



**57th JOINT MEETING OF THE
FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION
AND THE PERMANENT COUNCIL**

1. Date: Wednesday, 21 May 2014

Opened: 10 a.m.
Closed: 12.50 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador A. Popov (FSC) (Moldova)
Mr. P. von Arx (PC) (Switzerland)

The Chairperson (FSC), also on behalf of the Chairperson (PC) and the participants in the joint FSC-PC meeting, expressed condolences to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Croatia in connection with the recent flooding in those countries. Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia thanked delegations for the expression of condolences.

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: EFFORTS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT: ADDRESS BY H.E. ANGELA KANE, UNITED NATIONS HIGH REPRESENTATIVE FOR DISARMAMENT AFFAIRS

Chairperson (FSC), United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs (FSC-PC.DEL/25/14 OSCE+), Greece-European Union (with the candidate countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland, Montenegro and Serbia; the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate countries Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia, Moldova, Monaco and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC-PC.DEL/23/14), Switzerland (Annex 1), Austria, Ukraine (FSC-PC.DEL/27/14), Romania, Belarus (FSC-PC.DEL/26/14 OSCE+), Turkey, United States of America, Russian Federation (Annex 2), United Kingdom, Serbia, FSC Chairperson's Co-ordinator on Non-proliferation Issues (Latvia)

Agenda item 2: GENERAL STATEMENTS

Situation in Ukraine: Ukraine (FSC-PC.DEL/28/14), Greece-European Union (with the candidate countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Iceland and Montenegro; the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate countries Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC-PC.DEL/24/14), Russian Federation, United States of America, United Kingdom

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

None

4. Next meeting:

To be announced



57th Joint Meeting of the FSC and the PC
FSC-PC Journal No. 44, Agenda item 1

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF SWITZERLAND

Dear Co-Chairpersons,
Her Excellency Angela Kane,
Excellencies and colleagues,

The Swiss delegation joins those who warmly welcome Her Excellency Angela Kane, United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, to today's Security Dialogue, and congratulates the Moldovan FSC Chairmanship for having joined us in choosing the highly relevant topic of disarmament.

The OSCE, as the most important regional security organization, is indeed a relevant player in the field of disarmament. With its confidence- and security-building measures in the politico-military dimension, its experience with small arms and light weapons as well as with stockpiles and destruction of conventional ammunition, and its commitments with regard to the implementation of UNSCR 1540 (2004), the OSCE has a number of tools and instruments at its disposal enabling it to play an active role in creating a safer world by addressing disarmament issues. Furthermore, its comprehensive approach supports a holistic approach to disarmament issues.

As a neutral non-aligned State, Switzerland has a vital interest in ensuring that compliance with international law takes precedence over military might in international relations. Therefore, Switzerland's arms control and disarmament policy is a central pillar of its security policy. In this context, it pursues three objectives:

1. Stability and security at the lowest possible level of armaments;
2. Measures for disarmament and non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction;
3. Fostering of human security.

In pursuing these objectives, Switzerland utilizes all the possibilities at its disposal to exercise an influence, at both the multilateral and the bilateral levels:

- Membership of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament since 1996;
- Signing and ratification of all the key disarmament agreements;

- Approval of all the principles of non-proliferation, as stated in UNSCR 1540;
- Active commitment within international bodies to the strengthening of arms control; and
- The disarmament process in all its aspects.

It is important to note that Switzerland was among the first signatory States of the Arms Trade Treaty, and the ratification of this agreement is under way at the national level. Switzerland stands ready to suggest Geneva as the location at which to install the ATT Secretariat.

To be relevant, arms control and disarmament regimes must be non-discriminatory and verifiable. Transparency is an important factor in an effective disarmament policy. For this reason, Switzerland fully supports instruments enhancing transparency and predictability in the military field, as they contribute in an important way to stability and confidence amongst States.

Concerning conventional arms, Switzerland takes note of the trend towards rearmament instead of disarmament.

In the field of small arms and light weapons, the Swiss policy is twofold: on the one hand, we are very engaged against the illegal trade in small arms and, on the other hand, we support all measures to prevent small arms and light weapons finding their way into the hands of groups in regions beset by tensions and unrest. Uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons is a serious threat to human security, and intensifies and prolongs armed conflicts, above all those having an intra-State character. It obstructs first aid to those who need it most and supports organized crime and terrorist movements. Strict and internationally harmonized rules must be applied for exports of conventional arms so as to improve security and stability. Furthermore, initiatives to improve the safe stockpiling of SALW and ammunition and to destroy surpluses are useful means to make a difference.

Switzerland aims at the eradication of weapons of mass destruction, as they are a major threat to international security and to humanity. To this end, disarmament policy must be combined with measures to prevent proliferation. Switzerland supports an initiative launched for the purpose of lowering the level of readiness of nuclear weapons.

The framework conditions of arms control and disarmament policy are becoming ever more complex. This is due, among other things, to the growing multipolarity of the international context, as well as to the challenge posed by non-State actors to the State monopoly on the use of force. An active, pragmatic and realistic approach is therefore urgently required of all of us. This includes a joint and synchronized approach with organizations sharing the same interests in these fields, as for example UNODA.

To offer and promote the OSCE as a platform for exchanges and discussion concerning conventional arms control, including disarmament, is one of Switzerland's priorities for the 2014 OSCE Chairmanship.

Thank you very much for your attention.

I kindly request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation
Permanent Council**

FSC-PC.JOUR/44
21 May 2014
Annex 2

ENGLISH
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57th Joint Meeting of the FSC and the PC
FSC-PC Journal No. 44, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Co-Chairpersons,

Our delegation is pleased to welcome Her Excellency Angela Kane, United Nations High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, and thanks her for her comprehensive and in-depth statement. I should like briefly to sketch the approach of the Russian Federation to these important questions, particularly in the global context.

Co-Chairpersons,

The Russian Federation has consistently advocated reinforcing the central role of the United Nations in peacekeeping and international security, arms control, and strengthening the regimes for non-proliferation and real disarmament.

Ridding the world of the threat of weapons of mass destruction is one of the key elements in strengthening international security and strategic stability. Russia makes an important contribution to addressing this historic task, complying strictly with its commitments under multilateral and bilateral agreements on disarmament, including rigorous fulfilment of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. Further nuclear disarmament measures by the Russian Federation are possible only with account taken of this Treaty.

Being firmly committed to its obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Russian Federation urges all States to make systematic progress towards the creation of a framework for a gradual accomplishment of the strategic task of building a world free of nuclear weapons.

The reduction and limitation of nuclear arms cannot be accomplished in isolation from the whole set of factors that exert an influence on strategic stability. Among these factors, in our opinion, are the unilateral and unrestricted deployment by the United States of a global anti-missile defence system, the lack of due progress in ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the reluctance of the United States to abandon the

possibility of putting arms into outer space, the creation of a quantitative and qualitative imbalance in conventional arms, and more.

We call on all countries of the world to make united and concerted efforts to create a situation that would enable further progress to be made in nuclear disarmament while strengthening stability and equal and indivisible security for all. We believe that it is counter-productive to attempt to divert the attention of the international community by overemphasizing spurious and far-fetched issues like the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons. The Russian Federation is aware of the possible consequences of the use of nuclear weapons and continues to make every effort to prevent this.

One of the most important tasks with respect to preventing threats to the nuclear non-proliferation regime is the development of multilateral co-operation in accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 and mechanisms such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and multilateral export control regimes to prevent nuclear materials and related technologies from getting into the hands of non-State actors, above all terrorists.

We agree with the need to hold a conference as soon as possible attended by all of the States of the Middle East without exception to discuss the creation in the region of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction and the means for their delivery.

Co-Chairpersons,

It is unacceptable for outer space to be transformed into a new sphere of military confrontation and a potential theatre of military activities. There is a need to draft an international legally binding treaty as soon as possible on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space. The basic ideas for a document of this nature can be found in a corresponding Sino-Russian draft and enjoy the support of the overwhelming majority of the international community.

As an important step towards such a treaty, we call on all responsible States to join our initiative for no first deployment of weapons in outer space (NFDWOS). With a view to ensuring the predictability of the strategic situation and of consolidating global stability, the Russian Federation is intending to present a draft NFDWOS resolution to the 69th session of the United Nations General Assembly. We hope for maximum co-authorship and the adoption by consensus of this resolution.

In the present-day situation, transparency and confidence-building measures in outer space activities (TCBOS) are all the more important and relevant.

I should like to mention in particular that a resolution on TCBOS, unprecedentedly co-authored by Russia, China and the United States and sponsored by 67 States, was adopted in the First Committee of the 68th session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Co-Chairpersons,

I shall not repeat our statements today on the problem of conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures. Suffice to say that Russia will work towards

bringing the conventional arms control in Europe regime into line with present-day realities and ensuring unconditional observance by all countries of the agreed confidence- and security-building measures.

Russia regards the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) as a global dimension of the problem. Indeed, the black market for SALW supplies terrorists, extremists, illegal armed formations, organized and street crime and various conflicts. The relevant documents should unfailingly address the inadmissibility of the illicit trade in SALW. Effectiveness in practice would be substantially increased if concrete measures were taken to prevent SALW from getting into the hands of people who use them for criminal purposes. The most important measure of this type is a ban on SALW transfers to structures not authorized by the State.

With regard to transparency, it is our belief that the basic task of the relevant mechanisms, including the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, is to track destabilizing accumulations of arms in the interests of fostering dialogue between States with a view to allaying concerns.

Co-Chairpersons,

We firmly advocate stepping up co-operation and co-ordination between the United Nations and the OSCE in areas of common interest. Needless to say, duplication should be avoided and the specific features of our organizations and their effective potential should be taken into account, but the executive bodies should also keep strictly to their mandate defined by the participating States. Observance of these conditions would maximize the effectiveness and fruitfulness of our co-operation.

Co-Chairpersons,

I should like to dwell for a moment on a question raised by my Ukrainian colleague and say something about the alleged violations by Russia of its commitments under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum.

Through its policy, particularly with regard to national minorities, the current regime in Kyiv, which came to power as a result of an anti-constitutional revolution, has itself effectively destroyed the unity of Ukraine.

At the OSCE Summit in Budapest in 1994 and the events on the margins of this meeting Russia did not undertake to force a part of Ukraine to remain within the country against the will of the local population, and the provisions of the Budapest Memorandum do not extend to circumstances arising as a result of internal political or socio-economic factors.

As you are aware, 97 per cent of the voters in Crimea who took part in the referendum held on 16 March this year under the supervision of international observers voted for admission to the Russian Federation.

Thus the loss by Ukraine of its territorial integrity was the result of complex internal processes that are unrelated to Russia and its commitments under the Budapest Memorandum.

The Russian Federation has always strictly observed the commitments set forth in the Budapest Memorandum to respect Ukraine's sovereignty, even during the months of internal political conflict in Kyiv. This is more than can be said for the policies of Western countries, which openly ignored this sovereignty at the time of the "Maidan" events.

We should also like to recall the affirmation in Budapest of the importance of OSCE commitments to prevent the growth of aggressive nationalism and chauvinism. It is quite clear that Ukraine has not honoured these commitments and for many years has condoned the growth of highly aggressive nationalism, which has ultimately led to the demand for self-determination by the people of Crimea through admission to the Russian Federation.

As for the assertions that through its actions Russia is apparently demonstrating the unreliability of the very concept of "negative guarantees" of the security of non-nuclear States and in so doing "destroying" the nuclear non-proliferation regime, it should be pointed out that the common element of the Budapest Memorandum and the concept of "negative guarantees" in the classic sense is only the commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. In no way has Russia failed to honour this commitment with respect to Ukraine.

All of the other commitments under the Budapest Memorandum are in line with OSCE principles and bear no relation to the concept of "negative guarantees" or to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a whole. Consequently, the assertions that Russia's activities "undermine" the nuclear non-proliferation regime are baseless and in bad faith.

Thank you, Co-Chairpersons. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.