

Chairmanship: Armenia**982nd PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM**

1. Date: Wednesday, 7 July 2021 (via video teleconference)

Opened: 10 a.m.
Suspended: 1.10 p.m.
Resumed: 3 p.m.
Closed: 3.30 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador A. Papikyan
Ms. L. Grigoryan

The Chairperson reminded the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) of the technical modalities for the conduct of FSC meetings during the COVID-19 pandemic, as outlined in FSC.GAL/31/21 OSCE+.

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: SECURITY DIALOGUE: SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS (SALW) AND STOCKPILES OF CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION (SCA): PRACTICAL ASSISTANCE MECHANISM

- *Presentation by Lieutenant Colonel N. Luković, Senior Adviser, Department for Material Management, Ministry of Defence, Montenegro*
- *Presentation by Mr. W. Kernmaier, Head of Section of International Capacity Building for Weapons and Ammunition Logistics, Austrian Armed Forces Logistics School, Ministry of Defence, Austria*
- *Presentation by Mr. R. Mossinkoff, Senior FSC Support Officer, OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre*

Chairperson, Lieutenant Colonel N. Luković, Mr. W. Kernmaier, Representative of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, Slovenia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and

potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/280/21), Austria (Annex 1), Switzerland (FSC.DEL/275/21 OSCE+), Belarus (FSC.DEL/274/21 OSCE+), United States of America (FSC.DEL/272/21 OSCE+), United Kingdom, Russian Federation (Annex 2), Ukraine (FSC.DEL/278/21 OSCE+), Azerbaijan (Annex 3), Armenia (Annex 4), Canada, Turkey, Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Latvia) (Annex 5), FSC Co-ordinator for Assistance Projects on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Austria) (Annex 6)

Agenda item 2: GENERAL STATEMENTS

Situation in and around Ukraine: Ukraine (FSC.DEL/282/21/Rev.1 OSCE+) (FSC.DEL/282/21/Add.1 OSCE+), Slovenia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (Annex 7), United States of America (Annex 8), United Kingdom (Annex 9), Canada

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *Financial contributions to projects in the OSCE area:* Austria (Annex 10), Montenegro, Representative of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre
- (b) *Briefing on the military exercise “Green Griffin”, to be conducted from 27 September to 8 October 2021:* Germany (Annex 11) (FSC.DEL/276/21 OSCE+)
- (c) *Meeting of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, to be held via video teleconference on 15 July 2021:* Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Latvia)
- (d) *Briefing on the military exercise “Cossack Mace 2021”, to be conducted from 12 to 24 July 2021:* Ukraine (FSC.DEL/279/21), United Kingdom

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 21 July 2021, at 11 a.m., in the Neuer Saal



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/988

7 July 2021

Annex 1

ENGLISH

Original: GERMAN

982nd Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 988, Agenda item 1

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF AUSTRIA

Mr. Chairperson,

Austria fully aligns itself with the statement by the European Union. Allow me to make some additional remarks in my national capacity.

I thank the Armenian Chairmanship for the focus selected for the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) today, and I likewise thank the panellists for their valuable presentations. They have provided us with excellent insights into the ongoing implementation of projects.

Shedding light on the assistance mechanism from both an operational and a technical angle is important in our view and more relevant than ever before, not least given the ongoing evaluation process. Today's presentations have made it clear how comprehensive and complex the implementation of projects is and how intensive the work required of everyone involved.

It is precisely such information that is so greatly enriching for the FSC: by means of it we are able to form a picture of the work taking place on the ground and draw appropriate conclusions as regards the normative aspects.

Austria is particularly delighted by the fact that the project in Montenegro, in which we are privileged to be significantly involved, was presented in exemplary fashion today.

Thanks to the work of international organizations and the participating States, there is increasing evidence that challenges in the field of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA) have different effects depending on gender and age group. The OSCE can make an important contribution here – for example, by developing a Guidance Note on Assistance Projects dealing with the topic of “Mainstreaming gender into the OSCE assistance mechanism for SALW and SCA”.

In closing, I should like to thank our Montenegrin colleagues for the outstanding collaboration, which we would very much like to continue in the future.

Mr. Chairperson, I kindly ask you to attach this statement to the journal of the day.

Thank you.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/988

7 July 2021

Annex 2

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

982nd Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 988, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Mr. Chairperson,

We should like to join in thanking the Armenian Chairmanship for organizing this meeting on the assistance mechanism for providing support with the management of stockpiles of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA). The OSCE is a recognized leader in this field, as evidenced by the stimulating presentations by the distinguished keynote speakers. We are grateful to them for their contribution to the discussion.

Today's plenary meeting, in addition to being in implementation of a tasking from the 2016 Hamburg OSCE Ministerial Council (MC/DOC/3/16), enables us to consider new opportunities for promoting project activities in the field of SALW and SCA. One undoubtedly positive aspect of this topic is the fact that the projects are supported by the vast majority of participating States, represent an important contribution to the strengthening of European security and are also aimed at achieving concrete results. In this regard, we welcome Austria's initiative designed to strengthen the OSCE assistance mechanism and we likewise welcome continuing the process of updating the best practice guides, which are also made use of when implementing projects.

Control over SALW and their ammunition is a priority in the Russian Federation. We pay particular attention to ensuring the secure storage of weapons stockpiles, controlling their circulation and eliminating in a timely manner stockpiles of obsolete weapons and their surpluses. Our country has strict regulations governing the circulation of SALW and ammunition. They fully meet the requirements of international instruments, including the OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA.

We attach great importance to international co-operation in the disposal of surplus and obsolete types of SALW and ammunition. We are actively co-operating with our partners from the Collective Security Treaty Organization, the Commonwealth of Independent States and the OSCE in these areas. We regularly hold inter-agency workshops and conduct exchanges of information and experience. Since 2004, Russian military experts have been involved on numerous occasions in OSCE projects to support States in training national personnel, establishing record-keeping and reporting systems for small arms, and so on.

Together with foreign specialists, we have successfully implemented projects in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.

We are ready, upon request, to consider providing expert assistance on all aspects of SALW control throughout the life cycle of such weapons, and also to share our experience in establishing an effective regulatory and legal framework in this area.

Mr. Chairperson,

There was talk today of the new challenges and threats that have emerged in the OSCE's area of responsibility owing to an increase in the illicit proliferation of SALW and their ammunition. "Colour revolutions", during which control over State weapons arsenals is lost, are one of the main sources of the illicit circulation of SALW. The spread of weapons in such cases is not limited to the national territory of the State faced with a political crisis, but spills over into neighbouring countries and further afield. Libya, Syria and some North African countries are a case in point in this context.

A similar situation is arising in Ukraine. Back in 2014, as the political crisis escalated, radical elements seized small arms and other types of weapons from depots belonging to units of the armed forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Ukraine. Proper control over weapons was lost during the coup d'état. The subsequently announced programme to gather up these weapons from the public failed to achieve its main objective of completely removing SALW from illicit circulation. Today, the illicit market is sustained mainly by a certain proportion of the arsenal used by the Ukrainian military in the zone of armed conflict in Donbas. As a result, committing crimes using "spoils of war" such as grenades or grenade launchers is no longer something unusual in Ukraine.

The black market for weapons in Ukraine already comprises up to 5 to 6 million units of weaponry. According to the Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office, in 2019 more than 6,200 cases were classed as illegal handling of weapons, ammunition and explosives; what is more – and take note of this – fewer than 100 of these cases involved owners of officially registered weapons. This year, according to the Ukrainian Security Service, only 500 firearms have been withdrawn from circulation. These are very telling figures.

Illegal operations involving the buying and selling of SALW and conventional ammunition in Ukraine often take place via the darknet; weapons can also be assembled independently by means of the unhindered purchase of spare parts on the Internet. Local law enforcement agencies have so far failed to achieve tangible results in countering crimes related to illegal arms trafficking, not least on account of the chronic corruption.

We believe that this state of affairs cannot but be of concern to the OSCE participating States, as it also raises the risk of arms transfers outside Ukraine. It would therefore be useful to hear from the distinguished Ukrainian delegation as to who controls the circulation of weapons and the security of their stockpiles in the country today and how. What legal provisions regulate their use in the zone of hostilities, given the fact that some of these weapons are in the hands of private non-State paramilitary formations equipped using money from the purse of oligarchs?

The situation in Ukraine with regard to the illicit circulation of weapons and ammunition can rightly be described as threatening and, unless steps are taken in the near future to bring order to the circulation of SALW and their ammunition, it could represent a significant security threat to the OSCE area as a whole.

Mr. Chairperson,

In conclusion, we should like to emphasize that we support the main thrust of the discussion, namely that the OSCE participating States' efforts to prevent the uncontrolled spread of SALW and SCA contribute to the strengthening of stability and should be systematically continued. We look forward to substantive discussions during the forthcoming meeting to review the implementation of OSCE assistance projects in the field of SALW and SCA in October.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



982nd Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 988, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF AZERBAIJAN**

Mr. Chairperson,

The delegation of Azerbaijan welcomes our keynote speakers at today's Forum for Security Co-operation meeting and thanks them for the interesting and insightful presentations.

Azerbaijan has been consistently attaching high importance to the implementation of the OSCE commitments in the field of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA). We believe that today's dedicated Security Dialogue with a focus on practical assistance mechanisms as well as the OSCE Meeting to Review the Implementation of OSCE Practical Assistance Projects in the Field of SALW and SCA to be held in October 2021 could give a further impetus to our efforts in combating SALW/SCA-related threats.

Since the adoption of the OSCE Document on SALW in 2000 and the OSCE Document on SCA in 2003, the Organization has done a lot to streamline norms and best practices in the field of SALW and SCA, as well as expand and consolidate the normative framework in this sphere. Nevertheless, the persistent threats posed by the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and proliferation of SALW and SCA continue to pose threats to security and stability, as well as the safety of citizens in the OSCE area. The full implementation – in letter and spirit – of the commitments contained in relevant OSCE documents and decisions as well as practical steps taken to this end are necessary to tackle these threats.

As a regional security arrangement under Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, the OSCE is well placed to take effective action in countering the threats posed by the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and proliferation of SALW and SCA in its geographical area. This should complement United Nations-led international efforts in this sphere, including through the full implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.

We would like to emphasize the illicit transfer and diversion of SALW and SCA as an important area in which the OSCE has yet to realize its potential and make a tangible

contribution to international efforts. This task should remain high on the Organization's agenda and results-oriented efforts to integrate it into the normative body of the OSCE and its programmatic activities, in line with global standards, should be continued. We also note that the prevention of the illicit transfer and diversion of SALW and SCA could be an important element for rehabilitation, reintegration and peacebuilding in post-conflict contexts.

Practical assistance projects are one of the most important areas where the OSCE has developed a strong *acquis*. Throughout the years, the OSCE has facilitated the implementation of a number of practical assistance projects based on demand-driven requests by participating States. The implementation of commitments on practical assistance projects is essential to address the negative repercussions of these threats on security and stability, as well as the safety of the population in participating States. Speaking from the perspective of the OSCE's comprehensive and cross-dimensional concept of security, realization of practical assistance projects is of primary importance for the implementation of our commitments in other dimensions of security, such as facilitating the return of internally displaced persons to their homes in safety and dignity.

Following the end of the armed conflict after last year's 44-day war in our region, post-conflict rehabilitation, reconstruction and re-integration constitute an absolute priority for Azerbaijan. In this regard, we remind the Forum of Azerbaijan's practical assistance request for enhancing the capacities of its national authorities (ANAMA) in implementing explosive hazards risk reduction and response action. This request was made on the basis of our shared commitments, in accordance with the OSCE Document on SCA.

Mines planted by Armenia on a massive scale in the formerly occupied territories of Azerbaijan threaten human lives on a daily basis and keep claiming the lives of innocent civilians. Last month's tragic death of three Azerbaijani civilians, including two journalists, and the serious injury of four other civilians as a result of a mine explosion is a case in point.

The threat emanating from mines can be mitigated through the release by Armenia of all the maps of the mined areas in Azerbaijan, in compliance with customary international humanitarian law. We recall that on 12 June 2021, Armenia provided maps of 97,000 mines, including 54,000 anti-tank and 43,000 anti-personnel mines planted in the Aghdam district of Azerbaijan. On 4 July 2021, Armenia submitted maps of 92,000 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines planted in the Fuzuli and Zangilan districts of Azerbaijan. In return, on each occasion Azerbaijan handed over to Armenia 15 Armenian detainees as a humanistic step.

We encourage Armenia to build on the success of the recent humanitarian measures and continue engaging constructively with the international community and actors in the region for releasing the remaining maps of the mined areas in Azerbaijan. Obtaining these maps is of immense importance from a humanitarian standpoint, as this helps save the lives of innocent civilians, including those engaged in demining activities both from Azerbaijan and other countries. Full release of the maps of the mined territories will facilitate the implementation of post-conflict reconstruction, rehabilitation and re-integration projects for ensuring the safe and dignified return of internally displaced persons to their homes. This will also build trust and confidence between Armenia and Azerbaijan, contributing to post-conflict reconciliation and normalization of our inter-State relations and the ultimate consolidation of peace and stability in the region.

As to our assistance request, we remind that Azerbaijan has provided all the necessary information in line with the procedures envisaged by the SCA Document. We expect the Conflict Prevention Centre and its FSC Support Section, as well as the next FSC Chairmanship of Austria to respond to the request of Azerbaijan in a timely manner and take further steps for implementation of the project.

In closing, we once again thank our speakers for their valuable contributions to our Security Dialogue and wish them every success in their future endeavours.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/988

7 July 2021

Annex 4

Original: ENGLISH

982nd Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 988, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF ARMENIA**

Mr. Chairperson,

The delegation of Armenia would like to join others in thanking the speakers for their thought-provoking presentations. This meeting is another good opportunity to exchange ideas and views on the OSCE assistance mechanism for small arms and light weapons (SALW) and stockpiles of conventional ammunition (SCA), and in particular the challenges associated with its application, since identifying challenges is key to ensuring progress.

Armenia has always advocated the importance of control of SALW and SCA, as it is directly linked to human security. Armenia has engaged constructively in the elaboration of today's impressive set of documents in the field of SALW and SCA. The assistance mechanism is an important OSCE asset and since its establishment has contributed greatly to the implementation of our commitments through the provision of expertise and assistance to participating States.

Mr. Chairperson,

For many years, our co-operation with the OSCE in the field of SALW and SCA has clearly been hindered by one participating State. While our responsible and constructive behaviour has been taken for granted by the OSCE and its participating States, this unfortunately led to more unwarranted and undue claims. Moreover, it is deplorable that the work of the Organization and its concept of indivisible and co-operative security has been undermined by that same participating State in order to hinder the co-operation between Armenia and the OSCE. It is equally regrettable that the unwillingness and inability of the Organization and its participating States to combat such practices, condemn such irresponsible behaviour and uphold our shared commitments led to the cancellation of the OSCE Meeting to Review the Implementation of OSCE Assistance Projects in the Field of SALW and SCA in 2019.

The delegation of Armenia strongly believes that our joint commitments in the realm of SALW and SCA cannot be realized through a mere exercise of accumulation of agreed languages. No matter how good the commitments related to SALW and SCA may look on paper, they cannot ensure proper implementation. The current state of affairs requires not

words but full implementation of the existing commitments, which should not be made conditional on the inconsistent positions of some participating States.

I am not going to comment on the allegations voiced by the delegation of Azerbaijan against my country. But as the assistance request by Azerbaijan in the field of explosive hazards risk reduction was mentioned, I should like to use this opportunity to reiterate the position of Armenia in this regard. The position of Armenia on the assistance request by Azerbaijan was presented in detail at the 967th and 973rd meetings of the FSC, and in the letter addressed to the FSC Chairperson dated 18 March 2021. I will limit myself to reiterating that Armenia views the project proposal by Azerbaijan, which is to be implemented in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone and in the occupied territories of Artsakh, as an attempt to legitimize its recent war of aggression and the outcomes of its use of force against Artsakh.

The delegation of Armenia reiterates its call to the current and future FSC Chairmanships and all the OSCE structures to refrain from any actions or activities that may be perceived as endorsing Azerbaijan's policy in that regard. Once a comprehensive settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has been achieved under the auspices of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, the OSCE may become involved in, and contribute to, such projects after careful consultations and after obtaining the clearly expressed consent of all the parties concerned.

I kindly ask that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/988

7 July 2021

Annex 5

Original: ENGLISH

982nd Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 982, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE INFORMAL GROUP OF FRIENDS ON
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS AND STOCKPILES OF
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION (LATVIA)**

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.

Dear colleagues,
Distinguished speakers,

In my capacity as Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA), I should like to start by thanking the speakers for their valuable contributions and thoughts on the topic of today's Security Dialogue.

In the context of today's Security Dialogue, I would like to highlight the role of the international standards and best practices, including the OSCE ones, in the field of SALW and SCA and their practical application through assistance projects. This includes their practical utility. The OSCE Best Practice Guides (BPGs) on SALW and conventional ammunition (CA) are, first and foremost, designed to aid in smooth and effective project implementation.

I would like to recall the second Biennial Meeting to Assess the Implementation of the OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA held on 13 and 14 October 2020, at which emphasis was laid on the importance of lessons learned shared by all parties involved in implementation and execution of the assistance projects – from donor States to States receiving assistance. These lessons learned from applying the BPGs to OSCE assistance projects feed into the OSCE BPGs review and update process, which goes hand in hand with and is complementary to the important work being carried out by our SALW and SCA assistance projects.

During the second Biennial Meeting to Assess the Implementation of the OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA there was discussion of a need to strengthen the assistance mechanism. There were also recurrent calls to ensure its continued relevance, responsiveness and consistency.

I commend Austria for its leadership and Bosnia and Herzegovina, Germany, Montenegro, Switzerland and the United States for their readiness to support and bring forward the initiative on the assistance mechanism under the OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA.

I would like to reiterate that, although not binding in nature, the BPGs on SALW and CA are endorsed and generally accepted by all 57 OSCE participating States and provide a common understanding of the relevant approaches, procedures and terminology. They are not intended to be prescriptive or to provide a “one size fits all” solution. Rather, they aim to present flexible and effective measures that can be tailored to the unique circumstances of each project in the implementation of the OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA.

Before I conclude, dear colleagues, let me inform you that work on updating the OSCE Best Practice Guides on SALW and CA continues apace. Since the inception of the review process, nine out of the 17 existing BPGs have been included in this effort; this includes an annex to the BPGs that is proposed for adoption as a stand-alone BPG. I am pleased to note that a week ago the second updated BPG was adopted by the FSC. Further draft updates of four BPGs are already proposed for consideration in Working Group A. Comments and/or endorsements on the part of participating States are much appreciated.

Besides updating the existing OSCE Best Practice Guides on SALW and CA, three new initiatives related to SALW and SCA are being developed, one of which has already been proposed for consideration in Working Group A.

However, dear colleagues, we should not rest on the laurels of progress achieved and I therefore encourage the participating States that originally authored or sponsored the remaining eight BPGs to initiate update processes for these, or at least to lead the discussions aimed at assessing whether they are still up-to-date or need to be updated.

In conclusion, I would like to once again thank the participating States for supporting the work of the Informal Group of Friends and to encourage you to remain actively involved.

Thank you for your attention. I kindly ask that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/988

7 July 2021

Annex 6

Original: ENGLISH

982nd Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 988, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE FSC CO-ORDINATOR FOR ASSISTANCE PROJECTS ON
SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS AND STOCKPILES OF
CONVENTIONAL AMMUNITION (AUSTRIA)**

Mr. Chairperson,
Excellencies,
Dear colleagues,

Please allow me to deliver this statement in my capacity as the Chairperson's Co-ordinator for Assistance Projects on Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (SCA).

Let me start by expressing my gratitude to the Armenian Chairmanship for putting the OSCE assistance mechanism on today's agenda and by thanking the panellists for their valuable contributions.

Dear colleagues,

The field of SALW and SCA is one of the most dynamic sectors of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) agenda and one in which co-operation and progress on the ground are visible and impactful. In most cases, consensus in the OSCE forums – both on a political and technical level – is still possible in this field.

Let me underline that all recent, present and forthcoming FSC Chairmanships have dedicated or will dedicate at least one specific Security Dialogue to different aspects of SALW and SCA. On 17 February, the United States FSC Chairmanship focused on man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) and on 24 February on explosive hazards in Central Asia. Today, Armenia has brought the topic of the SALW/SCA practical assistance mechanism to the attention of the participating States. Finally, in October, Austria plans to highlight ongoing initiatives in the field of SALW and SCA during its FSC Chairmanship.

Now, at the end of the second quarter of 2021, the OSCE has implemented 20 assistance projects in the field of SALW/SCA at national and regional levels, valued at almost 41 million euros. While the projects address a wide array of risks, they all have the ultimate goal of contributing to security and stability in the OSCE area. As mentioned in the concept note, following the establishment of the mechanism, the projects focused mainly on

the disposal of surplus weapons and conventional ammunition. Over the course of time, however, this has become just one aspect of many. As noted by Senior FSC Support Officer Mr. Robin Mossinkoff, at present the overarching topic in this regard is that of comprehensive and sustainable life cycle management for SALW and SCA. Statistics related to the extrabudgetary projects in active implementation show that currently 50 per cent are focused on addressing dynamic aspects of combating illicit trafficking in SALW and SCA, 20 per cent on mine action, 15 per cent on physical safety and stockpile management, and 14 per cent on rocket fuel disposal.

It should be noted that the disproportionate negative effects of SALW use and misuse on women and girls have been confirmed through focused research, statistical evidence and other means. Therefore, gender mainstreaming should be considered as a valuable tool at all stages of the assistance mechanism. In addition, continued research, exchange of views, sharing of information and best practices should further be promoted.

The OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA established the assistance mechanism in 2000 and 2003 respectively and continue to provide an appropriate normative basis for its practical implementation, as was confirmed during the second Biennial Meeting to Assess the Implementation of the OSCE Documents on SALW and SCA held in October 2020. As a direct outcome of this meeting, initiatives were launched aimed at making inclusive compilations of valuable experiences shared and lessons learned, structured in such a way as to ensure the continued relevance, responsiveness and consistency of the assistance mechanism. Today's focused Security Dialogue offers, among other things, another opportunity to listen to the expectations of participating States on further improvement in the implementation of the OSCE assistance mechanism.

On 5 and 6 October this year, important discussions on this subject will take place at the OSCE Meeting to Review the Implementation of OSCE Practical Assistance Projects in the Field of SALW and SCA. It is encouraging that at the beginning of the year it was possible to achieve consensus on holding this biennial meeting, making it possible to follow the rhythm of the United Nations. To allow for timely planning on the part of the participating States, I can now inform you of the forthcoming Austrian Chairmanship's intention to organize this meeting in a blended "1+1" format.

Finally, it should be noted that providing assistance in the field of SALW and SCA depends on the political will of the OSCE participating States. Financial support is one aspect in this regard, and I would like to extend my gratitude to all the donor countries for their important contributions. This year, a great deal of effort has been put into fundraising. I would like to highlight the donor event in late March organized by the United States FSC Chairmanship in collaboration with Germany, which resulted in pledges of more than 10 million euros in contributions and resources to strengthen action against the illicit proliferation of SALW and SCA in South-Eastern Europe.

I also express my appreciation to all participating States who provide expert support to assistance projects; such support is invaluable, as it facilitates the transfer of experience and best practices among participating States.

Thank you for your attention. May I ask for this statement to be attached to the journal of the day.



982nd Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 988, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY
THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION**

The delegation of Slovenia, in its capacity as EU Presidency, passed the floor to the representative of the European Union, who delivered the following statement:

Mr. Chairperson,

The European Union and its Member States regret that the security situation in the conflict zone remains volatile. Last week, the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) observed a 42 per cent increase in the number of ceasefire violations and explosions along the entire line of contact, including a spike of 1,302 violations and 134 explosions within the periphery of the Zolote disengagement area on the night of 23–24 June as well as a fourfold increase in ceasefire violations within a 5-kilometre radius of the Donetsk filtration station. These upward trends are worrisome and must be reversed. We repeat that the ceasefire can be best preserved if both sides implement their commitments repeatedly made in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) and adhere to the additional measures agreed in July 2020. In this context, we deplore any military provocations and commend Ukraine for its restraint.

Our position on the conflict remains clear and coherent. We decisively reject Russia's attempts to portray itself as a mediator in an "internal Ukrainian conflict". The Minsk Protocol is unambiguous in stating that the TCG consists of representatives of Ukraine, the Russian Federation and the OSCE, the latter being the mediator. Finding a sustainable solution to the conflict requires frank and honest discussion on its nature, as well as the political will to implement the respective commitments. We therefore urge Russia, as a party to the conflict, to take responsibility for its actions and to constructively engage in the discussions on the implementation of the Minsk agreements in good faith. The use of threatening rhetoric as we heard last week in this Forum is unacceptable.

We reiterate the importance of the faithful implementation of the OSCE principles and commitments concerning military transparency. We call on Russia to engage meaningfully under Chapter III of the Vienna Document and provide the necessary transparency on its remaining forces along its border with Ukraine and in the illegally annexed Crimea. We also look forward to a substantial briefing on the upcoming large-scale military exercise "Zapad-2021".

The SMM must have full freedom of movement within the entire territory of Ukraine, including Crimea and along the whole Ukraine-Russia State border. We regret that the Mission has faced restrictions to its freedom of movement on 18 occasions during the previous week, all of which have occurred in non-government-controlled areas. These restrictions violate the Mission's mandate agreed by all participating States. We urge Russia to use its considerable influence over the armed formations it backs in order to make sure that all restrictions on the SMM's freedom of movement are removed.

Mr. Chairperson, we deplore that SMM unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been subjected to GPS signal interference 55 times over the past week, causing planned launches on six occasions to be aborted. We consider unacceptable that on 29 June, an SMM long-range UAV permanently lost spatial control and crashed due to strong dual GPS interference, after attempting to land twice at its base in Stepanivka. Moreover, on 22 June the Mission registered 40 shots of small arms fire assessed as aimed at its UAV, near non-government-controlled Kalynove-Borshchuvate, in Luhansk region. We are concerned about this worrying trend of increased GPS interference since March 2021 and about the presence of jamming equipment on both sides of the line of contact. At the same time, the SMM continues to report modern Russian electronic warfare equipment in the conflict zone that has never been in use by the Ukrainian armed forces. We have still not heard any credible explanation from our Russian colleagues on how such sophisticated weapons were transported into Ukraine. The OSCE being a platform for dialogue, we urge Russia to respond to this issue raised recently by a number of delegations.

We also deplore the damage caused by gunfire to one of the SMM cameras at the Oktiabr mine in a non-government-controlled area in Donetsk region on 28 June. The targeting of SMM assets must stop. This significantly hinders the Mission's ability to conduct effective monitoring and reporting of the security situation and puts the Mission members and its assets at risk. Those responsible for any wilful damage, destruction or loss of SMM assets should be held accountable, both politically and financially.

In conclusion, we remain firm in our call on all sides to swiftly and fully implement the Minsk agreements and honour their commitments in full in order to achieve a sustainable political solution to the conflict in line with OSCE principles and commitments. Respect for these principles and commitments must be restored. We underline Russia's responsibility in this regard and once again call on Russia to use its considerable influence over the armed formations it backs to meet these commitments in full. We reiterate our deep concern about the presence of military equipment and personnel from Russia in the conflict zone. We call on Russia to immediately stop providing financial and military support to the armed formations. The ceasefire must be respected. All Minsk-regulated weapons must be withdrawn. All foreign armed formations, military equipment and mercenaries must be removed from Ukraine. Re-establishing full Ukrainian control over its State border is essential.

We recall our unwavering support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and independence of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders and call upon Russia to do likewise. We urge Russia to recognize these fundamental principles that it has itself invoked many times and to contribute, by acts and public pronouncements, to stabilizing the situation and reversing moves that contravene these principles. We strongly condemn the clear violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity by acts of aggression by the

Russian armed forces since February 2014 and the illegal annexation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol to the Russian Federation, which we will not recognize. We continue to call on Russia to ensure unhindered and free passage to and from the Sea of Azov in accordance with international law. We express our deep concern about Russia's actions to block access to parts of the Black Sea, including near illegally-annexed Crimea and the Kerch Strait, and about the ongoing large-scale militarization of the Crimean peninsula by Russia which continues to impact the security situation in the Black Sea region and beyond.

Mr. Chairperson, I kindly request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day

The candidate countries the Republic of North Macedonia¹, Montenegro¹ and Albania¹, the EFTA countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, as well as Ukraine, the Republic of Moldova, Georgia, Andorra and San Marino align themselves with this statement.

1 The Republic of North Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.



982nd Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 988, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

Mr. Chairperson,

The United States remains concerned about Russia's lack of transparency and failure to implement its Vienna Document commitments with respect to its recent military deployments in and near Ukraine. The illegal restrictions imposed by Russia on freedom of navigation in the Black Sea and portions of the Sea of Azov accentuate our concern. The direct threats we all heard in recent weeks, and which I will not repeat in this Forum, serve in no way to de-escalate tensions in the region, but rather to inflame them.

Mr. Chairperson, as we approach another OSCE summer recess we must be honest with ourselves regarding the conflict in Ukraine, where the situation is worse now than a year ago and still far from being resolved. Recent weeks saw sustained and increased ceasefire violations including in disengagement areas and in the vicinity of the Donetsk filtration station. The Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) reported continued jamming of its unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), sabotage of its cameras, restrictions on its movements at checkpoints and border crossings by Russian-led forces, and civilian casualties due to unexploded ordinance and small arms fire.

The report of the SMM's Chief Monitor, covering the period from 21 March to 6 June, depicts an increasingly fragile security situation: spikes of ceasefire violations along the contact line, increased use of Minsk-proscribed weapons, continued civilian casualties, and damage to civilian infrastructure. The ongoing partial closure of the checkpoints by the armed formations along the contact line limits the number of civilian crossings and is widening the separation between people. The report details persistent impediments to the SMM's freedom of movement, overwhelmingly in non-government-controlled areas as well as jamming of SMM's unmanned aerial vehicles and sabotage of the SMM cameras.

Regrettably such reports continue. On 29 June, an SMM long-range UAV experienced GPS jamming while attempting to land at its base in Stepanivka, resulting in the loss of control of the vehicle and causing it to crash. Last week an SMM camera located one kilometre from the contact line at the Oktiabr mine ceased functioning due to damage from a bullet; this was the second time this particular camera was deliberately sabotaged since April.

We would like to stress OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 1117, which specifies that the SMM shall have safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. Unrestricted access to all areas is essential to ensure effective monitoring, whether with monitors on the ground or UAVs overhead, and reporting on the security situation, the ceasefire, the withdrawal of weapons, demining and disengagement. Interference with UAVs and cameras, and restrictions on the SMM's freedom of movement unacceptably hinder the Mission's ability to conduct effective monitoring and report on the security situation and must be stopped.

Mr. Chairperson, we could continue to focus on negative developments on the ground in eastern Ukraine, as we do week after week, but perhaps we should take a broader view in our final discussion of the conflict prior to the summer recess. As we convene this FSC today, more than one million people are displaced in eastern Ukraine. The conflict instigated and fuelled by Russia has caused more than 13,000 Ukrainian military and civilian deaths, destroyed the economy of the region, and contaminated the landscape with landmines that will threaten the lives of the area's residents for generations. As for the cost to Russia, only Moscow knows how many servicemen and irregular forces it has lost during this conflict; the Border Observer Mission regularly reports funeral vehicles with military designations crossing the border into Russia and this only at the two lone checkpoints it can observe.

After more than seven years of conflict, what has Russia accomplished? As this conflict grinds on, Russia becomes increasingly isolated. We urge Russia to withdraw its forces from Ukraine, settle this conflict to which it is unquestionably a party, and re-commit to co-operative security in the OSCE region. We encourage Russia to invest in the well-being of its people and their future rather than seeking to divest Ukraine of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. We have heard Russia vow in this Forum that nothing will come at the expense of Russian security; that is a given. We have seen security in the OSCE region deteriorate as a result of Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2014. May we ask if Russia's security improved as a result? Are the Russian people better off today?

We are often lectured by Russia about an alleged NATO policy of containment. How is Russia being "contained"? Does Russia believe it is being contained within its own internationally recognized borders? If that's the definition of "containment," staying within your borders and not invading your neighbours, this would embody our core OSCE principles and commitments to which Russia itself has subscribed. All OSCE participating States have committed to remain within their borders and seek peaceful resolution of disputes. Russia should abide by its commitments.

Mr. Chairperson, the United States fully supports Ukraine's sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, extending to its territorial waters. We remain concerned over Russia's militarization of Crimea and announced restrictions through October on navigation in parts of the Black Sea, and we call on Russia to immediately rescind these restrictions. We do not, nor will we ever, recognize Russia's purported annexation of Crimea. We join our European and other partners in affirming that our Ukraine-related sanctions against Russia will remain in place until Russia fully implements its Minsk commitments and returns full control of Crimea to Ukraine.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/988

7 July 2021

Annex 9

Original: ENGLISH

982nd Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 988, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM**

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. This statement is delivered under the topic raised by Ukraine.

The United Kingdom remains concerned at the continued tensions caused by the increased Russian military activity on Ukraine's border and in illegally annexed Crimea in April. Reports still indicate a significant number of forces remain concentrated in proximity to the Ukrainian border and in illegally annexed Crimea, two months following the withdrawal deadline set by Russia itself.

We continue to be disappointed that the Russian Federation did not, and still chooses not to, engage constructively in using the OSCE processes and mechanisms available to provide necessary transparency and de-escalate the situation. This includes addressing Ukrainian concerns regarding the military build-up near its borders and in illegally annexed Crimea under Chapter III of the Vienna Document. This is despite repeated calls from fellow participating States on Russia to address these valid concerns and provide transparency.

In its statement written for the Security Dialogue on transparency in military exercises and activities (which I note the Russian delegation elected not to deliver), Russia stated that it "pays considerable attention to the issues of practical implementation of agreed confidence-building measures and the transparency of military exercises and activities". It also stated that it is open to informing participating States about military exercises and activities of the armed forces of the Russian Federation, even if it is not required under the provisions of the Vienna Document and, as needed, deliver relevant briefings at this Forum. So why has it not done so in this regard? Especially when it is clear that such notifications and briefings would provide the necessary transparency to address the valid concerns of participating States, including on the withdrawal of its forces, and so de-escalate the situation.

The United Kingdom again calls on Russia to use the agreed upon OSCE processes and mechanisms available, including through briefings in this forum. And we look forward to receiving the necessary briefings and notifications surrounding exercise "Zapad-2021" at the appropriate time.

Mr. Chairperson,

Last week we discussed the various OSCE tools to enhance transparency in the parts of Ukraine being affected by the Russian-instigated and -fuelled conflict. In particular, we drew attention to the fact that the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) is prevented from being able to fulfil its mandate due to systematic denials of access in areas held by Russian-backed armed formations. Sadly, recent events mean that I must once again focus on the egregious interference that is impeding the Mission's work.

We are appalled that on 28 June, five individuals assessed by the SMM as probable members of the armed formations harassed and threatened an SMM patrol in a non-government-controlled area near Petrivske. A visibly intoxicated man confronted the patrol and threatened to lay mines on the road to prevent the SMM from returning to the area. We condemn in the strongest terms this unacceptable attempt to intimidate the Mission.

It is not only the SMM's patrols that are facing interference, but also the Mission's technical assets. On 2 July, when the SMM visited its camera system at Oktiabr mine, in an area held by Russian-backed armed formations, it saw that one of the cameras had been shot by small arms fire. It is worth recalling that in the past, the armed formations have interfered with this camera system by placing their own camera on the mast and damaging access ladders. We deplore this wilful damage to the Mission's cameras and call for those responsible to be held accountable.

As well as the SMM's cameras, the Mission's unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are facing significant impediments. Between 21 March and 6 June, there was a fourfold increase in instances of signal interference, assessed as jamming, encountered by SMM UAVs compared to the previous 78 days. Most recently, an SMM long-range UAV crashed while attempting to land at the Mission's UAV base at government-controlled Stepanivka due to a loss of spatial control attributed to signal jamming.

We condemn these unacceptable instances of deliberate interference with the Mission's technical assets. These assets are an inseparable part of the Mission's operational infrastructure and, as such, covered by OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 1117 that the Mission should have safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. We once again reiterate our call for the Mission to have the unconditional and unrestricted access throughout the entire territory of Ukraine that it needs to fulfil the mandate that we, the 57 participating States, entrusted to it. We particularly call on Russia to use its undeniable influence over the armed formations it backs to ensure that they respect the Mission's mandate.

We reiterate our support for the Minsk agreements to deliver a peaceful resolution to the conflict in full respect of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, and the work of the Trilateral Contact Group and the Normandy Four in this regard. Russia must play its part and fulfil its obligations.

Finally, Mr. Chairperson, the United Kingdom reiterates our condemnation of Russia's ongoing militarization of Crimea, the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. The recent deployment of large numbers of Russian forces to illegally annexed Crimea and the subsequent large-scale exercise was provocative, aggressive and wholly unacceptable. We also reiterate our deep concern at the Russian Federation's decision to impose restrictions on

some areas of the Black Sea, including the approaches to the Kerch Strait, from April until October. These actions are unjustified and destabilizing.

The United Kingdom strongly supports Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognized borders, including its territorial waters. As we have clearly demonstrated, we will always uphold international law and will not accept unlawful interference with innocent passage. We do not and will not recognize Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea. The United Kingdom has consistently stood with Ukraine in opposing all instances of Russian aggression towards Ukraine and we will continue to do so, including through sanctions, together with our international partners.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/988

7 July 2021

Annex 10

ENGLISH

Original: GERMAN

982nd Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 988, Agenda item 3(a)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF AUSTRIA**

Mr. Chairperson,
Excellencies,
Ladies and gentlemen,
Dear colleagues,

I am especially delighted to announce today the following financial contributions by Austria to extrabudgetary OSCE projects.

Firstly, on the occasion of today's Security Dialogue, I should like to inform the OSCE participating States about our financial support in the amount of 20,000 euros for the project on small arms and light weapons (SALW) and the storage of conventional ammunition in Montenegro (project number 2700458). This financial contribution was transferred to the OSCE Secretariat already at the start of the year and, as outlined by Werner Kernmaier at today's Security Dialogue, it is meant, together with the sharing of expertise, to play a significant part in helping to strengthen the security of stockpiles of SALW and conventional ammunition in Montenegro.

Secondly, Austria is supporting, with a contribution of 5,000 euros, the second essay competition organized by the OSCE and the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (project number 1102157). Like last year, students and young professionals from the OSCE participating States and OSCE Partners for Co-operation have been invited to set down, in concise and to-the-point essays, their ideas and proposals for reviving conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures. As the Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) in the third trimester of this year, Austria intends to invite the selected winners of this essay competition to the FSC meeting on 8 December, where they will be able to present their work to the OSCE delegations.

Thirdly, Austria is once again contributing 5,000 euros to support the Conflict Prevention Centre-FSC project on the Information Management and Reporting System (iMARS) (project number 1102019). Through this modest contribution for the current year we wish to help, together with the other donors, to develop the project further, to improve the

implementation of reporting obligations in the politico-military dimension and, thereby, ultimately to do our bit towards enhancing transparency and predictability.

Mr. Chairperson,

I kindly ask you to attach this statement to the journal of the day.



982nd Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 988, Agenda item 3(b)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF GERMANY**

Mr. Chairperson,
Esteemed colleagues,

Today I should like to speak about the “Green Griffin” exercise, which will take place from 27 September to 8 October 2021 on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. The basis for this briefing is Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) Decision No. 9/12 (FSC.DEC/9/12) and notifications CBM/DE/19/0075/F30/O and CBM/DE/20/5044/F30/O.

The accompanying presentation is to be found under reference number FSC.DEL/276/21.

Slide 2:

Here you can see the basic structure of the Rapid Forces Division in Stadtallendorf together with its subordinate units.

The Division comprises around 11,000 German soldiers and 2,100 soldiers from the Netherlands, who as members of the 11th Air Assault Brigade from Schaarsbergen have been integrated into the German Division.

Slide 3:

“Green Griffin” is a field training exercise of the Rapid Forces Division that will take place from 27 September to 8 October 2021 in the north-east of Germany, mainly on the Kliestz, Altengrabow and Lehnin training ranges and at an airfield in Stendal.

Owing to COVID-19 restrictions, “Green Griffin” will be conducted as a modified exercise, that is, concentrating on selected “vignettes”.

The originally planned joint exercise will be divided into different training areas corresponding to the separate vignettes for the subordinate units.

The Rapid Forces Division is building on the results of the earlier “White Griffin” and “Red Griffin” exercises, which were conducted as training and planning exercises – focusing on, for example, command and control, the operation of a forward arming and refuelling point, and command post training.

Further topics covered include the integration of a company from Romania’s 81st Mechanized Brigade and certification of the Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) unit from the Netherlands and of the German helicopter task force for the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) 2023.

Various vignettes are planned, such as close air support, live firing and the aforementioned certification of the German helicopter task force for the VJTF.

To achieve these objectives, simple tactical situations will be used in the exercise.

As part of a multinational approach, the Rapid Forces Division, together with the United States of America, Romania and the Netherlands, will execute training blocks for airmobile forces, including in-depth training.

Slide 4:

Here you can see the formations providing troops together with their peacetime locations and the planned troop strength for the exercise, which will have up to 2,200 participants.

The “Green Griffin” exercise is thus far below the notification threshold.

Slide 5:

The participation of 33 helicopters of different types from three countries is currently planned for the “Green Griffin” exercise, including the certification of the German helicopter task force for the VJTF.

Slide 6:

Here you can see the various training elements to be covered by the participants in the exercise, but I do not wish to go into them in detail, since after all they have to do with specific military training at a lower, tactical level.

Slide 7:

Here you can see the planned exercise locations showing the units that are to be involved.

The 1st Airmobile Task Force is in Saarlouis to begin with. The main base for the exercise is in Faßberg; as for the other locations in the north-east, Stendal and Kliestz serve as a forward operating base, while Altengrabow and Lehnin are intermediate objectives 1 and 2.

Slide 8:

The starting situation for the exercise is shown here. The 1st Airmobile Task Force carries out live firing on the Altengrabow and Lehnin training ranges (which here serve as intermediate objectives 1 and 2), while the 11th Airmobile Task Force (initially in the Faßberg area) prepares to conduct ground and aerial reconnaissance in the direction of the intermediate objectives and, if necessary, to attack these and subsequently secure them.

Meanwhile, the Romanian mechanized company will secure the forward operating base in Stendal and the multinational Air Task Force will support the 11th Airmobile Task Force as required and serve as a reserve force.

The German helicopter task force for the VJTF will carry out its certification exercise.

Slide 9:

Here you can see a visualization of what has just been described, the aim of which is to seize intermediate objectives 1 and 2 as part of an offensive action involving forces from the 11th Airmobile Task Force.

The Romanian mechanized company continues to secure the forward operating base in Stendal, while the multinational Air Task Force carries on supporting the 11th Airmobile Task Force as required.

Slide 10:

Summing up, I should like to state the following:

- The “Green Griffin” exercise is far below the notification threshold;
- Up to 2,200 multinational soldiers and 33 helicopters will be taking part in the “Green Griffin” exercise;
- This briefing pursuant to FSC Decision No. 9/12 is for the purpose of transparency and is meant to serve as a confidence-building measure.

Mr. Chairperson, I kindly ask you to attach the text of this briefing to the journal of the day.

Thank you for your attention.