



Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

THEMATIC REPORT

RESTRICTIONS TO THE SMM'S FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT
AND OTHER IMPEDIMENTS TO FULFILMENT OF ITS MANDATE

July — December 2019

April 2020

Published by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

© OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine 2020

All rights reserved. The contents of this publication may be freely used and copied for non-commercial purposes, provided that any such reproduction is accompanied by an acknowledgement of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine as the source.

Available electronically in English, Ukrainian and Russian at:
<http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm>

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | |
|---|----|
| Summary of conclusions | 4 |
| Introduction | 5 |
| Roles and responsibilities | 6 |
| The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine | 6 |
| The signatories of the Minsk agreements | 6 |
| The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) | 6 |
| Categories of restrictions | 7 |
| Overview of restrictions | 8 |
| Restrictions involving gunfire near SMM patrols, direct threats and violent behaviour | 10 |
| Restrictions at checkpoints | 11 |
| Restrictions related to monitoring of withdrawal of weapons | 14 |
| SMM means of remote observation | 15 |
| Border areas outside government control | 18 |
| Disengagement areas | 19 |
| Mines, UXO and other explosive objects | 22 |
| Impediments to gathering information | 24 |
| Contribution of the JCCC | 25 |
| Conclusions | 26 |
| Annex 1: Graphs and Maps | 28 |
| Annex 2: Violence and threats against or in the presence of the SMM | 31 |
| Annex 3: Table of incidents involving weapons aimed at SMM mini- and mid-range UAVs | 32 |

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

- The SMM's unhindered, unrestricted and unconditional freedom of movement is crucial to the implementation of its mandate.
- The Mission continued to face restrictions to its freedom of movement and other impediments in eastern Ukraine. These restrictions have been concentrated overwhelmingly in non-government-controlled areas in southern Donetsk region.
- The Mission's monitoring of border areas beyond government control continued to be limited due to restrictions to the Mission's access.
- SMM unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) continued to be subjected to GPS signal interference as well as to gunfire, which poses risks also to the SMM patrols operating UAVs.
- Failure to remove existing mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other explosive objects or laying of new ones continued to impede the Mission's freedom of movement.
- It is the responsibility of the sides to mark, fence off and demine contaminated areas; however, the SMM noted little progress on mine and UXO clearance on both sides of the contact line.
- In non-government-controlled areas, the Mission continued to face impediments in establishing and reporting facts following specific incidents and reports of incidents.

INTRODUCTION

The SMM's unhindered, unrestricted and unconditional freedom of movement is crucial to the implementation of its mandated tasks, as outlined by the OSCE Permanent Council's Decision No.1117, and to the effective execution of its role in the Protocol and Memorandum of September 2014 and in the Minsk Package of Measures of February 2015 and its Addendum of September 2015, also outlined in the Framework Decision of Disengagement of Forces and Hardware of 21 September 2016. Any restriction encountered by the Mission potentially reduces its ability to monitor the security situation and carry out its mandate, thereby challenging both the decision of the Permanent Council and the commitments agreed upon by the signatories of the Minsk agreements.

This report provides an updated overview of the restrictions and other impediments that the SMM faced in implementing its mandate in the second half of 2019. The last update covering the first six months of 2019 was published in [September 2019](#).

The report explores categories and types of freedom of movement restrictions and other impediments in the implementation of the Mission's mandate by providing trends and comparative analyses of data collected. The report also contextualizes freedom of movement restrictions and other impediments faced in non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region, which affect the SMM's comprehensive monitoring of the security situation, including border areas, and impact on the civilian population in the area.

It also notes restrictions faced in monitoring the withdrawal of heavy weapons, including heavy weapons holding areas and permanent storage sites, and hindrances to the SMM's monitoring of border areas outside government control.

ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

[OSCE Permanent Council Decision No. 1117](#) stipulates that the aim of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine is to contribute to reducing tensions and fostering peace, stability and security throughout the country. The Mission's mandate specifies that it shall have safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. Unrestricted and unconditional access to all areas is essential to ensure effective monitoring and reporting of the security situation, its impact on civilians, the ceasefire, withdrawal of weapons, demining, disengagement, as well as respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. The mandate also tasks the Mission with reporting on any restrictions to its freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate.

The signatories of the Minsk agreements

The signatories of the Addendum to the Package of Measures and [the Framework Decision on Disengagement of Forces and Hardware](#) (2016) agreed that the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations should ensure secure and safe access for the SMM, and rapid response to specific violations reported by the Mission. They have also agreed that restrictions to the SMM's freedom of movement, including interference with the Mission's means of remote observation, constitute a violation of its mandate, and have committed to ensuring effective monitoring and verification by the SMM.

The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC)

The JCCC was established in September 2014 through a bilateral initiative between the Ukrainian and Russian General Staffs of the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Ministries of Defence. The signatories of the Addendum determined that the JCCC should contribute both to rapid response to impediments to the Mission's monitoring and verification, and to the safety of its monitors.¹ On 18 December 2017, the Russian Federation Armed Forces officers departed from the JCCC. Until that day, the Mission had requested both sides of the JCCC – officers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and officers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation – to contribute to immediate resolution of impediments encountered by the SMM.

¹ In addition, in accordance with the TCG mine action decision of 3 March 2016, the JCCC is responsible for overall co-ordination of demining and compliance with the ceasefire during mine clearance.

CATEGORIES OF RESTRICTIONS

The SMM categorizes freedom of movement restrictions as the following types:

Denial of access: when the Mission is prevented from visiting an area of interest, including an international border area, or when it is prevented from following its planned patrol route and not allowed to pass through a checkpoint or cross the contact line.

Conditional access: when the Mission is granted access to an area only after accepting certain conditions, including being escorted, presenting documents (e.g. the national passports of SMM monitors), or being subjected to vehicle searches (inspections).

Delay: when the Mission faces regular waiting times, for instance at checkpoints, while those responsible check the SMM's documents, note vehicle license plate numbers or seek permission from their superiors. These are reported as freedom of movement restrictions on occasions when the waiting time was deemed longer than reasonable and unduly limited the SMM's access.


Other impediments: a form of denied access reported when the functioning of the SMM's technical monitoring capabilities is obstructed in any way, for example by jamming of or gunfire aimed at its UAVs.

Furthermore, the Mission also encounters impediments to its efforts in establishing and reporting facts following specific incidents and reports of incidents in certain locations by civilian interlocutors, including as a result of reluctance to engage with the SMM, especially due to "orders" or "lack of permission" from those in control. This type of restriction affects SMM human rights monitoring in particular. It is, however, difficult to quantify the number of these incidents, and they do not form part of the statistical data in this report.

OVERVIEW OF RESTRICTIONS

Between 1 July and 31 December 2019, the SMM faced more restrictions to its freedom of movement and other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate, compared with the first six months of the year. In total, the Mission's freedom of movement was restricted on 566 occasions, an almost 25 per cent increase, compared with the first six months of 2019, when about 450 restrictions had been recorded.² As in previous reporting periods, restrictions occurred overwhelmingly in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (93 per cent), of which 385 were denials of access.³

Freedom of movement restrictions by area for 2019



In the second half of 2019, denial of access constituted 402 cases of the total 566 restrictions, a 16 per cent increase, compared with the previous six months of 2019 (346 cases). The Mission recorded 17 denials of access in government-controlled areas of both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, of which eight

were at heavy weapons holding areas. In non-government-controlled areas, denial of access constituted 385 cases in total, with 341 and 44 cases for Donetsk and Luhansk regions, respectively. Of the 341 denials of access in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, 250 cases were in southern Donetsk region, whereas 96 denials of access occurred at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Verkhnohshyrokiivske (formerly Oktiabr).

The Mission experienced delayed access on 78 occasions, a 73 per cent increase, compared with the previous six months of 2019 (45 cases). Of these, five were in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and 73 were in non-government-controlled areas (71 in Donetsk region and two in Luhansk region). More than 85 per cent of delayed access in non-government-controlled areas took place in southern Donetsk region, at a checkpoint near Verkhnohshyrokiivske (60 occasions) and near Zaichenko (three occasions).

The Mission's freedom of movement was conditioned on 20 occasions; all but one occurred at checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region (19 in the previous reporting period). In southern Donetsk region, the Mission faced two instances of conditional access when members of the armed formations escorted SMM patrols from a checkpoint near Novoazovsk towards a hospital where the Mission was following up on civilian casualties from Roza and Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove).


² The above figures do not include instances of GPS signal interference of SMM UAVs assessed as caused by jamming or probable jamming, or restrictions encountered on a regular basis due to the observed or potential presence of mines and UXO on certain roads identified as important for effective monitoring and in and near any of the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. For more information related to the first six months of 2019, "[Thematic Report on Restrictions of SMM's freedom of movement and other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate, January – June 2019](#)".

³ For such restrictions encountered on a regular basis, see [SMM Daily Reports](#).

In other cases, members of the armed formations requested additional documents, inspected the vehicles or escorted SMM patrols in areas where it was following up on reports of damage to civilian property.


Other impediments to mandate implementation (not counting GPS signal interference with SMM UAVs, assessed as probable jamming) constituted 66 cases, amounting to a 46 per cent increase, compared with the previous six months of 2019 (45 cases). Of these, 15 cases were in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, all related to gunfire assessed as targeting SMM UAVs. In non-government-controlled areas, the Mission recorded 51 cases – 30 and 21 in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, respectively. Of these, 28 were related to gunfire assessed as targeting SMM UAVs and four to gunfire close to SMM patrols.

Categories of restrictions by percentage July-December 2019



- Denial of access
- Delays
- Conditional access
- Other impediments

Freedom of movement restrictions by category for 2019



RESTRICTIONS INVOLVING GUNFIRE NEAR SMM PATROLS, DIRECT THREATS AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOUR

The SMM continued to face freedom of movement restrictions involving gunfire or threats in its proximity, or threats and aggressive behaviour directed towards it. However, it faced fewer instances (five) of such restrictions, compared with the first six months of 2019 (eight cases). All but one took place in non-government-controlled areas. While small-arms fire or explosions in its vicinity did not target the SMM, patrol members had to leave the area without completing assigned tasks.

For example, in July, while positioned on the southern edge of non-government-controlled Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, about 600m east of the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM patrol heard whistling sounds, assessed as originating from bullets flying above their heads, and bullets ricocheting off a hard structure at an assessed distance of 5–10m from them.⁴

In September, while assessing damage to civilian properties in the north-eastern part of non-government-controlled Pikuzy, SMM patrol members heard and saw an explosion impacting on the road about 30m away and saw a tailfin from a rocket-propelled grenade land on the road near the impact. The SMM patrol members immediately relocated to east of Pikuzy, and even after moving about 700m east it was still able to hear two undetermined explosions.⁵ In November, while positioned in Pikuzy to follow up on damage to civilian

properties, the SMM heard three shots of small-arms fire about 100-200m south-west of its position.⁶

Also in September, the SMM was prevented from launching a mini-UAV flight near government-controlled Topolyne, as a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the Mission that any SMM UAVs flying in the area would be shot down.⁷

Notably, all incidents involving gunfire close to SMM patrols occurred despite security guarantees having been provided for adherence to localized ceasefires. These incidents put at great risk the safety of SMM members and hinder the implementation of the Mission's mandate (for all such incidents, see Annex 2).

⁴ See [SMM Daily Report 6 July 2019](#).

⁵ See [SMM Spot Report 2 September 2019](#).

⁶ See [SMM Daily Report 30 November 2019](#).

⁷ See [SMM Daily Report 27 September 2019](#).


RESTRICTIONS AT CHECKPOINTS

The restrictions faced at various checkpoints along the contact line increased by about 60 per cent, with 409 occasions recorded in the reporting period (compared with 256 in the previous reporting period). Of the 409 restrictions, 12 occurred in Luhansk region (three in government- and nine in non-government-controlled areas) and 397 in Donetsk region (five in government- and 392 in non-government-controlled areas). Of the 397 restrictions in Donetsk region, about 75 per cent (304) were denials of access in non-government-controlled areas (compared with 169 in the previous reporting period). Of the 304 denials of access in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, 239 instances took place in the southern part of the region, including 96 at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Verkhnohyrokiivske (formerly Oktiabr).

The SMM has been facing systematic freedom of movement restrictions when accessing non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region. In doing so, patrols use the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near government-controlled Hnutove and the corresponding checkpoint controlled by the armed formations near Verkhnohyrokiivske. From Verkhnohyrokiivske, the road provides access to the settlements in the northern vicinity of the checkpoint, east towards the section of the international border not under government control, as well as to settlements south towards the Sea of Azov.

In the reporting period, the SMM faced 156 freedom of movement restrictions at the checkpoint near Verkhnohyrokiivske (96 denials of access and 60 cases of delayed access), compared with almost 50 per cent fewer in the previous reporting period (39 denials of access and 40 cases of delayed access).

All categories of freedom of movement restrictions in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk Region




- Verkhnohyrokiivske
- Other checkpoints in southern Donetsk region
- Other checkpoints in Donetsk region

On most occasions, members of the armed formations cited spurious reasons such as “ongoing operation in the area” and “demining in the area” when denying the SMM passage. However, when the SMM was allowed to pass through the checkpoint near Verkhnohyrokiivske without restrictions, often times its movement was restricted at other checkpoints of the armed formations further away, thus preventing the SMM from reaching their intended destinations. The SMM faced 158 freedom of movement restrictions (153 denials of access, three cases of delayed access and two of conditional access) at other checkpoints of the armed formations in southern Donetsk region, thus impeding the SMM’s ability not only to monitor the security situation and its impact on civilians in the area but also the border areas not under government control.

Specifically, the Mission's patrols faced freedom of movement restrictions on 68 occasions (65 of which were denials of access) at a checkpoint near Zaichenko, 31 occasions at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (29 of which were denials of access), 18 denials of access at a checkpoint near Bezimmenne, 15 near Shevchenko, seven near Prymorske, seven near Sosnivske, four near Tavrycheske and the remaining seven at other checkpoints in southern Donetsk region.

Freedom of movement restrictions at checkpoints in southern Donetsk region



These restrictions to the Mission's freedom of movement in southern Donetsk region have considerable impacts on its monitoring activities. This concerns not only SMM monitoring of border areas but also affects its monitoring of the withdrawal of weapons and other hardware in these areas, and in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed, according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.⁸ It also hinders the Mission's monitoring and reporting on the impact

of the conflict on the civilian population, including on how hostilities conducted in populated areas threaten their safety. Due to systematic denials of access to non-government-controlled areas, the SMM is unable to visit on a regular basis the settlements of Sakhanka, Novoazovsk, Bezimmenne, Siedove and Pikuzy. The Mission was allowed to visit Pikuzy only twice to assess damage to civilian properties.

In other areas of Donetsk region, the SMM faced freedom of movement restrictions at checkpoints of the armed formations near Kremynets on ten occasions, Staromykhailivka on nine occasions, Nova Marivka on eight occasions and in other settlements. In most cases, members of the armed formations conditioned access by searching SMM vehicles, requesting identification or vehicle registration documents, or allowing the SMM to proceed only after being escorted by members of the armed formations.

In Luhansk region, of 12 freedom of movement restrictions faced by the Mission, nine occurred in non-government-controlled areas. Such restrictions took place near Veselohorivka (four instances), Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (twice) and near Metalist and Stepanivka, where members of the armed formations cited "ongoing operation", "poor road conditions" and "mine hazard" when denying the SMM access.

⁸ Prohibition of deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment in the area delimited by the population centres of Kalmiuske (formerly Komsomolske), Kumachove, Novoazovsk, Sakhanka, to be monitored by the OSCE.



Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Checkpoint near Verkhnoшыrokiwske and other checkpoints in non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region

1 July - 31 December 2019

- GCA - EECP
- NGCA - check point
- Selected settlement
- High frequency FoM corridor
- De Facto Line of Contact
- Point 5 of the Minsk memorandum - estimated lines
- Freedom of Movement restriction frequency
 - Low
 -
 -
 -
 -
 -


Sources: administrative boundaries - OCHA; roads, rivers - OpenStreetMap; sea - VLIJ (2005), IHO sea areas; other - OSCE.

Coordinate system: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

© OSCE SMM 2019 Use, copy, reproduction, transmission, broadcasting, sale, license, or exploitation not permitted without OSCE prior written authorization.

Created: 14/04/2020



RESTRICTIONS RELATED TO MONITORING OF WITHDRAWAL OF WEAPONS

The SMM's ability to monitor the withdrawal of weapons remained hindered, as the sides on numerous occasions denied it access to places holding weapons, including heavy weapons holding areas (HWA) and permanent storage sites (PSS).

The SMM faced 15 freedom of movement restrictions when accessing such sites in the reporting period, which constituted about eight per cent of total visits, compared with 30 in the first six months of 2019, which constituted about 14 per cent of total visits.

Nine of these cases occurred in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (eight denials and one case of delayed access), five in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and one in non-government-controlled Luhansk city. In all previously mentioned cases, "lack of written permission", "orders from superiors" and "lack of pre-approved permissions" were cited when denying the SMM access.

The higher number of restrictions in government-controlled areas is also due to the higher numbers of such holding areas and storage facilities registered. Concerning such sites in non-government-controlled areas, the SMM systematically faced denials of access to southern Donetsk region (see Restrictions at checkpoints section for details), which affected a number of inspection visits in the area. On at least eight occasions, SMM patrols were unable to reach such sites in non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region due to the restrictions faced at checkpoints.

SMM MEANS OF REMOTE OBSERVATION

The targeting of, and interference with, SMM's technical equipment continued, despite the signatories of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum agreeing that the Mission would be able to use all technical equipment necessary, including UAVs, to execute its mandate.⁹ In 2019, the Chief Monitor continued to call upon the signatories of the Minsk agreements to take measures to ensure the unrestricted and secure operation of SMM personnel and assets.

UAVs

The SMM has been utilizing UAVs since 2014 in order to complement monitoring by ground patrols and in particular to monitor areas inaccessible due to security considerations and restrictions to the Mission's access. The Mission operates three types of UAVs: long-range, mid-range and short-range (or mini-UAVs).

Throughout the second half of 2019, the Mission conducted 2,879 UAV flights, which is about a 15 per cent more than in the first six months of 2019 (2,518 operational flights). Of the total number, 153 were long-range, 245 mid-range and 2,481 were mini-UAV flights. Use of UAVs (mini- and mid-range) to monitor in non-government-controlled areas was hindered due to systemic restrictions faced by the SMM (see patrol routes and UAV flights map, Annex 1).

Long-range UAVs

Given the frequent restrictions to freedom

of movement for the Mission on the ground, the long-range UAV is a critical asset toward ensuring comprehensive monitoring in eastern Ukraine. The long-range UAV is also currently the only means of ensuring monitoring of specific areas of both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, especially those which the SMM is unable to reach due to security considerations, and capable of performing night-time monitoring.

Long-range UAVs continued to experience single and dual GPS signal interference assessed as caused by probable jamming. In this reporting period, such interferences occurred on 250 occasions during 153 flights, revealing multiple losses of the GPS signal per single flight.¹⁰

Given the failure of the signatories to abide by their commitments to guarantee unimpeded access to the SMM, including through the use of UAVs, the SMM has implemented a number of technical measures and trainings to enable it to continue operating and to safeguard the long-range UAV in the face of concerted signal interference. However, these operational adjustments cannot offer complete protection.

Mid-range and mini-UAVs

The SMM conducted 2,726 mini- and mid-range UAV flights, with about ten per cent of those flights experiencing GPS signal interference assessed as caused by probable jamming.

⁹ The Memorandum prohibits flights of combat aircraft and foreign UAVs, with the exception of those of the SMM, in the security zone, while the Package of Measures stipulates that its signatories will ensure effective monitoring and verification of ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy weapons by the OSCE, using all technical equipment necessary. The Addendum provides that the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations will rapidly respond to specific violations registered by the SMM, including interference aimed at impeding the use of technical equipment necessary for monitoring and verification of withdrawal of weapons.

¹⁰ The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV's position.

On 45 occasions, small-arms fire was assessed as targeting SMM UAVs: 13 instances in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region and 29 instances in non-government-controlled areas (ten in Donetsk and 19 in Luhansk region), and three instances between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and those of the armed formations. This is a 20 per cent increase, compared with the first six months of 2019, with 38 such cases. Of the 45 instances, 43 were assessed as targeting mini-UAVs,

and two were assessed as targeting mid-range UAVs. Considering that the mini-UAVs have a flight range up to 5km, the patrols operating them are at risk due to their proximity to the UAVs. The incidents involving gunfire persist, despite the provision of security guarantees and advanced notification provided by the SMM on operation of UAVs by the sides. The sides have shown reluctance to assume responsibility and take the necessary action to address this issue.



1 x member of armed formations aiming rifle at OSCE Mini UAV
9km from the contact line

near Zemliane | non-government-controlled
Luhansk region
12 July 2019
Mini UAV Imagery



UAF soldier pointing weapon at SMM UAV
Less than 1 km from the contact line

near Pyshevyk | government-controlled
Donetsk region
7 October 2019
Mini UAV Imagery

In total, the Mission lost one mid-range UAV and six mini-UAVs in the reporting period. In September, an SMM mid-range UAV was damaged, assessed as by small-arms fire, while flying over non-government-controlled areas near the Petrivske disengagement area.¹¹ Additionally, two mini-UAVs were lost after small-arms fire, assessed as targeting the UAVs near non-government-controlled Obozne and Lobacheve in Luhansk region, and four mini-UAVs were unable to be recovered after the SMM lost control of them as a result of signal interference near non-government-controlled Verkhnohshyrokyivske and Petrovskyyi district of Donetsk city, and twice in both government- and non-government-controlled areas of the Petrivske disengagement area.¹²

SMM cameras

Since 2015, the SMM has been deploying cameras to monitor key areas near the contact line, including areas near critical civilian infrastructure, EECPs and corresponding checkpoints, in order to ensure continuous monitoring, including during nighttime. The SMM installed three additional cameras to monitor the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas following the beginning of disengagement on 29 October and 9 November 2019, respectively, increasing the total number of cameras from 22 to 25.

Out of 25 SMM cameras, 16 are located in government-controlled areas, five in non-government-controlled areas and four between government- and non-government-controlled areas. The lower number of cameras in non-government-controlled areas

can primarily be explained by the reluctance of those in control of these areas to allow the installation of cameras. During the reporting period, the Chief Monitor wrote a letter to the signatories of the Minsk agreements to address the situation, urging them to ensure that the Mission be allowed to fulfil its mandate without hindrance. It should also be noted that SMM cameras register ceasefire violations and other relevant observations on both sides of the contact line.

After more than a year of having no access to its camera site in non-government-controlled areas close to the Petrivske disengagement area (which necessitated manual downloading of its recordings) due to the presence of mines, the SMM was able to reach it on 23 August 2019. Members of the armed formations restricted the SMM from accessing its camera site from 1 September until 8 October, citing “security situation” and “special operations” in the area. To enhance its monitoring capabilities of the disengagement area, the SMM deployed in December in government-controlled Bohdanivka an additional live-streaming daylight and thermal camera system. During the reporting period, the armed formations refused to comply with the SMM’s request to install a similar camera on the non-government-controlled side at a better, more elevated location overlooking the disengagement area.¹³

¹¹ See [SMM Daily Report 30 September 2019](#)

¹² See SMM Daily Reports of [6 July 2019](#), [9 July 2019](#), [14 August 2019](#), [15 August 2019](#), [30 September 2019](#) and [22 October 2019](#)

¹³ The SMM’s request to install a thermal and live-streaming camera at an elevated location on a road between non-government-controlled Styla and Petrivske was denied by members of armed formations. In 2019, they allowed replacing the previous camera with a new camera facing in the same direction, which the SMM was able to do (outside the reporting period) on 10 March 2020.

BORDER AREAS OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT CONTROL

Recalling OSCE Permanent Council decision No.1117 of 21 March 2014, the SMM is mandated to gather information and report on the security situation throughout Ukraine. The Minsk Protocol (19 September 2014) stipulates permanent access for monitoring and verification on the Ukrainian-Russian Federation border by the OSCE. Safe and secure access to all areas adjacent to the international border with the Russian Federation is essential for comprehensive monitoring and reporting by the SMM.

The number of visits to border areas outside government control in the reporting period (about 200) remained similar to the previous reporting period (205). In Luhansk region, the Mission faced 29 instances of denial of access, compared with 55 instances reported in the first six months of 2019. Most of these restrictions continued to persist near border crossing points¹⁴ near Izvaryne, Dovzhanske, Sievernyi and Voznesenivka (including at a railway station in the latter area) where, a few minutes after the SMM's arrival, members of the armed formations told SMM patrols to leave, often citing "orders from superiors". Such repeated denials of access significantly obstructed the SMM's monitoring capability in these areas.

In Donetsk region, to reach border areas beyond government control, the SMM needs to cross a checkpoint near Verkhnohshyrokiivske and subsequent checkpoints, including one near non-government-controlled Novoazovsk

(close to the border). At the latter checkpoint, the Mission's freedom of movement was restricted on 31 occasions: on 29 occasions it was denied access and twice it was allowed to cross the checkpoint upon escort by members of the armed formations.¹⁵ In other cases, SMM patrols were regularly denied access to the border at checkpoints kilometers away, such as at the abovementioned checkpoint in Verkhnohshyrokiivske.

Even when the Mission's freedom of movement near border crossing points was not restricted by members of the armed formations, lengthy travel times (along with routes consisting of several checkpoints), exacerbated by poor road and weather conditions, and limited daylight hours, particularly during winter periods, meant it could only conduct short visits to these areas (generally no longer than one hour). Monitoring also continued to be hindered by the unwillingness of those in control to provide security assurances to open a patrol hub and forward patrol bases in towns near these border areas. Thus, the Mission's observations in border areas beyond government control remained limited and could not be categorized as comprehensive and independent monitoring as a result of such restrictions.

¹⁴ According to decisions in 2014 by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, operations are suspended at these and other border crossing points located outside government control.

¹⁵ See SMM Daily Reports of [12 September 2019](#) and [24 September 2019](#).

DISENGAGEMENT AREAS

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske on both sides of the contact line through regular patrolling and remote observations, as foreseen in the Framework Decision.

Following the withdrawal of forces and hardware at the end of June, the SMM observed demining activities and vegetation clearance on both sides of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge that continued until the new section of the bridge was completed on 19 November. The sides demined and cleared vegetation from an area within 125m radius of the former broken section of the bridge and along the road between the EECP north of the area and the checkpoint of the armed formations immediately south of the broken section of the bridge. This development positively affected civilian crossing by increasing their physical safety. However, much of the area inside the disengagement area, particularly areas with summerhouses south of the Sieverskyi Donets river, remains contaminated with mines, UXO and other explosive objects.

From 1 July to 26 September, the SMM continued to face restrictions accessing the disengagement area near Zolote on road T-1316, between government-controlled Zolote and non-government-controlled Pervomaisk through the disengagement area. Specifically, the SMM's access was restricted by the presence, from July to 20 September, of 12 anti-tank mines (assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces) laid across road

T-1316 and, further south, a “barely visible obstacle” (MPZ) (assessed as belonging to the armed formations) stretched across the same road. On seven occasions, personnel of the Ukrainian Armed Forces removed all the 12 anti-tank mines to allow the SMM passage until they were permanently removed on 20 September. The armed formations refused to remove the “barely visible obstacle” (MPZ) despite repeated requests by the Mission.¹⁶ On 26 September, the SMM saw for the first time a newly placed barbed wire with an attached manufactured “Stop” sign on it, along with a tube of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-22) placed on the ground on the western edge of road T-1316, near the railway tracks.¹⁷ Both obstacles were removed by the Ukrainian Armed Forces to allow the SMM passage on 27 and 30 September and, permanently, on 8 October.¹⁸

Since 6 October, the Mission has been observing demining activities and vegetation clearance conducted by the State Emergency Service of Ukraine both inside and outside the disengagement area in Zolote, in the fields and on both shoulders of road T-1316. Simultaneous demining by the sides started on 2 November after withdrawal of forces and hardware was completed on 1 November.¹⁹ As in Stanytsia Luhanska, demining activities focused on removing mines, UXO and other explosive devices within 30m on both sides of road T-1316. Nevertheless, the SMM continued to observe minefields, comprising more than 500 mines in fields on both sides of road T-1316, assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

¹⁶ See [SMM Daily Report 11 September 2019](#).

¹⁷ See [SMM Daily Report 10 October 2019](#).

¹⁸ See SMM Daily Reports of [30 September 2019](#) and [1 October 2019](#).

¹⁹ See SMM [Spot Report 2 November 2019](#).

Similarly, no demining activities took place in government-controlled Katerynivka, a settlement partially located inside the disengagement area on its north-western edge, which restricted the SMM monitoring of the area.²⁰

Unlike the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas, the Petrivske disengagement area has no road passing through it, and the SMM monitors the area positioned east of government-controlled Bohdanivka and on the road junction between non-government-controlled Petrivske and Styla. Road C050952 between Bohdanivka and Petrivske is situated about 300m north of the area's northern edge. The road has been partially demined; however, it continues to be contaminated with mines, and a trench cuts through it, obstructing the SMM's passage.

The SMM's freedom of movement in accessing the Petrivske disengagement area has been restricted 48 times (38 denials and three delayed access recorded in non-government controlled Petrivske, and two cases of delayed access in government-controlled Bohdanivka), including five occasions involving gunfire assessed as targeting its UAVs. Of these, 38 denials of access were reported on a daily basis from 1 September to 7 October, when members of the armed formations restricted the SMM's access to Petrivske to monitor the security situation and to manually download the footage of its camera. The SMM lost a mid-range and a mini-UAV near non-government-controlled Petrivske, as well as a mini-UAV near government-controlled Bohdanivka (see SMM means of remote observation section for

observations related to the SMM UAVs and cameras).²¹

Following the beginning of withdrawal of forces and hardware in the Petrivske disengagement area on 9 November 2019, the number of denials of access plummeted.²² Subsequent simultaneous demining by the sides commenced on 13 November and was completed on 20 November after the sides informed the SMM of the completion of basic demining inside the area, removal of obstacles and fencing-off of additional areas assessed as contaminated with UXO.²³ Despite completion of demining inside, the disengagement area remains inaccessible for the SMM's direct monitoring, as road C050952 continues to contain mines both in government- and non-government-controlled areas (although the government-controlled side of the road was partially demined), trenches cutting through the road in Petrivske, as well as a minefield assessed as belonging to the armed formations on the area's south-eastern edge.

In his letter from 17 December 2019 to the signatories of the Minsk agreements, the Chief Monitor noted that the sides have unequally supported the Mission's requests for support in making the Bohdanivka-Viktorivka-Petrivske road accessible to the SMM and in installing additional technical means of monitoring in the area. For instance, the Mission noted (outside the reporting period), the presence of improved concrete slabs laid by the Ukrainian Armed Forces, upon the SMM's request, on the road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske where filling of trenches was previously observed.

²⁰ Outside the reporting period, in March 2020, the Mission observed beginning of demining activities in Katerynivka.

²¹ See SMM Daily Reports of [9 July 2019](#), [30 September 2019](#) and [22 October 2019](#).

²² See [SMM Spot Report 9 November 2019](#).

²³ See [SMM Daily Report 21 November 2019](#).

The Mission is currently assessing the improved road conditions from Bohdanivka, which are essential to efficiently monitor the Petrivske disengagement area. However, part of the road from Petrivske remains impassable for the SMM due to the presence of the bisecting trench belonging to the armed formations in an area outside but just adjacent to the north-eastern corner of the disengagement area.

MINES, UXO AND OTHER EXPLOSIVE OBJECTS

The signatories of the Memorandum agreed to ban the setting-up or laying of mines in the security zone. Nevertheless, the threat from mines and UXO continued in the reporting period. The SMM continues to face standing freedom of movement restrictions in travelling across the bridge in Shchastia and due to the presence of anti-tank mines on the road leading to it.

In Donetsk region, in July, on road C051801 leading from government-controlled Orlivka to Umanske (regularly used by civilians and the SMM), the SMM saw for the first time the presence of UXO, assessed as a projectile from a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS), embedded in the asphalt in the middle of the road.²⁴ The SMM continued seeing contamination such as anti-tank mines, UXO and other explosive objects on the road, road shoulders and areas about 5m off the road between the EECP near government-controlled Pyshevyk and a corresponding checkpoint near non-government-controlled Verkhnoшыrokyivske in July, August, October, November and December, which pose a threat to the SMM and about 3,500 civilians who use this road daily.²⁵

In Luhansk region, road T-0504 between non-government-controlled Pervomaisk and government-controlled Popasna continues to serve as one of two roads used by the SMM to cross the contact line.

The accessibility of the road is critical to SMM operations. It became impassable due to the presence of UXO and other explosive objects on 11 occasions in the reporting period, hindering the SMM's passage from the beginning of July to mid-August.²⁶ The Mission has repeatedly requested demining of the road, which sometimes could not take place due to the lack of security guarantees by the sides. In October, on three occasions, the SMM saw de-miners of the State Emergency Services of Ukraine and de-miners from non-government-controlled areas removing UXO and other explosive objects from the same road.²⁷

The probable presence of mines and UXO (observed for the first time or reconfirmed) prevented the Mission from patrolling areas, in addition to those identified during previous reporting periods, along the contact line, including critical routes, such as:²⁸

- Road M03 (from non-government-controlled Debaltseve to government-controlled Svitlodarsk);²⁹
- Road M14 (from non-government-controlled Novoazovsk to government-controlled Mariupol);³⁰
- Road C050952 (from government-controlled Bohdanivka to non-government-controlled Petrivske) (see observations under the Disengagement areas section);

²⁴ See SMM Daily Report of [9 July 2019](#), [17 August 2019](#), [26 August 2019](#), [22 October 2019](#), [23 October 2019](#), [9 November 2019](#), [15 November 2019](#) and [14 December 2019](#).

²⁵ See [SMM Daily Reports of 1 August 2019](#).

²⁶ See SMM Daily Reports of [4 July 2019](#), [9 July 2019](#), [16 July 2019](#), [17 July 2019](#), [1 August 2019](#), [19 August 2019](#), [10 October 2019](#), [12 October 2019](#), [22 October 2019](#), [7 November 2019](#) and [27 December 2019](#).

²⁷ See SMM Daily Reports of [21 October 2019](#), [29 October 2019](#) and [31 October 2019](#).

²⁸ See ["Thematic Report on Restrictions of SMM's freedom of movement and other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate, January – June 2019"](#).

²⁹ The SMM had been unable to travel on road M03 connecting Debaltseve and Svitlodarsk since early 2015. The presence of mines was reconfirmed in June 2019.

³⁰ The presence of mines at this location was reconfirmed in June 2019.

- Road T-1315 (from non-government Pryshyb to non-government-controlled Krasnyi Lyman);
- Road T-0519 (from government-controlled Mariupol to non-government-controlled Pikuzy);³¹
- A local road leading from government-controlled Verkhnotoretske to non-government-controlled Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan);³² and
- Road T-0512 (from non-government-controlled Boikivske (formerly Telmanove) to non-government-controlled Staromarivka).³³

Following the [fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb](#), which was most likely caused by an anti-tank mine, resulting in the death of an SMM patrol member and injury of two others, the Mission limited its patrolling to asphalt or concrete roads. This restriction continued to affect the following operations:

- Visits and inspections of places holding weapons that were accessible only via unpaved roads or surfaces (approximately only 53 per cent of designated sites are accessible by the SMM);
- Vehicle-based ground patrolling activities within the security zone;
- UAV flights requiring soft-surface launch or landing sites; and
- Camera maintenance and data retrieval activities requiring driving over unpaved surfaces (see SMM cameras above).

The SMM again noted little progress on clearance of mines, UXO and other explosive objects, despite the signatories agreeing on the need for co-ordination of mine clearance by the JCCC and on who is responsible for removing the risk these explosive objects pose. In the Trilateral Contact Group's Working Group on Security Issues (WGS), as well as through his letters to the signatories, the Chief Monitor also repeatedly called on the sides to carry out demining activities near the EECPs. The imposed restrictions on usage of paved and asphalt roads limits the SMM's access to certain areas and settlements that have predominantly unpaved or gravel roads. Limited mine action collaboration of sides and confirmation or mapping of such areas also hinder the SMM's access to certain areas and settlements and its efforts to monitor the security situation and its impact on the population.

In Donetsk region, the settlements around the Donetsk airport (government-controlled Opytne and Pisky, as well as non-government-controlled Spartak and Vesele); Zaitseve; Rozsadky, government-controlled Travneve, Taramchuk and Shyrokyne; and non-government-controlled Staromykhailivka, Kruta Balka and (certain areas of) Horlivka continue to be inaccessible due to mines, UXO and other explosive objects. In Luhansk region, the roads leading to or from government-controlled Novooleksandrivka and Krymske, as well as non-government-controlled Donetskyyi, Zholobok, Sokilnyky, Znamianka and Pryshyb, remain heavily contaminated with mines, UXO and other explosive objects.

³¹ The road is contaminated with mines and trenches cutting through the road, noted in the reporting period.

³² The road has many locations where trenches cut through it, noted in the reporting period.

³³ The road continues to be contaminated with mines and UXO.

IMPEDIMENTS TO GATHERING INFORMATION

In non-government-controlled areas, the Mission continued to face impediments in establishing and reporting facts following specific incidents and reports of incidents, as well as in interacting with the local population.³⁴

As in previous months and years, on many occasions, civilians were hesitant to talk with SMM monitors, often citing “orders” or “lack of permission to talk to the SMM” from those in control of non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions as the reasons, at times expressing a fear of repercussions.

In particular, this challenge persisted when the SMM was interacting with medical staff and other interlocutors in non-government-controlled areas on 18 occasions

in the reporting period. All but one were recorded in Donetsk region (nine cases in hospitals, seven in educational facilities and one in a kindergarten). At hospitals, staff usually refused to provide the Mission information that would help confirm civilian casualties (without the “permission” of those in control).

On nine occasions, representatives of educational facilities refused to provide information to the Mission while it monitored the impact of the conflict on pupils and on their education in Oleksandrivka, Donetsk and Staromykhailivka (twice in each settlement), Ilovaisk, Horlivka and Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk).

³⁴ On 30 November 2018, those in control of certain areas of Luhansk warned the Mission in a letter against undertaking attempts to establish contacts with representatives of educational and other institutions “without co-ordination” with those in control. See [“Thematic Report on Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement and other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate, July – December 2018”](#).

CONTRIBUTION OF THE JCCC

Since the departure of the officers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from the JCCC on 18 December 2017, the Mission has maintained daily interaction with JCCC headquarters in Soledar, and coordinated between the Ukrainian side of the JCCC and SMM patrols encountering freedom of movement violations on the ground to ensure the provision of security guarantees, notification of UAV flights and facilitation of removal of UXO and other explosive objects, among other things. The SMM regularly requested its assistance in ensuring a rapid response to impediments to the Mission's monitoring and verification, as stipulated by the signatories of the Addendum and the Framework Decision. The SMM's reporting provided additional information to respond to and remedy violations.

The Mission again repeatedly recalled that the JCCC was tasked by the signatories to co-ordinate demining work, as foreseen in the Trilateral Contact Group's mine action decision.

The departure of the officers of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation continues to impact processes related to the JCCC, in particular the provision of security guarantees for repairs and maintenance of infrastructure and demining, as well as when the SMM's freedom of movement is restricted.

The Mission remains prepared to resume work with the JCCC in its original joint configuration.

CONCLUSIONS

The SMM's safe and secure access to eastern Ukraine is crucial to the implementation of its mandate, and to objective and accurate monitoring and reporting.

Operating under the principles of transparency and impartiality as decided by the OSCE Permanent Council, it is crucial for the Mission to carry out facts-based, objective, accurate and timely reporting of developments to ensure effective implementation of its mandate and the execution of its role as outlined in the Protocol and Memorandum of September 2014, as well as in the Minsk Package of Measures of February 2015 and its Addendum of September 2015.

In addition, in the Common Agreed Conclusions of the Normandy Four Summit held in Paris on 9 December 2019, the Normandy Four recalled that the SMM should be able to use all means ensured to it by its mandate and to have safe and secure access throughout Ukraine in order to fully implement its mandate. However, the Mission's freedom of movement remained severely restricted.

The Mission continues to face restrictions to its freedom of movement and other impediments in eastern Ukraine where sides continue to deny, delay or condition its access to certain areas.

Of 556 restrictions faced in the second six-month period of 2019, about 93 per cent occurred in non-government-controlled areas, predominantly in southern Donetsk region. The Mission faced freedom of movement restrictions at various checkpoints

along the contact line. As a result, the SMM's ability to monitor the security situation in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including at border areas not under government control, or to follow up on cases of civilian casualties and damage to civilian properties was hindered.

SMM UAVs continued to be subjected to GPS signal interference and to gunfire, posing risks also to the SMM patrols operating UAVs.

To ensure comprehensive monitoring during night hours or monitoring of areas inaccessible by patrols, the Mission has used technical equipment (UAVs and cameras). In the second half of 2019, SMM UAVs experienced GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, on more than 500 occasions, whereas cases of small-arms fired assessed as targeting its UAVs were recorded on 45 occasions. Due to gunfire and GPS signal interference, the SMM lost one mid-range and six mini-UAVs.

The Mission's monitoring of border areas continued to be limited, and not comprehensive, due to the restrictions it faces.

In the second half of 2019, the SMM conducted 201 visits to border areas outside government control. In Luhansk region, it faced 29 instances of denial of access, whereas in Donetsk region, the SMM was restricted from crossing a checkpoint of the armed formations near Novoazovsk (close to the border with the Russian Federation) on 31 occasions.

In addition, many patrols continue to be unable to reach non-government-controlled areas of southern Donetsk region, including border areas, due to systematic freedom of movement restrictions.

Monitoring also continued to be hindered by the unwillingness of those in control to provide security assurances to open a patrol hub and forward patrol bases in towns near these border areas. Thus, the Mission's observations in border areas beyond government control remained limited, and could not be categorized as comprehensive or independent as a result of such restrictions.

The SMM continues to face restrictions in monitoring disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske.

In the reporting period, the SMM monitored withdrawal of personnel and hardware and demining activities in disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. However, only basic demining activities were completed, and some areas inside the disengagement areas and roads outside them remain contaminated with mines, UXO and other explosive objects. The SMM's access to the disengagement area near Petrivske continued to be hindered and imposed a significant weight on its resources, causing it to seek alternative means of monitoring the disengagement process through deploying cameras and UAV flights.

Mines, UXO and other explosive objects continue to pose risks to hundreds of civilians and members of the SMM crossing the contact line.

In the last six months of 2019, the SMM continued facing standing restrictions


in accessing the bridge in Shchastia due to the presence of anti-tank mines on road H-21. Similarly, mines, UXO, remnants of ammunition and other explosive objects continue to be placed within and near residential areas, local roads and main access routes between entry-exit checkpoints and the corresponding checkpoints of the armed formations in Donetsk region. It is the responsibility of the sides to take actions in order to mark, fence off and clear those areas of mines, UXO and other explosive objects.

In non-government-controlled areas, the Mission continues to face impediments in establishing and reporting facts following specific incidents and reports of incidents.


In the reporting period, the SMM faced restrictions on 18 occasions while following up on cases of civilian casualties and on the situation of education facilities.

ANNEX 1: GRAPHS AND MAPS

The number of movement restrictions 2019



Freedom of movement restrictions by category 2019






Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Freedom of movement (FoM) restrictions

1 July - 31 December 2019



Frequency of FoM restrictions*

- 1 - 5
- 6 - 10
- 11 - 20
- 21 - 40
- 40+

Other features

- Estimated line of contact
- Settlement
- Regional boundary
- National boundary

* Restrictions at weapons storage sites, DA, mines, road block, UXO not mapped

Sources: administrative boundaries - OCHA; roads, rivers - OpenStreetMap; sea - VLIZ (2005). IHO sea Areas; other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.


© OSCE SMM 2019 Use, copy, reproduction, transmission, broadcasting, sale, license, or exploitation not permitted without OSCE prior written authorization.

Created: 28/02/2020




Organization for Security and
Co-operation in Europe
Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Patrol routes and UAV flights 01 July - 31 December 2019



- Estimated line of contact
- Short-range UAV flight
- Mid-range UAV flight
- Long-range UAV flight
- Patrol route



Sources: administrative boundaries - OCHA; roads, rivers - OpenStreetMap; sea - VLIZ (2005), IHO sea Areas; other - OSCE.

Coordinate System: WGS 1984 UTM Zone 37N

This map is provided for illustrative purposes only. Its content is not warranted to be error-free and does not imply endorsement or acceptance by the OSCE SMM.

© OSCE SMM 2019 Use, copy, reproduction, transmission, broadcasting, sale, license, or exploitation not permitted without OSCE prior written authorization.

Created: 17/04/2020

ANNEX 2: VIOLENCE AND THREATS AGAINST OR IN THE PRESENCE OF THE SMM³⁵

| Date | Location | Control | Summary of event | Source |
|------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|---|
| 05/07/2019 | Southern edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka | Not under government control | Patrol members heard two bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of 1km north-west of its position. They also heard whistling sounds, assessed as originating from bullets flying about 5m above their heads, and bullets ricocheting off a hard structure at an assessed distance of 5-10m south | <u>SMM Daily Report 6 July 2019</u> |
| 02/09/2019 | Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove) | Not under government controlled | While assessing damage to civilian properties, the patrol members saw and heard an explosion about 30m south-west. Shortly after, patrol saw a tailfin of a rocket-propelled grenade land nearby | <u>SMM Spot Report 2 September 2019</u> |
| 27/09/2019 | Topolyne | Under government control | Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the Mission that any SMM UAV flying in the area would be shot down. | <u>SMM Daily Report 27 September 2019</u> |
| 30/11/2019 | Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove) | Not under government controlled | While assessing damage to civilian properties, the patrol heard three shots of small-arms fire about 100-200m south-west of its position | <u>SMM Daily Report 30 November 2019</u> |
| 09/12/2019 | Yasynuvata | Not under government controlled | Patrol, deployed to facilitate adherence to a localized ceasefire to enable operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, heard a whistling sound assessed as a projectile in flight fired from a north-easterly direction | <u>SMM Daily Report 9 December 2019</u> |

³⁵ Not including small-arms fire assessed as targeting SMM UAVs or ceasefire violations affecting cameras.

ANNEX 3: TABLE OF INCIDENTS INVOLVING WEAPONS AIMED AT SMM MINI- AND MID-RANGE UAVS

| Date | Location | Control | Summary of event | Source |
|------------|-----------------|------------------------------|--|--|
| 01/07/2019 | Khreshchatytske | Not under government control | The UAV spotted a member of the armed formations with his rifle assessed as aiming at the UAV. | <u>SMM Daily Report 3 July 2019</u> |
| 02/07/2019 | Zernove | Not under government control | Bursts and shots of small arms fire about 700m north-north-west in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 3 July 2019</u> |
| 03/07/2019 | Debaltseve | Not under government control | Bursts of small-arms fire about 850m north-north-east in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 4 July 2019</u> |
| 05/07/2019 | Marinka | Under government control | Bursts of small-arms fire about 200-250m north-east in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 6 July 2019</u> |
| 11/07/2019 | Zolote | Not known | Shots of small-arms fire about 1.5km north-north-west in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 12 July 2019</u> |
| 12/07/2019 | Metalist | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 1.5km north in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 13 July 2019</u> |
| 22/07/2019 | Chermalyk | Under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 1.8km north-west in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 23 July 2019</u> |
| 28/07/2019 | Pervomaisk | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 2km west in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 29 July 2019</u> |
| 05/08/2019 | Avdiivka | Under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 1.6km north-north-east in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 6 August 2019</u> |
| 07/08/2019 | Novoselivka | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 350m south-east in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 8 August 2019</u> |
| 13/08/2019 | Hnutove | Under government control | Bursts and shots of small-arms fire about 3.4km east in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 14 August 2019</u> |
| 13/08/2019 | Talakivka | Under government control | Bursts and shots of small-arms fire about 2km east in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 14 August 2019</u> |
| 13/08/2019 | Obozne | Not under government control | Bursts of small-arms fire about 3km north in an area where the UAV was flying. The SMM lost control of the UAV and was unable to recover it. | <u>SMM Daily Report 14 August 2019</u> |
| 14/08/2019 | Paraskoviivka | Under government control | Bursts of small-arms fire 1km south-east in an area where the UAV was flying. The SMM lost control of the UAV and was unable to recover it. | <u>SMM Daily Report 15 August 2019</u> |
| 15/08/2019 | Zolote 4/Rodina | Under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 1-1.5km east in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 16 August 2019</u> |
| 19/08/2019 | Pervomaisk | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 700m north-north-west in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 20 August 2019</u> |
| 19/08/2019 | Smile | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 3.6km north-north-west in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 20 August 2019</u> |
| 20/08/2019 | Luhansk | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 1km west-north-west in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 21 August 2019</u> |

| Date | Location | Control | Summary of event | Source |
|------------|----------------------|------------------------------|--|--|
| 30/08/2019 | Tavrycheske | Not under government control | Bursts of small-arms fire about 1.8 km west in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 31 August 2019 |
| 09/09/2019 | Zolote-5/Mykhailivka | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 0.8-1km north-north-west in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 10 September 2019 |
| 13/09/2019 | Pyshchevyk | Under government control | Bursts of small-arms fire about 3-4km north-east in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 14 September 2019 |
| 13/09/2019 | Starohnativka | Under government control | Bursts of small-arms fire about 3- 4km east in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 14 September 2019 |
| 20/09/2019 | Petrivske | Not known | Shots and bursts of small-arms fire about 2.5km and 3.5km south-west in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 21 September 2019 |
| 21/09/2019 | Petrivske | Not known | Shots and bursts of small-arms fire about 2km east in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 23 September 2019 |
| 29/09/2019 | Lobacheve | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 3km south-east in an area where the UAV was flying. The SMM lost control of the UAV and was unable to recover it. | SMM Daily Report 30 September 2019 |
| 03/10/2019 | Horlivka | Not under government control | Shots and bursts of small-arms fire about 500m south in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 4 October 2019 |
| 07/10/2019 | Hnutove | Under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 3.5km south-east in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 8 October 2019 |
| 07/10/2019 | Pyshchevyk | Under government control | Shots and bursts of small-arms fire about 3.5km east-north-east in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 8 October 2019 |
| 09/10/2019 | Petrivske | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 1km south-west in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 10 October 2019 |
| 14/10/2019 | Novotroitske | Under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 100-200m north-north-east in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 15 October 2019 |
| 14/10/2019 | Berezove | Under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 1km east in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 15 October 2019 |
| 16/10/2019 | Sentianivka | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 2.5-3km north-east in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 17 October 2019 |
| 26/10/2019 | Petrivske | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 1-2km south in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 28 October 2019 |
| 28/10/2019 | Sentianivka | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 3km north-west in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 29 October 2019 |
| 29/10/2019 | Arkhanhelske | Under government control | Bursts of small-arms fire about 500-700m south-east in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 30 October 2019 |
| 4/11/2019 | Chermalyk | Under government control | Bursts of small-arms fire about 1km north-east and about 2km south-east in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 5 November 2019 |
| 5/11/2019 | Metalist | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 0.8-1km north-west in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 6 November 2019 |
| 8/11/2019 | Khrystove | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 2.5km south-east in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 9 November 2019 |
| 11/11/2019 | Metalist | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 600-800m north-west in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 12 November 2019 |
| 16/12/2019 | Raihorodka | Under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 50-70m south in an area where the UAV was flying. | SMM Daily Report 17 December 2019 |

| Date | Location | Control | Summary of event | Source |
|-------------|-----------------|------------------------------|--|--|
| 19/12/2019 | Raivka | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 400-450m south-east in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 20 December 2019</u> |
| 24/12/2019 | Dachne | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 1-2km north in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 27 December 2019</u> |
| 25/12/2019 | Novoselivka | Under government control | Shots and bursts of small-arms fire about 2km east-north-east in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 27 December 2019</u> |
| 31/12/2019 | Luhansk | Not under government control | Shots of small-arms fire about 400-500m south-west in an area where the UAV was flying. | <u>SMM Daily Report 3 January 2020</u> |