



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Permanent Council**

PC.DEL/730/13  
29 July 2013

ENGLISH only

---

**Chairmanship: Ukraine**

## **2013 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE**

**Vienna, 19 and 20 June 2013**

## **CHAIRPERSON'S REPORT**



## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Chairperson's perception .....	1
Opening session .....	6
Working session I: Transnational threats and challenges .....	12
Working session II: Early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation: Lessons learned and way ahead.....	17
Working session III: Arms control and confidence- and security-building measures.....	22
Working session IV: Afghanistan.....	27
Appendices.....	31
Decision No. 1079 on the dates of the 2013 Annual Security Review Conference .....	33
Decision No. 1084 on the agenda and organizational modalities of the 2013 Annual Security Review Conference.....	34



## CHAIRPERSON'S PERCEPTION

This year's Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) provided a timely opportunity for participating States within one of the existing frameworks to reflect upon the security situation in the OSCE area, find common responses to existing and emerging security threats and challenges, build mutual understanding and promote co-operation in the different areas of security that affect the Organization and its participating States, primarily from the point of view of the politico-military dimension. Organized under the overall theme of "Towards Helsinki+40, finding common responses to security threats and challenges", the Conference provided a constructive platform for enhancing inclusive political dialogue and, in that respect, benefited from broad participation, including by key policy makers and experts from participating States' capitals and other international and regional organizations and security-related institutions.

The indispensable role of the OSCE in equal, indivisible, comprehensive and co-operative security was highlighted. While views differed on some matters, there were others where common views were shared. In that respect, the ASRC was acknowledged as an important forum, also for capitals, for achieving inclusive dialogue and ownership, particularly since the strategic relevance and capability of the Organization to address an increasingly complex security environment lay primarily with the 57 participating States.

There was also a general recognition that, owing to its broad membership, comprehensive and cross-dimensional concept of security, its network of field operations and institutions, and to the fact that it provided a platform for political dialogue, the OSCE had all that was needed to maintain and strengthen its role as a fundamental pillar of the European security architecture and to advance towards the security community set out in the Astana Commemorative Declaration. It was agreed that, by ensuring full implementation of all the OSCE commitments, focusing within the politico-military dimension on the Organization's core functions, and adopting an incremental "step-by-step" approach, collective security could be made a reality.

However, the view was that a lack of trust, confidence and common vision could impede progress. In that regard, participants stressed that the Helsinki+40 Process was an important opportunity for reinvigorating the OSCE, and one through which differences and dividing lines among participating States, including difficult ones, could be overcome and new approaches embraced. That would enable the Organization to advance towards a security community and strengthen co-operation between participating States, not only by 2015, but also on the way to the 50th anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act and beyond.

The Security Days events organized by the Secretary General were widely welcomed as important platforms for strengthening OSCE interaction with Track II initiatives, as well as with civil society, think tanks and academia. They were seen as a valuable contribution to the wider debate on the OSCE's role as a security organization, including in a public diplomacy context.

A recurring theme throughout many sessions was the enduring need to strengthen co-operation and co-ordination with other regional and international security organizations. Such an engagement remained essential to ensuring that the OSCE, bringing its comparative

advantages to bear as relevant to specific circumstances, added value and complemented the efforts of other actors while avoiding wasteful duplication.

Turning to transnational threats and challenges (TNTs), the world today was seen as increasingly interdependent and exposed to a wide, multifaceted range of interlinked TNTs, which undermined the functions of States, impacted on economies, and threatened the safety and well-being of societies and individuals. TNTs were evolving and spreading, including outside the OSCE area, and required collective, effective international responses which were co-ordinated and founded on a multi- and cross-dimensional approach that also tackled the causes at their sources, and that was one of the comparative strengths of the OSCE. In that respect, the OSCE's work to address TNTs should be targeted at areas where the OSCE had unique strengths, address the threats in a cross-dimensional manner, and be complementary to and co-ordinated with the activities of other relevant actors. Furthermore, ownership and support by capitals was essential for the sustainability of the Organization's TNT activities.

The adoption of Permanent Council decisions on combating illicit drugs, on police-related activities, on the fight against terrorism, and on confidence-building measures (CBMs) related to the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs), and the Ministerial Council decision on broader OSCE efforts to address TNTs were recognized as a solid groundwork for better co-ordinated and more visible efforts. While the groundwork had been laid, much remained to be done to turn them into fully effective and sustainable programmatic action. That should continue as a priority with a focus on, *inter alia*, support and assistance in information exchange, capacity-building, awareness-raising, training and legislation.

The adoption of a Permanent Council decision on a first set of CBMs related to the use of ICTs was singled out by many delegations as particularly important. Progress to date was welcomed, and it was hoped that constructive engagement would lead to a decision being adopted soon after the next meeting in July of the informal working group pursuant to Permanent Council Decision No. 1039. Further work in that key area should continue thereafter.

Effective border management and security, an area in which the OSCE had developed significant expertise, played a critical role in combating TNTs, especially as countries of origin, transit and destination were considered a core concern with regard to TNTs. Moreover, cross-border co-operation could be mutually beneficial to neighbouring countries and organizations, including as a confidence-building measure. Wide support was also expressed for the Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, with a number of delegations expressing their support for its inclusion in the OSCE Unified Budget.

Organized crime was highlighted as a key area where different TNTs intersected, and one in which the OSCE could play a role complementary to that of other international and regional organizations. A number of participants called attention to the importance of addressing terrorism and other TNTs through closer involvement and ownership by governments, businesses and civil societies. Others emphasized the importance of paying due attention to human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, in particular when addressing TNTs.

In early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation, the OSCE's comprehensive approach to security, its wide

membership, and consensual decision-making processes were stressed as giving it unique comparative advantages to act as an objective actor in the conflict cycle. Moreover, such aspects allowed the OSCE to play a distinct role in all phases of the conflict cycle, which remained at the core of its activities. Efforts aimed at promoting the Organization's capacities in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation required creative and appropriate strategies and mechanisms, but also the political will and the political courage of participating States to make use of them most efficiently.

The importance of conflict resolution was another area that was extensively discussed. That was especially true in the case of the existing protracted conflicts. In that context, many delegations stated that those conflicts remained one of the main sources of tension and of threats to security and stability in the OSCE area, and challenged further progress on the establishment of a security community. The settlement of protracted conflicts was thus underscored as a top OSCE priority. Their resolution required increased efforts by peaceful political means, within established formats, fully respecting the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act and international law.

Delegations welcomed and supported the work done by the Chairmanship and the Secretariat to implement Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11, on elements of the conflict cycle, while some expressed the view that, for the decision to be fully effective, the issue of resources should be appropriately addressed. The need for enhanced recruitment and training for OSCE staff was also highlighted by some. Regarding conflict prevention, there was support to strengthen the OSCE's capacities for timely early warning and analysis. That would have to be followed by early political decision-making and effective and properly funded early action. The OSCE should also make better use of its institutional memory to draw on best practices and lessons learned from the past. In addition, conflict prevention must be systematic and tackle the root causes of actual or potential conflicts in the OSCE area at the earliest possible stage. Tackling root causes, building State institutions and bringing about a greater involvement of civil society were key elements in which the OSCE could also provide support and assistance, including in post-conflict rehabilitation. The importance of the participation of women throughout the conflict cycle was also stressed by some delegations.

Several delegations encouraged enhanced OSCE efforts in dialogue facilitation and mediation support, including through biannual appointments of Special Representatives of the Chairperson-in-Office, while there were also some suggestions that the OSCE should support the development of national/regional mediation capacities. Historical reconciliation was recognized by a number of participants as vital for ensuring a conflict settlement process and for preparing for peace. As differing views were expressed by delegations on reconciliation, further debate would be beneficial for a deeper understanding of this concept.

Concerning arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), there was widespread recognition that those regimes were major instruments for ensuring military stability, predictability and transparency, and were key pillars for a reliable, indivisible, co-operative security community. Hence, a proper and effective functioning of those instruments was in the interest of all the participating States, given that revitalizing arms control and CSBMs was a major element in the strengthening of European security. That should also be taken into account in the on-going security dialogues in the FSC and in the Helsinki+40 Process.

Areas of deadlock remained in the modernization of conventional arms control, notably the CFE Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty (including its Consultative Commission), which were having an impact on their continued relevance. That fact, and reduced levels of transparency, including at the subregional level, had led to an erosion of trust and confidence in the politico-military field of the OSCE. Views differed as to what needed to be done to adapt arms control mechanisms to current military and security conditions, and there were numerous calls for solutions to be found, mindful that that was heavily reliant on political will.

Many participants called for substantial adaptations to the Vienna Document 2011 in a number of areas, in order to bring it into line with the transformations of armed forces that were taking place. While the Vienna Document and CFE Treaty were complementary and interlinked, progress on the former should not be hindered by a lack of progress on the latter. Also, they could not replace each other.

Moreover, arms control, while linked to political actions, could not in themselves provide for political solutions, for example, in territorial disputes. Yet arms control and CSBMs had an important role to play in subregional and regional stability, which depended on, *inter alia*, the prevention of local arms races and military actions which might be considered as threatening or undermining by others. Ways to address those issues must be promoted.

Other issues raised by participants that require further attention include the adaptation and modernization of commitments and norms related to small arms and light weapons and the control of stockpiles of ammunition and the implementation of UNSCR 1540 and UNSCR 1325, the latter including in the context of the Code of Conduct. Meanwhile, the revitalization and strengthening of European security mechanisms should be carried out in a cost-efficient manner, taking into account budget restraints

On Afghanistan, the substantial progress achieved since 2001 in the politico-military, economic and human rights fields was noted. The country was in the final phase of the transition to Afghan ownership, to be followed by a decade of transformation. Views on the impact of the international military drawdown ranged from cautious optimism to predictions of catastrophe. Some feared an increase in extremist activity, drug trafficking, organized crime and other illegal cross-border activities which would adversely impact security and stability in the wider OSCE area, and in the neighbouring Central Asian participating States in particular.

Those shared challenges needed to be met by means of collaborative and co-ordinated efforts by the international community, which should continue to assist, while fully respecting Afghan leadership and ownership. Afghanistan was committed to OSCE's values and principles and its cross-dimensional approach and would welcome an expansion of its partnership with the Organization. In that regard, the Organization's comprehensive approach to security, its involvement in multilateral efforts, and its proximity to Afghanistan, including in a subregional context, placed it in a unique position to assist further.

The OSCE's support and assistance should meet the needs identified by Afghans, build on previous projects undertaken by the Organization, take account of previous and current efforts by others (such as SCO and CSTO) and could include, *inter alia*, support to regional and bilateral co-operation and platforms of dialogue between Afghanistan and the



Central Asian participating States. Other areas were capacity-building and training of Afghan police, particularly in community policing, and of border guards as well as officials for combating drugs and terrorism. Support in the fields of technical assistance in the second dimension, economic and democratic good governance, justice, respect for human rights and ethnic minorities, religious tolerance, the development of civil society and the media, and reconciliation were others worthy of consideration. The hope was also expressed that the ODIHR might be able to offer its expertise to help ensure that the elections scheduled to take place in 2014 were free, fair and transparent. Support might include reviewing legislation and election manuals, training, and monitoring elections. In addition, there was an appeal to participating States to fund the projects elaborated as a result of Vilnius Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/11 and to enable the OSCE to play a more fundamental role in the Afghan transition and transformation period. The regionally led Istanbul Process was welcomed, with some speakers calling for the OSCE to take a more active part in the implementation of its six CBMs, while also emphasizing the need for local ownership of the Process.

As a final remark on the Conference, the Chairmanship believes that the 2013 ASRC provided ample substance for reflection and dialogue and may also be regarded as a pertinent contribution of the first dimension for consideration within the OSCE Helsinki+40 Process. Furthermore, the Conference generated numerous recommendations and suggestions which should be followed up in the appropriate OSCE bodies.

## OPENING SESSION

- Opening remarks: Mr. Andrii Olefirov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
- Keynote speakers: Mr. Maciej Popowski, Deputy Secretary General for Inter-institutional Affairs, European External Action Service
- Mr. Aleksey Meshkov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Russian Federation
- Mr. Eric Rubin, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Department of State, United States of America
- Mr. Lamberto Zannier, Secretary General of the OSCE
- Report by: Ambassador Giedrius Čekuolis, Chairperson of the Forum for Security Co-operation
- Chairperson: Ambassador Ihor Prokopchuk, Chairperson of the Permanent Council
- Rapporteur: Ms. Leaksmy Norin, United States Mission to the OSCE

In his opening remarks, Mr. Andrii Olefirov stated that the Conference's overall theme reflected the importance of the Helsinki+40 Process as an inclusive effort by all participating States to provide strong and continuous political impetus to advance work towards a security community. It also pointed to the relevance of the ASRC as a contribution to that Process within the politico-military dimension and was indicative of the continuous efforts required by all participating States to respond collectively. He outlined the priorities of the Ukrainian OSCE Chairmanship, noting that on transnational threats (TNTs), participating States had been called upon to re-double their common efforts to counter them effectively and that the focus had been on the practical implementation of recent Ministerial and Permanent Council decisions. On conflict-related matters, unresolved conflicts in the OSCE area continued to represent a serious threat to regional stability and were a major concern to all participating States. In that respect, the Ukrainian Chairmanship had continued to assist the parties and the formats in the different conflicts to find an enduring political solution. On conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures, real progress had been limited. The Ukrainian Chairmanship believed bridges needed to be built between existing approaches on continuing the update of CSBMs, accommodating both extant and future realities while ensuring an inclusive approach. Turning to developments in Afghanistan, he stressed the need to be well prepared to respond to the threats and challenges that could arise from the evolving security priorities and needs in Afghanistan and the wider region. Furthermore, supporting and assisting that OSCE Partner for Co-operation to the extent needed and possible was in the Organization's common interest.

Mr. Maciej Popowski discussed the main trends in the global security environment and the Helsinki+40 Process from the EU's perspective. The EU was a strong supporter of the Helsinki+40 Process and saw it as an opportunity to preserve and enhance the relevance of the OSCE in the future, to reinvigorate the Organization and to increase trust and

confidence among its participating States. He noted that the OSCE had all the requisites to remain an important pillar of the European security architecture but that it was experiencing increasing challenges to addressing its core tasks and everyday functioning due to, *inter alia*, a lack of trust and a common vision of security among the participating States. Other obstacles included achieving progress in the resolution of protracted conflicts in the OSCE area, in establishing a set of confidence-building measures on cybersecurity, and in the full implementation of all OSCE commitments in the human dimension. He stated that the OSCE needed to modernize its toolbox and must equip itself with the necessary resources.

Mr. Aleksey Meshkov expressed support for the Chairmanship's desire to use the ASRC as a platform to enhance the role, authority and relevance of the OSCE as a unique forum for political dialogue. He observed that the need for increased attention to security issues in the OSCE area was brought about by instability in neighbouring regions. Once the International Security Assistance Force withdrew from Afghanistan in 2014, participating States would be faced with a more complicated situation in that country, and that was likely to pose serious threats to the countries of the region. The OSCE could play a supporting role, primarily in helping to combat terrorism, drug production and organized crime, and also in training Afghan specialists. He also noted the instability and unpredictability in North Africa and the Middle East and how the situation there would be long-term and fraught with heightened risks for OSCE participating States. He stressed the need to work more closely with the OSCE Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation on all common challenges. International terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, illegal shipments of conventional arms, especially to conflict zones, drug trafficking, piracy, cyberattacks, natural and man-made disasters and increased tensions between different religions and cultures were mentioned as real risks. He stated that it was important to focus the efforts of interested players on developing collective action, based on the strict observance of the norms and principles of international law, and on devising a joint strategy to combat those threats.

Mr. Eric Rubin stressed the need for the OSCE to find new ways of working together to achieve concrete results on the tough security issues facing the OSCE region, including the protracted conflicts. He noted that the Helsinki+40 theme of the ASRC reflected the desire of participating States to examine how the OSCE could advance the goals of the Helsinki Final Act, and that obstacles to effective co-operation as a security community had become progressively more evident since the 2010 Astana Summit. He asked participating States to consider not only what the Organization would look like at the 40-year anniversary of the Helsinki Final Act, but also how respect for the Helsinki commitments and the continued relevance of the Organization on its 50-year anniversary and beyond could be ensured. On current threats and challenges, he highlighted some of the issues which had impeded the ability of governments and citizens to address pressing problems affecting stability and security: backsliding on commitments to fundamental freedoms of expression, assembly, association and religion; threats to the safety of journalists; serious shortcomings with regard to the rule of law; and, intolerance and discrimination against ethnic, religious and other minorities. He stressed that the OSCE provided important tools for building a security community whose members enjoyed equal potential in all three OSCE dimensions, and that the structures and capacities of the Organization could provide tremendous return on investment. He stated that the OSCE should take seriously the need to allocate resources wisely and make the decision to shift resources from regions where much had already been achieved – such as the Balkans – to regions and issues where there were new, urgent needs. He asserted that the Helsinki+40 Process should identify and promote how the OSCE would work in a changing world that took account of new technologies, growing interdependence,

cross-border linkages, and the new and emerging threats to common security. Civil society must also have a voice and prominent role in Helsinki+40 discussions and the OSCE's processes and procedures should be enhanced to take into greater account the role and input of civil society.

The OSCE Secretary General stressed the need for the OSCE to step up its engagement on a broad range of security issues where there were common views as well as those with divergence. He highlighted the Security Day events and the executive structures' work which had contributed to advancing the Astana Summit vision of an OSCE security community. For instance, significant progress had been made in implementing the TNT-related Ministerial Council and Permanent Council decisions as well as the Ministerial Council decision on elements of the conflict cycle. On arms control, he noted that the Secretariat continued to facilitate the implementation of FSC-related commitments, but the lack of progress on arms control related agreements had led to an erosion of trust and confidence in the military field across the OSCE. On Afghanistan, he stressed that Afghan and regional leadership and co-operation during and after the transition period needed to be at the core of the efforts of the international community. He stated that, given the OSCE's comprehensive concept of security and its unique position as a platform for dialogue among all concerned stakeholders, the Organization should continue to explore opportunities for co-operation among all relevant actors.

The Chairperson of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) outlined the FSC's work since the 2012 ASRC. He highlighted the Forum had continued its efforts to strengthen the implementation of existing politico-military commitments as well as to discuss possible additional measures in line with the Astana Commemorative Declaration and relevant decisions adopted at the meeting of the Ministerial Council in Vilnius. He noted the OSCE played an important role in curbing the proliferation of illicit SALW and was known for its valuable work in reducing threats to security and the environment posed by surplus or outdated stockpiles of conventional ammunition awaiting destruction. UN Security Council resolution (UNSCR) 1540 had been another important element of the FSC's work. The FSC has also examined efficient ways to deliver assistance in the implementation in the OSCE region of UNSCR 1325 and related resolutions on the issue of gender and security.

## **Discussion**

Delegations welcomed the chance to hold discussion about the OSCE and different threat perceptions, some noting that including civil society through the OSCE Security Days, was especially useful. It was also noted that the Annual Security Review Conference continues to be a useful platform to discuss all security issues and provides a comprehensive framework for revising the security work of the OSCE and its participating States. The OSCE community is confronted with many security challenges that threaten peace and development and that atmosphere is aggravated by a crisis of trust and confidence. One delegation noted that there is not enough political willingness to engage in substantive discussion of conflict resolution issues. Another delegation noted an ongoing tendency toward inertia which hinders the work of the Organization, not allowing it to play a role in tackling its goals. Obstructive approaches were felt to be counterproductive and the OSCE should rather focus on areas of progress. To become truly effective, the OSCE has to focus on resolving those issues that are decisive for the security of all participating States. One delegation felt that the OSCE must be transformed into a fully-fledged international organization with legal status.

Some delegations noted that the need for strong Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security co-operation is greater than ever, but that any discussions to improve the region's security must maintain and enhance the OSCE's inclusive concept of security, to include the human, economic, environmental, and political-military dimensions. A number of delegations stressed that the institutions and concepts underpinning the OSCE remain fundamentally sound but that the OSCE needs to make what it has work better. In a time of financial turbulence and budget constraints, it is important that the OSCE, the UN, other regional security organizations, and their member States calibrate their efforts to ensure maximum effect.

A number of delegations raised the issue of how to prevent a decreasing role for the OSCE in pan-European security architecture. One delegation noted that there is a need to address this in view of increased co-operation in activities with military blocs and the impact of this on participating States who are not members of defence blocs but who might seek guarantees that this will not impact their security. Imbalances between such participating States in this regard were felt to be reflected in the setting of the ASRC agenda and the need to avoid increasing mistrust was stressed.

Many delegations indicated that they are prepared to take up the Helsinki+40 process, noting that it is a chance to give a new strategic perspective to the OSCE and offers participating States a unique chance to further develop the OSCE, its structures and instruments. One delegation noted that the Astana declaration and framework are important to be built upon but that a road map was needed for the next two years. A call was made for the rapid appointment of a Helsinki+40 Co-ordinator. Another delegation noted that the Helsinki+40 process is a logical continuation of the Astana Commemorative Declaration and that continuity of this process will allow the collective efforts of the current and next two chairmanships of the OSCE, with support of the FSC, to provide a solid basis for creating a security community. In that regard, the OSCE must focus on resolving issues that undermine security – such as TNTs.

On the conflict cycle, a number of delegations noted that the Helsinki+40 process could be used to make political capital and expertise, so that the OSCE can become a key actor in the various phases of the conflict cycle, especially on mediation and confidence and security building measures. One delegation noted that steps towards resolving “frozen conflicts” will also be a key factor in building trust and confidence within the OSCE area, keeping in mind that the resolution of these conflicts lies first and foremost on the specific Parties involved. One delegation stressed the need to look at the problems caused by protracted conflicts and to support with actions the calls peaceful resolution of conflict made in established formats. Delegations also stressed the need to strengthen the OSCE's capacity across the entire conflict cycle – from early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, to post-conflict rehabilitation, and taking into account gender issues. In that connection, the establishment of a mediation support capacity within the Secretariat was sought.

A number of delegations noted that with respect to transnational threats, recent events showed that terrorism and cyberchallenges are a clear threat to common security. On cybersecurity, some delegations urged that adoption of the first package of CSBMs should be a priority in the near future.

Some delegations observed that arms control provided the OSCE more relevance in the political/military dimension, noting that the OSCE could be used as a platform for

exchange on conventional arms control in Europe. Delegations agreed that the initiative to renew dialogue on arms control is welcome and that the OSCE's shared efforts will lay the foundation for the future of arms control. Many delegations stressed the need to identify ways forward and to define role of the OSCE in modern European security architecture. The responsibility lies with all participating States that are responsible for creating a climate that can enable the search for constructive co-operation and joint programmatic solutions. Continued involvement in supporting the implementation of UNSCR 1540 and overcoming the deadlock in the Open Skies Consultative Commission and other negotiation formats were called for.

Many delegations stressed that the OSCE must improve its approaches to transnational threats, particularly those emanating from Afghanistan. The OSCE must contribute to strengthening governance, security and development in Afghanistan, particularly in the context of the ISAF transition. The discussion about ISAF withdrawal is something the OSCE should follow closely. Delegations urged the OSCE to consider how best to react to the challenges in Afghanistan and work together with other international organizations.

### **Recommendations and suggestions**

1. Participating States should continue to make progress to implement Ministerial Council decisions on transnational threats including policing, counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics.
2. Participating States should re-double their common efforts to effectively counter TNTs and focus on the practical implementation of those decisions.
3. The OSCE should take seriously the need to allocate resources wisely and make the decision to shift resources from regions where much has already been achieved to regions and issues where there are new and urgent needs.
4. The OSCE should ensure that its efforts complement the work of other relevant international, regional and subregional organizations, for example, UNODC, Interpol, CoE, CSTO, CIS and GUAM.
5. The OSCE should continue engagement with civil society in its work, particularly through the Secretary General's Security Days initiative.
6. The OSCE should improve its approaches to transnational threats, particularly those emanating from Afghanistan. The OSCE should contribute to strengthening governance, security and development in Afghanistan, particularly as responsibility for security is transitioned to Afghan control.
7. The OSCE should focus on resolving those issues that are decisive for the security of all participating States, including combating terrorism, drugs, and trafficking in humans.
8. The OSCE should focus on good faith implementation of existing OSCE commitments by demonstrating a collective commitment to uphold the values of the OSCE and adapting the Organization to meet the security needs for the continent. Participating States should work to ensure that norms and commitments not lag behind declarations.

9. The Helsinki+40 process should identify and promote how the OSCE can apply these principles in a changing world, taking into account new technologies, growing interdependence, cross-border linkages of civil society, and new and emerging threats to our common security.

10. The Helsinki+40 process should promote trust and mutual confidence in the political military realm, and revitalize conventional arms control as well as confidence- and security-building regimes. Civil society must also have a voice and prominent role in Helsinki+40 discussions and the OSCE's processes and procedures should be enhanced to take into greater account the role and input of civil society.

11. Conventional arms control needs to adapt to the realities of the strategic environment. The OSCE should make efforts to modernize this regime and include a corresponding reaffirmation by all participating States to continue to uphold this regime.

12. Participating States should adopt the first package of CSBMs on cybersecurity.

## **WORKING SESSION I: TRANSNATIONAL THREATS AND CHALLENGES**

Keynote speakers: Ambassador Michèle Ramis, Ambassador on Organized Crime, France

Lieutenant General Oleksandr Melnykov, Director of the International Relations and Law Directorate, State Border Guard Service, Ukraine

Dr. Jonathan Lucas, Director, UN Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute

Moderator: Ambassador Tacan Ildem, Permanent Representative of Turkey to the OSCE

Rapporteur: Ms. Bilge Koçyiğit, Permanent Mission of Turkey to the OSCE

In his opening remarks, the moderator outlined the progress that had been achieved since the previous year's ASRC, particularly by the adoption of Dublin Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/12 on OSCE's efforts to address transnational threats (TNTs), which endorsed PC decisions on policing, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and information and communication technologies (ICTs). He stressed the importance of the full implementation of all commitments stemming from those TNT decisions and emphasized that the informal working group (IWG) that had been established to elaborate confidence-building measures (CBMs) to address risks stemming from the use of ICTs needed to finalize its work in the coming months by building on the expertise of the OSCE regarding CBMs.

He referred to transnational organized crime as an important object of the fight against TNTs, by pointing out that the diversification and expansion of organized crime activities into new areas, through changes in their scope and the use of new technologies, made the challenge a complex and multifaceted one and meant that international co-operation in that respect was indispensable.

The first keynote speaker, Ambassador Ramis, said that organized crime was not only a major security issue, but also had a human, social and public health dimension. She mentioned drug trafficking, counterfeiting, trafficking in human beings and cybercrime as the most important sources of illicit revenue obtained through organized crime. The response from the international community needed to be comprehensive and integrated, in the sense that it should involve ratification and implementation of international conventions, as well as bilateral, regional and international co-operation. She also gave an overview of the activities of France in combating organized crime, noting that France believed that the OSCE had an important role as a regional player. Efforts should be made to strengthen co-operation and co-ordination between the OSCE and other international organizations active in the area. The signing of an action plan between the OSCE and UNODC to combat TNTs was a step in the right direction.

The second keynote speaker, Lieutenant General Melnykov, gave an overview of the activities of the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service, and explained the progress it had achieved, notably through bilateral and multilateral co-operation. The co-operation extended



to various areas such as border patrolling, the fight against illegal migration and visa issues. The challenges related to unmarked and undefined borders were being addressed by Ukraine through several measures, such as the enlargement of border forces and the setting up of border services at the borders with Moldova, Belarus and the Russian Federation. Many reforms were being implemented in the area of integrated border management, with the main purpose of finalizing institutional capacity-building by 2015. A new law on borders would soon enter into force in Ukraine. In addition to the OSCE, Ukraine co-operated with the EU, Frontex, the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM), and the Organization of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation in the field of border security and management.

The third keynote speaker, Dr. Lucas, highlighted the profits made by illegal groups through organized crime activities, which amounted to seven per cent of total world exports of merchandise. He emphasized that transnational organized crime posed a threat to the foundations of States by seriously undermining their proper functioning. Organized crime was linked to terrorism; drug trafficking; human trafficking; smuggling of migrants; illicit trade in fire arms; smuggling of raw materials; illicit exploitation of mineral resources; fake medicines, etc. He highlighted the importance of identity theft as the most dangerous type of organized crime in cyberspace. He also gave information about the UNICRI programme dealing with radicalization in prisons, in the framework of the fight against terrorism and radicalization.

## **Discussion**

The first delegation taking the floor welcomed the progress achieved by the OSCE in the fight against TNTs since the Astana Summit and underlined the importance of full implementation, translating political commitments into systematic programmatic action in a comprehensive manner, and fully respecting OSCE commitments, including those related to human rights. The delegation emphasized the importance of effective co-ordination among executive structures and field missions and deemed co-operation with other relevant international and regional actors to be desirable. It also welcomed the progress made in the field of cybersecurity CBMs and expressed the hope that concrete results would soon be achieved. In addition, it encouraged the Secretariat's ATU to focus more on capacity-building at the national and regional levels with respect to counter-terrorism, than on organizing conferences. Furthermore, the work of the Border Management Staff College should be further developed, based on a proper assessment of its effectiveness.

The second delegation stressed the importance of OSCE's comprehensive approach to security and announced the country's intention to hold an OSCE-wide anti-terrorism conference with a special focus on regional co-operation. The delegation welcomed the substantial progress that had been achieved in elaborating a set of CBMs in the field of ICTs and hoped that a PC decision could be adopted on the first set in July. Afghanistan had a negative impact on the security of the OSCE region, notably in the context of border management. The OSCE should make the best use of the Border Security and Management Concept.

The next speaker, representing the ODIHR, suggested that human-rights-compliant and gender-sensitive policies were essential in the fight against TNTs. Efforts should not be used arbitrarily to limit freedom of expression. Democracy and rule of law must be upheld in

all circumstances. He outlined the range of the ODIHR's contribution to work relating to TNTs on borders, policing and countering of violent extremism.

One delegation pointed out that important progress had been made in the fight against TNTs since the Astana Summit, and the adoption of the TNT package of decisions in 2012 was a welcome development. The Border Security and Management National Focal Points Network, as well as the Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, were invaluable assets of the OSCE. The delegation expressed its desire to see the OSCE more active in the field of TNTs, and stressed the importance of adopting a first set of CBMs in the field of cybersecurity.

The next speaker, representing the Regional Cooperation Council (RCC), referred to the role of the RCC in consolidating stability and promoting the rule of law in South-East Europe through regional co-operation. He said that the RCC encouraged regional initiatives to carry out internal strategic reviews in order to evaluate their added value, looking into their contribution to the overall security co-operation process within South-East Europe. Through a clearly defined mapping of regional initiatives and their activities, the RCC had identified gaps, overlapping and duplication of actions and had supported the establishment of operational links between the different co-operation initiatives.

The next delegation stressed the importance of cybersecurity and the fight against terrorism, and outlined the activities that its country had been carrying out in those two fields.

The following delegation pointed out the importance of: (1) adopting a set of CBMs in the field of ICTs, an area where security threats had expanded dramatically and where the OSCE had an added value; (2) pursuing the fight against terrorism, while promoting the rule of law and countering violent extremism, through training programmes, the implementation of best practices and the development of public-private partnerships; (3) fully funding the Border Management Staff College from the Unified Budget, particularly in the context of the OSCE's contribution to international efforts towards ensuring a secure and stable Afghanistan.

The next delegation referred to the need to strengthen the OSCE's engagement with Afghanistan, to adopt a first set of CBMs on cybersecurity, to improve the existing OSCE *acquis* and activities related to TNTs, to seek closer contact with civil society, and to remain open to innovative concepts that would foster dialogue. The delegation suggested that creating a new forum, where senior officials from the participating States would be able to discuss informally the most topical issues pertaining to the OSCE's security agenda, deserved thorough consideration.

The next speaker, representing the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development (GUAM), pointed to the lack of reliable statistical information on addressing TNTs, and suggested that the disparities in statistical data resulted in different operational results. The representative identified human trafficking, drug trafficking and illegal migration as important challenges.

The next delegation emphasized the links between terrorism and organized crime by providing examples from the region of North Africa. The delegation welcomed the activities of, and expressed readiness to further co-operate with, the Border Management Staff College.

One delegation welcomed the adoption of the TNT package at the Dublin Ministerial Council meeting, and underlined the importance of its implementation. The OSCE needed to strengthen co-ordination and co-operation with all the relevant international and regional organizations. Co-ordination of the activities of the TNT Department with all the executive structures and field missions also remained crucial. The delegation supported the continuation of OSCE activities in areas of excellence such as the Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, the work on community policing, as well as the organization of round tables and conferences for experts in countering terrorism and radicalization. It looked forward to reaching consensus on a set of CBMs in the field of cybersecurity.

One delegation pointed to the existence of “grey zones” in the OSCE area, where internationally agreed security measures could not be implemented and verified. Those areas were a source of concern, particularly as they represented a base for terrorist activities as well as accumulation of weapons of mass destruction.

The next delegation stressed the importance of illegal migration as a TNT which affected the economic and social cohesion of States and negatively impacted on bilateral relations. Trafficking of human beings had become an even more important challenge following recent developments in the Mediterranean region. The OSCE could make better use of its expertise and comparative advantages, such as its comprehensive approach to security.

One delegation emphasized that the fight against terrorism required an integrated and co-ordinated approach, including cutting the material support of terrorist organizations and preventing society from being influenced by extremist ideologies. One of the main tools of recruitment for terrorist organizations was the Internet, and that challenge needed to be duly addressed. Addressing drug trafficking, especially that emanating from Afghanistan, and cybersecurity, including through better co-operation, were other TNTs to which the delegation also attached the utmost importance.

The last delegation taking the floor said that 2012 had been a landmark year in terms of the fight against TNTs in the OSCE context. The delegation referred to the OSCE’s Bucharest Plan of Action for Combating Terrorism, in which aggressive separatism was cited as a source of terrorism. It expressed concern that illegal business activities in the territories of some participating States resulted in tax evasion and money-laundering, which later became sources of financing of terrorism. The CBMs in the field of cybersecurity should be based on principles of international law, and the OSCE should benefit from the experience of other international organizations that were already active in that field. The fight against drug trafficking and police-related activities should be kept high on the OSCE’s agenda.

### **Recommendations and suggestions**

1. International solutions are essential for tackling transnational threats, and the OSCE is uniquely placed to play a key role, with its comprehensive approach to security in three dimensions. The work of the OSCE complements the work of other relevant international, regional and subregional organizations.
2. Dublin Ministerial Council Decision No. 4/12 on the OSCE’s efforts to address transnational threats was an important step towards making the Organization’s work to address TNTs better co-ordinated and more visible. It is now time to fully implement that

decision and to translate political commitments undertaken in the fields of the fight against terrorism, drugs, police-related activities and information and communication technologies into effective and sustainable programmatic action.

3. There is a need for enhanced constructive engagement to adopt a set of confidence-building measures in the field of cybersecurity in the near future. The informal working group established pursuant to Permanent Council Decision No. 1039 should continue to meet and finalize its work with the participation of experts from capitals.

4. The OSCE's work to address TNTs should be targeted towards areas where the OSCE has unique strengths, address the threats in a cross-dimensional manner and be complementary to and co-ordinated with other relevant actors. Organized crime is a key area where different TNTs intersect and the OSCE can play a role complementary to those of other international and regional organizations.

5. TNTs must be addressed in a way that fully takes into account all the dimensions of the OSCE, including the human dimension, in order to be fully effective.

6. Co-ordination of the activities of the TNT Department with executive structures and field missions remains crucial. Ownership and support of capitals is essential for the sustainability of TNT activities.

7. The OSCE has developed significant expertise in the field of border management through its Border Security and Management Concept (Ministerial Council Decision No. 2/05). A number of delegations expressed their support for including the Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe in the OSCE Unified Budget. The College, as the trademark of the OSCE, deserves the support of the participating States.

8. It is important to address the TNTs stemming from Afghanistan, particularly in the post-2014 period. Broad regional co-operation is vital to address the challenges that Afghanistan is facing and ensure regional stability and security.

9. It is important to address the threat of trafficking in human beings and illegal immigration as part of the TNT agenda of the OSCE.

## **WORKING SESSION II: EARLY WARNING, CONFLICT PREVENTION, CRISIS MANAGEMENT, CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND POST-CONFLICT REHABILITATION: LESSONS LEARNED AND WAY AHEAD**

Keynote speakers: H.E. Roza Otunbayeva, Former President of the Kyrgyz Republic

Ms. Mo Bleeker, Special Envoy, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, Switzerland

Moderator: Ambassador François Alabrune, Permanent Representative of France to the OSCE

Rapporteur: Mr. Simon Deignan, Permanent Mission of Ireland to the OSCE

The moderator, Ambassador François Alabrune, opened the session by asking whether the OSCE was making full use of its potential in the conflict cycle. Although Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11 on the conflict cycle had provided the Organization with a road map, and its implementation was continuing, the current session provided for a stocktaking exercise and gave a chance to provide input into the Helsinki+40 Process.

The first keynote speaker, H.E. Roza Otunbayeva, outlined her own experience in dealing with the OSCE's crisis management tools during the 2010 ethnic clashes in south Kyrgyzstan, and highlighted a number of recommendations for the OSCE to take into account in dealing with future conflict situations. She urged the OSCE to bolster its early warning, analytical and monitoring capabilities in order to portray an objective representation throughout the conflict cycle; such monitoring had been important prior to the crisis in Kyrgyzstan and had fed into subsequent reports of other stakeholders, such as the International Crisis Group. The OSCE should focus on enhancing the capacity of local actors in terms of early warning and analysis. In addition, drawing on its comprehensive approach to security, the OSCE's capacity-building tools could be more effectively utilized in particular in Central Asia in areas such as training in border management, environmental protection, economic development and minority rights. Turning early warning into early action could be improved by making better use of the OSCE's institutional memory. That could include the establishment of an OSCE database on lessons learned, which could be linked to the institutional memory of other international organizations, such as the Council of Europe. Furthermore, the OSCE needed to have at its disposal expert mediators who were ready to be deployed when necessary. She concluded by noting that the OSCE was in urgent need of high-profile personnel for its field operations. Only heads of mission who demonstrated a certain professional gravitas and had the respect of their interlocutors could make the OSCE's voice heard efficiently. That should be coupled with enhanced recruitment and training policies. Conflict prevention should be carried out first and foremost on the ground and not only in Vienna.

The second keynote speaker, Ms. Mo Bleeker, began by underlining her three primary lessons learned in conflict management: the main cause of intra-State conflicts and civil wars was political exclusion; the transition from war to peace was long-term and required a

multi-stakeholder approach; peace agreements were simply the first step and needed to be supplemented by mediation capacities at the national and regional levels. Those lessons learned pointed the way for three suggestions of ways in which the OSCE could be made a more effective conflict manager: (1) the OSCE could contribute to the development of an architecture of prevention, consisting of national and regional structures that would provide for both early warning of crisis situations and firm decision-making procedures, thereby increasing ownership, responsibility and overall capabilities in non-violent dispute management, in particular with a view to the protection of civilians and the prevention of atrocities; (2) the OSCE could support the enhancement of national mediation capacities which would allow for the inclusion of civil society actors and which were especially important in post-conflict situations when multiple-mediation processes were needed to address issues that might not have been covered in a peace agreement; (3) the OSCE should use its expertise in dealing with the past and work towards a conceptual framework with a focus on transitional justice, accountability, principles guarding against impunity (covering the right to know, the right to justice and the right to reparation) and guarantees of non-recurrence. That conceptual framework should be linked to prevention strategies developed by participating States. Dealing with the past in terms of accountability should not be restricted to criminal justice, but should rather be seen in the light of lessons learned in order to understand where preventive mechanisms had failed and needed to be improved.

## **Discussion**

The first delegation, speaking on behalf of a large group of delegations, said that the group assigned priority to the strengthening of OSCE capacities in the conflict cycle. In that regard, the group welcomed the establishment of the Open-Ended Working Group on the Conflict Cycle, as well as the OSCE's work on rehabilitation and reconciliation. It also called for enhanced follow-up reporting to the Permanent Council on early warning signals, thematic meetings on the protracted conflicts, a best practices guide to OSCE involvement in peace processes, the strengthening of OSCE mediation efforts, and the adoption of an implementation plan for UNSC resolution 1325. The group of delegations concluded their intervention with a call for progress in resolving the protracted conflicts.

The second delegation taking the floor supported the recommendations of the keynote speakers, while pointing out that, if the OSCE was expected to carry out such work, it would require the necessary resources, notably within the Conflict Prevention Centre and the field missions. The OSCE's reconciliation activities needed to be promoted, since there could be no lasting security in a post-conflict situation without successful reconciliation. The delegation further supported the establishment of the OSCE's academic network and the Organization's co-operation with Track II initiatives aimed at the development of ideas and concepts related to the conflict cycle. The delegation finally stated that it considered the Helsinki+40 Process to be an appropriate forum for furthering the OSCE's work in conflict management.

The third delegation taking the floor seconded the call for more resources and added that the mediation unit within the Secretariat should be enhanced. It encouraged the development of a common reconciliation concept based on lessons learned and past experiences. It further stressed that appropriate funding for early action was needed.

The fourth delegation encouraged participating States to seize the opportunity of the Helsinki+40 Process to make progress in solving the protracted conflicts and enhancing the

OSCE's capacities in all phases of the conflict cycle. One possible suggestion was to allow impartial fact-finding missions to be deployed without a Permanent Council decision.

The next speaker outlined his delegation's position regarding each of the protracted conflicts, all of which must be settled peacefully, in keeping with international law and principles, through existing formats, and with respect for the interests of the parties. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict must be resolved only through diplomatic means, as agreed by the Co-Chairs; although there were differing views on the sequencing of implementation for a settlement, the good will of the parties was required. On the "5+2" talks, progress had stalled due to differences in views on the final status. However, there was still scope for some small steps. On the Geneva talks, the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism was proving to be a positive tool, while the issues of internally displaced persons and non-use of force were being deadlocked by the actions of one State in other fora. The speaker concluded by calling for the profile of the ASRC to be raised.

The sixth delegation said that the Open-Ended Working Group on the Conflict Cycle could be more focussed, and stated that the OSCE's rapid response capacity should not be held hostage by consensus. The speaker supported the promotion of the OSCE's capacities with regard to early warning, early action and dialogue facilitation, and called for structural conflict prevention, carried out in a multidimensional manner by all the OSCE's institutions and directed towards removing the structural causes of conflicts. The delegation further supported a longer (two-year) appointment of special representatives involved in mediation activities, as well as increased co-operation between Chairmanships on plans and personnel for protracted conflicts.

The seventh delegation regretted the lack of progress in the Geneva talks and blamed one participating State for politicizing the consensus principle, for violating the principle of territorial integrity, for blocking the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, for increasing "borderization", and for not reciprocating a commitment to non-use of force. The delegation called for increased efforts by the OSCE, the EU and the UN to address humanitarian issues, and urged that the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia be given full access to the country's territories, and that the OSCE re-establish a mission in Georgia.

The representative of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (PA) suggested that the PA could contribute to the OSCE's work in the conflict cycle by assessing the situation, working towards preventative diplomacy and proposing that the Chairperson-in-Office appoint a PA representative as a special envoy for certain crisis situations.

The speaker representing the ninth delegation, while subscribing to the statement of the large group of delegations that had intervened earlier, underlined the importance of the role of women in the conflict cycle.

The tenth delegation similarly expressed its alignment with a previous statement, while calling for more progress in the "5+2" talks. In addition, the delegation urged that the gap between early warning and early action should be closed, and supported promotion of the OSCE's mediation capabilities.

The eleventh delegation warned that Helsinki+40 would not succeed without progress in the protracted conflicts. The OSCE was not focussing sufficiently on conflict resolution,

post-conflict rehabilitation and displacement issues. In its work on implementing Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11, the Secretariat tended to misinterpret the content of the Ministerial Council decision by moving forward on issues regarding which there was no consensus among the participating States. The delegation noted that previous early warning tools had failed, while stressing that reconciliation could not be addressed until a conflict was satisfactorily settled.

The twelfth speaker urged the parties involved in the “5+2” talks to stop encouraging separatism through economic subsidies and benefits.

The penultimate speaker stressed that early warning needed to be followed by early action. The delegation supported the full implementation of Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11, including through reconciliation efforts carried out throughout all phases of the conflict cycle, while noting that each conflict was unique. All the principles of international law must be equally respected and none singled out for pre-eminence. In order to achieve settlement of a conflict, governments must prepare their populations for peace.

The final speaker said that the OSCE Permanent Council should play a stronger role in addressing the protracted conflicts and that decisions should not be taken outside of it. The delegation stressed that the Minsk Group required reinvigoration, while adding that the OSCE had sufficient mandates to address post-conflict rehabilitation and conflict resolution without the creation of new tools. Any reconciliation effort initiated before a settlement was in view could be interpreted as an acceptance of the status quo and should thus be implemented only in the post-conflict rehabilitation phase.

## **Recommendations**

1. The transition from conflict to sustainable peace is a long-term endeavour requiring an inclusive multi-stakeholder approach with both long- and short-term objectives.
2. The OSCE’s comprehensive approach to security, wide membership, and consensual decision-making processes give it unique comparative advantages for acting as an objective actor in the conflict cycle.
3. Dealing with the past and transitional justice are vital in the struggle against impunity and to ensure accountability of all actors. In line with recommendations from Track II initiatives, the OSCE should develop a conceptual framework within which national mechanisms aimed at an architecture for conflict prevention could be shaped.
4. All the participating States welcomed and supported the implementation of Ministerial Council Decision No. 3/11 on the conflict cycle, while some pointed out that, for the decision to be fully effective, more resources needed to be allocated to the CPC and the field missions. The need for enhanced recruitment and training for OSCE staff was also highlighted.
5. The OSCE should augment its analytical capacity and increase its monitoring capabilities throughout all phases of the conflict cycle. In this regard, there should be more flexibility in the dispatch of fact-finding missions and consideration should be given to assigning a role to the OSCE PA. Furthermore, the OSCE should increase its early warning



capacities and have at its disposal efficient and adequately funded mechanisms for early action.

6. Most participating States encouraged enhanced OSCE efforts in mediation, possibly through longer (two-year) appointments of special representatives, while there were some suggestions that the OSCE should support the development of national/regional mediation capacities. The importance of the participation of women was also stressed.

7. Reconciliation was widely recognized as vital to any conflict settlement process, while two delegations believed that the concept should only apply following the resolution of a conflict.

8. Regarding the protracted conflicts themselves, there was general consensus that more needed to be done to reinvigorate work towards peaceful settlement, within agreed formats and in accordance with international law. Some delegations underlined the potential of the Helsinki+40 Process in that regard.

## **WORKING SESSION III: ARMS CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES**

Keynote Speakers: Mr. Greg Delawie, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Security, Technology and Implementation, Department of State, United States of America

Mr. Oleksandr Aleksandrovych, Director General for International Security and Disarmament, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ukraine

Ambassador Dr. Gerhard Jandl, Security Policy Director, Federal Ministry for European and International Affairs, Austria

Moderator: Ambassador Giedrius Čekuolis, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Lithuania to the OSCE

Rapporteur: Dr. Emilia Breuss, Permanent Mission of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the OSCE

The keynote speakers assessed the current situation with regard to arms control and confidence- and security-building measures and discussed possible ways of improving the existing regime and adapting it to the changing security environment. In that regard, full use should be made of the Helsinki+40 Process.

The first keynote speaker, Mr. Delawie, began by stating the importance of the revitalization and strengthening of European security mechanisms, including those related to conventional arms control. An adaptation and improvement of the existing security architecture – achieved in a way that was efficient and effective for all the countries involved, while continuing to preserve key principles and commitments – was needed in order to meet the current and future security needs.

Outlining the three main pillars of the existing arms control and CSBM regime, namely, the Open Skies Treaty, the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document 2011, he highlighted the unique contribution of each to military stability in Europe and strategic relationships. At the same time, he expressed concern about the challenges they were currently facing, in particular the stalemate over the CFE Treaty and the procedural impasse in the Open Skies Consultative Commission (OSCC) caused by national political interests. In that regard, the introduction of a political issue outside the mandate and control of the Open Skies Treaty's mechanisms was not in the interest of any State party. There was a need for all the Parties to modernize the Treaty, including through the shift towards digital sensors, and for sufficient assets to be assigned for future operations. The Vienna Document should be modernized and recalibrated to take account of the security needs of the 21st century in order to ensure its continued relevance, e.g., by strengthening existing provisions, for example, by enhancing inspection opportunities and by introducing changes such as a lowering of thresholds for notification of military activities. He further stressed that the Vienna Document and the CFE Treaty were complementary, but not interchangeable.

A further key component of European security co-operation was the establishment of a true strategic partnership between NATO and the Russian Federation. Regular information exchange and co-operation should ensure transparency and mutual confidence. In addition to that, a bilateral co-operation between the United States and Russia on issues such as nuclear disarmament and missile defence transparency would be in the security interest of all.

The second keynote speaker, Mr. Aleksandrovych, welcomed the new dynamic of discussions on arms control within the framework of the FSC and during events such as the Security Days. While those discussions on the future of arms control had shown persisting divergences, some broadly shared views could also be identified, such as the desirability of absorbing technical elements of the CFE Treaty into a future arms control regime, which would be a combination of legal and political commitments, inserted in a framework agreement and supplemented by regional arrangements. Whereas the addition of new categories of controlled armaments seemed unlikely, a shift away from bloc-to-bloc confrontation was to be expected and the Vienna Document could be further updated and improved. Arms control, nuclear arms control and missile defence were interrelated, although to be treated separately. He further argued that the interests of non-bloc or neutral States were to be taken into account in any future arrangement and that – despite the fact that arms control was not a primary tool for conflict settlement – the exercise of self-restraint by participating States in the area of arms control might have a mitigating effect on existing tensions.

In conclusion, he announced the issuance of a concise compendium, which would include the main points put forward during the continued dialogue in 2013 on the future of arms control, in preparation for the meeting of the Ministerial Council in Kyiv.

The third keynote speaker, Ambassador Jandl, also discussed possible ways to fulfil the tasking of the Astana Summit meeting to “revitalize, update and modernize conventional arms control and CSBM regimes” against the background of the erosion of the CFE Treaty and current problems in the OSCE. He stressed the need to analyse different threat perceptions and expressed regret that concepts of nuclear deterrence as well as a bloc-to-bloc approach continued to be threats in the changing global security environment. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation could only be addressed through a common approach and would indirectly benefit the OSCE.

Regarding conventional arms control, he expressed his support for the ongoing discussions in the framework of the FSC, as well as for the efforts of the Chairperson-in-Office and the Secretary General in reassessing existing instruments and principles in that respect. He also highlighted the importance of substantially modernizing and strengthening the Vienna Document by introducing more transparency, flexibility and practicability. He particularly suggested the reduction of thresholds for the announcement of military activities, a modification of the Annual Exchange of Military Information, an adjustment of the duration of visits to air bases and more flexibility in the existing verification mechanisms. He also underlined the clear differentiation between the Vienna Document and the CFE Treaty. With regard to the way ahead in arms control, he suggested two avenues: (1) a comprehensive new architecture, encompassing the Open Skies Treaty, the CFE Treaty and the Vienna Document, discussed among the 57 participating States; and/or (2) a reinforced Vienna Document – while acknowledging that the latter could not fully replace the CFE Treaty.

Once again stressing the interrelatedness of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, he called for an adaption of the OSCE Principles Governing Non-Proliferation and pledged a constructive approach to the initiative by the Chairmanship of a new draft of these principles.

## **Discussion**

Following the keynote speakers' presentations, 15 delegations took the floor.

All the delegations agreed on the vital importance of arms control and CSBMs for European security and considered that their effective functioning was in the common interest of all.

Most delegations affirmed that, while preserving the existing *acquis* and its level of implementation, there was a need to revitalize, update and modernize the current regime in order to adequately reflect the present-day security environment, as agreed at the OSCE Summit meeting in Astana and reflected on in other relevant OSCE documents. Many delegations highlighted the potential of the Helsinki+40 Process in that regard.

Most delegations also expressed their concern about the lack of progress in overcoming the stalemates in the OSCE and relating to the CFE Treaty, which had led to an erosion of trust and confidence in the politico-military field of the OSCE. Some delegations stressed the need for the participating States to find a timely solution to the current stalemate.

Regarding the Vienna Document, a large majority of the participating States called for a substantial modernization, increasing transparency and bringing the Vienna Document in line with the current military and security conditions. A number of delegations stressed that that should be achieved in a cost-effective manner. Several delegations called for an agreement on the proposal on lowering the thresholds for notification on military activities. One delegation referred to its proposal on the extension of the information exchange to "non-combat units".

Regarding the Open Skies Treaty, many delegations called for a resolution of the impasse in the Open Skies Consultative Commission, expressing their support for the Chairmanship of the Commission. One delegation pointed out the essential importance for the future of the Open Skies Treaty of a functioning OSCE, which would operate on the basis of consensus by all the participating States and would be technically modernized, e.g., through renewed sensor systems. Another delegation recalled its aspiration to accede to the Open Skies Treaty.

Regarding conventional arms control, divergent views were expressed by delegations regarding the way forward in overcoming the current stalemate. One delegation stated that the CFE Treaty was outdated and proposed a modern conventional arms control regime, while others stressed that a future regime should build upon existing measures, which were constrained by the lack of political will rather than by their nature. A number of delegations insisted that CSBMs could not be a substitute for a legally binding arms control regime.

A number of delegations further stressed that arms control regimes and CSBMs were not a vehicle for conflict resolution. One delegation called for the removal of "frozen" conflicts from future talks on arms control. Other delegations underlined the importance of

arms control regimes and CSBMs for subregional stability, but also pointed out the negative impact of conflicts on their implementation. One delegation enumerated central obligations that were breached, undermining the existing regime and the security of the OSCE area as a whole. Another delegation expressed concern about the decreasing importance of the OSCE in the area of CSBMs, where it had formerly played a pioneering role. Two other delegations recalled that another participating State was stationing its military forces in parts of their territories without their consent. One delegation pointed out that the non-exemption of “grey zones” – *de facto* or *de jure* – from the application of arms control regimes and CSBMs was of vital importance for their effectiveness.

At the same time, most delegations expressed their support for discussions aimed at opening the way for negotiations on a future conventional arms control and CSBM regime. A number of delegations particularly welcomed the new dynamic within the framework of the FSC and Track II initiatives, while one delegation noted that such talks could supplement, but not serve as a substitute for, discussions in other formats.

Two delegations made reference to an International Conference on Military and Political Aspects of European Security, held on 23 and 24 May in Moscow, at which persisting differences as well as concurring views had been identified regarding the OSCE’s role in safeguarding European security.

Many delegations also referred to the important contribution of other CSBMs in the toolbox of the FSC to the common goal of a European Security Community, namely, the relevant OSCE documents in the field of small arms and light weapons and stockpiles of conventional ammunition and the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, as well as the OSCE’s support for the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions 1540 and 1325.

In particular, several delegations underlined the importance of the recent adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty, which would also have an impact on the OSCE’s tools in the field of SALW, and encouraged all the participating States to sign and ratify the Treaty. One delegation expressed its concern about the risk of the OSCE’s fading importance in the field of SALW in light of developments at the global level.

One delegation called attention to the Second Annual Discussion on the Implementation of the Code of Conduct, to take place on 10 July 2013, and also referred to the importance of the OSCE’s outreach activities related to the Code of Conduct. It was also suggested that a dialogue should be initiated with civil society to extend awareness of the Code of Conduct beyond an expert level. Two delegations welcomed the ongoing efforts to update the 1994 OSCE Principles Governing Non-Proliferation.

In concluding working session III, Mr. Delawie noted the common agreement on the importance of conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures and gave assurances of his country’s commitment to work with all partners on resolving the issues that had been brought forward during the discussion.

Mr. Aleksandrovysh stressed the need for more discussions of the type that had just taken place in the current year and hoped to see them moved forward to an official level. He further suggested – in light of the implicit link to nuclear arms control and missile defence –

that scenarios for conventional arms control should also be studied, depending on possible developments in other related areas.

### **Main Findings and Recommendations**

1. The continued relevance of the Vienna Document needed to be ensured by its full implementation and modernization, bringing it in line with the transformation of modern armed forces towards smaller but better equipped capacities.
2. Common concern was expressed about the lack of progress in overcoming the stalemates in the OSCE and the CFE Treaty, which had led to an erosion of trust and confidence in the politico-military field of the OSCE. Political will was required to overcome the existing impasse.
3. It was suggested that different threat perceptions should be analysed. Although they were to be treated separately, the interrelatedness of arms control, non-proliferation and missile defence was highlighted.
4. The importance of arms control and CSBMs for subregional stability was underlined. Arms control regimes and CSBMs could not, however, provide for political solutions to conflicts; linkages to unresolved conflicts should therefore be avoided.
5. The recent adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty would have an impact on the OSCE's tools in the field of SALW.
6. The potential of the Helsinki+40 Process should be fully used in an effort to revitalize, update and modernize the existing *acquis*. It was suggested that arms control and CSBMs should constitute one of the building blocks in the framework of the Helsinki+40 Process.

## WORKING SESSION IV: AFGHANISTAN

- Keynote speakers: Ambassador Ayoob M. Erfani, Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the OSCE
- Mr. Erkin Akhinzhanov, Director of the Department for Europe, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan
- Ambassador Daan Everts, former NATO Senior Civilian Representative in Afghanistan
- Ms. Nora Niland, former Director of Human Rights in the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and Representative of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
- Moderator: Ambassador Kairat Abdrakhmanov, Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the International Organizations in Vienna
- Rapporteur: Ms. Margaret Belof, United Kingdom Delegation to the OSCE

In his opening remarks, the moderator noted that Afghanistan was attracting increasing attention as the ISAF drawdown loomed closer. Despite the welcome progress in Afghanistan over the past 11 years, the ISAF drawdown had the potential to lead to an increase in instability, particularly in Central Asia. A rise in transnational threats such as trafficking in people and narcotics and an increase in radicalization and terrorism were issues that the OSCE could not ignore.

The first keynote speaker, Ambassador Ayoob M. Erfani, outlined the progress towards peace and development made in Afghanistan since 2001, citing positive developments in the politico-military, economic and human rights spheres, and noted that the majority of Afghans held an essentially optimistic outlook for the country's future. However, he also referred to continuing transnational criminal and security challenges that required a comprehensive and collective response. In that context, regional co-operation, such as under the Istanbul Process, was crucial. Afghanistan deeply appreciated its partnership with the OSCE, remained committed to the OSCE's values, principles and cross-dimensional approach, and believed there was room for expanded co-operation, particularly in respect of training for Afghan officials in the security sector, technical co-operation and assistance in the economic and environmental sectors and capacity-building in the political and civil society sectors, including elections, law and the media. The timetable for support during the transition decade of 2014–2024 was flexible according to sector, but it would be important to avoid wasting money as in the past by improving international co-ordination.

The second keynote speaker, Mr. Erkin Akhinzhanov, encouraged participating States to fulfil the promises of assistance to Afghanistan that they had given at the Tokyo Conference on Afghanistan in 2012, but stressed that there should be no interference in Afghan internal affairs.

The third keynote speaker, Ambassador Daan Everts, outlined mistakes from previous policy on Afghanistan which had led to and had been perceived by many Afghans as an over-emphasis on military aspects at the expense of a political settlement and good governance needs. Future policy should focus on multilaterally-based support to the Afghan Government with a greater emphasis on Afghan ownership and involvement and should foster regional interdependence. The OSCE could best assist by creating a platform for dialogue and sharing best practice in its areas of expertise, particularly in relation to its comprehensive approach to security.

The fourth keynote speaker, Ms. Nora Niland, thought there needed to be a new political settlement to address concerns about injustice stemming from the flaws in the 2001 Bonn settlement, which had not been inclusive, had empowered warlords and had exacerbated a culture of impunity. A durable peace could not be achieved without Pakistan's involvement and was dependent on improving governance and producing a viable economy. Views on the future ranged from cautious optimism to expectations of catastrophe. The OSCE needed to be realistic. It should support the progress already made, recognize the importance of agriculture, invest in human rights, back the "Facebook generation" and civil society, and support a level playing field for all Afghans.

## **Discussion**

A number of delegations welcomed having an ASRC session dedicated to Afghanistan and called for continuing assistance to the country. They expressed their support for regional co-operation through the Istanbul Process, called for women's rights to be respected, and noted the importance of holding credible and transparent elections as well as ensuring that there was effective regional and international co-ordination.

The first speaker, representing a large number of delegations, called for strategic co-operation amongst international actors whilst acknowledging the central role of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and fully respecting Afghan ownership. He welcomed the progress to date on implementing the 2007 and 2011 Ministerial Council decisions on Afghanistan, but called for more financial support and regretted the absence of consensus as to whether the OSCE should implement projects in Afghanistan itself.

The second delegation noted that shared challenges required a collaborative response and called for greater regional connectivity. Trade and transport corridors along the lines of a new Silk Road offered the greatest potential for regional stability and the OSCE was well positioned to offer assistance on integrated cross-border security and trade. There was also scope for the OSCE to support regional centres of excellence on law and research.

The third delegation feared that the security situation in Afghanistan was worsening, particularly in the northern provinces, and that could have an impact on Central Asia and beyond. The Afghan security forces were not yet strong enough and should take more advantage of the training offered under OSCE auspices in the CIS countries. Any form of continuing international military support needed to be mandated by the UN Security Council and should not include long-term foreign military bases. Whilst the Istanbul Process offered a platform for dialogue, regional co-operation could only be implemented by formats of proven effectiveness such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The Customs Union offered the best platform for economic



development and co-operation. Indeed, trade links could strengthen regional security in the region. There was also a need for increased international counter-narcotics action.

The fourth delegation said that the region should lead efforts for its own security, and noted that the Istanbul Process, which was centred on Afghanistan, had already exceeded expectations. It also expressed the view that the Afghan-led reconciliation process would lead to long-term stability. There was, however, a need for concerted efforts to counteract transnational threats, and trafficking of narcotics in particular.

The fifth delegation noted the importance of a confident and secure Afghanistan for the security of all the OSCE participating States and thought the OSCE might play a role on issues related to security, reconciliation, elections and economic development. The delegation, however, also pointed out the importance of local ownership to ensure security.

One delegation thought that peace could only be achieved through national reconciliation which was Afghan-led and -owned and that there should be no spheres of influence for others.

### **Recommendations and suggestions**

1. The OSCE should adopt a proactive attitude towards Afghanistan, including through active involvement in the implementation of the CBM action plan of the Istanbul Process.
2. The OSCE should continue capacity-building and training of Afghan officials. It should meet the needs identified by Afghanistan, build on previous projects undertaken by the Organization and take account of previous and current efforts by other members of the international community. Areas for focus include border management, counter-narcotics, counter-terrorism, law enforcement, customs, economic good governance and the development of civil society and the media.
3. The OSCE could support regional and bilateral co-operation and platforms of dialogue between Afghanistan and the Central Asian participating States.
4. The Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe and the OSCE Academy in Bishkek could be expanded to increase their impact.
5. The OSCE might explore initiatives in the third dimension, in particular relating to democratic good governance, justice, respect for human rights, religious tolerance and sharing of HCNM expertise on national minorities.
6. The ODIHR could offer support to the Afghan Government on election legislation, manuals and training and offer election monitoring.
7. The OSCE Secretariat should continue to identify and develop meaningful extrabudgetary projects on Afghanistan.



## **APPENDICES**





**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Permanent Council**

PC.DEC/1079

18 April 2013

Original: ENGLISH

---

**948th Plenary Meeting**

PC Journal No. 948, Agenda item 3

**DECISION No. 1079  
DATES OF THE 2013 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE**

The Permanent Council,

Taking into account the recommendation of the Forum for Security Co-operation,

Decides that the 2013 Annual Security Review Conference will take place in Vienna on 19 and 20 June 2013.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
Permanent Council**

PC.DEC/1084  
13 June 2013

Original: ENGLISH

---

**956th Plenary Meeting**

PC Journal No. 956, Agenda item 2

**DECISION No. 1084  
AGENDA AND ORGANIZATIONAL MODALITIES OF THE 2013  
ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE (ASRC)**

The Permanent Council,

Recalling Porto Ministerial Council Decision No. 3 on the Annual Security Review Conference,

Taking into account its Decision No. 1079 on the dates of the 2013 Annual Security Review Conference,

Taking into account the recommendation of the Forum for Security Co-operation,

Decides to organize the 2013 Annual Security Review Conference in accordance with the agenda and organizational modalities contained in the annexes to this decision.

PC.DEC/1084  
13 June 2013  
Annex 1

## **2013 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE**

Vienna, 19–20 June 2013

### **Agenda**

#### **Wednesday, 19 June 2013**

- |                |   |
|----------------|---|
| 10 a.m.–1 p.m. | Opening session   |
| 3–5 p.m.       | Working session I: Transnational threats and challenges |

#### **Thursday, 20 June 2013**

- |                       |  |
|-----------------------|--|
| 9–11 a.m.             | Working session II: Early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation: lessons learned and the way ahead |
| 11.30 a.m.–12.30 p.m. | Working session III: Arms control and confidence- and security-building measures   |
| 2.30–3.30 p.m.        | Working session III: Arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (continued)   |
| 4–5.30 p.m.           | Working session IV: Afghanistan  |
| 5.30–6 p.m.           | Closing session  |

PC.DEC/1084  
13 June 2013  
Annex 2

## **ORGANIZATIONAL MODALITIES OF THE 2013 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE**

Vienna, 19–20 June 2013

### **Background**

The Tenth Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, at Porto, by adopting its Decision No. 3, dated 7 December 2002, established the Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) to provide a framework for enhancing security dialogue and for reviewing security work undertaken by the OSCE and its participating States, to provide an opportunity to exchange views on issues related to arms control and confidence- and security-building measures, and to promote the exchange of information and co-operation with relevant international and regional organizations and institutions.

### **Organization**

A representative of the Chairperson-in-Office will chair the opening and closing sessions. The Secretariat will issue a journal of the Conference.

Each working session will have one moderator and one rapporteur. The Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC) will serve as co-ordinator for preparing the sessions.

The contribution of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) will be made in accordance with its procedures, mandate and competences. The FSC contribution to the ASRC includes the chairing of the third working session by a member of the FSC Troika or the Director of the CPC.

The Rules of Procedure of the OSCE will be followed, *mutatis mutandis*, at the Conference. Also, the guidelines for organizing OSCE meetings (Permanent Council Decision No. 762) will be taken into account.

Interpretation from and into all six working languages of the OSCE will be provided at the opening, working and closing sessions.

The Chairmanship will co-ordinate the preparation of the ASRC with the FSC Chairperson and the OSCE Secretariat.

The Chairperson-in-Office will distribute a comprehensive report on the Conference before the summer recess.

The Press and Public Information Section (PPIS) will inform the press, as appropriate.



## **Participation**

The participating States are encouraged to be represented at a high level, by senior officials from capitals, responsible for security-related policy in the OSCE area.

The OSCE institutions will participate in the Conference, as will the Secretary General and the CPC. The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Partners for Co-operation will be invited to participate.

The Chairmanship may also invite some heads of OSCE field operations to participate in the Conference. Consideration should be given to the possibility of inviting heads of field operations to be present as keynote speakers or moderators.

The international organizations that may be invited are the security-related organizations mentioned in Permanent Council Decision No. 951 of 29 July 2010.

Consideration is to be given to the possibility of inviting security-related scientific institutes, think tanks of international standing, and NGOs to send keynote speakers or to be represented as members of national delegations.

## **General guidelines for participants**

The work of the ASRC will be conducted in six sessions. The opening session is intended to provide an opportunity for formal statements to be delivered and to set the stage for substantive, focused and interactive discussions at the working sessions. The opening session will include the welcoming remarks by the Chairperson-in-Office or his representative and the report by the FSC Chairperson. The Chairmanship will explore the possibility of inviting high-level special guest(s) to address the Conference.

The four working sessions will each concentrate on a different topic, introduced by a number of keynote speakers, whose addresses will be followed by a discussion of relevant topics that are mentioned in the agenda.

The aim is an interactive and free-flowing discussion.

In order to reinforce the effectiveness of security activities across all three dimensions of the OSCE, it is expected that, at each of the sessions, the interfaces of security, and also the question of co-operation with other international and regional organizations, will be addressed.

To promote interactive discussion, the formal statements at the opening session and the interventions at the working sessions should be as concise as possible and should not exceed five minutes in length. Prior circulation of statements and interventions will enhance the possibility for engaging in discussion.

By 7 June 2013, the participants in the Conference should inform the OSCE Secretariat of the composition of their delegations to the ASRC, in response to the

PC.DEC/1084

13 June 2013

Annex 2

information circular regarding organizational aspects of the Conference which will be sent out by the OSCE Secretariat.

By 7 June 2013, the participating States and other participants in the Conference are invited to submit any written contributions they may have, including those that contain reactions to the keynote speeches.

Written contributions should be submitted to the Conference Services, which will then distribute them. The information could also include contributions from OSCE institutions and other international organizations, if appropriate.

### **Guidelines for keynote speakers**

The contributions of the keynote speakers should be focused on the subject of the relevant session, thus setting the scene for the discussion at the sessions, and should stimulate debate among delegations by raising appropriate questions and suggesting potential recommendations based on OSCE realities.

The maximum available speaking time is 15 minutes per keynote speaker.

Keynote speakers should be present during the entire session at which they are speaking, and should be ready to engage in the debate following their presentation.

To enable delegations to prepare themselves, keynote speakers should provide a written contribution and their biographical synopsis to the CPC by 7 June 2013. In their presentations, keynote speakers should touch on the highlights of their written contribution.

### **Guidelines for moderators and rapporteurs**

The moderator chairs the session and should facilitate and focus the dialogue among delegations. The moderator should stimulate the debate by introducing items related to the subject of the opening and working sessions, as appropriate, in order to broaden or focus the scope of the discussion.

The rapporteurs' written reports should address issues raised during the relevant sessions, and should cover problem areas, improvements, suggestions made at the session, and other relevant information.

Moderators and rapporteurs should seek to identify and summarise specific recommendations made in each of the sessions.

Personal views shall not be advanced.

### **Guidelines for the participation of other international organizations**

International organizations may participate in all the sessions. They are invited to concentrate their contributions on aspects of co-operation with the OSCE within the scope of the relevant session.

International and regional organizations should provide factual information, useful for the participants of the ASRC, to the Conference Services by 7 June 2013.

PC.DEC/1084  
13 June 2013  
Attachment 1

Original: ENGLISH

**INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER  
PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE  
OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND  
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE**

By the European Union:

“The European Union believes it is very important to ensure that this key event can be organized in line with the tasking set by our Ministers in Porto. We have therefore joined consensus on this decision. Nevertheless, we very much regret that, despite tireless efforts by the Chairmanship and others, it was not possible to find consensus on a more detailed agenda in a timely manner which would have allowed us to better focus our discussions in the different sessions. This type of shortened ASRC agenda should not set a precedent for future years.

It is particularly disappointing that not all delegations would agree to use language which had been accepted last year and the year before, after long discussions.

The Annual Security Review Conference is a central event on the annual calendar of the politico-military dimension. We look forward to it and the preceding Security Days event and we will participate fully and constructively in line with our priorities which include the resolution of protracted conflicts.”

The acceding country Croatia<sup>1</sup>, the candidate countries the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia<sup>1</sup>, Montenegro<sup>1</sup>, Iceland<sup>2</sup> and Serbia<sup>1</sup>, the countries of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate countries Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the European Free Trade Association countries Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, align themselves with this statement.

---

1 Croatia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia continue to be part of the Stabilisation and Association Process.

2 Iceland continues to be a member of the EFTA and of the European Economic Area.

PC.DEC/1084  
13 June 2013  
Attachment 2

Original: ENGLISH

**INTERPRETATIVE STATEMENT UNDER  
PARAGRAPH IV.1(A)6 OF THE RULES OF PROCEDURE  
OF THE ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY AND  
CO-OPERATION IN EUROPE**

By the delegation of the United States of America:

“I would like to express our appreciation for your patient efforts to facilitate a compromise enabling participating States to reach a consensus on the agenda and organizational modalities of the 2013 Annual Security Review Conference.

Just seven weeks after we took the floor to offer an interpretive statement expressing our regret that consensus could not be reached for a detailed agenda for the High-Level Conference on Tolerance, we find ourselves again in the same regrettable position. Despite your tireless and outstanding efforts, and the flexibility and efforts of many participating States around the table, we regret that a timely consensus decision could not be reached on a detailed agenda for this important annual conference. Furthermore, we are disappointed that not all delegations could agree to language for the agenda that was accepted in the two previous years for this annual conference. I would like to call to your attention that last year’s agenda notably invited delegations to address “ongoing OSCE activities with regard to existing conflicts in the OSCE area”. More broadly, we regret that language for this year’s event that would help focus speakers’ presentations and participating States’ interventions in areas including, but not limited to, protracted conflicts and the OSCE’s role in preventing and resolving conflicts; conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures; further contributions the OSCE could make to supporting Afghanistan; and the role of the ASRC in contributing to the Helsinki+40 process, could not be agreed.

While we have shown flexibility on this issue today in order to allow the important Annual Security Review Conference – the premiere event in the annual calendar of the politico-security dimension – to move forward, this abbreviated agenda should not be viewed as a precedent for the agendas of future years.

I would like to request that this interpretative statement be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.”