

FSC-PC.JOUR/70 3 November 2021

Original: ENGLISH

FSC Chairmanship: Austria OSCE Chairmanship: Sweden

### 83rd JOINT MEETING OF THE FORUM FOR SECURITY CO-OPERATION AND THE PERMANENT COUNCIL

1. Date: Wednesday, 3 November 2021 (in the Neuer Saal and via video

teleconference)

Opened: 10 a.m. Closed: 11.40 a.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador F. Raunig (FSC) (Austria)

Ambassador U. Funered (PC) (Sweden)

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: STRUCTURED DIALOGUE

Presentation by H.E. Mr. C. Valdés y Valentín-Gamazo, Permanent Representative of Spain to the OSCE and Chairperson of the Informal Working Group on Structured Dialogue on the Current and Future Challenges and Risks to Security in the OSCE Area

Chairperson (FSC), Chairperson (PC) (Annex 1), Chairperson of the Informal Working Group on Structured Dialogue on the Current and Future Challenges and Risks to Security in the OSCE Area, Slovenia-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC-PC.DEL/60/21), Armenia, United States of America (FSC-PC.DEL/53/21 OSCE+), Canada, Switzerland (FSC-PC.DEL/56/21 OSCE+), Finland, Turkey (FSC-PC.DEL/58/21 OSCE+), Germany (Annex 2), Lithuania (Annex 3), Russian Federation (Annex 4), Poland (FSC-PC.DEL/57/21 OSCE+), Latvia (Annex 5), United Kingdom, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly

## Agenda item 2: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) Resumption of verification activities in Austria from 1 December 2021: Chairperson
- (b) Follow-up on the progress of an FSC e-learning course on conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures: Representative of the Conflict Prevention Centre

### 4. <u>Next meeting</u>:

To be announced



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Original: ENGLISH

**83rd Joint Meeting of the FSC and the PC** FSC-PC Journal No. 70, Agenda item 1

# STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRPERSON OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL

Dear Florian, Dear colleagues,

Also from my side a warm welcome to this joint meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation and the Permanent Council, today committed to the important Structured Dialogue. Let me first thank Austria for working closely with us on this important topic to facilitate this meeting.

Let me also in particular thank Spain for chairing the informal working group of the Structured Dialogue and its efforts to lead a thorough discussion on various aspects connected to the Framework for Arms Control. This was established 25 years ago upon the notion that positive trends of co-operation, transparency and predictability needed to be strengthened. Today the situation is clearly different, but the Framework for Arms Control is an example of what can be achieved if there is a real political will. With this as a basis, the Structured Dialogue has since 2017 provided us with a useful tool to discuss important challenges to our common security.

In the beginning of this year, we stated that we were convinced that Spain would be a good choice to continue, for a second year, to chair the Structured Dialogue. We were right. Not only have you with strong efforts lead the Structured Dialogue as such, but also with a great deal of new thinking, thereby introduced both different and new perspectives, which has been very useful. Your concept of U4S, "Understanding for Security", with its four phases listening, reflecting, sharing and learning have certainly proved to be a useful guidance in this work.

Starting consultations early, you also showed an obvious will to take on board the views and thoughts of other participating States during the year, which has been beneficial for this forum and us all. Thank you, Ambassador Valdés, to you and your team, for the efforts and professionalism.

Without going to much advance, today's briefing will show us that this year has been a year of comprehensive discussions on a variety of topics within this framework. Topics like enhancing transparency, risk reduction, the Framework for Arms Control, climate change and security, new strategic challenges and others, have all helped to broaden the perspectives and

reflect on different possible solutions. There were quite practical terms that contributed new perspectives on possible options as well, for example to consider educational initiatives to strengthen the knowledge of the OSCE as an organization. The discussions were held not only in the informal working group, but also through expert-level meetings and a special session in the Annual Security Review Conference, which highlights the comprehensiveness of these efforts.

From the following open and frank discussions, interesting and useful conclusions have been deducted, that we can all benefit from.

The responsibility for engagement in our common work, interaction in discussions and a development of understanding for security within the Structured Dialogue should be of common shared interest of all participating States. This is clearly a very important forum for our dialogue on common security, strongly supported by Sweden as OSCE Chairmanship. With a deteriorating security situation at hand, this forum has a more important role than ever. We might not agree on several issues right now, but at least we can move forward and contribute to mutual understanding of various topics and options. For this we need a true dialogue, and this was facilitated this last year. We now need to continue our efforts to foster political will to discuss the natural development for our common instruments for transparency, in order to improve existing instruments, and at the same time be open for requests for reform and improved efficiency of the Organization. As Chairperson, I am convinced that, despite obvious challenges, there is room for developing all this. And to be quite frank, I also have no other option in the current dire situation. We must use the tools we have to the maximum of our ability.

Finally, as the Swedish Chairmanship slowly comes to an end, we would again like to remind participating States that the Structured Dialogue is not primarily a Vienna-based dialogue; it needs capital involvement. We need to continue to keep up the level of this forum. I believe that Spain's strong leadership and commitment has showed the way in this regard. Sweden's strong support for the Structured Dialogue and its important role is solid and will remain beyond the Chairmanship.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I kindly request this statement to be attached to the journal of the day.



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**ENGLISH** 

Original: GERMAN

83rd Joint Meeting of the FSC and the PC

FSC-PC Journal No. 70, Agenda item 1

#### STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF GERMANY

Madam Chairperson of the Permanent Council, Mr. Chairperson of the Forum for Security Co-operation,

Germany fully aligns itself with the statement by the European Union.

I should nevertheless like to say a few additional words about the Structured Dialogue process. First of all, I thank the Spanish Chairperson and his team for their very good work and not always easy guidance of the Structured Dialogue in the past two years.

In their Declaration on the Twentieth Anniversary of the OSCE Framework for Arms Control at the Ministerial Council meeting in Hamburg in 2016, the OSCE Ministers for Foreign Affairs announced the launch of a structured dialogue on the current and future challenges and risks to security in the OSCE area. They did this in recognition of the interrelation between conventional arms control, confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and the wider politico-military context.

Since then, inclusivity, collective ownership and mutual respect for different views in the OSCE area have been the guiding principles of the Structured Dialogue.

Today, five years after the Hamburg Declaration, significant progress has been made in this process.

In the first year, when Germany held the Chairmanship, we began to organize threat perceptions in different clusters so as to give structure to future discussions.

We initiated work on a systematic analysis by military experts of trends in military force postures and their exercises.

This marked the successful start of a series of meetings, which developed over the years into the Expert-Level Workshop. The insights into the annual exchange of military information and the shared wish to make this exchange more informative led to the development of a new instrument, the Information Management and Reporting System (iMARS), available to all participating States.

The subsequent Belgian Chairmanship encouraged the discussion of ideas and initiatives with and between existing formats, but without any duplication, and obtained very positive results.

Among other things, Belgium suggested the consideration of a series of ideas aimed at better understanding threats and risks and ultimately at helping eliminate concerns in an atmosphere of mutual respect.

The fact that it was possible to discuss certain controversial issues in the Structured Dialogue format and then to feed some of the results into other OSCE forums shows that the Structured Dialogue has established a place for itself as a discussion platform alongside existing OSCE formats.

When the Netherlands assumed the Chairmanship of the Informal Working Group, it focused particularly on transparency, risk reduction and incident prevention.

It introduced us to new online tools, such as Mentimeter, that would increase interactivity and spontaneous discussion. Mentimeter allowed concentrated and more technical discussion among experts and led to fruitful political discussion in the Structured Dialogue itself.

The present Spanish Chairmanship has piloted us through troubled waters for almost two years now. The Spanish guiding principle, "Understanding for Security" – listening and reflecting, sharing and learning – aims to re-establish a discussion culture instead of a series of monologues.

Spain has managed successfully to keep the exchange going. The Expert-Level Workshops, whose agendas range from the transparency of military activities and implementation in crisis situations to new verification technologies, could help smooth the way for future adaptations of and pragmatic solutions to our existing regimes.

Madam/Mr. Chairperson,

We thank all previous Chairpersons of the Structured Dialogue for their proactive commitment to this process and their innovative and constructive contributions.

We firmly believe that over the past five years the Structured Dialogue has developed into a substantive, integrative and really creative process supported and fostered by all participating States. The active high-level participation by authorities in the capitals is of particular significance and a clear indication of this ownership of the process. It should be continued at all costs.

We consider it important always to keep in mind the Hamburg mandate, which aims to create an environment conducive to reinvigorating conventional arms control and CSBMs in Europe. To that end, a clear focus on politico-military issues should be maintained, and the determination to preserve, promote, strengthen and further develop conventional arms control and CSBMs in Europe reaffirmed.

In conclusion, I should like to wish Poland, as the future OSCE Chairmanship, every success in the selection of a Chairperson for the Informal Working Group on the Structured Dialogue who is willing and able to continue to foster respectful discussion and to take over the baton from the Spanish Chairmanship and further strengthen the Structured Dialogue.

Thank you.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



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Original: ENGLISH

**83rd Joint Meeting of the FSC and the PC** FSC-PC Journal No. 70, Agenda item 1

#### STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF LITHUANIA

Excellencies, Colleagues,

Lithuania fully aligns itself with the statement by the European Union. However, allow me to add a few remarks from our national perspective.

Lithuania continues to support the Structured Dialogue as a platform for discussing arrangements that could be conducive to improving conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) in the OSCE area, and to fostering greater understanding of current and future challenges and risks to security.

In our view, both objectives are closely interlinked. Without discussions on the broader politico-military context and on risk and threat perceptions, it is not realistic to undertake the task of reinvigorating arms control and CSBMs. Similarly, without full implementation in good faith of existing conventional arms control/CSBM agreements and genuine efforts to update and modernize these, specifically the Vienna Document, it is difficult to restore trust among the OSCE participating States – a prerequisite for considering the adoption of any new measures.

As far as Lithuania is concerned, the Structured Dialogue should remain an open and inclusive State-driven process, in line with the letter and the spirit of the mandate formulated in the 2016 Ministerial Council Declaration "From Lisbon to Hamburg". We are ready to continue discussing politico-military issues and broader security challenges and threats that are of relevance to the participating States – both existing and emerging challenges, and both conventional and subconventional, or hybrid, threats, as we call them.

Discussions on the security implications of the COVID-19 pandemic, of climate change and of hostile actions below the threshold of military conflict (such as disinformation, the instrumentalization of irregular migration and cyberattacks) are essential to understand today's complex security environment. Omitting such topics would render us unable to address them properly. Therefore, for the sake of greater understanding, we should use the platform provided by the Structured Dialogue to engage in open and frank discussions, even on topics that we may disagree on.

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Lithuania appreciates highly the untiring efforts of the committed and professional Spanish team during these past two years. Despite the unprecedented challenge posed by the global pandemic, the Spanish Chairmanship of the Informal Working Group on the Structured Dialogue ably guided our work at both the political and the military expert level. Ambassador Valdés, we sincerely thank the delegation of Spain for its dedication in leading the Structured Dialogue.

I would kindly ask for this statement to be attached to the journal of the day.

Thank you.



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**ENGLISH** 

Original: RUSSIAN

83rd Joint Meeting of the FSC and the PC

FSC-PC Journal No. 70, Agenda item 1

# STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Distinguished Co-Chairpersons,

We are grateful for the convening of this joint meeting of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation and the OSCE Permanent Council, which provides an opportunity to take stock of the activities of the Informal Working Group (IWG) on the Structured Dialogue in the current year. We thank the distinguished Ambassador Cristóbal Valdés and the Spanish Chairmanship team for preparing an informative report reflecting the main thrusts of the discussions.

The past two years have not been easy ones for the Structured Dialogue. However, despite the initial plans being restricted by the COVID-19 pandemic, the Spanish Chairmanship has been able to make a significant contribution to maintaining the viability of the Structured Dialogue and developing it as a unique platform for professional dialogue on the politico-military aspects of European security. We commend these efforts and expect the next IWG Chairmanship, in a spirit of continuity, also to be guided by the principles of openness, balance and a focus on concrete results, helping to create the necessary conditions for revitalizing conventional arms control and confidence- and security-building measures. We are convinced that this is what the Structured Dialogue is all about.

It should be recalled that at all stages our country has taken the position that the Structured Dialogue is inseparable from the pan-European political process. Therefore, when participating in Structured Dialogue meetings, we take into account the wider politico-military realities in the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian area. Unfortunately, they are not encouraging.

The NATO countries continue their politicized aggressive campaign against Russia aimed at ratcheting up tensions and demonstrating the "need for collective defence". We follow reports about calls by the "European grandees" for the United States of America not to abandon the idea of a pre-emptive strike when reviewing its nuclear doctrine. In the meantime, there has been an increase in the equipment and combat readiness of US and Allied Forward Presence units in Poland, the Baltic countries, Romania and Bulgaria. And references to their "rotational" nature are used to circumvent NATO's commitments under the 1997 Founding Act not to deploy "substantial combat forces" on the territory of the new

members of the Alliance. In addition to the multinational contingent on Russia's borders, the Polish Government plans to double the size of its national armed forces to counter imaginary threats.

In view of the growing tensions in Europe, our Western partners should not get carried away with the rhetoric that they are stoking up with regard to our country, but rather look at the real situation and the extent to which these actions "on the ground" are in the fundamental interests of the European countries, and indeed of the United States.

So far, the outcome of the Structured Dialogue meetings demonstrates a paradoxical situation. A number of participating States are categorically opposed to proceeding to an objective search for practical measures to de-escalate tensions. Instead, we are invited to discuss the security implications of climate change, even to the point of developing some vague voluntary initiatives. The Russian delegation has no intention of taking part in this discussion. We believe that the problems of climate change and new challenges should be addressed in the relevant forums.

This raises the question as to whether our colleagues really cannot see the wood for the trees. Are they going to keep on waiting for the bell to toll, announcing to everyone that we are in serious trouble? Or would it be better, instead of waiting for that to happen, to stop going around in circles and sit down at the negotiating table in order to de-escalate the situation, building on previous positive experience and taking into account the possible contributions of each State?

For us, the key problem underlying the present crisis of confidence is obvious, namely the choice in favour of a "closed" security architecture rather than the development of pan-European institutions, and the disregard for the principle of the indivisibility of security. As long ago as 1990, the Charter of Paris envisaged the task of building a unified, free and peaceful Europe. However, NATO decided that this should be done by expanding its ranks, arguing that such expansion, which is now being suited up "in armour", would improve the security of all. Let me remind you as well that the initiative to scale down military-to-military contacts did not come from our country.

As for the US claims that there is no other way of improving the security situation in Europe apart from the modernization of the Vienna Document 2011, I should like to say that they are deeply mistaken. Sooner or later a new format will be created. And there will be no modernization of the Vienna Document 2011 as long as NATO, and above all the United States, try to threaten Russia on land, in the air and at sea. We are not the ones sending warships to the Gulf of Mexico. It is the US and NATO that are barging into the Black Sea. We are keeping them closely in our sights.

Have no illusions, ladies and gentlemen. The responsibility for the ill-intentioned degradation of security in Europe rests with you, no matter what you say. This is obvious.

Under these circumstances, we suggest that more rational use should be made of the resource in the form of meetings of the Structured Dialogue, which is valuable as a platform for fact-based expert discussion and as an opportunity for consideration by military practitioners of ways of developing specific measures for reducing military risks. We are in

favour of continuing these efforts with a focus on meetings of military specialists on the subject of de-escalation of tensions in Europe.

Thank you, distinguished Co-Chairpersons. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the meeting.



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Original: ENGLISH

**83rd Joint Meeting of the FSC and the PC** FSC-PC Journal No. 70, Agenda item 1

STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF LATVIA

Distinguished Chairpersons,

Latvia fully aligns itself with the statement delivered on behalf of the European Union. Nevertheless, I would like to add some thoughts in my national capacity.

Please allow me to extend my congratulations to Ambassador Valdés on assuming the position of Chairperson of the Informal Working Group on the Structured Dialogue, and to thank him for providing a report on the Informal Working Group's activities in 2021 to date that reflects the richness of the discussions held throughout the year.

We agree that the Structured Dialogue is a confidence- and security-building measure in itself that allows us to address our differences and our commonalities. Dialogue, by its nature, should remain an ongoing and open-ended process, in which all parties engage on all subjects.

In today's challenging security environment, the OSCE Framework for Arms Control, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 1996, is as relevant as ever. In our view, the negative trends concerning the co-operation, transparency and predictability have emerged not because of a lack or absence of norms or established principles, but because of the behaviour of a certain participating State. Arms control continues to depend on political will to respect and implement in good faith the existing norms and commitments: there is no need to reinvent these.

The Vienna Document is one of the most important instruments in the OSCE's politico-military toolbox. It presents a broad range of measures that can be used to provide and promote e transparency, military predictability and stability, risk reduction and the prevention of military incidents. Let me reiterate that the full and faithful implementation by participating States of their obligations under the Vienna Document is of paramount importance. The best way to enhance military transparency, begin to rebuild trust and reaffirm the role of conventional arms control is through modernization of the Vienna Document. We call on all the participating States to engage, in good faith and in a professional, non-politicized manner, on negotiations on this modernization process.

#### Esteemed Chairpersons,

The Structured Dialogue enables us to discuss politico-military aspects as well as new risks to security. Alongside the selective implementation of existing international obligations, hybrid methods of warfare are being employed with increasing frequency. Like many other countries, we regard hybrid threats as real and relevant security concerns that should be discussed within the Structured Dialogue format.

These threats are multidimensional, cross-border and cross-domain. We cannot ignore malign activities, including disinformation, cyberattacks, the exploitation of energy dependencies and other asymmetric threats of increasing complexity, such as one participating State's deliberate and targeted use of migrants to inflict damage on its neighbouring States. Such condemnable actions amplify existing mistrust, contribute to misperceptions and the deterioration of confidence between countries, and undermine our joint efforts to promote stability and security.

I will conclude by reminding delegations that the OSCE can contribute to strengthening the resilience of participating States to hybrid threats – above all, by ensuring that all the participating States implement fully and in good faith the fundamental principles of the Organization and respect the commitments they have already undertaken.

To respond to the statement just delivered by the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation, I would like to underline that NATO's multinational battlegroups in the Baltic States and Poland are defensive and proportionate, well below any reasonable definition of "substantial combat forces". NATO's enhanced Forward Presence was established as a response to the Russian Federation's aggression against its neighbours in 2014. NATO itself is a defensive alliance whose purpose is to protect its member countries and not to attack any neighbouring State.

I kindly request that this statement be attached to the journal of today's meeting.

Thank you.