearming Georgia and of carrying out transfers of arms that contribute to the instability of the region. According to the UN and EU documents, States should refrain from delivering military technology and equipment that may be used for internal repression or international aggression or may contribute to regional instability. This, however, has not prevented Russia from delivering advanced military technologies and equipment to the government of one particular country in the throes of a bloody civil war, namely, Syria.

Mr. Chairperson,

With reference to the statement of the distinguished Russian representative, there is no doubt that the Russian Federation is fully entitled to check information exchanged by States, just as all other participating States are. The Georgian side has also had the opportunity to analyse the information on the military exchange of SALW and on transfers of conventional arms among the OSCE participating States. We are confident that it would be more appropriate for the Russian side to concern itself with the accuracy of the information it provides, as it differs significantly from corresponding data exchanged by other participating States.

Furthermore, I would like to draw your attention to the language of the Russian delegation. The Russian Ambassador several times used the expression “the Saakashvili regime” to refer to the Government of Georgia. This is outside the acceptable norms of diplomatic communication, and certainly cannot contribute to a constructive dialogue. In order to facilitate and promote discussions that are in line with OSCE norms, we would respectfully suggest that the Russian side in future use, at the very least, the expression “the Government of Georgia”.

Finally, let me take this opportunity to stress that Georgia is grateful to the countries that are co-operating with us in arms acquisition. We look forward to continuing this co-operation in a fully transparent manner and in accordance with our international obligations. Our goal remains the same – to improve our defence capabilities, to contribute more effectively to regional and common Euro-Atlantic security, and to achieve full interoperability with NATO.

I kindly ask you, Mr. Chairperson, to attach this statement to the journal of the day.

Thank you.



692nd Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 698, Agenda item 3

**DECISION No. 5/12
USE OF THE OSCE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK
BY PARTICIPATING STATES OF THE DOCUMENT ON
CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN
THE NAVAL FIELD IN THE BLACK SEA**

The Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC),

Recalling Section II, subsection (A), paragraph 2 of the OSCE Communications Network Document, annexed to FSC.DEC/5/99 of 6 October 1999, according to which the FSC will consider proposals of other OSCE-related bodies to enhance their use of the Network,

Reaffirming the importance of the OSCE Communications Network for the successful implementation of agreements and treaties,

Welcoming the request of the Chair of the Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea for use of the Integrated Notification Application (INA) by the Group,

Decides:

- To approve the use of the Integrated Notification Application (INA) for the implementation of the Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea;
- To task the Communications Group with the technical implementation of this decision, contingent upon the receipt of the necessary resources.