

FSC.JOUR/992 22 September 2021

Original: ENGLISH

Chairmanship: Austria

986th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

1. Date: Wednesday, 22 September 2021 (in the Neuer Saal and via video

teleconference)

Opened: 10.05 a.m.
Suspended: 1.05 p.m.
Resumed: 3.05 p.m.
Closed: 3.15 p.m.

2. <u>Chairperson</u>: Ambassador F. Raunig

Mr. R. Lassmann

3. <u>Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:</u>

Agenda item 1: SECURITY DIALOGUE: "RISKS AND CHALLENGES TO

SECURITY"

 Presentation by Air Commodore J. F. Monahan, Head of Air, Space and Cyber Doctrine at the Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence, United Kingdom

- Presentation by Major General P. N. Muraveika, Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus
- Presentation by Major General J. Wikman, Deputy Chief of Joint Operations, Sweden

Chairperson, Air Commodore J. F. Monahan, Major General P. N. Muraveika, Major General J. Wikman, Russian Federation (Annex 1), Slovenia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/339/21), Canada, United Kingdom (FSC.DEL/343/21 OSCE+), United States of America (FSC.DEL/334/21

OSCE+), Turkey (Annex 2) (Annex 3), Ukraine (FSC.DEL/336/21), Armenia (Annex 4), Latvia, Lithuania, Azerbaijan, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria

Agenda item 2: GENERAL STATEMENTS

Situation in and around Ukraine: Ukraine (FSC.DEL/337/21), Slovenia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/340/21), Canada, United Kingdom (FSC.DEL/342/21 OSCE+), United States of America (FSC.DEL/335/21 OSCE+), Russian Federation (Annex 5)

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) FSC Chairmanship side event "Framework for Arms Control", to be held at the Modul University Vienna in Kahlenberg, Vienna, and via video teleconference on 27 September 2021: Chairperson
- (b) Progress of an FSC e-learning course on conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures: Representative of the Conflict Prevention Centre
- (c) Meeting of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition, to be held on 28 September 2021: Chairperson of the Informal Group of Friends on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Latvia)

4. <u>Next meeting:</u>

Wednesday, 29 September 2021, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal and via video teleconference



FSC.JOUR/992 22 September 2021 Annex 1

ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

986th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 992, Agenda item 1

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Mr. Chairperson,

I should like to begin by saying that I fully share the approaches and assessments voiced today in the statement by the head of the International Treaty Directorate of the Main Directorate for International Military Co-operation of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, Colonel Alexander Novikov, and the presentation by the Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus, Major General Pavel Muraveika.

As regards the statements by our esteemed Western colleagues, it should be noted that if the word "Russia" is replaced with "the United States of America", "the United Kingdom" or "Canada", then everything that has been said would be seen to apply to them and their remarks would actually become true.

We would describe the concerns voiced by OSCE participating States about military activity on Russian territory (our sovereign right, as it happens) as an attempt to divert attention from NATO's provocative actions near our borders.

Let me provide some statistics. These are dry figures, with no politicization whatsoever. Strategic bomber aircraft flights by the United States Air Force near Russia's borders have increased fourteenfold since 2014. Every week, the Russian air defence forces on duty detect up to 50 foreign spy planes and some 20 reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles close to our borders. In 2019–2020, foreign spy planes began to appear 40 per cent more frequently in the Black Sea region. During the same period, aerial reconnaissance activities near Crimea went up by 61 per cent. The total length of time that NATO warships spend in the waters of the Black Sea has increased by 30 per cent, with up to 40 per cent of these ships being equipped with long-range precision weapons. Among them, incidentally, is the USS Roosevelt, a destroyer capable of carrying up to 90 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The activity of the Alliance's naval forces in the Barents Sea and the Baltic Sea has intensified.

One of the commitments that NATO undertook was to stop approaching Russia's borders. We have become accustomed to the fact that our Western colleagues, having signed up to many commitments in the 1990s, are beginning to ignore them. And when we suggest

that they reaffirm what was stated therein – for example, the principle of the indivisibility of security, or not strengthening one's own security at the expense of the security of others – they avoid doing so. I wish I were wrong, but the conclusion to be drawn is very simple, namely that they have some kind of malicious plans with regard to Russia. How else can we explain the lack of a response to the Russian proposals for de-escalating the situation along the Russia-NATO line of contact? As has been noted on numerous occasions, these proposals remain on the table.

In the context of the discussion of contemporary risks and challenges to security, I should also like to comment on the subject of the so-called threats "below the threshold of armed conflict".

It is well known that to conduct successful "hybrid" activities, it is necessary to have global and all-pervasive media, superiority in information and telecommunications technology, concentrated leverage over the global financial system and experience in using special forces in other countries and regions. It is quite clear who has such a "toolkit" in their possession and is actively using it in practice.

For example, it would come as no revelation if I were to say that the US digital giants are abusing the lack of regulation of their activities at the level of international law. As a result, during the elections to the eighth convocation of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 50 per cent of the cyberattacks on the Central Election Commission's website were carried out from the United States. Evidence of meddling in our country's internal affairs was provided by senior officials from the Russian Embassy in Washington during meetings at the White House and the State Department.

We can also see perfectly clearly who at the OSCE is most active in raising the issue of "hybrid" threats and trying to pin labels and use propaganda to cast other countries in the image of an "enemy". In doing so, participating States, whether wittingly or not, are activating the "hybrid" mechanisms themselves. As the saying goes, "an uneasy conscience betrays itself". We consider it necessary to caution that using "hybrid" schemes to solve geopolitical and economic problems inevitably weakens international security and co-operation.

Today, our colleagues in these negotiations once again mentioned the joint Russian-Belarusian strategic exercise "Zapad-2021". I would remind you that we organized briefings on this exercise ahead of time. This was done through the Russian and Belarusian Ministries of Defence in Moscow and Minsk, respectively, at the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) here in Vienna. There was detailed coverage in the media and on social media of the parameters and progress of the manoeuvres. Military attachés accredited in Moscow were invited as observers. What else should we have done to set our Western partners' minds at rest?

It should be emphasized that the maximum number of military unit personnel under unified operational command involved in the Russian-Belarusian exercise – a parameter covered by the Vienna Document 2011 – did not exceed 6,400 personnel on the territory of Russia, which is significantly lower than the threshold for notifiable military activity. As for those who are trying to call this figure into question, we recommend that they read the Vienna Document 2011 again carefully to see which forces are covered and which are not.

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Unfortunately, we do not always see such openness on the part of the Alliance. NATO has long been pursuing a policy of breaking its exercises down into separate stages so as to avoid the notification threshold, although these training activities have a single operational context and are conducted using the same forces and equipment under the auspices of nation States, NATO or the US Air Forces in Europe. This was the case, for example, during the major US-led manoeuvres conducted in May and June of this year on the territory of 16 States stretching from the Baltic in the north to the Balkans in the south. NATO did not invite our observers to these manoeuvres.

Let me turn to the Baltic. Our esteemed colleagues from Latvia and Lithuania have spoken about the "peace-loving" expansion of NATO's presence on the "eastern flank". In that regard, the experience of Afghanistan, which enjoyed a "privileged" partnership with the Alliance, should not be forgotten. We all know only too well how that panned out in practice.

As for the statements by the representatives of the North Atlantic bloc regarding the need to modernize the Vienna Document 2011, our position on this matter is well known. There will be no steps in that direction as long as NATO continues its sabre-rattling at our borders.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of today's FSC meeting.



FSC.JOUR/992 22 September 2021 Annex 2

Original: ENGLISH

986th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 992, Agenda item 1

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF TURKEY

Mr. Chairperson,

I should like to thank the guest speakers for their insightful presentations.

Allow me also to thank the Austrian Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) for dedicating today's Security Dialogue to the theme of "risks and challenges to security".

Mr. Chairperson,

Risks and challenges, as clearly defined in the OSCE Framework for Arms Control, still exist in the OSCE area. In addition, new ones have emerged since that document was adopted in 1996.

We believe that many of these risks and challenges stem from a serious deficit of trust among the participating States.

Unfortunately, confrontation is replacing co-operation throughout the OSCE area.

We need a sincere and genuine dialogue among the participating States to restore confidence.

Open diplomatic channels are the most effective tools for tackling the current risks and challenges.

Constructive dialogue should be the first conventional response to threat perceptions. This is not an easy task, but it is doable.

Moreover, full implementation of the existing commitments is an absolute must.

Turkey has always embraced and advocated greater openness, transparency and predictability in the politico-military environment.

Furthermore, as already underlined in the FSC Chairmanship's concept note for today's Security Dialogue, we believe that the increasing misuse of technological innovations poses another challenge to our security.

Some asymmetric tactics, supported by technological developments, target the vulnerabilities of States. Cyberattacks or disinformation campaigns are used to achieve political goals.

We are also witnessing how non-State actors, particularly terrorist organizations, can employ some of these new tactics for their heinous activities.

As a country that has long been combating terrorist organizations such as PKK/YPG/PYD, Daesh and FETO, Turkey has always faced the threat of terrorism.

Despite our calls, their façade organizations and extensions still exploit the legal loopholes in several countries, enabling the aforementioned terrorist groups to continue with their recruitment, propaganda and financing activities.

This is a real security threat for Turkey.

As stipulated in the final subparagraph of paragraph 7 of the OSCE Framework for Arms Control, "full co-operation, including co-operation in the implementation of existing commitments, in combating terrorism in all its forms and practices" must be ensured.

We take this opportunity to reiterate our call to all participating States to resolutely implement the "extradite or prosecute" principle and to prevent any abuse of refugee status by those involved in terrorist acts.

Mr. Chairperson,

Irregular migration is another challenge that exacerbates the current security environment.

Turkey is of the opinion that a sustainable solution to irregular migration can only be attained if the "push factors", such as wars and conflicts, human rights violations and economic deprivation in many of the countries of origin, are tackled.

The countries of destination should support peace processes and promote the peaceful settlement of disputes in conflict-affected areas and step up their humanitarian aid and development investments in the countries of transit and origin.

On the other hand, the rising trends in xenophobia, racism, hate speech, hatred against Islam and anti-Semitism in the OSCE area and beyond are alarming and could multiply the existing risks and challenges.

These trends continue to threaten our common values as well as the peace and harmony of our societies.

Mr. Chairperson,

Last but not least, the continuation of conflicts in the OSCE area constitutes yet another threat to regional peace and stability.

Full respect for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of States is the key element in resolving these conflicts.

The FSC should continue to play a major role in countering all these threats in the politico-military dimension. Turkey remains ready and is willing to contribute to efforts to that end.

We kindly ask you, Mr. Chairperson, to attach our statement to the journal of the day.

Thank you.



FSC.JOUR/992 22 September 2021 Annex 3

Original: ENGLISH

986th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 992, Agenda item 1

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF TURKEY

Mr. Chairperson,

I am taking the floor to exercise our right of reply regarding the issues raised by the distinguished Armenian colleague, since my country's name was mentioned.

We completely reject these baseless accusations against Turkey.

It is well known that Turkey and Azerbaijan have been conducting joint military exercises in a transparent manner for several years.

Turkey, acting in good faith, provides information about these military activities through the official sources.

All these exercises are being held in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Document and do not target any third country.

Taking this opportunity, I would like to reiterate that if the Armenian delegation has concerns regarding the thresholds and provisions of the Vienna Document, we strongly call upon them to join its modernization efforts and propose their suggestions.

Finally, I should also like to restate our conviction that constructive dialogue, instead of blame games, should be the first conventional response to the threat perceptions. This is not an easy task, but it is doable.

We kindly ask you, Mr. Chairperson, to attach to the journal of the day our previous statement together with this statement made in exercise of our right of reply.

Thank you.



FSC.JOUR/992 22 September 2021 Annex 4

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986th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 992, Agenda item 1

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF ARMENIA

Mr. Chairperson,

The delegation of Armenia joins the other delegations in thanking the distinguished keynote speakers at today's Security Dialogue for their interesting presentations.

At the last meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) we looked at the origins of the arms control regime in the OSCE area, at the ideas that in those days united participating States, and at the evolution of threats and challenges that have led to the current complex and unpredictable security environment, which is characterized by multiple traditional and non-traditional security threats. The emergence of unconventional security threats, however, has not diminished the impact of conventional threats, nor has it abolished traditional approach to security – that is, seeking to prevent the threat or use of force.

Bearing in mind the security threats posed by unnotified military exercises and activities, the Armenian FSC Chairmanship organized a Security Dialogue on transparency in military exercises and activities on 23 June, which was aimed at demonstrating the security implications of the lack of military transparency and the need for joint actions to prevent further deterioration of the security environment in the OSCE area. Military transparency is essential for building trust and confidence among the participating States, and we should like to commend the Austrian Chairmanship for keeping this topic high on the FSC agenda.

Mr. Chairperson,

Unnotified military exercises continue to pose a major threat to security and stability in the OSCE area, particularly those conducted in close proximity to conflict zones. My delegation has been vocal in pointing out the direct link between large-scale military exercises and the likelihood of the use of force. The war of aggression unleashed against Artsakh on 27 September 2020 is a stark reminder of how military exercises can be used to prepare for a real offensive. Thus, the war of aggression against Artsakh was preceded by an unnotified joint Azerbaijani-Turkish military exercise that involved thousands of military personnel, hundreds of armoured combat vehicles, artillery and military aviation, including Turkish F-16 jets and unmanned aerial vehicles. It is worth mentioning that the exercise was used to deploy Turkish military equipment and personnel to Azerbaijan, which were then

used in the war against Artsakh – in clear defiance of the obligations and commitments undertaken by those two participating States.

Mr. Chairperson,

While the conventional arms control regime confronts deepening challenges and threats, conventional risks to security are being multiplied by the emergence of new weapons and technologies. The growing gap between emerging security challenges on the one hand, and the limited capacities of and lack of determination within our Organization on the other, calls for a coherent and focused approach to arms control.

The pace and scale of technological development in the field of conventional arms and its impact on security in the OSCE area demand our constant attention and thorough consideration. The discussions that we had during the Armenian FSC Chairmanship revealed that new weapons and technologies, such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic weapons, robotics and autonomous weapons, are primarily disruptive in nature and have to be placed under appropriate legal and ethical constraints. Clearly, the topic of modern warfare calls for sustained attention by the FSC, and we therefore welcome its inclusion in the work programme of the Austrian Chairmanship.

Mr. Chairperson,

Allow me to conclude by expressing our hope that the participating States will be able to reinvigorate the ideas of co-existence and co-operation from the past and engage in a meaningful dialogue for a safe and secure future.

I kindly ask that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you.



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ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

986th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 992, Agenda item 2

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Mr. Chairperson,

The delegation of the Russian Federation, as before, does not consider it necessary to listen to the propaganda exercises of the Ukrainian delegation or to hold discussions on a topic imposed by the latter, especially since at this stage Ukraine is in fact being steered from outside and is not an independent actor in international relations. This is regularly borne out by the statements made at the Forum for Security Co-operation by the Western "quartet", who have adopted the position of going along with the war crimes of the fascist Ukrainian armed forces and marauding neo-Nazi formations. They too, among others, have the continued bloodshed in Donbas on their conscience.

In this connection, I consider it of the utmost importance to draw attention to the terrible events that took place in Donbas yesterday, 21 September, that is, on the International Day of Peace established by the United Nations General Assembly. It is most telling that, against the backdrop of calls by the international community for them to refrain from violence and the use of weapons, the Ukrainian security forces intensified their shelling of civilian objects and the civilian population of certain areas of the Donetsk region – an action smacking of genocide and war crimes.

As reported by Donetsk media, the settlement of Yasynuvata came under mortar fire from the positions of the 25th Brigade of the Ukrainian armed forces. The Ukrainian security forces fired 15 mortar shells with a calibre of 120 mm. Contrary to all the norms of international humanitarian law, a school was shelled inside which there were 63 children and 53 staff at the time. All the children and staff were promptly evacuated to a shelter. It was by sheer luck alone that no one was hurt.

What happened demonstrates once again the rotten core of the pro-Nazi regime in Kyiv, for which the simulation of war with some "external enemy" is a means of safeguarding its own existence. An end to the war would be its complete undoing. It is for that very reason that we hear statements from the Ukrainian authorities calling into question the Minsk agreements and, in particular, the Minsk Package of Measures, which is the internationally recognized framework for a settlement of the internal Ukrainian conflict. Let

us see how Volodymyr Zelenskyy will try to justify these crimes from the lofty podium of the United Nations.

In closing, we call on Ukraine and its external "minders" to finally stop misrepresenting the true causes and trajectory of the internal Ukrainian crisis. In order to swiftly halt the armed confrontation in Donbas, it is necessary to bring targeted influence to bear on the Ukrainian leadership with a view to ensuring implementation of the Minsk Package of Measures in its entirety and in a co-ordinated manner through direct dialogue between the Ukrainian Government and the authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.