

Chairmanship: United States of America**967th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM**

1. Date: Wednesday, 3 February 2021 (via video teleconference)

Opened: 10 a.m.
Suspended: 1 p.m.
Resumed: 3 p.m.
Closed: 3.15 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ms. C. Austrian

Prior to taking up the agenda, the Chairperson reminded the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) of the technical modalities for the conduct of FSC meetings during the COVID-19 pandemic, as outlined in FSC.GAL/2/21 OSCE+.

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: GENERAL STATEMENTS

Situation in and around Ukraine: Ukraine (FSC.DEL/43/21), Portugal-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/50/21), United Kingdom (FSC.DEL/48/21 OSCE+), United States of America, Canada, Russian Federation (Annex 1)

Agenda item 2: SECURITY DIALOGUE: VIENNA DOCUMENT
MODERNIZATION

- *Presentation by Mr. B. Turner, Senior Bureau Official, Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance, US Department of State*
- *Presentation by Colonel S. M. Babusch, Royal Netherlands Air Force*
- *Presentation by Mr. I. Anthony, Director of the European Security Programme, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute*

Chairperson, Mr. B. Turner (Annex 2), Colonel S. M. Babusch (FSC.DEL/67/21 OSCE+), Mr. I. Anthony (FSC.NGO/1/21 OSCE+), Portugal-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/51/21), Sweden (Annex 3), Switzerland (FSC.DEL/35/21 OSCE+), United Kingdom (FSC.DEL/46/21 OSCE+), Germany (Annex 4), Canada, Georgia, Belarus (FSC.DEL/38/21 OSCE+), Turkey, Ukraine (Annex 5), Russian Federation (Annex 6), Armenia (Annex 7), Azerbaijan, FSC Co-ordinator for the Vienna Document (Sweden) (Annex 8)

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar, to be held on 9 and 10 February 2021:* Chairperson
- (b) *Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting, to be held on 2 and 3 March 2021:* Chairperson (Annex 9)
- (c) *Briefing on the outcomes of the Conceptual and Planning Workshop on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, held via video teleconference on 25 and 26 January 2021:* FSC Co-ordinator for the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security (Switzerland)
- (d) *Update on the OSCE's contribution to the 2020–2021 Comprehensive Review of the status of implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 (FSC.DEL/15/21 Restr.):* FSC Co-ordinator on Non-Proliferation Issues (Belarus)
- (e) *Distribution of a synopsis of the status of assistance projects within the OSCE on small arms and light weapons and conventional ammunition (FSC.GAL/8/21 OSCE+):* FSC Co-ordinator for Assistance Projects on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Austria)
- (f) *Cancellation of the “Joint Viking 2021” military exercise:* Norway (Annex 10)
- (g) *Request for assistance in enhancing the capacity of Azerbaijan's national authorities for reducing and responding to explosive hazards:* Armenia (Annex 11)

4. Next meeting:

Wednesday, 17 February 2021, at 10 a.m., via video teleconference



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/973
3 February 2021
Annex 1

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

967th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 973, Agenda item 1

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION**

Madam Chairperson,

Our basic assessment of the causes and consequences of the internal Ukrainian conflict, as well as our fundamental approach to its settlement, are well known to our partners in the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and remain unchanged. For more information, colleagues are invited to refer to our previous statements attached to the FSC journals.

We strongly condemn the Ukrainian Government's attempts to call into question the Minsk agreements and its continuation of the bloody punitive operation against the civilian population of Donbas. We categorically reject any military assistance from Western countries to Ukraine, which makes them complicit in the war crimes committed by the Ukrainian security forces. Instead of pumping Ukraine full of hardware, there is a need to work closely and systematically with the Ukrainian leadership to stop the armed confrontation in Donbas as soon as possible.

For its part, the Russian Federation, in its capacity as a mediator, will continue to promote a settlement in Donbas on the basis of the Minsk Package of Measures of 12 February 2015 through direct dialogue between the Ukrainian Government and the authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



967th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 973, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

Good morning to everyone, and thank you, Chairperson, for inviting me to once again to speak about modernizing the Vienna Document, as I have done on several occasions over the last six years in this Forum.

This week's Security Dialogue on modernizing the Vienna Document 2011 builds upon the momentum over the last several years, including most recently and notably the joint proposal for modernizing the Vienna Document, tabled in October 2019 and co-sponsored by 34 participating States. Since that time, the imperative of updating the Vienna Document to reflect current-day security realities has become more pressing. Our discussion today is intended, once again, to spur participating States to begin the actual process of achieving substantial progress in 2021 on modernizing the Vienna Document 2011, as 45 participating States called for in the joint statement on the thirtieth anniversary of the Vienna Document at the OSCE Ministerial Council in Tirana in December 2020. Updating the Vienna Document to promote transparency and confidence in the face of large-scale military exercises, sometimes with little or no notice, and unusual military activities, is a critical task for the Forum for Security Co-operation and should be considered a responsibility of all participating States.

Updating the Vienna Document is more vital than ever because, as we all know, the security situation in Europe has deteriorated sharply since 2014. Disregard for the OSCE's foundational principles and international law are at the heart of this insecurity. Behaviour that raises threat perceptions and threatens general stability – such as large-scale, no-notice military exercises near borders – undermines confidence and efforts to promote military transparency, risk reduction, and incident prevention.

Some have argued that increased military transparency is not needed at this time, or that we cannot negotiate an update to the Vienna Document in light of recent changes to NATO's defensive and deterrence posture in the region through its enhanced Forward Presence (eFP). But this assertion is a red herring. NATO is not a threat to any country, and the measures Allies have implemented in recent years are all defensive in nature, proportionate, consistent with NATO's international commitments, and respectful of the rules-based European security architecture. Last week's dialogue should have dispelled any misunderstandings about the entirely defensive nature of eFP, as well as insincere claims that it somehow poses an impediment to modernizing the Vienna Document. In fact, the opposite

is true. Modernizing the Vienna Document would increase military transparency, including with respect to eFP.

The United States, along with most participating States, is concerned about the erosion of reciprocal arms control across the European continent, and we believe it is important to take steps to prevent that erosion from continuing. The obvious place to start is to focus on implementing fully the instruments we still have, and updating them where possible to meet the needs of today; there is no need to invent a new architecture. But it is also critical that these measures apply to all; the problem with fully voluntary measures, as opposed to firm commitments, is that they are almost certainly not going to be implemented by all, or equally.

As the key set of confidence- and security-building measures within the FSC, the Vienna Document should play an essential role in promoting military transparency and stability within the OSCE area. In our view, restoring trust and increasing mutual confidence among the participating States, enhancing reciprocal military transparency and predictability, and reducing risk by updating the Vienna Document would be an important demonstration of participating States' commitment to begin to address a number of the security challenges facing Europe today.

Such an effort is long past due. The Vienna Document was always intended to be a living document that would require periodic updates. As recalled in paragraph 6 of the Vienna Document, participating States committed in 2010, through an FSC decision, that they would update and revise the Vienna Document on a regular basis and reissue it every five years or more frequently. And yet, now a decade later, the FSC is still reliant on the 2011 version, which does not address current security challenges, and in actuality was not even a substantial enhancement of the Vienna Document 1999. It is clearly time to do better.

The joint proposal for modernizing the Vienna Document, co-sponsored by 34 participating States and tabled in October 2019 (FSC.DEL/213/19/Rev.2), provides a concrete framework to address many of the major challenges identified by participating States over the years and provides a starting point for beginning real negotiations on updating the Vienna Document. We hope that the joint proposal can serve as the basis for achieving consensus at 57 this year.

By now, I hope all participating States have a baseline understanding of the joint proposal's key elements, which consist of: (1) lowering thresholds for advance notification and observation of large military activities; (2) modestly increasing the number of inspection and evaluation opportunities; (3) modestly increasing team sizes – this, notably, was originally an idea of the Russian Federation; (4) adding steps to facilitate real-time, impartial information-gathering in situations where questions have arisen about unusual military activities; and (5) providing greater transparency regarding large military activities conducted without prior notice to the troops involved. When tabled as part of the joint proposal in October 2019, these already were not new ideas. We had in fact been reviewing many of these ideas as individual proposals for several years. What was new was to introduce them as a single, balanced package.

I would like to underscore here that these proposals would be of benefit to all participating States, including the Russian Federation. For example, reaching consensus on

lowering the thresholds for advance notification and observation of military exercises would provide participating States, including Russia, increased awareness of military activities in areas of potential concern. A modest increase in inspection and evaluation opportunities, as previously called for by Russia, would also provide for increased transparency. Likewise, improving information sharing mechanisms for unusual military activities would increase all participating States' trust and confidence in the other participating States, should military activities of this nature occur in areas of concern. Russia would surely benefit from the joint proposal's provision of greater transparency for so-called "snap" exercises that might occur in areas of interest to Russia. These reciprocal confidence-building proposals apply to all participating States equally – to NATO forces and non-NATO forces alike. That's the point of reciprocity.

I want to reiterate that the joint proposal is only a starting point for negotiations, not a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. We never intended to exclude other ideas, which can be introduced and addressed in the course of negotiations. Similarly, existing elements of the joint proposal may be amended or adjusted in the course of negotiations after they have begun. But that can only happen if negotiations actually do take place. We need to begin those negotiations in earnest, find areas of compromise, and work together to agree on some practical steps to begin to rebuild trust and enhance military transparency by the time of the Stockholm Ministerial Council in December.

With that, our hope today is that we can discuss the following three questions to initiate our work in 2021 on updating the Vienna Document:

First: As noted above, in 2010, by FSC decision, participating States committed to updating the Vienna Document every five years. Do participating States agree that the deterioration in the European security environment necessitates updating the Vienna Document 2011, the FSC's key set of confidence- and security-building measures? If not, why?

Second: What are participating States' views on the reasons why the FSC has not yet updated the Vienna Document 2011?

Third: We have received comments on the joint proposal from some participating States, but would also like to hear specific feedback from those participating States that have not provided their views on the joint proposal as of yet. What changes, additions, or deletions to the joint proposal for modernizing the Vienna Document 2011 would they view as helpful?

To conclude, December 2021 will mark the twenty-fifth anniversary of the OSCE Framework for Arms Control. Twenty-five years after Lisbon, conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures remain important for advancing comprehensive, co-operative, and indivisible security in the OSCE area. Arms control is still integral to the OSCE's comprehensive and co-operative concept of security. The United States continues to value open and meaningful dialogue on these issues, just as we welcome steps to further develop military-to-military contacts through the OSCE, including at the High-Level Military Doctrine Seminar scheduled for next week.

I look forward to listening to the remarks of our other speakers today, and I thank Dr. Ian Anthony of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and Colonel Sylvia Babusch of the Benelux Arms Control Agency for joining today's panel.



967th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 973, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF SWEDEN**

Good afternoon, Madam Chairperson,
Good afternoon, dear colleagues,

Sweden fully aligns itself with the European Union's statement and would like to state the following in its national capacity:

Modernizing the Vienna Document is an explicit priority of the Swedish OSCE Chairmanship and today's Security Dialogue on the matter is most welcome. We thank the United States of America for putting this important topic on the agenda of the Forum for Security Co-operation. We also thank the speakers for their open, informative and concise presentations.

The faith we place in the Vienna Document as an important framework for mutual dialogue on security issues cannot be overstated. It provides measures to increase transparency and predictability, not least through the enhancement of military co-operation and contacts. It also facilitates co-operative sharing of information on military activities, developments and trends. It is a fundamental and imperative tool that helps to foster and improve security in our part of the world. For a militarily non-aligned country such as Sweden, the OSCE and its confidence- and security-building measures are of great value.

Sadly, the situation with regard to our collective security is changing and quickly deteriorating. The erosion of predictability and trust that may be observed in the current European security environment is a common concern. This trend has to be reversed, and we have to start now. We must enhance transparency and mitigate concerns about military activity.

But we also live in a world that is in constant flux. In order to keep our tools for security relevant and useful, they must evolve to reflect this fact. For example, the information flow of today is characterized by a speed and scope that are beyond anything we could have imagined in 2011, when the Vienna Document was last updated. This "acceleration" is essentially a positive development and could help to improve security, but it could also be misused, leading to information overflow, confusion and misunderstandings. Other factors that have had a dramatic impact on security include the emergence of a variety

of new technologies, but also recent developments regarding military formations' size, transportability and effectiveness.

All these aspects pose new challenges to the security environment. The Vienna Document and other agreements must be tailored to reflect this new reality in order to maintain our efforts, our procedures and our determination to achieve improved security. There is no doubt that all the participating States would benefit from this. If participating States today perceive an increasing lack of transparency and predictability, coupled with certain threats, it should be in everyone's interest to ensure that this is not the case tomorrow.

Sweden has been crystal clear on the fact that we strongly encourage taking action to modernize the Vienna Document. It is hard to see a valid reason why we should not be able to embark on a deeper analysis and dialogue. We need a more – not less – constructive discussion and exchange of views. It is time to move forward on this matter – for our common security.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

Please attach this statement to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/973
3 February 2021
Annex 4

ENGLISH
Original: GERMAN

967th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 973, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF GERMANY**

Madam Chairperson,
Dear colleagues,

I thank the United States Chairmanship for giving us the opportunity to discuss the urgently needed modernization of the Vienna Document in detail. We all know that this modernization has been overdue since 2016. I hope that we will manage, five years later, to make progress here.

I thank the panellists for their good introduction to the subject. I agree fully with the statement made on behalf of the European Union. Allow me to highlight the following aspects.

We have already expressed our concern several times at the worsening security environment in the OSCE area. It is becoming increasingly urgent to enhance trust and predictability among the participating States. The most important and specific measure in that regard is the modernization of the Vienna Document.

The joint proposal, a comprehensive modernization proposal supported by 34 participating States, is on the table. It is a negotiable proposal. Working Group A is the right place for negotiation, further fine-tuning the provisions and supplementing them with contributions from other participating States. Germany is willing to support this in the Working Group and in bilateral discussions.

In that context, allow me to emphasize once again that the proposed changes are based on pragmatic experience in the implementation of the Vienna Document in recent years. They are not in the interests of just a few States or a group of States but would naturally have an impact on all participating States. The proposals are also up for negotiation. I believe that it is in the spirit of the Vienna Document at least to react constructively to such an offer.

Discussions in the Structured Dialogue and its expert meetings could also contribute to the success of this process. I thank Ambassador Cuesta for his committed and inspiring leadership. His leitmotif “Understanding for Security” also provides impetus for the

Vienna Document. In line with the mandate of the 2016 Hamburg Declaration, we will create an environment conducive to reinvigorating conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in Europe.

I hope that our efforts here in Vienna can soon be accompanied by a full resumption of the implementation activities under the Vienna Document. Germany is already active in this regard and stands ready to take further steps as soon as the health situation allows.

The full implementation of the letter and the spirit of the Vienna Document and other arms control agreements and CSBMs is an essential element of our security. Existing implementation deficits by individual States must be rectified swiftly and by agreement.

Under these conditions and in a climate of goodwill on the part of all involved, let us make some progress in the modernization of the Vienna Document in 2021, ten years after its last updating.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



967th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 973, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF UKRAINE**

Madam Chairperson,

Ukraine has aligned itself with the European Union's statement, which we fully support. In addition, allow me to make some remarks in my national capacity.

The delegation of Ukraine would like to join others in warmly welcoming today's speakers and thanking them for their valuable contributions to the discussion on this topic at the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC).

Before presenting our views on the modernization of the Vienna Document 2011, I should like to draw your attention to the communication by Ukraine with reference "CBM/UA/21/0002/F41/O".

Ukraine expressed therein its resolute protest in connection with the information on military forces deployed in the temporarily occupied Crimea, Ukraine, that Russia disseminated via notification "CBM/RU/20/0078/F41/O" as part of the annual exchange of military information.

We consider such communications to be blatant attempts by Russia to legitimize its illegal acts of occupation of the sovereign territory of Ukraine, and we call upon all OSCE participating States to condemn the misuse of our Organization's politico-military documents for such purposes.

The Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol is an integral part of Ukraine. Since 2014 this territory has been temporarily occupied by Russia as a result of its armed aggression against Ukraine, which culminated in the military invasion and illegal seizure of the Crimean Peninsula.

All military formations and units of the armed forces of the Russian Federation located in the temporarily occupied Crimea clearly have the status of occupying forces and are stationed there without the host nation's consent.

The ongoing military presence of Russia's occupation forces in the temporarily occupied Crimea constitutes an act of armed aggression against Ukraine and is in flagrant

violation of the Charter of the United Nations; the Helsinki Final Act; United Nations General Assembly resolution 68/262 of 27 March 2014, entitled “Territorial integrity of Ukraine”; United Nations General Assembly resolutions 73/194 of 17 December 2018, 74/17 of 9 December 2019 and 75/29 of 7 December 2020 “Problem of the militarization of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, as well as parts of the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov”; and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly resolution of 8 July 2019 entitled “The militarization by the Russian Federation of the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Ukraine, the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov” and other international documents.

All of Russia’s occupying forces, including their armaments, military equipment and personnel, must be withdrawn immediately from the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

Meanwhile, we urge the Russian Federation to comply with its politico-military commitments by providing, under the Global Exchange of Military Information, accurate data on its forces, weapons and military equipment deployed beyond its sovereign territory – specifically those deployed in the temporarily occupied Crimea and parts of Donbas, Ukraine.

Esteemed colleagues,

The Vienna Document remains one of the pillars of the European security architecture, which has been facing significant challenges in recent years. This instrument was designed to play an important role in maintaining and enhancing transparency, predictability and confidence among the participating States. It is based on the founding principle of our Organization, which is enshrined in its core documents, namely, to refrain from the threat or use of force in inter-State relations and, indeed, in all international relations as such.

That very principle was gravely violated and continues to be disregarded by the Russian Federation, which unleashed armed aggression against Ukraine and Georgia. To this day Russia occupies parts of both countries’ sovereign territory, which it has turned into so-called “grey zones” inaccessible for verification activities and fall short of the exchange of military information. Such actions continue to undermine existing arms control regimes and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs).

However, there are certain steps that might prevent further aggravation of the security situation and shed promising light on the way forward. One of them is the modernization of the Vienna Document 2011 – a task that is necessitated by technological developments in the military sphere, including changes in force structures, and by current and emerging security threats. A number of relevant proposals for updating the Vienna Document have been tabled in the FSC Working Group A, in particular the joint proposal put forward in October 2019, which garnered vast support among the participating States. It is time to fulfil these endeavours, which were most recently endorsed by no fewer than 45 participating States in a joint statement at the Tirana Ministerial Council meeting in December 2020.

There is a strong appeal for lowering the notification and observation thresholds; improving the risk reduction mechanisms under Chapter III; enhancing the transparency of large-scale “snap” (“no-notice”) exercises; and improving inspection and evaluation

activities. We fully support these objectives and believe that they should constitute the baseline of the modernization efforts.

Ukraine remains committed to the full implementation, both in letter and in spirit, of existing commitments in the politico-military dimension. It is essential to enhance military transparency and political stability in the OSCE area. Ukraine supports the modernization of the Vienna Document 2011 and the development of further CSBMs. To that end, we express our full support for the joint proposal for a Vienna Document Plus draft decision put forward within Working Group A.

Ukraine encourages all delegations to engage in the modernization effort.

Moreover, we have been putting into practice new enhanced arrangements for the implementation of the Vienna Document 2011 under the ongoing foreign armed aggression and temporary occupation of parts of our territory.

In particular, in order to dispel concerns over military activities, Ukraine, in a spirit of openness and transparency, has been doing its utmost in such difficult circumstances to enable other participating States to conduct above-quota inspections in areas of concern. Since 2014, the participating States have been regularly conducting such inspections, also in the Donbas region of Ukraine. The results of these verification activities have been duly circulated among the participating States.

Ukraine has expanded the scope of inspections, allowing the inspection teams to receive a wide range of briefings from regional authorities and other State institutions.

Additionally, in order to strengthen confidence and security at the regional level, Ukraine is steadfastly fulfilling its obligations under bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries, which were concluded in accordance with Chapter X (“Regional Measures”). Reciprocal inspections with these countries provide an opportunity to try out new initiatives for the implementation of the provisions of the Vienna Document 2011.

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize that taking into account our national experience, we believe in the need to further develop regional CSBMs; to lower the thresholds for the observation of military activities in the vicinity of borders; and to ensure military transparency within 25 kilometres of border areas by providing the possibility of inspections and observation flights – specifically by introducing the practice of multinational observation flights over military activities at the tactical (brigade/battalion) level conducted near a State’s border.

We would kindly ask you to attach this statement to the journal of the day.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

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3 February 2021
Annex 6

ENGLISH
Original: RUSSIAN

967th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 973, Agenda item 2

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Madam Chairperson,

Last year we celebrated the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Vienna Document. We concur with the assessments of the keynote speakers and a number of delegations that it is a relevant and functioning instrument that continues to fulfil the tasks it was originally meant to and makes a tangible contribution to the enhancement of transparency and stability in Europe.

However, it is regrettable that the modernization of the agreed confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) has been treated by participating States in a utilitarian manner as a purely technical process, presented as a panacea for improving the European security situation and even used to put pressure on certain countries that hold different views on the process.

We should like to remind the distinguished Mr. Bruce Turner, a Senior Bureau Official for Arms Control, Verification and Compliance in the United States Department of State, that in the first decade of this century the US Government was among those who stubbornly opposed the drafting of a new version of the Vienna Document. As a result, agreement was not reached until a year after the 2010 Astana Summit. During those years, Russia consistently sought to persuade its partners of the need to modernize that document, using exclusively diplomatic arguments and never making accusations about the “blocking” of negotiations that we have heard today from our US colleague.

Our position on the prospects for modernizing the Vienna Document 2011 is well known. The primary reasons for the deterioration of the European security situation are not the lack of CSBM instruments but the consolidated positions of the United States, NATO and the European Union in opposition to our country, the unprecedented political and economic pressure on Russia and the breakdown of military co-operation. The crisis in Ukraine, sponsored by the United States with the connivance of its European allies, merely served as a pretext for the collective West to adopt the strategy mentioned. All this runs counter to the OSCE’s vision of a pan-European security area.

Madam Chairperson,

At the last plenary meeting of the Forum, we heard a chorus of voices trying to convince us that the measures to build up NATO's military presence and develop its infrastructure in Eastern Europe and the Baltic States, the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea were "purely defensive" in nature.

We recall, however, that the NATO "defence" bloc and some of its members have, on spurious grounds, repeatedly used military force against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of various States in Europe (Yugoslavia) and beyond (Iraq, Libya, Syria, etc.).

We are told that the scale of these measures is not significant and we apparently have nothing to worry about.

We remember, however, that on 27 January this year, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg called on members of the Alliance's Military Committee to increase investments in modern armaments in order to respond adequately to some "aggressive actions" by the Russian Federation.

And yet, there is no credible argument that Russia is a threat to the bloc's countries. It suffices to compare the objective data on the defensive build-up of our country and NATO States, as well as the parameters of their military expenditure.

Here are some concrete examples. Whereas in 2015 the combined military budget of the North Atlantic Alliance was ten times that of Russia's defence spending, today it is 22 times that of Russia. The NATO countries have 2.5 times as many armoured combat vehicles as Russia, three to four times as many tanks, artillery systems, multiple rocket launchers, warships and submarines, five times as many combat aircraft, and more than seven times as many combat helicopters.

Under these circumstances, we naturally reserve the right to take measures to safeguard Russia's national security interests – please note – on our national territory.

Parallel to the NATO-initiated rollback of military-to-military dialogue, an unprecedented campaign to discredit the legitimate day-to-day activities of the Russian armed forces has been unleashed. Despite the transparency measures we have taken, blatant falsehoods are being bandied about, going as far as to reproach us for a lack of transparency even when we are using all possible channels to report voluntarily on combat training activities in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Document.

The question arises: how can confidence- and security-building measures be modernized when the North Atlantic Alliance countries have confirmed in practice that they are not prepared to invest in either trust or security?

As an aside, I should like to warn our partners in advance that their favourite clichés about "propaganda" and "disinformation", which they use every time they hear something unflattering to them, will be out of place in this context. We are talking about real facts.

Madam Chairperson,

In order to create the conditions for discussion on CSBM modernization, the Alliance should stop increasing and rather reduce activity on the eastern flank. This issue can be revisited once military tensions have subsided, sanctions have been lifted and trust has been restored.

The Russian Federation will be willing to discuss military security if and when the North Atlantic Alliance countries are “ripe” for it. Our specific initiatives aimed at preventing negative developments have been proposed to our partners on a number of occasions in the past. These include the re-establishment of military-to-military dialogue (which could start with consultations at the military expert level), the reduction of military activities on a reciprocal basis along the NATO-Russia line of contact, and an improvement in the mechanism for preventing dangerous military activities at sea and in the airspace.

These proposals have been made by our representatives, including within the NATO-Russia Council, but so far there has been no substantive reaction to them.

It is very important to assess the situation honestly, to focus not on imaginary but on real problems, and to address the security imbalances that are really critical for the pan-European community. We propose that for the near future participating States limit their efforts to improving the implementation of the Vienna Document 2011 (we all remember well the saying: “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it”) and focus on creating at least the minimum necessary conditions for constructive discussions on the fundamental issues of strengthening the politico-military foundations of European security.

Thank you, Madam Chairperson.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



967th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 973, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF ARMENIA**

Madam Chairperson,

I should like to begin by thanking the keynote speakers for their insightful presentations, which have helped to shape today's discussions.

The Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures is a key component of the European security architecture and of the OSCE politico-military toolbox, and is aimed at building trust and confidence among the participating States. Launched in 1975, it has developed from a modest initiative with limited political support and scope of implementation into one of the pillars of European security, making a significant contribution to military stability and security in our region.

However, today the stability and security of and in the OSCE area are challenged by multifaceted threats and a spiralling crisis over the values of co-operative security. In these circumstances, the Vienna Document, with its key purpose of preventing the use of force, is becoming ever more crucial.

Madam Chairperson,

For years the Armenian delegation has been voicing concerns about Azerbaijan's violations of the provisions of the Vienna Document – specifically the provisions regulating the prior notification of military exercises –, as a clear sign of systematic preparations for the resumption of war. Azerbaijan's refusal to provide any clarifications testifies to that country's complete disregard for the principles of co-operative security.

Last year alone, three unnotified military exercises conducted by Azerbaijan in systematic and unapologetic defiance of the Vienna Document's relevant provisions resulted in aggression and the use of force against Artsakh. The war unleashed by Azerbaijan with the direct support and involvement of Turkey and foreign terrorist fighters and jihadists once again confirmed the validity of all our concerns. Two days ago, Turkey and Azerbaijan began conducting another joint military exercise near the border with Armenia. As of today, we have yet to receive any response from the Turkish delegation to our request for clarification on the parameters of the exercise. Instead, the Turkish delegation implied in its statement that violation of the Vienna Document's provisions by Turkey and Azerbaijan should be treated

by Armenia as a signal, a message – nay a sincere gesture aimed at promoting trust and confidence among neighbours. What an unscrupulous distortion of the objectives and values of the Vienna Document and of our Organization! The so-called good intentions of Turkey and Azerbaijan to turn the page of mistrust obviously lack any credibility given the cultivated at the State level decades-long hatred towards Armenia and Armenians, genocide, war crimes, atrocities, aggression and continued denialism. Moreover, such provocative actions as the aforementioned joint military exercise can only aggravate the existing mistrust. Unfortunately, we have not seen any real and palpable action from the Turkish side that might lend the slightest credence to their declaration of good intentions.

Madam Chairperson,

We are encouraged by the fact that the international community, with but a few exceptions, speaks with one voice when it comes to rejecting the use of force. However, we are also compelled to acknowledge with deep regret – as was made abundantly clear by the war against Artsakh – that there is a lack of resolve among the participating States, including those actively advocating the implementation and modernization of the Vienna Document, to stand up for the concept of co-operative security and to employ to that end the entire toolkit at the disposal of the OSCE, such as early warning and prevention mechanisms. Constant breaches of, and disregard for, our joint commitments undermine the legitimacy of our Organization, thereby providing additional credence and encouraging further violations. Double standards and selective approaches shaped by geopolitical interests are by no means conducive to upholding our common co-operative and indivisible security.

In closing, I wish to reiterate that the Republic of Armenia remains committed to all the commitments emanating from the Vienna Document. We believe that modernization of the Vienna Document can be achieved only through the full and unconditional implementation of our joint commitments and through inclusive dialogue.

Madam Chairperson,

In response to the remarks by the Turkish delegation, I should like to point out that my delegation has already communicated our position regarding Armenia's decision to suspend military inspections by Turkey and the participation of Turkish guest inspectors in multinational inspections on the territory of the Republic of Armenia – in particular in a note verbale circulated under the reference number SEC.DEL/273/20, and in statements circulated under the reference numbers PC.DEL/1093/20 and JCG.DEL/5/20 – and I am not going to repeat them. I shall limit myself to reiterating that the decision is based on Armenia's legitimate security interests. Armenia is not in a position to provide sensitive military information to a country who uses it against the population of Armenia as the security of our population is not subject to compromise.

Thank you.

I kindly ask that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/973
3 February 2020
Annex 8

Original: ENGLISH

967th Plenary Meeting
FSC Journal No. 973, Agenda item 2

**STATEMENT BY
THE FSC CO-ORDINATOR FOR THE VIENNA DOCUMENT
(SWEDEN)**

Madam Chairperson,
Dear colleagues,

At the outset, let me start by thanking our keynote speakers for their interesting and valuable presentations on an important issue – an issue that is of direct relevance to confidence- and security-building within the European security architecture.

As the FSC Co-ordinator for the Vienna Document, I am also grateful to the US Chairmanship of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) for having chosen to highlight the Vienna Document and the need for it to be updated by devoting today's Security Dialogue to the theme of "Vienna Document Modernization".

It is beyond any doubt that most of the OSCE participating States represented at the Forum acknowledge a need for modernization of this instrument. The joint statement on the 30th anniversary of the Vienna Document issued at the Tirana Ministerial Council meeting in December last year was thus endorsed by no fewer than 45 participating States.

The Vienna Document should be updated on a regular basis. As laid down in Chapter XII, paragraph 152, of the Vienna Document 2011, "[p]articipating States will organize a special FSC meeting to take place every five calendar years or more frequently, as decided by the FSC, starting no later than in 2011 and taking into account the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting, as appropriate, in order to reissue the Vienna Document". Since the participating States failed to implement that part of the Vienna Document by 2016 as originally envisaged, they now have an opportunity to do so in 2021.

At the Forum we sometimes hear participating States calling for implementation before modernization, but it is important to bear in mind that implementation cannot be done selectively. Modernization is implementation.

Another key point to note is that a majority of the participating States have been speaking out in favour of instruments designed to enhance implementation of the Vienna Document, especially since that would save resources and improve efficiency for end users in the participating States, namely their verification centres. Unfortunately, though, all of the

proposals for enhancing implementation of the Vienna Document raised within the FSC – I am thinking here of the draft decisions on the “F-format” notifications and the latest Finnish draft text on visits to air bases – have been rejected. Participating States should be mindful that it is essential for the Vienna Document to be updated regularly if it is not to lose its relevance, especially given the current restrictions arising from the COVID-19 pandemic.

I would remind you all of the concluding words of that joint statement by 45 participating States at the Tirana Ministerial Council meeting: “We reaffirm our strong commitment to the Vienna Document and its full implementation in letter and spirit, and are determined to support constructively the process of its modernization with a view to achieving substantial progress toward[s] updating the Vienna Document by the OSCE Ministerial Council [in] 2021.”

Finally, I should like to encourage all participating States to become involved in the future discussions and work on this topic within the FSC and its working groups. I look forward to further proposals, food-for-thought documents and draft decisions that will help to stimulate the efforts being undertaken by Working Group A in particular. For this is about our commitments and our security. It is very much our Vienna Document.

Thank you.

Madam Chairperson, please attach my statement to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/973
3 February 2021
Annex 9

Original: ENGLISH

967th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 973, Agenda item 3(b)

**STATEMENT BY
THE CHAIRPERSON**

In preparations for the 31st Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting to be held on 2 and 3 March 2021, the FSC Chairmanship wishes to announce the moderators and rapporteurs of the respective working session.

Working session 1 on the Global Exchange of Military Information and Vienna Document Introduction of Chapters I to III. The moderator is Colonel Marek Sobotka, Senior Military Adviser from Poland and the rapporteur is Ms. Unni Mortensen, Adviser from Norway.

Working Session 2 on Vienna Document Chapters IV to VII. The moderator will be, Lieutenant Colonel Søren Hvid-Hansen, Senior Military Adviser from Denmark and the rapporteur is Ms. Ann-Sophie Vermeersch, Political Attaché, from Belgium.

Working Session 3 on improving the implementation of CSBMs. The moderator will be Colonel Johan Huovinen, Military Adviser from Sweden and the rapporteur is Mr. Igor Vujacić, Military Adviser from Montenegro.

I would express my thanks to the moderators and rapporteurs for volunteering taking up this role and contributing to the upcoming Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting.

Let me also inform you that the moderators will distribute their food-for-thought papers by 12 February.

The FSC Chairmanship will issue the annotated agenda with the registration details by 16 February.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/973
3 February 2020
Annex 10

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967th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 973, Agenda item 3(f)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF NORWAY**

Madam Chairperson,
Dear colleagues,

I should like to inform the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) that on 26 January, Norway decided to cancel the “Joint Viking 2021” exercise, which was notified to all OSCE participating States last year through notification [CBM_NO_20_0013_F30_O](#).

The exercise had been planned to be this year’s main military exercise in Norway and was notified as such in accordance with Vienna Document Plus (FSC) Decision No. 9/12. The exercise was meant to have taken place in March of this year.

The decision to cancel “Joint Viking 2021” was taken as part of a set of stricter measures to halt the recent outbreak in Norway of a mutant variant of the virus responsible for COVID-19.

The cancellation was notified to all OSCE participating States on 1 February by notification [CBM_NO_21_0002_F41_O](#).

Thank you.

Please attach this statement to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Forum for Security Co-operation**

FSC.JOUR/973
3 February 2021
Annex 11

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967th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 973, Agenda item 3(g)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF ARMENIA**

At the last meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) on 27 January, the delegation of Azerbaijan informed the Forum about a request for a practical assistance project dealing with explosive remnants of war.

In reaction to the provided information, I wish to state that the delegation of Armenia will not support the proposed assistance project requested by Azerbaijan to be implemented in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone and in the occupied territories of Artsakh. We consider the proposed project to be an attempt by Azerbaijan to legitimize its aggression and the outcomes of its use of force against Artsakh. We strongly encourage the FSC Chairmanship to refrain from any actions that would be perceived as an endorsement of Azerbaijan's policy in that respect. We are convinced that any conflict-related activities by the OSCE can be implemented only after thorough consultations and clearly expressed consent of all the parties concerned. Furthermore, we believe that the OSCE's involvement in, and contribution to, projects of that kind should be part of a comprehensive peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

I kindly ask for this statement to be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you.