



Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

LOCAL ELECTIONS

6 October 2024

ODIHR Election Observation Mission Final Report



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	1
II.	INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	4
III.	BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT	5
IV.	LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM.....	6
V.	ELECTION ADMINISTRATION.....	8
VI.	VOTER REGISTRATION.....	11
VII.	CANDIDATE REGISTRATION	13
VIII.	CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT	14
IX.	CAMPAIGN FINANCE.....	16
X.	MEDIA	18
	A. MEDIA ENVIRONMENT.....	18
	B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE MEDIA	19
	C. ODIHR EOM MEDIA MONITORING	20
XI.	ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION	21
XII.	ELECTION OBSERVATION.....	23
XIII.	ELECTION DAY.....	24
	A. OPENING AND VOTING.....	24
	B. CLOSING AND COUNTING	25
	C. TABULATION AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESULTS	26
XIV.	POST-ELECTION DAY DEVELOPMENTS	26
XV.	RECOMMENDATIONS	27
	A. PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS	28
	B. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS	28
	ANNEX I: ELECTION RESULTS.....	31
	ANNEX II: LIST OF OBSERVERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTION OBSERVATION MISSION	37
	ABOUT ODIHR	42

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Following an invitation to observe the 6 October 2024 local elections, and in accordance with its mandate, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) established an Election Observation Mission (EOM) on 30 August. The ODIHR EOM assessed the compliance of the election processes with OSCE commitments and other standards for democratic elections, as well as domestic legislation. For election day, the ODIHR EOM joined forces with delegations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (the Congress) and the European Parliament (EP) to form an International Election Observation Mission (IEOM).

In its Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions issued on 7 October, the IEOM concluded that the elections “were competitive and efficiently managed, but there were insufficient efforts to generate public engagement. The elections took place in an environment lacking social and political cohesion. As long-lasting negotiations among political parties to introduce needed reforms failed, the High Representative imposed extensive amendments that enhanced the integrity of the process. The election administration worked professionally, but the short timeframe to implement the new tasks, coupled with inadequate resources, placed a significant burden on them and left some important provisions unfulfilled. Contestants were able to campaign freely and provided voters with distinct alternatives, albeit along ethnic lines. The limited media coverage negatively impacted voters’ opportunity to make an informed choice. The media and journalists are increasingly targeted by political and legal pressures. Efforts to enhance women’s active participation have not yielded tangible results, and women were underrepresented as candidates, in particular in mayoral races, and throughout the campaign. Voters’ and contestants’ right to effective remedy was not fully guaranteed, with a large number of cases unresolved by election day. Due to heavy flooding and landslides, elections were postponed in five municipalities, affecting some 63,000 voters. Election day was calm but impacted by concerns regarding the secrecy of the vote and procedural shortcomings.”

The legal framework overall provides a solid basis for the conduct of democratic elections. Still, several priority ODIHR recommendations remain outstanding, and certain provisions, including some of the newly introduced ones, require revision to eliminate inconsistencies, be fully implementable, and to be brought into compliance with international standards. The High Representative and other domestic and international actors repeatedly called on local political stakeholders to collaboratively adopt the necessary changes to ensure the integrity of elections, but due to lack of political will, no consensus was reached on the comprehensive electoral reform. While preceded by a not fully consultative process, the amendments imposed by the High Representative in March 2024 introduced important integrity safeguards and confidence building measures and further strengthened some aspects of the electoral process, addressing many longstanding ODIHR recommendations.

The Central Election Commission (CEC) and nearly all Municipal Election Commissions (MECs) administered the technical aspects of the electoral preparations efficiently and professionally and generally enjoyed the confidence of stakeholders. However, the amendments introduced shortly before elections placed a significant burden on the CEC and tested its capacity, in particular, the revised rules for appointment of Polling Station Commission (PSC) presidents and deputy presidents,

¹ The English version of this report is the only official document. An unofficial translation is available in Bosnian, Croatian and Serbian.

who under recent amendments cannot be politically affiliated. The CEC held regular public sessions, but most discussions took place outside the formal CEC sessions, and not all of its decisions were published in full, reducing transparency of the decision-making process. As provided by the 2024 amendments and with financial assistance from the donor community, the CEC implemented four Information and Communication Technology (ICT) pilot projects. The technology was introduced gradually and the pilots were tested before election day. Voter education efforts were inclusive but limited due to insufficient financial and human resources, and opportunities to reach out to wider audiences through online social networks were underutilized.

Citizens of at least 18 years old and with permanent residency in Bosnia and Herzegovina have the right to vote, except those convicted of a serious crime and those declared incapacitated by a court decision, including on the basis of intellectual and psychosocial disability; the latter is contrary to OSCE commitments and international standards. Some 3.4 million voters were eligible to vote. The CEC made continuous efforts to update the register. Nevertheless, several ODIHR EOM interlocutors expressed concerns regarding the accuracy of the voter registration data as the mechanism for removing deceased citizens and persons who have left the country from local civil registration databases does not provide for complete accuracy of the voter registration data. Voters had sufficient opportunities to verify their data. The proof of residency requirement and lack of awareness impacted on the right to participate of the Roma minority.

Candidate registration was inclusive, efficient and conducted in a transparent and timely manner. Following the 2024 amendments, individuals convicted by an international or domestic court of the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes cannot stand or hold any elected, appointed or other public office. Candidates could stand on a party or coalition list, independently, or on a list of independent candidates. The CEC certified a total of 296 political subjects; overall, 26,089 candidates contested these elections. For the first time, the submissions were done exclusively in electronic form, significantly facilitating the verification and registration process.

Contestants could campaign freely, and the fundamental freedoms of assembly and expression were respected in the overall low-key campaign. The 2024 amendments prohibit any type of early campaigning, including online, and the CEC imposed numerous fines for such activities. Misuse of administrative resources persisted notwithstanding 2024 amendments aimed at tackling it. While some parties identify as multi-ethnic or 'civic', in practice the campaign focused mainly on competing for intra-ethnic rather than inter-ethnic support. Overall, campaign discourse focused more on local issues than national concerns. Some political leaders' rhetoric dwelled on and aggravated wartime trauma and fears the country could once again be violently divided. The tone of the campaign online of monitored political actors largely ranged from neutral to positive and there were no indications these actors were involved in any systematic effort to spread disinformation and hate speech.

Efforts to achieve more balanced gender representation in elected and appointed bodies have not been sufficient as women continue to be under-represented in public and political life. Furthermore, the need to address the barriers of the frequent use of misogynic language and gender-specific attacks and threats remains. While a total of 42 per cent of the candidates were women, not all candidate lists complied with the 40 per cent gender requirement and only 29 of the 386 (some 8 per cent) mayoral candidates were women, with only 8 women candidates elected as mayors. The legal requirements for the CEC and MECs to have at least 40 per cent representation of each gender were also not consistently met. The 2024 amendments aim to promote gender equality during campaigning, including in the media; however, this reform did not have a tangible impact on the visibility of women candidates in campaign events as observed by the ODIHR EOM.

The legislation prescribes limits for campaign donations and expenditures, but prior ODIHR recommendations related to proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for violations and effective

campaign finance oversight remain only partially addressed, limiting transparency and accountability. The 2024 amendments increased monetary sanctions for campaign finance violations to achieve a dissuasive effect, but at the same time, spending limits, which are calculated on the basis of number of registered voters, are unrealistically low in some municipalities, resulting in the potential for disproportionate sanctions. In line with a prior ODIHR recommendation, the 2024 amendments introduced interim campaign finance reporting; however, the CEC decided not to publish the reports before election day, due to lack of time and resources, adversely impacting transparency. Not all contestants submitted their interim campaign finance reports.

While the media environment is pluralistic, verbal attacks and threats against journalists, and the strategic use of defamation lawsuits by politicians, have had a chilling effect and undermined the media's ability to operate freely. The state public broadcasters' viability is jeopardized by ongoing severe underfunding. Campaign coverage in the news and political programmes of major media outlets was limited. Further, the broadcast media regulator failed to address evident bias by the Republika Srpska's public broadcaster, as evidenced by the ODIHR EOM media monitoring. This combined with an increased vulnerability of media to political pressure and the division of media along ethnic lines, provided the voters with only partial information on the main contestants, reducing their opportunity to make an informed choice. However, public broadcasters met their legal obligation to provide contestants with free airtime. The broadcast media regulator did not conduct any media monitoring, despite previous ODIHR recommendations, and a self-regulatory oversight body only has limited capacity to oversee online and print media content. In a welcome development, some local media as well as the most popular national online portal organized debates, but not all invitees used the opportunity to participate.

The law provides for administrative and judicial remedy of election disputes, but notwithstanding the 2024 amendments, the transparency and effectiveness of dispute resolution remained limited. The exemption of important decisions from judicial review is not in line with OSCE commitments. The CEC handled some 600 cases, mostly related to early campaigning, misuse of administrative resources, and the composition of PSCs. In line with a prior ODIHR recommendation, deadlines for considering complaints by election commissions were extended. However, the CEC did not manage to meet the extended deadlines in a majority of cases, with some 480 cases pending as of election day. A CEC complaints database partially addressed a prior ODIHR recommendation, but publication of decisions on complaints is not explicitly required by law, limiting transparency. The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina reviewed some 200 appeals against CEC decisions on complaints, upholding most CEC decisions, but it did not hold public hearings on election-related disputes.

The law provides for election observation of all stages of the electoral process by citizen and international observers, as well as by observers appointed by political subjects. The 2024 amendments state explicitly that observers must have access to conduct effective observation. Accreditation of observers was inclusive, and a total of 47,347 observers representing 60 organizations were accredited. The main citizen observer group *Pod Lupom* conducted long-term and short-term observation and was active in all 143 municipalities.

Election day was calm, and procedures were overall followed, but the secrecy of the vote was often compromised due to the inadequate layout of the voting premises and the placement of polling booths. Women constituted 51 per cent of PSC members in polling stations observed and chaired 52 per cent of PSCs in these polling stations. IEOM observers assessed the voting process negatively in 7 per cent of polling stations observed and noted several instances of serious irregularities indicating pressure on voters and attempts to unduly influence them as to who to vote for, as well as procedural shortcomings such as group and proxy voting. In a relatively high number of polling stations observed where ICT projects were piloted, IEOM observers noted intermittent issues with the proper functioning of the technology, or voters having difficulties using it, resulting in delays. Despite a

legal requirement, more than one half of polling stations observed did not provide for independent access for voters with physical disabilities. The majority of counts observed by IEOM observers was assessed positively overall, with negative assessments mainly due to lack of adherence to prescribed procedures and procedural errors. IEOM observers noted that a significant majority of PSCs observed had problems completing the results protocol. The tabulation was assessed positively at all but three of the 62 MECs observed. However, conditions for processing of protocols were assessed as inadequate in nine MEC premises where IEOM observers observed the tabulation, due to insufficient space or inadequate layout, overcrowding, or poor organization.

Following election day, the CEC ordered the recount of 363 polling stations in 63 municipalities. It also began a detailed comparison of the manually entered results and the results transmitted electronically by ballot scanners and ordered recounts where discrepancies were identified. The elections in the municipalities of Fojnica, Kiseljak, Konjic, and Kreševo, which had been postponed due to floods and landslides, were held on 20 October, and in Jablanica, which had been most affected, on 3 November.

This report offers recommendations to support efforts to bring elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina closer in line with OSCE commitments, international obligations and standards for democratic elections. Priority recommendations relate to reviewing the electoral legal framework to address shortcomings and eliminate inconstancies through an open consultative procedure in advance of the next elections, addressing outstanding ODIHR recommendations, lifting restrictions to the right to vote based on intellectual or psychosocial disability, enhancing the secrecy of the vote, improving campaign finance regulations, taking additional steps to ensure equal representation of women, decriminalizing defamation, and enhancing the effectiveness of election dispute resolution. ODIHR stands ready to assist the authorities to further improve the electoral process and to address the recommendations contained in this and previous reports.

II. INTRODUCTION AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Following an invitation to observe the 6 October 2024 local elections and in accordance with its mandate, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) established an Election Observation Mission (EOM) on 30 August. The mission, led by Corien Jonker, consisted of a 14-member core team based in Sarajevo and 20 long-term observers (LTOs) deployed on 6 September to 10 locations around the country. The ODIHR EOM remained in the country until 13 October.

For election day, the ODIHR EOM was joined by delegations of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe (the Congress) and the European Parliament (EP) to form an International Election Observation Mission (IEOM). Each of the institutions involved in the IEOM has endorsed the 2005 Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation. Carla Dejonghe was the head of the Congress delegation, and Lucia Annunziata led the EP delegation. On election day, 240 observers from 37 countries were deployed, including 202 observers deployed by ODIHR, as well as a 25-member delegation by the Congress and a 13-member delegation by the EP. Women accounted for 53 per cent of IEOM observers.

The ODIHR EOM assessed the compliance of the electoral process with OSCE commitments, other international obligations and standards for democratic elections, as well as domestic legislation. This final report follows a Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions which was released at a press conference in Sarajevo on 7 October.²

² See the previous ODIHR election-related [reports](#) on Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The ODIHR EOM wishes to thank the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina for the invitation to observe the elections, and the Central Election Commission for their assistance. The ODIHR EOM also expresses its appreciation to other state, entity, and local institutions, political parties, media and civil society organizations, representatives of the international community and other interlocutors for sharing their views and for their co-operation.

III. BACKGROUND AND POLITICAL CONTEXT

On 8 May 2024, in line with the law, the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Bosnia and Herzegovina announced local elections for 6 October. Voters were called upon to elect mayors and members of municipal legislatures.

According to the Constitution, established by the 1995 General Framework Agreement for Peace, commonly known as the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), the country consists of two entities: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska.³ The Constitution grants the status of “constituent peoples” to Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Citizens may also declare themselves as “Others”, either by identifying with another ethnic group or by choosing not to affiliate with any group.⁴ The DPA also established the Office of the High Representative (OHR), an international body charged with overseeing the implementation of civilian aspects of the peace settlement.

Following repeated unsuccessful attempts by the political parties to agree on constitutional and electoral reforms, the High Representative imposed extensive amendments to the electoral legal framework on 26 March 2024 (see *Legal Framework*).⁵ On 21 March, the European Council decided to green-light the start of European Union (EU) accession negotiations with Bosnia and Herzegovina once all relevant steps set out in the European Commission’s recommendations of 12 October 2022 have been taken, a significant step towards a longstanding foreign policy goal. On 23 May, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution designating an annual commemoration of the genocide in Srebrenica; the day before, the Republika Srpska’s National Assembly (RSNA) demanded that the resolution be withdrawn. Reacting in particular to the High Representative’s March 2024 reforms, Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik, who is on trial before the state Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina for failing to implement the High Representative’s decisions, took a series of steps challenging the constitutional order of Bosnia and Herzegovina.⁶

³ In addition, the Brčko District holds special status as a unit of local self-government under direct state sovereignty. Each of the two entities has its own distinctive ethnic composition and a wide degree of autonomy, including its own constitution, political structure, governing institutions, administrative, and judicial bodies.

⁴ The Law on the Protection of the Rights of Members of National Minorities recognizes 18 national minorities: Albanians, Austrians, Czechs, Germans, Hungarians, Italians, Jews, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Poles, Roma, Romanians, Russians, Ruthenians, Slovaks, Slovenians, Turks, and Ukrainians. According to data from the 2013 census, “Others” account for 2.73 per cent of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina; 0.71 per cent did not declare a nationality and 0.18 per cent did not answer. Roma are the largest minority according to the 2013 census with 12,583 persons declaring themselves as such.

⁵ The High Representative had previously imposed a series of changes to the Election Law in June and July 2022 in the time leading up to the 2022 general elections and on election day, 2 October 2022, itself (immediately after the close of polls). Among these legal amendments was the introduction of a definition of intolerant and inciteful language that qualifies as hate speech (hereinafter when this report refers to hate speech it is in reference to this legal definition).

⁶ In April 2024, Republika Srpska adopted a separate election law (see *Legal Framework*). On 23 May, Republika Srpska authorities announced they would deliver a proposal for “peaceful dissociation” to the Federation by the end of June. On 8 June, Republika Srpska President Milorad Dodik attended an ‘All-Serb Assembly’ in Belgrade, which proposed a declaration on the “protection of ethnic and political rights and common future of the Serb people”, subsequently passed by the RSNA on 2 July. On 4 July, the RSNA adopted Serbia’s national anthem and coat of arms as its own.

Most major political parties have traditionally targeted their appeals to a single constituent people, although several parties have professed to take a multi-ethnic ‘civic’ approach to the electorate.⁷ At the state level, governance has largely remained at an impasse, with the main political parties pursuing parochial interests at the expense of those of the broader public.⁸ Nevertheless, prior to the EU decision to open accession talks pending Bosnia and Herzegovina’s fulfillment of certain preconditions, the country implemented laws on preventing conflicts of interest in its institutions and on money laundering. The elections took place in a climate of public disillusionment with the process and the political situation more generally.⁹

Women continue to be under-represented in public and political life, notwithstanding the temporary special measures set by the 2003 Law on Gender Equality and electoral quota requirements, and authorities did not sufficiently attempt to address longstanding gender bias. Several ODIHR EOM interlocutors noted that the prominence of misogynistic language and the volume of gender-specific attacks and threats in public discourse discourage women from becoming politically active or prompted them to leave politics. In the current state and entity legislatures, women comprise between 17 and 28 per cent of the elected members. In the last local elections, only 5 women (in 140 directly elected contests) were elected mayors, and 618 were elected to municipal legislatures (19.6 per cent of total members).

Relevant authorities should take additional steps to enhance women’s participation. Political parties should identify and address barriers to women’s active participation, including by conducting gender audits and adopting plans to address internal culture and practices hindering women’s effective representation within party structures. Legislative bodies at all levels could adopt rules of procedure banning misogynistic behavior, with violations being subject to dissuasive sanctions.

IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND ELECTORAL SYSTEM

Local elections are primarily regulated by the Constitution and the 2001 Election Law (most recently amended in 2024), as well as the 2012 Law on Financing of Political Parties. Bosnia and Herzegovina is party to major international and regional instruments on democratic elections.¹⁰

The Election Law has been amended multiple times, including since the last elections, most recently on 26 March 2024 through an imposition by the High Representative (hereinafter the 2024

⁷ In the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the major political parties are the Alliance for a Better Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina (SBB BiH), the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina (HDZ BiH), the Democratic Front (DF), Our Party (NS), the Party for Democratic Action (SDA), People and Justice (NiP), and the Social Democratic Party (SDP BiH). SDA largely focuses on voters who identify as Bosniak, while HDZ BiH, along with smaller parties, focuses on the Croat electorate. The remaining parties take a multi-ethnic approach. In Republika Srpska, the major parties are the Party for Democratic Progress (PDP), the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), and the Alliance of Independent Social Democrats (SNSD); all three focus on the Serb electorate.

⁸ The ruling coalition at the state level has failed thus far to implement the EU Reform Agenda; as a result no funds from the [EU Growth Plan for the Western Balkans](#) have been released.

⁹ On 27 September, the most prominent citizen observer organization, the Coalition for Free and Fair Elections *Pod Lupom*, [published](#) a recent survey of the public which found that “seven out of ten citizens... believe that elections are not free and fair”.

¹⁰ This includes the [1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights](#), [1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination](#), [1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights](#) (ICCPR), [1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women \(CEDAW\)](#), [2003 UN Convention against Corruption](#), [2006 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities](#) (CRPD), [1950 European Convention on Human Rights](#), and 1994 Council of Europe [Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities](#).

amendments).¹¹ Prior to this, the High Representative and other domestic and international actors repeatedly called on national political stakeholders to collaboratively adopt the necessary changes to ensure the integrity of elections. Nevertheless, no consensus was reached on the overall electoral reform due to a lack of political will.¹² On 19 April, the RSNA adopted its own election law that provided for a new entity-level election commission with exclusive competence over the election process in Republika Srpska. However, according to the Constitutional Court, redistribution of responsibilities vested in state institutions provided for in the law was unconstitutional.¹³

Overall, the legal framework provides a solid basis for the conduct of democratic elections, and the 2024 amendments introduced important safeguards and further strengthened some aspects of the process. The extensive recent changes pertain to all aspects of the process and addressed many long-standing ODIHR recommendations and were generally welcomed by ODIHR EOM interlocutors. In particular, in line with prior ODIHR recommendations, the amendments related to the allocation of funds to the election administration, revised the system of appointment of lower-level election commissions, extended deadlines for consideration of election disputes by election administration, detailed prohibitions against misuse of administrative resources, and made the sanctions for campaign violations more dissuasive.

Certain changes only partially implement ODIHR recommendations, leaving room for further improvement, including those regarding the participation of women and transparency of election dispute resolution.¹⁴ Moreover, several ODIHR recommendations remain unaddressed, including a priority recommendation to lift residency and ethnicity-based restrictions on passive and active suffrage rights for general elections, which would require constitutional changes.¹⁵

The legislator should comprehensively address outstanding ODIHR recommendations, including lifting discriminatory residency and ethnic restrictions on suffrage rights to further align the legal framework with OSCE commitments, international standards, and good practice. Such a revision should be done through an open consultative procedure in advance of the next elections, providing sufficient time for an effective implementation.

Several amendments are not fully harmonized with existing regulations, in particular where different institutions are involved, resulting in inconsistencies within the amended text or with existing

¹¹ The law was later supplemented by [Corrigenda](#) which *de facto* extend the mandates of some CEC members, enabling them to remain in their positions for the 2026 general elections.

¹² For instance, most ODIHR EOM interlocutors mentioned several instances of discussions of election reform, including in Neum in 2022, which did not bear legislative results. State institutions and other interlocutors met by the ODIHR EOM confirmed that continued political disagreements, in particular regarding the representation of ‘constituent peoples’, precluded law-making.

¹³ The RSNA has been repeatedly introducing legislation challenging the authority of state institutions and the OHR. On 27 June 2023, the RSNA adopted a law on non-application of decisions of the Constitutional Court on the territory of Republika Srpska and on the non-publication of decisions of the High Representative in the entity’s Official Gazette.

¹⁴ For example, while amendments aim to increase the participation of women in the campaign, a [recommendation](#) by ODIHR and the Council of Europe’s European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) regarding a system which would ensure a minimal percentage of each gender in elected bodies remains unaddressed. The [2024 CEDAW General Recommendation No. 40](#) requires States parties to “amend the Constitution and legislative frameworks to institutionalize 50:50 parity between women and men in all spheres of decision-making”. Similarly, while ODIHR previously recommended the publication of complaints and decisions, the 2024 amendments only require the CEC to disclose information about complaints and decisions, which resulted in limited transparency as the decisions themselves were not published.

¹⁵ See, among others, European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgements in [Sejdić and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina](#), [Zornić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina](#), [Pilav v. Bosnia and Herzegovina](#), [Šlaku v. Bosnia and Herzegovina](#) and [Kovačević v. Bosnia and Herzegovina](#). The latter case was referred to the ECtHR Grand Chamber on 14 December 2023. The Grand Chamber held a hearing on 20 November 2024 but has not issued a ruling yet.

legislation¹⁶ In the absence of a fully consultative process, bilateral consultative meetings took place between the High Representative and the main stakeholders, including the CEC.¹⁷ Some stakeholders, such as the Appellate Division of the state Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Personal Data Protection Agency were not consulted. Several ODIHR EOM interlocutors opined that introduction of some changes, in particular a limitation on the number of preferential votes, lacked sufficient reasoning and questioned the impact of these changes on the voters' trust and the integrity of the process. Further, some interlocutors perceived the rules on early termination of mandates of elected officials as targeted at certain individuals.

The introduction of the amendments close to the start of the election process, combined with limited financial and human resources, placed a significant burden on the CEC, due to the new range of tasks imposed, which tested its capacity. While overall, the amendments related to technical preparations for election day were implemented efficiently and in a timely manner, other amendments, in particular those related to the campaign, misuse of administrative resources, participation of women, campaign finance, and election dispute resolution, were only partially implemented.

Members of municipal councils (in the Federation) and municipal assemblies (in Republika Srpska) are elected through a proportional representation system, with preferential voting and a 3 per cent legal threshold for the allocation of mandates. The number of councillors varies depending on the number of registered voters.¹⁸ In line with the 2024 amendments, voters may indicate a preference for up to three candidates on the list of their choice, as opposed to the previous unlimited preferential votes, or vote for the list without stating a preference for any candidate.¹⁹ Mayors are directly elected under a plurality system, with the candidate who receives the most votes being elected. The mayors of Sarajevo, Mostar, and Brčko District are indirectly elected by the respective municipal legislatures. Mayors and councillors are elected for four-year terms.

The Election Law regulates the election to municipal councils and assemblies of candidates who belong to the 18 legally recognized national minorities. In municipalities where the total number of people from these minorities represents at least 3 per cent of the total population, at least one seat must be reserved for a national minority representative.

V. ELECTION ADMINISTRATION

Local elections are administered by a three-tiered structure, comprising the CEC, 143 Municipal Election Commissions (MECs), and 5,400 Polling Station Commissions (PSCs). For these elections, the CEC also set up 14 polling stations at diplomatic and consular missions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as 376 mobile voting teams.

¹⁶ For instance, the 2024 amendments provide the CEC with the opportunity to publish excerpts of the voter lists on its website; however, the CEC refrained from doing so due to concerns over personal data protection. While the deadlines for consideration of complaints were extended for the CEC, they remain unaltered for the courts, resulting in the court handling a high number of appeals within tight deadlines (see *Election Dispute Resolution*). Furthermore, the law increased sanctions for violations of expenditure limits, but expenditure limits remain unaltered, resulting in disproportionality between financial violations and penalties (see *Campaign Finance*).

¹⁷ Paragraph 5.8 of the [1990 OSCE Copenhagen Document](#) provides that legislation is "adopted at the end of a public procedure".

¹⁸ Municipalities with less than 8,000 registered voters elect between 11 and 17 members; municipalities with between 8,000 and 20,000 registered voters elect between 17 and 25 members, and municipalities with more than 20,000 registered voters elect between 25 and 31 members.

¹⁹ Previously, the number of preferential votes was not limited. Under the 2024 amendments, if more than three candidates are marked, the list is considered to have received a valid vote, but preferential votes are not taken into account. The first candidates to obtain seats are those with a number of preferential votes of at least 10 per cent of the votes cast for a given list; others are awarded mandates based on their order on the list.

The CEC is a permanent body with a broad mandate to oversee the implementation of electoral legislation.²⁰ In line with the law, the CEC comprises two Bosniak, two Croat, two Serb, and one “Other” member, elected for a term of seven years. The current president represents “Others”.²¹ The CEC administered the technical aspects of the electoral preparations in a professional manner. It operated efficiently, despite the challenges stemming from the late introduction of 2024 amendments, and met most legal deadlines.²² The CEC held regular sessions, which were open to the public and live-stream. However, most items were discussed prior to the public sessions at the CEC members’ ‘collegiums’ and the public sessions mainly focused on adopting decisions, reducing transparency and collegiality of the process. Moreover, not all CEC decisions were published in full (see *Election Dispute Resolution*).

MECs are permanent bodies appointed for a seven-year term by municipal councils and approved by the CEC. They are responsible for overseeing voting and counting in subordinate polling stations and the data entry of preliminary election results. MECs held sessions on an ad-hoc basis, and only about 12 per cent of all MECs published the minutes of their meetings, as observed by the ODIHR EOM. While 79 per cent of all MECs published some electoral information, not all decisions were uniformly posted online, which decreased the transparency of MECs’ work. ODIHR EOM observers overall evaluated MECs as competent and familiar with relevant procedures.²³ The CEC and MECs generally enjoyed the confidence of electoral stakeholders.²⁴

To further enhance transparency of election administration, the CEC and MECs should publish the minutes of their meetings and ensure that all decisions and instructions, including on complaints, are published in a timely manner in full.

PSCs consist of a president and 2 or 4 members (3 or 5 personnel in total).²⁵ In line with previous ODIHR recommendations to enhance the impartiality of the election administration, the new appointment procedures for PSCs require that the presidents and their deputies are not politically affiliated and grant the right to nominate PSC members only to political parties represented in the respective municipal council or assembly. The late introduction of the amendment presented a significant challenge for the CEC, which had to appoint and train PSC presidents and their deputies.²⁶

²⁰ The CEC is appointed by the state House of Representatives upon nominations by the Special Commission for Selection and Nomination of the Parliamentary Assembly, comprising three members from the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council, two members from the Joint Committee of the House of Representatives of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and two CEC members.

²¹ The president is elected by the CEC members from amongst themselves. The law provides that one Bosniak, one Croat, one Serb and one “Other” member each serve a 21-month term as president.

²² The ODIHR EOM noted delays in the appointment of PSC presidents, their deputies, and members. The legal deadline for the recruitment of staff for the CEC and MEC tabulation centers (21 September) was also not met, due to shortage of available personnel.

²³ Between the announcement of the elections and election day, 9.1 per cent of MEC members were replaced, mainly due to the expiration of their mandate. The replacements did not appear to affect the institutional knowledge of MECs.

²⁴ Some stakeholders, however, raised concerns over MECs’ impartiality, due to their appointment by municipal councils or assemblies.

²⁵ The number of PSC members depends on the number of registered voters per polling station. Polling stations with less than 350 voters consist of a president and 2 members, while polling stations with more than 350 voters have a president and 4 members. Each president and all members should have a deputy.

²⁶ The deadline for nominations of PSC presidents and deputy presidents was 22 August. As of 27 September, the CEC had appointed 5,753 presidents and 4,439 deputy presidents to cover 5,400 polling stations. A total of 809 names were removed from the list of candidates for these positions due to links to political parties, of which 340 were candidates in these elections. Among the main reasons identified for insufficient nominations were lack of interest, shortage of qualified persons without political affiliation, and low financial incentives, notwithstanding a recent increase in remuneration. The three-day compulsory training was also cited as a deterring factor for those with full-time jobs. On election day, the CEC had to replace 45 presidents and deputies due to last-minute resignations.

In many cases, the CEC could not find suitable candidates and MECs had to provide staff from their reserve lists, which impacted the perceived independence of PSCs amongst some ODIHR EOM interlocutors. Despite these challenges, PSC trainings were mostly conducted on time, and were assessed as practical, clear, and concise by ODIHR EOM observers.

To further enhance the impartiality and professionalism of the lower-level election administration, in line with the 2024 amendments, and to avoid delays in PSC appointments, the CEC could identify and train PSC presidents and deputy presidents well in advance. In addition to continuous training, a refresher course closer to the elections could take place to ensure adequate preparedness for the elections.

In line with the 2024 amendments and with financial assistance from the donor community, the CEC implemented four ICT pilot projects. The pilots included fingerprint authentication and electronic transfer of polling station election results directly to the CEC (implemented in 65 polling stations in 11 municipalities); optical ballot scanners for ballot counting (145 polling stations in 7 municipalities); and biometric identification of voters at all 138 polling stations in Brčko District. The last project, a video surveillance system, was piloted at 10 polling stations in 5 municipalities, and was funded by the Ministry of Finance.²⁷ The gradual introduction of the technology as well as the testing of the pilots before election day as a means to address challenges ahead of a full implementation are in line with international good practice. Some concerns over the secrecy of the vote were observed by the ODIHR EOM during the testing phase and on election day.²⁸

To ensure effective implementation of ICT in elections, further pilots should continue to be implemented in line with the international good practice and accompanied by the timely allocation of resources, adequate training, and post-election audits on the usability and functionality of ICT.

The legal requirements for the CEC and MECs to have at least 40 per cent representation of each gender were not consistently met. The CEC only has two women among its seven current members (28.5 per cent). While overall, 46 per cent of all MEC members are women, the gender requirement was not met in 24 MECs (16.7 per cent), affecting both genders.²⁹ Out of 143 MECs, 38.5 per cent had a female president. To address gender representation in election administration the CEC appointed two representatives to the Co-ordination Committee on the Implementation of the Gender Action Plan and reports annually to the state Agency for Gender Equality.³⁰ In line with international standards and OSCE commitments, the CEC collected gender-disaggregated data for different aspects of the electoral process and made aggregate figures publicly available for candidates and registered voters, prior to the elections.³¹

Young people were well-represented in the lower-level election administration. Over 50 per cent of MEC members and 44 per cent of MEC presidents were under 30 years old. The 2024 amendments stipulate that accessibility for voters with disabilities shall be taken into consideration when

²⁷ The pilot projects were distributed amongst polling stations in the Federation (197 polling stations), Republika Srpska (130 polling stations), and Brčko District (138 polling stations).

²⁸ During the testing of the optical ballot scanners, there were several instances of ballots not being properly read and subsequently returned to the voter, which jeopardized the secrecy of the vote.

²⁹ Women constituted less than 40 per cent of members in 13 MECs, and men in 11.

³⁰ In October 2023, the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted the [Gender Action Plan](#) for the period 2023–2027. The [Committee for Monitoring the Implementation of the Gender Action Plan](#) was set up by the Council of Ministers in November 2023. The CEC further issued a [Statement of Commitment to Gender Equality](#).

³¹ General Comment 23, paragraph 48 of the [CEDAW](#) notes that “State parties should include statistical data disaggregated by sex”. Paragraph 40.13 of the [1991 OSCE Moscow Document](#) commits participating States to “ensure the collection and analysis of data to assess adequately, monitor and improve the situation of women”. The CEC collected gender-disaggregated data by municipality for registered voters, candidates, the election administration, and accredited observers.

designating polling stations.³² While the Election Law provides for assisted voting by a person of choice and the possibility to vote by mobile ballot box, it does not ensure independent access of persons with disabilities to the ballot box.³³

Voter education was conducted mainly through audiovisual means in local and national media. The CEC posted several educational videos, and set up an X chatbot for voters to find necessary information online. Nevertheless, opportunities to reach out to wider audiences through social networks remained underutilized.³⁴ The CEC and other stakeholders engaged in voter education, pointed to limited financial and human resources of the CEC Center for Education, established under the 2024 amendments, to conduct more widespread voter education activities. The use of sign language and production of easy-to-read materials and materials in Braille would have made voter education more accessible to voters with different disabilities, including hearing-impaired and visually impaired voters.

Continuous efforts should be made in close co-operation with civil society organizations working with persons with disabilities, to ensure persons with disabilities can vote autonomously, including ensuring the premises and layout of polling stations are suitable for independent access and providing electoral information in formats accessible to persons with disabilities, including voters with visual impairments.

In line with the 2024 amendments, the CEC is now authorized to submit a budget request without it being altered by the Ministry of Finance. The CEC also received a supplementary budget to implement the 2024 amendments during the local elections. Nevertheless, according to the CEC the funding for these elections was only approved at the end of July, which negatively impacted CEC planning. The CEC also faced significant challenges with the procurement of transportation services for sensitive materials, as the selected bidders were rejected twice by the public procurement system. With support from the Ministry of Defense, the CEC secured the transportation only on 23 September, six days before the planned deployment of election materials. Furthermore, the budget revisions required to implement some of the new provisions related to the 2024 amendments resulted in 12 MECs having financial challenges ahead of election day.³⁵

To avoid challenges in acquiring electoral goods and services, the CEC should have sufficient financial and organizational resources in place.

VI. VOTER REGISTRATION

Citizens aged 18 or older and with permanent residency in Bosnia and Herzegovina have the right to vote, except those convicted of a serious crime, including war crimes, and those who have been declared legally incapacitated by a court decision, including on the basis of intellectual or

³² In case a polling station is not accessible for voters with disabilities, a special place with a voting booth is arranged for them outside the polling station. Such arrangements are not fully in line with international standards as they create unequal voting conditions for voters with disabilities.

³³ Article 29 of the [CRPD](#) calls the States Parties to "guarantee to persons with disabilities political rights [...], including the right and opportunity for persons with disabilities to vote and be elected, inter alia, by [...] ensuring that voting procedures, facilities and materials are appropriate, accessible and easy to understand and use".

³⁴ The CEC's Communication Strategy recommends launching public campaigns in social media and digital channels. The CEC, however, indicated that it had insufficient resources to fully implement the strategy.

³⁵ A total of 12 MECs (Banja Luka, Bosansko Grahovo, Bugojno, Drvar, Gacko, Kostajnica, Livno, Ljubinje, Sarajevo Novi Grad, Sokolac, Srebrenica, and Velika Kladuša) had not secured sufficient funding for elections by 30 September. The funding gaps resulted from an increase in the salaries of PSC presidents and their deputies, in line with the 2024 amendments.

psychosocial disability. Restrictions of suffrage rights based on mental disability are at odds with OSCE commitments and other international standards.³⁶

To ensure equal suffrage in accordance with international standards, restrictions to the right to vote based on intellectual or psychosocial disability should be reviewed.

In-country voter registration is passive. The law also provides for out-of-country voting, for which voters are required to register electronically anew ahead of each election. The CEC has overall responsibility for the integrity and maintenance of the Central Voter Register (CVR), extracted from the civil register. The accuracy of the CVR, however, depends on the data provided by other institutions responsible for updating the civil register. The CEC made continuous efforts to update the register. Nevertheless, several ODIHR EOM interlocutors expressed concerns regarding the accuracy of the voter registration data as the mechanism for removing deceased citizens and persons who have left the country from local civil registration databases does not provide for complete accuracy of the voter registration data.³⁷

To increase trust in the voter register and improve its accuracy, the authorities should consider conducting a comprehensive audit of the Central Voter Register and the civil register.

For these elections, the CVR was closed on 22 August, with 3,400,204 registered voters, including 44,789 registered to vote abroad; 50.17 per cent of registered voters were women. Voters who turned 18 years old between 23 August and election day were allowed to vote by tendered ballot and were added to the CVR.³⁸ Following these changes, on 10 October, the CEC announced that a total of 3,408,130 voters were included in the CVR. While most ODIHR EOM interlocutors did not raise concerns regarding inclusiveness of the CVR, the ODIHR EOM noted that the proof of residency requirement and lack of awareness negatively impacted on the participation of the Roma minority.³⁹ Internally displaced persons (IDPs) can vote in special absentee polling stations for the electoral unit where they were registered before being displaced. While only a very small number of IDPs registered for these elections, ODIHR EOM interlocutors confirmed that there were no administrative obstacles for IDPs to register. Persons with disabilities, home-bound and hospital-bound voters, and detainees could register to vote by mobile ballot box. A total of 17,465 voters registered for mobile voting by the deadline of 40 days before election day. Some ODIHR EOM interlocutors, including civil society organizations working with persons with disabilities, reported that the early deadline to register for mobile voting and the need to provide medical documentation made the process onerous.

³⁶ See Articles 12 and 29 of the CRPD. See also Paragraph 9.4 of the [2013 CRPD Committee's Communication No. 4/2011](#) which states that "Article 29 does not provide for any reasonable restriction or exception for any group of persons with disabilities. Therefore, an exclusion of the right to vote on the basis of a perceived or actual psychosocial or intellectual disability, including a restriction pursuant to an individualized assessment, constitutes discrimination on the basis of disability".

³⁷ The institutions responsible for updating the population register include municipalities as well as cantonal and entity-level police. The responsibility to report the death of a citizen to the municipality lies with the family of the deceased person, who has to present a printed death certificate to the relevant authorities. Under the Law on Permanent and Temporary Residence of Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the registration and deregistration of permanent residence is a responsibility of the citizens concerned. After conducting checks of the proof of residence and citizenship, the CEC found irregularities in the records of 165 refugees registering for out-of-country voting. The CEC also took several decisions to remove from the CVR persons serving a prison sentence, in line with the Election Law.

³⁸ A tendered ballot is a ballot of identical design and contents as a regular ballot which is placed in a special envelope after voting and is only counted once the voting rights of the person casting the ballot have been verified. It is available to persons who are not on the voter list on election day but who can prove their residency in the respective electoral precinct.

³⁹ A 2014 amendment to the residency law requires proof of residence. A significant number of members of the Roma community do not have proof of residence, therefore lack access to personal identification documents, and cannot be included in the CVR.

Voters can verify their records throughout the year and request correction of their data with the responsible municipal institutions.⁴⁰ The 2024 amendments to the Election Law oblige the CEC to allow public access to the excerpts from the CVR via “its website or any other appropriate means,” while ensuring the protection of personal data.⁴¹ The CEC opted to not make the complete excerpts available on its website citing, among other reasons, personal data protection and website overload concerns. The CEC made the excerpts from the lists available for public scrutiny from 8 June to 8 July at the municipal level. Each voter also had direct access to her or his data through the CEC website. In accordance with the law, political parties could request a copy of the extract from the CVR in the municipality where they had candidates. The CEC informed the ODIHR EOM that almost all parties requested a CVR copy and were provided with one.

VII. CANDIDATE REGISTRATION

The right to stand is granted to citizens with voting rights. Following the 2024 amendments, no person who has been convicted by an international or domestic court of the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, or war crimes may stand as a candidate for election or hold any elected, appointed or other public office.⁴² Candidates for local elections may stand on a party or coalition list, independently, or on a list of independent candidates. A candidate can only run in one constituency and on one list.

Candidate registration is a two-step process. First, the CEC certifies the eligibility of political subjects.⁴³ During this stage, political subjects submit supporting signatures and electoral deposits, amongst other documents.⁴⁴ The certified political subjects can then submit candidate lists.

To be accepted by the CEC, candidate lists must include at least 40 per cent of candidates from the less represented gender, with specific placement requirements.⁴⁵ A total of 42 per cent of the candidates in these elections were women. Notwithstanding the legal requirements regarding candidate lists, equal representation of women was not ensured. In the newly elected municipal councils and assemblies, women account for only 22 per cent of members. Only 29 of the 386 candidates running for mayor were women (8 per cent), including 4 of the 5 incumbent women mayors; 8 women got elected as mayors.

To ensure equal representation of women, additional temporary special measures should be considered.

In line with the 2024 amendments, submissions were done exclusively in electronic form, via a dedicated online platform.⁴⁶ This significantly facilitated the verification and registration process, as the platform enables automatic verification of all supporting signatures but also automatically checks

⁴⁰ One request for correction was submitted to the CEC by a voter from Mostar who requested to vote on the other side of the street (in a different municipality). The CEC rejected this request as the municipality in which a voter votes is based on the permanent residence address.

⁴¹ According to the Agency for Personal Data Protection, the CEC has the right to determine in which form it will make the CVR accessible.

⁴² The CEC informed the ODIHR EOM that the verification is difficult due to the absence of a database of convicted war criminals and that data has to be provided by individual courts and the Ministry of Justice.

⁴³ A political subject is a party, a coalition of parties, an independent candidate or a list of independent candidates registered to participate in the elections.

⁴⁴ Parties and independent candidates must submit 100 signatures from municipalities with less than 10,000 registered voters and 200 signatures for municipalities with more than 10,000 registered voters. Political parties with members holding a mandate in the municipal council or assembly are exempt from the signature collection.

⁴⁵ The Election Law stipulates that at least one candidate of the less represented gender must be placed among the first two candidates, two among the first five candidates, and three among the first eight candidates on each list.

⁴⁶ Political subjects also had to deliver hardcopies of their documentation to the CEC, within the same deadline as for online registration.

the fulfilment of some other requirements, including those related to gender. Nevertheless, ODIHR EOM analysis showed that contrary to legal requirements, 61 lists that did not strictly comply with the 40 per cent gender quota were not rejected. Of these, 59 lists had 8 candidates, out of which 3 were women (37.5 per cent).⁴⁷

To ensure full compliance with the legal provisions in support of equal electoral participation of women, the CEC should strictly enforce the legally prescribed gender quota on all candidate lists and only register lists that comply with the quota.

Candidate registration was inclusive, efficient and conducted in a timely manner. Candidate registration started on 9 May and concluded on 22 August. A total of 296 political subjects were certified, including 110 political parties, 58 coalitions, 76 independent candidates, 43 independent candidates representing national minorities, and 9 lists of independent candidates. A total of 26,089 candidates contested these elections (386 ran for mayor and 25,703 for councillor).⁴⁸ In 12 municipalities, only one candidate stood for election as mayor.

VIII. CAMPAIGN ENVIRONMENT

The campaign was low-key, contestants could campaign freely, and the fundamental freedoms of peaceful assembly and expression were respected.⁴⁹ The 30-day official campaign period began on 6 September and ended on 5 October.⁵⁰ During the official campaign period, authorities are “obliged to ensure the equitable treatment of contestants” in their requests to use public spaces and facilities for campaigning. The law forbids the use of hate speech, broadly defined, as well as spreading disinformation, preventing journalists from performing their duties, and promising financial rewards to voters for their support.

The 2024 amendments also further detail what constitutes misuse of administrative resources and prohibit any type of campaigning, from the day the elections are called until the start of the official campaign period, mandating the CEC to sanction contestants for violation of these provisions.⁵¹ Interlocutors from civil society informed the ODIHR EOM that they had reported a substantial number of suspected violations to the CEC, and they also issued public reports alleging large-scale misuse of administrative resources.⁵² Bosnia and Herzegovina does not have a prohibition on increases in state expenditures during an election period or the introduction of new infrastructure

⁴⁷ In addition, the SNP in Ugljevik registered 11 women and 17 men (39.25 per cent), and the list of independent candidates in Buzim included 1 woman and 4 men (20 per cent). The CEC informed the ODIHR EOM that while deciding on the lists’ validity, it took into account the specific placement requirements rather than the overall 40 per cent gender quota.

⁴⁸ The ODIHR EOM is aware of one appeal, by SDS, in relation to candidate registration (see *Campaign Finance*). The case was resolved within the prescribed deadlines.

⁴⁹ The HDZ 1990 party informed the ODIHR EOM that they had requested access to a municipal space in Mostar but had been told that the space had already been reserved for other uses.

⁵⁰ A campaign silence period, which also applies to campaigning online, went into effect at 07:00 hrs. on 5 October and continued through the close of polls on election day.

⁵¹ During this pre-campaign period, the media are allowed to inform the public about activities of officials, but without mentioning their party affiliation or that they are candidates in the elections.

⁵² Transparency International Bosnia and Herzegovina (TI BiH) reported that in the two months prior to the official start of the campaign, one-time payments to pensioners and other citizens amounted to approximately BAM 53 million (around EUR 27.1 million). Between 6 July and 4 October, TI BiH identified 805 new government infrastructure projects, totaling BAM 601,840,622 (around EUR 307.7 million). Pod Lupom reported that between 22 July and 29 September it had noted 1,367 irregularities, including 372 potential cases of the misuse of administrative resources.

projects, contrary to good practice.⁵³ Although the 2024 amendments are a welcome measure to enhance the level playing field, many ODIHR EOM interlocutors acknowledged that the widespread and long-standing problem of misuse of administrative resources persists; the ODIHR EOM identified some specific and credible allegations in this regard.⁵⁴

To prevent the misuse of administrative resources, consideration should be given to legally defining and prohibiting extraordinary government expenditures from the call of an election, except in the event of a declared state of emergency.

The 2024 amendments also aimed to promote gender equality during campaigning, by calling on political parties to do their utmost to ensure equal promotion of candidates of both genders in media, at public gatherings, and in other forms of campaigning. This reform did not have a tangible impact on the visibility of women candidates. There were no female speakers at 19 of the 43 campaign events observed by the ODIHR EOM, and only one single female speaker at another 11 events, although a majority of these events featured three or more speakers. ODIHR EOM LTOs observed only two campaign events in which speakers focused specifically on gender issues more broadly.

With the start of the official campaign period, contestants used both traditional outreach methods, as well as advertisements on television, websites and social networks, including Facebook and X. While larger campaign events were limited, the ODIHR EOM observed 43 campaign events in various municipalities around the country, all of which proceeded without incident.⁵⁵ Following devastating flooding and landslides in five municipalities on the last full day of the campaign, most major political parties based in the Federation ended their campaigns early.

The existing campaign regulations also apply online. During the official campaign period, the ODIHR EOM followed 63 political actors across *Facebook* and *X*, although only 46 of these were active over the course of the official campaign period.⁵⁶ Follower counts for these actors did not see major shifts during this time. The tone adopted by these actors throughout the campaign largely ranged from neutral to positive. Posts focused to a great extent on promoting contestants, as well as infrastructure and foreign and economic policy, broadly construed. SNSD posted far more frequently than any other actor monitored by the ODIHR EOM, and actors based in the Republika Srpska posted with greater frequency than those based in the Federation. The ODIHR EOM did not detect any systematic effort

⁵³ See paragraph II.B.1.3 of the ODIHR and Venice Commission's March 2016 [Joint Guidelines for Preventing and Responding to the Misuse of Administrative Resources during Electoral Processes](#): “the legal framework should state that no major announcements linked to or aimed at creating a favourable perception towards a given party or candidate should occur during campaigns”.

⁵⁴ On 13 September at an SNSD campaign rally in Banja Luka Mr. Dodik discussed the candidacy of the head of the party’s list for the municipality, a cardiac surgeon at a local hospital, saying: “Someone comes to the surgery and sees the head surgeon... and he voted against him. This is already less chance to stay alive”. Banja Luka Mayor Draško Stanivuković (PDP) provided free bus fare for retirees for the last six months, and during the official campaign period also reportedly promised pensioners whose pension is less than BAM 400 per month (around EUR 205) a ‘friendship card’ which would secure discounts at designated shops. Multiple interlocutors raised concerns about HDZ misusing administrative resources, including official vehicles, and using public employment to pressure the electorate not to support its opposition.

⁵⁵ Twenty-two contestants organized these campaign events: the SNSD (11), SDA (4), and SDP (3), followed by the Democratic People’s Alliance, NiP, NS, PDP, SDS, and the party For Justice and Order (2 each). Another 13 contestants each organized a single observed campaign event. Twenty-six of these events were held in Republika Srpska, 11 in the Federation, and 6 in Brčko District. These events took place in 16 municipalities. Twenty-seven of the events were conducted in Serbian, 12 in Bosnian, 2 in Croatian, and 2 others in multiple languages.

⁵⁶ The ODIHR EOM observed the *Facebook* and/or *X* accounts of 10 parliamentary political parties, 8 political leaders, 34 candidates, 10 ‘influencers’, and the CEC. Candidates were chosen by identifying significant contests and then tracking all candidates participating in a given contest. However, 14 of these 34 candidates did not maintain accounts that could be identified on either *Facebook* or *X*.

to spread disinformation and hate speech via these monitored actors. A small number of posts used inflammatory rhetoric.

Overall, campaign discourse focused more on local issues than national concerns. Some political leaders' rhetoric dwelled on and aggravated wartime trauma and fears the country could again be violently divided.⁵⁷ Although all political party interlocutors identified hate speech as a serious concern in general, some thought the local character of these elections reduced its use, and a small number of isolated incidents were observed by the ODIHR EOM.⁵⁸ Despite the fact that some political parties identify as multi-ethnic or 'civic', in practice the vast majority of campaign activities seemed to focus on competing for intra-ethnic rather than inter-ethnic support. On 4 October, Serbian Prime Minister Miloš Vučević, Serbian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandar Vulin, and Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó participated in the SNSD's closing rally in Banja Luka.

IX. CAMPAIGN FINANCE

Campaign finance is primarily regulated by the Election Law and the Law on Financing of Political Parties.⁵⁹ The legislation provides for private and public financing of electoral campaigns.⁶⁰ Many political parties represented in state and local legislatures informed the ODIHR EOM that they cover most of their campaign expenditures from the funds received from the respective budgets. The law sets limits on donations from individuals as well as legal entities and prohibits funding from certain sources.⁶¹ While the 2024 amendments pertaining to campaign finance aimed at increasing its transparency and accountability, they did not fully address prior recommendations by ODIHR and the Council of Europe's Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), in particular with regard to proportionate and dissuasive sanctions for violations and effective campaign finance oversight.⁶²

For local elections, the spending limits are calculated based on the number of registered voters per municipality and vary widely, from BAM 59.4 (around EUR 30)⁶³ to BAM 58,120.⁶⁴ Many

⁵⁷ On 16 September, Sarajevo Mayor Benjamina Karić (SDP), whose campaign fliers detailed her commitment to improving sewage, local sports stadiums, and medical training, among other matters, placed a tank in downtown Sarajevo, ostensibly to commemorate the state Special Forces. On 17 September, Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina Minister of Internal Affairs Ramo Isak (People's Power; SN) claimed in a press conference to have "prevented a civil war" seven months earlier. On 27 September, the official Facebook account of SDA published a set of pictures of party President Bakir Izetbegović admiring new drones purchased by the state from Türkiye, although Izetbegović had no direct involvement in the purchase.

⁵⁸ On 5 September, in an interview with BiR TV, Chairman of the Herzegovina-Neretva Cantonal Assembly Džafer Alić (SDA) referred to Croats and Serbs as "tenants". On 13 September, at an SNSD rally in the Banja Luka neighborhood of Starčevica, Mr. Dodik described Republika Srpska opposition party PDP using a homophobic slur.

⁵⁹ The laws on political parties of Republika Srpska and the Brčko District and CEC instructions also regulate aspects of campaign finance.

⁶⁰ Political parties are entitled to annual funding from state, entity, cantonal, and municipal budgets, which can be used to finance campaigns.

⁶¹ An individual may donate to a party up to BAM 10,000, a party member up to BAM 15,000, and a legal entity up to BAM 50,000 annually. Donations from foreign, anonymous, and religious sources are prohibited, as are those from publicly funded sources, and from persons who have public procurement contracts exceeding BAM 10,000 in the current year.

⁶² In its 2020 [report](#) concerning political party funding, GRECO expressed disappointment that "no progress has occurred since the Fourth Interim Compliance Report of 2017. Much more needs to be done, inter alia, to harmonise the complex legal framework, promote the use of the banking system for contributions to political parties and increase the financial and personnel resources allocated to the Central Electoral Commission for the supervision of political financing".

⁶³ 1 EUR equals 1.96 BAM.

⁶⁴ The Election Law limits campaign expenditures of a political subject to BAM 0.30 per voter. According to CEC data, 198 voters are registered in the smallest municipality (Istočni Mostar), and 193,734 in the biggest one (Banja Luka).

municipalities have a small number of voters, and consequently, unrealistically low spending limits apply.⁶⁵ Several ODIHR EOM interlocutors opined that the current inflation rate makes it even more difficult to respect the spending limits in small municipalities.⁶⁶ According to ODIHR EOM interlocutors, these low spending limits resulted in contestants circumventing them, including through unreported cash transactions. The 2024 amendments significantly increased monetary sanctions for campaign finance violations; however, as the system of calculating the expenditure limits remained unchanged, penalties imposed for exceeding the spending limits in small municipalities lacked proportionality, at odds with good practices.⁶⁷ In addition, some ODIHR EOM interlocutors were not aware of the recently increased sanctions and expected to pay ‘insignificant’ monetary penalties for exceeding expenditure limits.⁶⁸

The system of calculating campaign expenditure limits could be revised to provide for adequate financing of election campaigns. Sanctions for the violations of campaign finance rules should have a dissuasive effect but at the same time be proportionate to the severity of the violation.

In line with the 2024 amendments, electoral contestants are obliged to open a special bank account for campaign incomes and expenditures. SDS, being subject to US sanctions, was not able to do so and had to register under a different name.⁶⁹ On 19 September, the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina in its final decision stated that the right to participate in elections and political activity must not be jeopardized by sanctions of an economic nature.⁷⁰

The CEC is mandated to oversee political and campaign finance and may impose sanctions for violations, either *ex officio* or based on a complaint.⁷¹ Following the 2024 amendments and in line with a prior ODIHR recommendation, contestants must submit interim financial reports to the CEC. However, the deadline for submission of three days before election day did not provide the CEC with sufficient time to ensure their publication before election day, given its limited capacity.⁷² According to the CEC, on 3 September, reports were submitted by 111 political parties and 157 independent candidates, while 5 political parties and 32 independent candidates did not submit them. According to the submitted reports, 89 parties reported election campaign expenses in the total amount of BAM 8,274,925.93 (around EUR 4,228,620). Twenty-two political parties did not report any campaign expenditures. According to the CEC report, the major portion of the campaign expenditures of

⁶⁵ For example, 198 voters are registered in Istočni Mostar, 226 in Istočni Drvar, and 319 in Kupres (Republika Srpska), which translates to campaign expenditure limits of BAM 59.40, BAM 67.80, and BAM 95.70, respectively.

⁶⁶ For instance, ODIHR EOM interlocutors stated that the prices for billboards have doubled since the 2022 elections.

⁶⁷ Article 16 of the [Council of Europe Recommendation Rec\(2003\)4 of the Committee of Ministers](#) requires sanctions for the breach of campaign finance rules to be proportional to the gravity of violations. Paragraphs 272-274 of the [2023 ODIHR Guidelines on Political Party Regulations](#) stress that sanctions must bear a relationship to the violation and respect the principle of proportionality.

⁶⁸ The applicable sanctions were increased up to BAM 30,000. The CEC confirmed that low expenditure limits were previously exceeded as contestants considered the sanctions to be insignificant.

⁶⁹ The party subsequently submitted its registration documents under the name “SDS–Will of the People” and was registered by the CEC under that name.

⁷⁰ As a result of the Constitutional Court decision, SDS also remained registered under its original name, without a special bank account, in one municipality. The Constitutional Court did not elaborate how the appellant would finance its election campaign in a manner consistent with the law.

⁷¹ The 2024 amendments oblige all state, entity, cantonal, and municipal institutions to co-operate with the CEC to provide all data, information and documents required for the effective verification of data accuracy.

⁷² The CEC informed the ODIHR EOM that it only has five employees to process the interim and final reports of all 296 political subjects who registered to participate in these local elections. Paragraph 263 of the [2023 ODIHR Guidelines on Political Party Regulations](#) states that “transparency in reporting requires the timely publication of parties’ financial reports; the reports need to remain public for an appropriate amount of time, to allow for proper public scrutiny. The fulfilment of this requirement means that reports need to contain enough details to be useful and understandable for the general public and can be facilitated through digitalization of the process”.

political parties and independent candidates was spent on billboards and other printed campaign materials as well as paid advertisement, including online. The most expensive campaigns were conducted by SDP, SDA and SNSD. The published information about campaign expenditures was not disaggregated by municipality.

To increase transparency of campaign finance, deadlines for submission and publication of interim campaign finance reports should ensure timely publication prior to election day. To guarantee voters' informed choice, the information about campaign incomes and expenditures for each electoral competition in each municipality should be made available to voters.

The final campaign finance reports are to be submitted within 30 days following the publication of the final election results and should be published on the CEC website within 30 days of receipt. Non-compliance with reporting requirements may result in the de-registration or revocation of mandates. While the new provisions contribute to greater transparency and accountability, they further increased the responsibility and workload of the CEC whose capacity, as well as human and technical resources, presented a challenge to conducting an effective and timely oversight of campaign finance.

The capacity of the Central Election Commission should be strengthened to enable it to effectively monitor campaign finance.

X. MEDIA

A. MEDIA ENVIRONMENT

There is a pluralistic media environment with a large number of outlets, in particular in the Federation. Online media, including social networks and particularly *Facebook*, are growing in importance. Nevertheless, the dire financial situation of the public service broadcasters, in particular at the state level, is of serious concern.⁷³ Most ODIHR EOM interlocutors alleged far-reaching political influence over many media outlets, noting that the small and underdeveloped advertisement market, which is dominated by state-owned corporations, does not provide for financial sustainability.⁷⁴ At odds with international good practice and previous ODIHR recommendations, the legal framework, does not sufficiently provide for transparency of media ownership, nor does it reflect the rapidly increasing significance of digital media content.⁷⁵

The public broadcasting service is provided by Radio and Television of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*BHRT*) at the state level, as well as by Radio Television of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (*RTFBiH*) and Radio Television of Republika Srpska (*RTRS*) at the entity levels. Underfunding has been a longstanding issue, with past ODIHR recommendations not implemented, highlighting the need to introduce a stable financing system. The existing system of license fees and the subsequent internal redistribution of funds, including advertising revenues, between these three major

⁷³ Reporters Without Borders recently significantly downgraded the country's press freedom status (from 64th to 81st place out of 180 countries being measured), see [Press Freedom Index 2024 – Bosnia and Herzegovina](#).

⁷⁴ In June 2024, the state Institute of Metrology of Bosnia and Herzegovina (established by a 2004 law as an independent administrative organization of the Council of Ministers and operating since 2007) announced a new public call for a company to conduct the broadcasting market data measurements. However, the implementation of the call has been significantly delayed, with a start foreseen only at the beginning of 2025. According to various ODIHR EOM interlocutors, this has caused serious market uncertainty, with a negative impact on investments and development of the media sector.

⁷⁵ Paragraph 4.1 of the [CoE Recommendation CM/Rec \(2018\)1](#) of the Council of Europe's Committee of Minister's Guidelines on media pluralism and transparency of media ownership calls on its member states to "promote a regime of transparency of media ownership that ensures the public availability and accessibility of accurate, up-to-date data concerning direct and beneficial ownership of the media".

broadcasters jeopardizes the steady functioning of the *BHRT* in particular.⁷⁶ A mixture of engrained political influence and reluctance to address the public broadcasters' problems not only undermines their credibility and is detrimental to more comprehensive reporting, including on elections, but altogether poses an existential threat to the public service system *per se*.⁷⁷

The existing structure of the public broadcasting service, including its legislative basis, on both state and entity levels, should be reconsidered, with the aim to ensure independent public media broadcasters. A stable, predictable, fair and enforceable system of funding that enables their free operation should be the priority.

The state and entity constitutions guarantee freedom of expression. In July 2023, however, contrary to international standards, defamation was re-criminalized in Republika Srpska,⁷⁸ causing both local and international concern and having a chilling effect on journalists and civil society.⁷⁹ ODIHR EOM interlocutors as well as numerous reports have highlighted an increase in pressure on media and journalists, referring in particular to verbal attacks and threats,⁸⁰ and the use of defamation lawsuits by politicians with the aim to silence media.⁸¹

Defamation should be de-criminalized. Interference with the activities of journalists and media personnel should not be tolerated, and authorities should fulfil their duty to protect the safety of media staff through effective and timely protective measures.

B. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE MEDIA

Media coverage of the election is regulated by the Election Law, including its 2024 amendments, and complemented by a CEC regulation from May 2024. Broadcast media are required to respect the principles of balance and impartiality, in particular in newscasts and other political programmes.

Each public broadcaster must grant at least three minutes of free airtime to each political subject, during the timeslots with the highest viewership. Political subjects may also purchase a maximum of 30 minutes of paid airtime per week in the public media, and a maximum of 60 minutes per week in private media. Public broadcasters met their legal obligation to provide contestants with the prescribed amount of free airtime, and two of the public broadcasters complied overall with the

⁷⁶ [The 2005 Law on the Public broadcasting system of Bosnia and Herzegovina](#) stipulates that 50 per cent of advertising revenues and license fee income (radio-television tax) will be allocated to *BHRT*, while 25 per cent will belong to each entity broadcaster (*RTVFBiH* and *RTRS*). The collection shall take place at the level of entities and then be redistributed to the other entity broadcaster and to state *BHRT*. However, since 2017 *RTRS* has not paid the tax portion that *BHRT* is entitled to, accumulating a debt of a total of some BAM 75 million (approximately EUR 37 million).

⁷⁷ See the 2024 Media Freedom Rapid Response, [Bosnia and Herzegovina – Media freedom in survival mode](#).

⁷⁸ Paragraph 47 of [General Comment No. 34 to Article 19 of the ICCPR](#) calls on States parties to “consider the decriminalization of defamation”. According to the local professional association *BH Novinari*, at least 100 criminal complaints for defamation have been filed since the amendments to the Republika Srpska Criminal Code were adopted in July 2023, and in five cases journalists and editors have been sued.

⁷⁹ See, among others, the [statement](#) by OSCE Representative on Freedom of Media, the [reaction](#) by the Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights, and the [joint statement](#) by the UN, the OSCE Mission, the Council of Europe and the EU Office in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

⁸⁰ See, among others, the 2023 [statement](#) by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the EU [Bosnia and Herzegovina Report 2023](#). *BH Novinari* disclosed 87 cases of threats and attacks in 2023, while there were some 40 such cases in first six months of 2024.

⁸¹ As of 2023, a network of some 35 local prosecutors who should serve as points of contact for journalists in case of threats or intimidation has been gradually established under the auspices of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council and with assistance from the international community. A [web portal](#) with basic information was launched, and in February 2024, a first training for the points of contact was conducted.

requirement to air it during the timeslots with the highest viewership.⁸² Public broadcasters decided not to air any debates, mostly due to the decentralized nature of the elections and the high number of electoral subjects. The most popular online outlet *Klix.ba*, as well as some 25 local media outlets, almost exclusively from the Federation, hosted a series of debates, mostly with mayoral candidates. However, many contesting parties did not prominently feature their women candidates in these debates or in the free addresses, at the detriment of a more balanced gender media representation.⁸³

To further encourage women's participation as candidates, consideration could be given to increase the amount of free airtime available for female candidates and the state funding allocated to them.

C. ODIHR EOM MEDIA MONITORING [ACCESS DETAILED INFORMATION](#)

On 6 September, the ODIHR EOM commenced qualitative and quantitative media monitoring of 7 television channels, 4 online media outlets and 3 newspapers.⁸⁴

EOM media monitoring revealed that both the state public television *BHT-1* and the Federation public broadcaster *FTV* provided only very limited coverage of the election activities of the contestants. Their political and election news coverage was by and large focused on electoral preparations and the activities of the state, entity and local authorities, which received some 70 per cent combined on each of these two broadcasters. The Republika Srpska public broadcaster *RTRS* gave clear preferential treatment to the entity authorities and SNSD, allotting 11 per cent of the coverage of political and election-related information to the president of Republika Srpska, 14 per cent to the entity government, and 13 per cent to SNSD. The coverage was almost exclusively positive and neutral in tone. Such coverage blurred the distinction between official and campaign activities.⁸⁵

As previously recommended by ODIHR, all public broadcasters should provide impartial coverage in their news and political programmes. The legal provisions on this requirement should explicitly address the coverage not only of registered election contestants but also of public officials who take part in the campaign.

The Communication Regulatory Authority (CRA) is empowered to oversee legal compliance by broadcasters and to apply sanctions. There are no clear deadlines for adjudication of media-related complaints. The CRA, despite repeated ODIHR recommendations, did not conduct media monitoring of the campaign, and it performed its oversight function exclusively based on complaints. Since 8 May, when the elections were called, the CRA received six relevant complaints, all of which were dismissed, two before and four after election day. The CRA failed to address the misuse of advantages of incumbency, in particular the evident bias in the political coverage of public *RTRS*.

⁸² Two public TV broadcasters (state *BHT-1* and Republika Srpska *RTRS*) aired the free addresses around 18:00 hrs. (between 17:40 and 18:00 hrs.), which is considered the beginning of wider primetime. On the other hand, Federation *FTV* broadcast its bloc of free addresses around mid-day (11:30–11:55 hrs.), outside what is considered primetime.

⁸³ While at least one woman participated in 32 out of 103 media debates organized during the campaign, overall, women accounted for only 13 per cent of participants. Women represented parties in 15 per cent of their free addresses aired by the state and entity public media. The 2003 Law on Gender Equality and the 2024 amendments to the Election Law aim to promote gender equality during campaigning, including in the media.

⁸⁴ TV channels were monitored with a focus on their prime-time programming (18:00–24:00 hrs.). In online media and newspapers, their daily politics and election-related sections were monitored. The sample included three public channels, state *BHT-1* (part of *BHTR*), Federation-based *FTV* (part of *RTVFBiH*), and Republika Srpska-based *RTRS*, and four private channels (*BN*, *Hayat*, *Nova BH*, and *NI*). The ODIHR EOM monitored the websites *avaz.ba*, *klix.ba*, *nezavisne.com*, and *radiosarajevo.ba*, as well as the daily newspapers *Glas Srpski*, *Oslobodjenje*, and *Vecernji List*.

⁸⁵ Paragraph 5.4 of the 1990 [OSCE Copenhagen Document](#) provides for a “clear separation between the State and political parties; in particular, political parties will not be merged with the State”.

The law should provide clear deadlines for expeditious adjudication of media-related campaign complaints, including during the campaign period. In addition, the CRA should act upon its own initiative and could be legally mandated to conduct systematic monitoring of broadcasters' compliance concerning impartial political coverage, in particular in the public media.

The monitored private broadcasters *Nova BH*, *NI* and *Hayat TV* all reported on election contestants in a limited manner. Conversely, Republika Srpska-based *BN* provided intensive coverage of political events, mostly in a critical tone. While it focused on the entity authorities (the president and government), allocating them some 18 per cent combined, in a highly negative tone, it also reflected the campaign activities of major contestants. The most covered party was SNSD with 17 per cent, in a similarly negative manner, while some other parties were presented in a more balanced or positive manner, most notably SDS.

The print and online media monitored by the ODIHR EOM, in particular newspaper *Oslobodenje* and online outlet *Klix.ba* and *radiosarajevo.ba*, provided more diverse coverage of the campaign. Of all the monitored outlets, *Klix.ba* gave the highest share to local governments, primarily in the Federation (21 per cent). Some outlets also displayed a clear entity-oriented approach, in combination with partisan editorial policies. The newspaper *Večernji List* dedicated 42 per cent of its election-related coverage to HDZ BiH, mostly in a positive tone. It also gave a combined 32 per cent to authorities of the Federation (20 per cent of which to local authorities), in an overwhelmingly positive and neutral tone. Similarly, *Glas Srpski* gave 16 per cent of mostly positive coverage to SNSD, and 42 per cent, combined, to authorities of the Republika Srpska (28 per cent to entity-level and 14 per cent to local authorities), in an almost exclusively positive and neutral manner.

By law, complaints related to print and online media fall under the mandate of the Press and Online Council, which as a self-regulatory body is dependent on its own resources and capacity. In the course of the campaign period, the Council received 34 complaints. However, only six complaints were resolved by mid-December with violations found in five cases; remaining complaints were still under review. Such a protracted process further reduced any tangible effect of the Council's non-binding decisions.

XI. ELECTION DISPUTE RESOLUTION

The law provides for administrative and judicial remedy of election disputes, but notwithstanding the 2024 amendments, the transparency and effectiveness of dispute resolution remained limited. The exemption of important decisions from judicial review is not in line with OSCE commitments.⁸⁶ Voters and electoral contestants whose rights are violated may file election-related complaints with the election administration. MECs are in charge of complaints related to voter registration and most campaign violations, while the CEC retains competences to handle in the first instance certain campaign violations, including those related to hate speech and misuse of administrative resources, as well as appeals against MEC decisions.⁸⁷ Appeals against CEC decisions are dealt with by the Appellate Division of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Overall, before election day, the CEC received complaints or initiated *ex officio* proceedings in some 2,000 cases, mainly related to early campaigning, misuse of administrative resources, and political affiliations of PSC chairpersons and deputy chairpersons. While the CEC imposed numerous fines

⁸⁶ In particular, the 2024 amendments exempt from appeals CEC decisions on complaints lodged against the appointment of PSC presidents and deputy presidents, which is not in line with OSCE commitments. See paragraph 18 of the 1991 [OSCE Moscow Document](#).

⁸⁷ The 2024 amendments added complaints on misuse of administrative resources to the first-instance competence of the CEC.

for early campaigning, it did not consistently apply sanctions for the misuse of administrative resources, despite numerous reported cases. The 2024 amendments classified campaigning before the official start of campaign as a violation, with a broad definition of early campaigning.⁸⁸ As a result, the CEC received some 600 complaints and *ex officio* proceedings on early campaigning of which it was able to handle only 422; more than 200 were still pending before election day. In over 100 cases, the CEC fined political subjects as well as their supporters, including for social media posts with factual information about candidates, and the publication of lists of prospective candidates on party websites before their registration.⁸⁹

The CEC received some 200 complaints on alleged misuse of administrative resources. The CEC applied few sanctions for misuse of administrative resources, and many ODIHR EOM interlocutors opined that the CEC was reluctant to apply new provisions and the increased fines. According to the CEC, this was, among other reasons, due to insufficient guidance in the Election Law, including on drawing the line between the misuse of administrative resources for campaign purposes and the necessity to ensure the continued functioning of the public administration. The CEC received about 30 complaints alleging hate speech in the election campaign and pre-campaign period and applied sanctions in 4 of these cases, including the highest possible monetary sanction of BAM 30,000 (around EUR 15,337) in one case.⁹⁰ More than 90 cases on the alleged misuse of administrative resources, at least 19 complaints related to the use of hate speech, and about 200 cases of alleged early campaigning were still pending before the CEC on election day, and handled only after. The CEC informed the ODIHR EOM that given its current capacity and the lack of preliminary scrutiny of complaints, the process of consideration of complaints would be significantly delayed. This, combined with the lack of an effective system for the management of the complaint process, created an overload which jeopardized the effectiveness of the remedy.

The system of admission and handling of election-related complaints should be reconsidered to ensure timely and effective legal remedies.

Most complaints handled by MECs were related to party affiliations of PSC presidents and deputy presidents. On the basis of this, as well as *ex-officio* proceedings and appeals to the CEC, 17 PSC presidents and deputy presidents were dismissed or replaced.⁹¹

Implementing a prior ODIHR recommendation, the 2024 amendments extended the deadlines for considering complaints by election commissions from three to five days, without, however, coordinating them with the deadline for courts, which remained unchanged at three days. As a result, the extended timeframe used by the CEC to consider complaints led to an overload of subsequent appeals in courts.⁹² The CEC did not manage to meet the extended deadlines, with some 480 cases pending as of election day.

⁸⁸ Subject to sanctions ranging from BAM 3,000 to 30,000.

⁸⁹ The Court upheld most CEC decisions on substance of early campaigning. For instance, social media posts with public messages such as “Let’s move on” or “Some new winds are blowing in Zavidovići” were regarded as early campaigning and sanctioned. In some cases, citizens who submitted complaints to the CEC requested the application of sanctions for activities such as organizing memorials or mentioning names of candidates in social media posts.

⁹⁰ This fine was applied to HSP BiH (Croatian Party of Rights BiH) for its billboard “Za dom spremni” (“For the homeland – ready”), a salute used by the Ustaša (a Croat fascist organization active during World War II).

⁹¹ The determination of such membership was done largely on the basis of information from social networks. Some 200 candidates for PSC presidents and deputies were removed from the list already at the stage of nomination.

⁹² The 2024 amendments extended the deadlines for handling complaints by election commissions to 72 hours and allowed for a further extension of the deadline by up to 5 days in highly complex cases.

The legal deadlines for consideration of complaints by the election administration and the judiciary should be aligned to ensure timely and effective remedy. All CEC decisions should be subject to judicial appeals.

Partially addressing a prior ODIHR recommendation, the amendments introduced the requirement for the CEC to maintain a database of complaints, but do not explicitly require the CEC to publish decisions and the text of complaints. At the same time, the reasoning for decisions on complaints and the determination of fines were not always clear from the database or from the brief discussions during CEC sessions. This, together with the lack of publication of decisions on complaints, limited the transparency of dispute resolution, contrary to previous ODIHR recommendations.⁹³

According to information compiled by the ODIHR EOM from the CEC and Court websites, the Appellate Division of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina reviewed some 200 appeals against CEC decisions on complaints, upholding most CEC decisions. While Court judgments are published, the search system on the Court's website is not user-friendly, and the Court confirmed the need to modify it to ensure transparency of justice. Despite a previous ODIHR recommendation, court sessions on election-related disputes are not open to the public.

In line with international standards and to ensure transparency of electoral dispute resolution, text and decisions on complaints and appeals should be promptly published by the respective institutions.

Judicial reforms, including the law 'On courts', have been subject of longstanding discussions. The Constitutional Court currently functions with six judges instead of nine, due to the Republika Srpska's refusal to appoint judges.⁹⁴ Notwithstanding these institutional obstacles, a number of ODIHR EOM interlocutors expressed trust in the professionalism and independence of judges, citing examples of the use of progressive European case-law by courts at all levels.

XII. ELECTION OBSERVATION

The law provides for election observation of all stages of the electoral process by citizen and international observers, as well as by observers appointed by political subjects. The 2024 amendments state explicitly that observers must have access to conduct effective observation. The CEC accredits international observers and all other observers observing at the national level, i.e. at the CEC and the Main Counting Center (MCC), while MECs accredit citizen observers for the respective municipality as well as observers nominated by political subjects and candidates in the respective municipalities.

Accreditation of observers was inclusive, and a total of 47,347 observers representing 60 organizations were accredited. Of these, 45,252 were accredited at MEC level and mostly represented political subjects. At the national level, the CEC accredited 12 citizen observer organizations with 1,548 observers, 30 international organizations with 457 observers, and 18 political subjects with 90 observers.

The main citizen observer group *Pod Lupom*, a coalition of 5 founding and 44 associated civil society organizations, deployed 55 long-term observers and some 1,000 short-term observers and was active in all 143 municipalities. During these elections, *Pod Lupom* placed particular attention to polling stations where new voting technologies were used, and deployed observers in 298 out of 448 polling stations conducting ICT pilots. *Pod Lupom* observers declared that they had unhindered access to most polling stations during election day, in line with the law.⁹⁵

⁹³ The decisions are delivered to the parties in the case but are not available to the public.

⁹⁴ In March 2024, the Venice Commission issued an [Opinion](#) on the functioning of the Constitutional Court.

⁹⁵ *Pod Lupom* [Preliminary assessment of election day](#).

In the pre-election period, *Pod Lupom* and TI BiH monitored the implementation of the Election Law, including with respect to the formation of PSCs, misuse of administrative resources, and irregularities in the election campaign. On election day, *Pod Lupom* reported that it had received 67 complaints from citizens alleging violation of the campaign silence, pressure on voters, group voting, records of deceased persons on the voter lists, and breaches to the secrecy of the vote.

XIII. ELECTION DAY

Election day was generally calm and peaceful. Due to the devastating floods and landslides shortly before election day, the CEC postponed the elections in five municipalities in the Federation, affecting 63,180 registered voters.⁹⁶ Mostar held local elections concurrently with the rest of the country, for the first time since 2008.

On election day, IEOM observers visited 122 municipalities. Opening was observed in 97 polling stations, voting in 968 polling stations, and counting in 85 polling stations. Tabulation was observed in 62 MECs.

Women were well represented among polling staff; they constituted 51 per cent of PSC members in polling stations observed and chaired 52 per cent of PSCs in these polling stations. The CEC announced that turnout was 47.7 per cent. It started posting preliminary election results from polling stations with ballot scanners at around 20:30 hrs., and from other polling stations at around 23:00, contributing to transparency.

Despite the legal requirement that polling stations be accessible for voters with disabilities, 51 per cent of polling stations where voting was observed did not provide for independent access for voters with physical disabilities, and in 21 per cent, the interior layout was not suitable for these voters. The IEOM observed several instances of persons with disabilities voting from their cars.

A. OPENING AND VOTING

The opening process was assessed positively in all 97 polling stations observed. Opening procedures were generally followed, but IEOM observers reported several instances of procedural errors, including 10 cases of not all PSC members signing the oath of office, and 5 cases of ballot boxes not being properly sealed. One in five polling stations did not open on time.

IEOM observers assessed the voting process negatively in 7 per cent of polling stations observed, a high number which is of concern. Negative assessments were attributed mainly to serious problems with the secrecy of the vote and procedural shortcomings. In one half of polling stations observed, not all voters marked their ballot in secrecy. The layout of the polling stations and the placement of polling booths did not provide for secrecy of the vote in 40 per cent of observed polling stations each. The polling station layout was not adequate for voting in 7 per cent of observations, and overcrowding was noted in 4 per cent of polling stations observed.

To ensure the secrecy of the vote, the layout of polling stations and the positioning of polling booths should be reconsidered.

Serious procedural shortcomings noted by IEOM observers included group voting (5 per cent), proxy voting (2 per cent), and series of seemingly identical signatures on the voter list (1 per cent). In 5 per

⁹⁶ The elections were postponed in Jablanica, Konjic, Kiseljak, Kreševo, and Fojnica municipalities.

cent of polling stations observed, the ballot boxes were not properly sealed. IEOM observers also noted several instances of serious irregularities indicating pressure on voters and attempts to unduly influence them as to who to vote for. IEOM observers observed that people other than PSC members were keeping track of voters who had voted (13 per cent of polling stations), calling out loud names of voters (3 per cent of polling stations), and attempting to influence voters (2 per cent of polling stations). Eight cases of intimidation of voters or election officials were also observed. IEOM observers reported tension outside seven polling stations, and inside 2 per cent of observed polling stations. Voters were taking pictures of their ballots in 2 per cent of polling station observed, in violation of the law.

With very few exceptions, in the polling stations observed all voters' identity documents were checked, and all voters signed the voter list. Where one or more voters were turned away or redirected to a different polling station (in 14 per cent of polling stations observed), it was mostly because they were not on the voter list of that polling station.

IEOM observers observed voting in 186 polling stations which were included in one of the four ICT pilot projects. They reported from 58 of these polling stations that the ICT was not functioning correctly, including incidents of ballot scanners not working intermittently or jamming, and problems with fingerprint scanners. Most instances of malfunctioning observed by IEOM observers were intermittent.⁹⁷ IEOM observers reported from 50 polling stations that voters had difficulties using the technology, and from 60 polling stations that the use of ICT, including the slow speed of ballot scanners, resulted in delays or queues (see *Election Administration*).

Citizen observers were present in 24 per cent of polling stations observed, contributing to transparency. Party and candidate observers were present in 92 per cent of polling stations observed. In 3 per cent of polling stations observed, non-PSC members, mostly party/candidate observers, were interfering in the work of the PSC.

B. CLOSING AND COUNTING

All but one of the polling stations observed closed on time or by 19:15 hrs. The large majority of vote counts observed by the IEOM were assessed positively overall. However, the vote count was assessed negatively in 13 out of the 85 polling stations observed, mainly due to lack of adherence to prescribed procedures and procedural errors or omissions. IEOM observers reported instances where PSCs did not perform the prescribed reconciliation procedures, such as counting and recording the number of unused ballots (6 cases each) or determine the number of voters who voted by counting the signatures on the voter list (2 cases). Election material was frequently not packed or put away as required before the ballot box was opened. The determination of ballot validity was not done in a reasonable manner in five cases. In 17 counts, ballots were not counted by at least two PSC members as required by law, and in 15 counts, not all PSC members participated in the determination of ballot validity.

In 24 observed counts, the PSCs had difficulties reconciling the results, 1 results protocol had been pre-signed, in 2 cases not all PSC members signed the protocol, and 14 PSCs did not post a copy of the protocol at the polling station, negatively impacting transparency. IEOM observers reported 2 cases of intimidation of PSC members, and 6 cases of tension.

To ensure consistent application of counting procedures and to eliminate mistakes in the results protocols and election forms, the CEC should develop and implement additional training for PSCs, as well as for prospective members on the reserve or vetted polling staff lists.

⁹⁷ The CEC at a press conference on election day reported that only two pilot polling stations had to revert to regular voting due to technical challenges and that the technology at the remaining polling stations was functioning properly.

C. TABULATION AND ANNOUNCEMENT OF RESULTS

The tabulation process was observed at 62 MECs and assessed positively in all but three reports submitted by IEOM observers. However, conditions for processing of protocols were assessed as inadequate in nine MEC premises where IEOM observers observed the tabulation, due to insufficient space or inadequate layout, overcrowding, or poor organization. At three MECs, not everybody present had a clear view of the process. In two MECs, IEOM observers were not able to observe the electronic data entry. The MECs co-operated fully with IEOM observers in all cases, and IEOM observers did not report cases of intimidation or deliberate falsification of results. Some PSCs submitted results protocols that were incomplete or not signed by all PSC members and in six MECs not all protocols submitted reconciled.

The CEC at a press conference on election day reported that it had received 164 complaints on breaches of the campaign silence and that 72 complaints on electoral violations had been submitted to MECs. In addition, cases that require a criminal investigation, including one case of alleged vote buying, were referred to the Prosecutor's office and the police.

XIV. POST-ELECTION DAY DEVELOPMENTS

In line with the law, to reconcile results protocols with discrepancies and to properly tabulate the results from all polling stations, on 8 October, the CEC, upon requests from MECs, ordered the recount of 373 polling stations in 62 municipalities. Out of these, 26 recounts were ordered for mayoral elections. For municipal assemblies and councils, 125 polling stations were recounted in cases where the number of preferential votes for a candidate was higher than the number of votes for her or his party; and 248 polling stations were recounted for other reasons.⁹⁸

On 11 October, the CEC also began a detailed comparison of the manually entered results and the results transmitted electronically by ballot scanners. As a result, the CEC ordered a detailed *ex officio* procedure requesting the MCC to perform a control and recount for 41 polling stations in Mostar, Sarajevo Novi Grad, and Prijedor. The decision to recount was based on the established difference in results between the manual count and the results established by the optical scanners. In general, the comparison of results from the electronic transmission with manual results is a good practice and an effective means of verification.

To ensure the integrity of the results and public confidence in case of full implementation of ICT in future elections, the CEC should ensure that the ballot scanning technology continues to offer the possibility of a manual count and keep a paper backup for confirming the results, audits, and complaints adjudication.

Conducting a random comparison of some results from the ballot scanners and the manual count, the ODIHR EOM noted some minor discrepancies in determining valid and invalid votes. The Election Law provides clear criteria for what constitutes a valid and invalid vote. For the manual count, the proper determination of the valid vote depends largely on the training of the polling staff. The ability of the ballot scanner to determine a voter's choice depends on the voter's proper marking of the ballot and is subject to the device's margin of error.

The CEC could consider conducting a post-election audit of invalid ballots, including a comparison between the manual and electronic count, to assess the margin of error of the ballot scanner. The

⁹⁸ The other recounts were conducted mainly due to errors in the results protocols which could not have been reconciled without inspecting the materials received from the polling stations.

results of the audit could be used to further improve training of polling staff as well as to inform voter education strategies.

The counting and tabulation of the votes from tendered, absentee, mobile, and postal ballots, as well as of ballots cast in diplomatic and consular missions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was conducted at the MCC, in this respective order. The MCC started the counting and tabulation process on 10 October. Specifically for the postal vote, the MCC waited five days after the elections (until 11 October) to ensure that all votes cast were included. For a postal vote to be valid, it had to be sent before or on election day.

The elections in the municipalities of Fojnica, Kiseljak, Konjic, and Kreševo, which had been postponed due to floods and landslides, were held on 20 October. The CEC took several steps towards an inclusive and credible process. To supervise the elections, the CEC appointed eight co-ordinators from its election and ICT departments. To ensure the integrity of the electoral materials in Fojnica, the CEC issued a special instruction that required PSCs to use an additional ballot stamp marked “postponed elections.” The CEC introduced this measure because the ballots had already been handed over to PSCs prior to the postponement. In Konjic, the CEC relocated two polling stations which had been destroyed by the floods, and it also set up six mobile teams to reach out to non-evacuated voters in the affected areas. Voters who lost their personal identity documents during the floods were advised by the CEC to contact the Ministry of Internal Affairs and obtain a new ID. The turnout in the four municipalities was close to 51 per cent, slightly above the national average. The CEC started announcing preliminary results from the delayed elections at midnight on 20 October, with most results tabulated the next day. Recounts were ordered in one polling station each in Fojnica and Kiseljak. Elections in Jablanica were held on 3 November, with a high voter turnout of 66.23 per cent.

On the basis of the report of the Chief Controller for processing, entering, and confirming the election results, the CEC ordered recounts for an additional 39 polling stations.⁹⁹ On 24 October, the CEC passed the decision on determining and publishing the electoral results. In line with the law, the results for all remaining municipalities were confirmed by 15 November.¹⁰⁰

Women won only 8 of the 140 directly elected mayoral seats (5.7 per cent). While this is an increase of three compared to the last local elections, women’s participation in local government continues to fall significantly short of the global average.¹⁰¹ No official sex disaggregated data on composition of municipal councils and assemblies was available at the time of compilation of this report.

XV. RECOMMENDATIONS

These recommendations, as contained throughout the text, are offered with a view to enhance the conduct of elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to support efforts to bring them fully in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations and standards for democratic elections to which they have committed. These recommendations should be read in conjunction with prior

⁹⁹ Recounts of some polling stations were conducted for the municipalities of Zenica (3 polling stations), Novo Sarajevo (7 polling stations), Stari Grad Sarajevo (8 polling stations), Novi Grad Sarajevo (9 polling stations), Ilidza (10 polling stations), Vitez (1 polling station), and Visoko (1 polling station).

¹⁰⁰ According to Article 5.32 of the Election Law, the CEC had until 5 November, and exceptionally until 20 November, to confirm all results from the 2024 local elections.

¹⁰¹ According to the [UN Women report on elected seats held by women in deliberative bodies of local government](#), women hold 35.5 per cent of elected seats in local government worldwide.

ODIHR recommendations which remain to be addressed.¹⁰² ODIHR stands ready to assist the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina to further improve the electoral process and to address the recommendations contained in this and previous reports.

A. PRIORITY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The legislator should comprehensively address outstanding ODIHR recommendations, including lifting discriminatory residency and ethnic restrictions on suffrage rights to further align the legal framework with OSCE commitments, international standards, and good practice. Such a revision should be done through an open consultative procedure in advance of the next elections, providing sufficient time for an effective implementation.
2. To ensure equal suffrage in accordance with international standards, restrictions to the right to vote based on intellectual or psychosocial disability should be reviewed.
3. To ensure the secrecy of the vote, the layout of polling stations and the positioning of polling booths should be reconsidered.
4. To ensure equal representation of women, additional temporary special measures should be considered.
5. Defamation should be de-criminalized. Interference with the activities of journalists and media personnel should not be tolerated, and authorities should fulfil their duty to protect the safety of media staff through effective and timely protective measures.
6. The legal deadlines for consideration of complaints by the election administration and the judiciary should be adjusted in order to ensure timely and effective provision of remedies against electoral violations. All CEC decisions should be subject to judicial appeals.
7. The system of calculating campaign expenditure limits could be revised to provide for adequate financing of election campaigns. Sanctions for the violations of campaign finance rules should have a dissuasive effect but at the same time be proportionate to the severity of the violation.

B. OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS

Political Background

8. Relevant authorities should take additional steps to enhance women's participation. Political parties should identify and address barriers to women's active participation, including by conducting gender audits and adopting plans to address internal culture and practices hindering women's effective representation within party structures. Legislative bodies at all levels could adopt rules of procedure banning misogynistic behavior, with violations being subject to dissuasive sanctions.

¹⁰² According to paragraph 25 of the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Document, OSCE participating States committed themselves "to follow up promptly the ODIHR's election assessment and recommendations". The follow-up of prior recommendations is assessed by ODIHR as follows: Recommendation 6 from [final report on the 2018 general elections](#) and recommendation 3 from the [final report on the 2022 general elections](#) were fully implemented, recommendations 5, 7 and 22 from 2018 final report the and recommendation 4 from 2022 final report are mostly implemented. Recommendations 2, 3, 4, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 16, 17, 19, 20 and 21 from the 2018 final report and recommendations 1, 2, 4, 7, 10, 11, 16, 17, 20 and 21 from the 2022 final report are partially implemented. See also the [ODIHR Electoral Recommendations Database](#).

Election Administration

9. To further enhance transparency of election administration, the CEC and MECs should publish the minutes of their meetings and ensure that all decisions and instructions, including on complaints, are published in a timely manner in full.
10. To further enhance the impartiality and professionalism of the lower-level election administration, in line with the 2024 amendments, and to avoid delays in PSC appointments, the CEC could identify and train PSC presidents and deputy presidents well in advance. In addition to continuous training, a refresher course closer to the elections could take place to ensure adequate preparedness for the elections.
11. To ensure effective implementation of ICT in elections, the pilots should continue to be implemented in line with the international good practice and accompanied by the timely allocation of resources, adequate training, and post-election audits on the usability and functionality of ICT.
12. Continuous efforts should be made in close co-operation with civil society organizations working with persons with disabilities, to ensure persons with disabilities can vote autonomously, including ensuring the premises and layout of polling stations are suitable for independent access and providing electoral information in formats accessible to persons with disabilities, including voters with visual impairments.
13. To avoid challenges in acquiring electoral goods and services, the CEC should have sufficient financial and organizational resources in place.

Voter Registration

14. To increase trust in the voter register and improve its accuracy, the authorities should consider conducting a comprehensive audit of the Central Voter Register and the civil register.

Candidate Registration

15. To ensure full compliance with the legal provisions in support of equal electoral participation of women, the CEC should strictly enforce the legally prescribed gender quota on all candidate lists and only register lists that comply with the quota.

Campaign Environment

16. To prevent the misuse of administrative resources, consideration should be given to legally defining and prohibiting extraordinary government expenditures from the call of an election, except in the event of a declared state of emergency.

Campaign Finance

17. To increase transparency of campaign finance, deadlines for submission and publication of interim campaign finance reports should ensure timely publication prior to election day. To guarantee voters' informed choice, the information about campaign incomes and expenditures for each electoral competition in each municipality should be made available to voters.
18. The capacity of the Central Election Commission should be strengthened to enable it to effectively monitor and investigate campaign finance.

Media

19. The existing structure of the public broadcasting service, including its legislative basis, on both state and entity levels, should be reconsidered, with the aim to ensure independent public media broadcasters. A stable, predictable, fair and enforceable system of funding that enables their free operation should be the priority.
20. To further encourage women's participation as candidates, consideration could be given to increase the amount of free airtime available for female candidates and the state funding allocated to them.
21. As previously recommended by ODIHR, all public broadcasters should provide impartial coverage in their news and political programmes. The legal provisions on this requirement should explicitly address the coverage not only of registered election contestants but also of public officials who take part in the campaign.
22. The law should provide clear deadlines for expeditious adjudication of media-related campaign complaints, including during the campaign period. In addition, the CRA should act upon its own initiative and could be legally mandated to conduct systematic monitoring of broadcasters' compliance concerning impartial political coverage, in particular in the public media.

Election Dispute Resolution

23. The system of admission and handling of election-related complaints should be reconsidered to ensure timely and effective legal remedies.
24. The legal deadlines for consideration of complaints by the election administration and the judiciary should be aligned to ensure timely and effective remedy. All CEC decisions should be subject to judicial appeals.
25. In line with international standards and to ensure transparency of electoral dispute resolution, text and decisions on complaints and appeals should be promptly published by the respective institutions.

Election Day

26. To ensure consistent application of counting procedures and to eliminate mistakes in the results protocols and election forms, the CEC should develop and implement additional training for PSCs, as well as for prospective members on the reserve or vetted polling staff lists.
27. To ensure the integrity of the results and public confidence in case of full implementation of ICT in future elections, the CEC should ensure that the ballot scanning technology continues to offer the possibility of a manual count and keep a paper backup for confirming the results, audits, and complaints adjudication.
28. The CEC could consider conducting a post-election audit of invalid ballots, including a comparison between the manual and electronic count, to assess the margin of error of the ballot scanner. The results of the audit could be used to further improve training of polling staff as well as to inform voter education strategies.

ANNEX I: ELECTION RESULTS

	Mayoral Elections	Council/Assembly Elections
Number of registered voters	3,213,970	3,402,246
Number of votes cast	1,553,866	1,638,469
Voter turnout	48.35%	48.16%
Number of invalid votes	101,876	90,545
Percentage of invalid ballots	6.56%	5.53%

Municipality	Mayoral Turnout	Mayoral First Place	First Place Vote Share	Mayoral Second Place	Second Place Vote Share	Legislative Turnout	Legislative First Place	First Place Vote Share	Legislative Second Place	Second Place Vote Share
Banja Luka	56.05%	PDP	49.48%	SNSD	36.03%	56.06%	SNSD	32.77%	PDP	21.09%
Banovići	71.78%	PDA	55.52%	SDA	44.48%	71.78%	PDA	44.33%	SDA	40.36%
Berkovići	73.84%	SDS	51.94%	SNSD	48.06%	73.84%	SDS	40.39%	SNSD	30.94%
Bihać	34.83%	POMAK	65.27%	SDA	34.73%	34.83%	SDA	27.43%	POMAK	27.23%
Bijeljina	52.88%	SDS	48.73%	SNSD	39.38%	52.88%	SNSD	21.25%	SDS	17.63%
Bileća	70.38%	SNSD	51.00%	SDS	45.62%	70.36%	SNSD	29.62%	SDS	16.50%
Bosanska Krupa	35.80%	NES + SDP	54.76%	SDA	36.72%	35.81%	SDA	38.06%	NES	22.17%
Bosanski Petrovac	48.56%	SDA	39.70%	SNSD	39.56%	48.54%	SDA	36.85%	SNSD	33.02%
Bosansko Grahovo	41.97%	IND	58.32%	SNSD	41.68%	41.93%	SNS FBiH	31.76%	SNSD	23.31%
Bratunac	56.50%	SNSD	46.93%	US	40.10%	56.52%	SNSD	21.48%	US	11.30%
Brčko Distrikt BiH						45.40%	SDA	15.93%	SNSD + SPS	15.72%
Breza	58.00%	SDA	91.61%	NES	8.39%	57.98%	SDA	39.61%	SN	16.08%
Brod	40.72%	SNSD	52.79%	SDS	47.21%	40.75%	SNSD	23.90%	SDS	19.94%
Bugojno	47.25%	Koalicija Trojka (SDP + NiP + NS)	44.50%	SDA	44.30%	47.25%	SDA	44.26%	SDP BIH	28.66%
Busovača	58.18%	SDA	56.89%	HDZ BIH	43.11%	58.20%	SDA	47.49%	HDZ BIH	33.57%
Bužim	46.23%	SDA	100.00%	—	—	46.23%	SDA	40.20%	NES	18.16%
Čajinče	63.15%	SRS	39.19%	SNSD	36.80%	63.18%	SNSD	22.95%	SP	14.15%
Čapljina	43.21%	HDZ BIH	51.03%	Čapljinska Neovisna Stranka	30.85%	43.20%	HDZ BIH	49.70%	Čapljinska Neovisna Stranka	15.65%
Cazin	36.39%	NES	61.24%	IND	36.11%	36.40%	NES	53.37%	SDA	30.67%
Čelić	52.42%	SBiH	69.07%	SDA	30.93%	52.43%	SBiH	38.01%	SDA	25.56%
Čelinac	60.64%	SNSD	64.69%	SDS	35.31%	60.65%	SNSD	45.19%	SP	10.23%
Centar Sarajevo	40.33%	NS + SDP	50.61%	DF	27.65%	40.33%	NS	21.36%	SDP BIH	19.38%
Čitluk	46.38%	HDZ BIH	81.11%	HDZ 1990	18.89%	46.38%	HDZ BIH	74.15%	HSP	7.16%
Derventa	43.02%	SNSD	52.29%	SDS	43.42%	43.03%	SNSD	33.46%	SDS	19.53%
Doboj	51.98%	SNSD	74.49%	SDS	20.05%	51.99%	SNSD	52.51%	DEMOS	10.26%
Doboj Istok	57.58%	SDA	68.71%	SDP BIH	31.29%	57.58%	SDA	56.78%	SDP BIH	16.98%
Doboj Jug	52.76%	SDA	57.57%	IND	31.51%	52.76%	SDA	31.05%	IND List	20.43%
Dobretići	28.94%	HSS	89.57%	HDZ BIH	10.43%	28.86%	HSS	80.09%	HDZ BIH	14.97%

Municipality	Mayor- al Turnout	Mayoral First Place	First Place Vote Share	Mayoral Second Place	Second Place Vote Share	Legis- lative Turnout	Legis- lative First Place	First Place Vote Share	Legislativ e Second Place	Second Place Vote Share
Domaljevac – Samac	36.70%	HDZ BIH	59.96%	IND	40.04%	36.70%	HDZ BIH	60.57%	HRS	10.00%
Donji Vakuf	56.96%	SDP BIH	33.78%	IND	32.28%	57.00%	IND List	29.46%	SDP BIH	28.53%
Donji Žabar	64.91%	SNSD	71.95%	SDS	28.05%	64.91%	SNSD	36.16%	SDS	20.81%
Drvar	50.41%	SNSD	62.46%	SNS FBiH	37.54%	50.41%	SNSD	39.07%	SNS FBiH	25.79%
Foča	62.69%	SNSD	53.73%	SDS	46.27%	62.68%	SNSD	40.36%	SDS	19.09%
Foča (FBiH)	68.07%	IND	64.01%	NiP	29.20%	68.07%	SDA	27.76%	Bosansko – hercegovački Demokrati	20.64%
Fojnica	51.60%	SDA	49.17%	SBiH	27.53%	51.60%	SDA	42.59%	HDZ BIH	15.80%
Gacko	72.25%	SDS	53.77%	SNSD	43.49%	72.25%	SDS	29.20%	SNSD	27.22%
Glamoč	49.11%	SNSD	49.97%	SNS FBiH	34.76%	49.11%	SNSD	22.74%	SNS FBiH	16.15%
Goražde	57.71%	SDP BIH	32.75%	NiP	19.74%	57.75%	Novi Početak	17.62%	SDA	17.06%
Gornji Vakuf – Uskoplje	55.01%	SDA	41.59%	HDZ + HDZ 1990 + HSS	32.99%	55.00%	SDA	40.17%	HDZ + HDZ 1990 + HSS	29.22%
Gračanica	51.26%	SDA	55.59%	SDP BIH	37.87%	51.26%	SDA	35.49%	SDP BIH	33.25%
Grad Mostar						44.36%	HDZ BIH	41.00%	Koalicija za Mostar (SDA + BPS + BH Zeleni)	26.02%
Grad Mostar – Izborna Jedinica Gradskog Područja 1						49.55%	Koalicija za Mostar (SDA + BPS + BH Zeleni)	59.36%	Koalicija Trojka (SDP + NiP + NS)	14.58%
Grad Mostar – Izborna Jedinica Gradskog Područja 2						40.55%	Koalicija za Mostar (SDA + BPS + BH Zeleni)	51.99%	Koalicija Trojka (SDP + NiP + NS)	25.34%
Grad Mostar – Izborna Jedinica Gradskog Područja 3						50.93%	Koalicija za Mostar (SDA + BPS + BH Zeleni)	66.10%	Koalicija Trojka (SDP + NiP + NS)	17.73%
Grad Mostar – Izborna Jedinica Gradskog Područja 4						50.22%	HDZ BIH	44.94%	Hrvatska Lista za Jug	30.00%
Grad Mostar – Izborna Jedinica Gradskog Područja 5						43.73%	HDZ BIH	68.73%	HRS	13.12%

Municipality	Mayor- al Turnout	Mayoral First Place	First Place Vote Share	Mayoral Second Place	Second Place Vote Share	Legis- lative Turnout	Legis- lative First Place	First Place Vote Share	Legislativ e Second Place	Second Place Vote Share
Grad Mostar – Izborna Jedenica Gradskog Područja 6						41.66%	HDZ BIH	66.52%	HRS	17.25%
Gradačac	52.63%	SDA	54.87%	Koalicija Trojka (SDP + NiP + NS)	40.14%	52.63%	SDA	44.66%	SDP BIH	21.84%
Gradiška	45.74%	SNSD	51.38%	IND	28.67%	45.74%	SNSD	33.06%	NPS	8.34%
Grude	42.29%	HDZ BIH	58.33%	HRS	41.67%	42.29%	HDZ BIH	61.91%	HRS	21.87%
Hadžići	54.74%	SDA	58.69%	NiP	19.87%	54.75%	SDA	48.22%	NiP	16.64%
Han Pijesak	72.26%	SDS	53.82%	SNSD	46.18%	72.26%	SNSD	35.87%	SDS	35.16%
Ilidža	41.16%	Koalicija Trojka (SDP + NiP + NS)	76.16%	SDA	23.84%	41.16%	NiP	32.35%	SDA	27.66%
Ilijaš	54.20%	Koalicija Trojka (SDP + NiP + NS)	52.18%	SDA	47.82%	54.19%	SDA	43.34%	NiP	23.96%
Istočna Ilidža	72.30%	SDS	60.16%	SNSD	39.84%	72.30%	SDS	35.46%	SNSD	25.65%
Istočni Drvar	85.02%	SNSD	41.67%	US	40.10%	85.02%	US	28.13%	SNSD	14.58%
Istočni Mostar	75.25%	SDS	76.61%	SNSD	23.39%	75.25%	SDS	40.54%	SDA	18.92%
Istočni Stari Grad	75.09%	SDS	71.25%	SNSD	28.75%	75.09%	SDS	63.60%	DEMOS	16.99%
Istočno Novo Sarajevo	65.81%	SNSD	100.00 %	—	—	65.84%	SNSD	47.69%	DNS	18.78%
Istočno Sarajevo	68.37%	SNSD	67.12%	IND	28.79%					
Jablanica	66.27%	SDA	60.83%	SDP BIH	39.17%	66.27%	SDA	36.11%	SDP BIH	20.32%
Jajce	42.91%	SDA	52.48%	HDZ BIH	41.65%	42.93%	SDA	35.24%	HDZ BIH	29.59%
Jezero	65.83%	SNSD	51.76%	NF	37.43%	65.83%	SNSD	35.36%	NF	17.27%
Kakanj	51.77%	SDA	43.20%	IND	23.23%	51.74%	SDA	33.01%	SDP BIH	24.42%
Kalesija	45.42%	SDA	49.23%	NiP	18.94%	45.43%	SDA	44.49%	SDP BIH	16.79%
Kalinovik	81.79%	SNSD	58.71%	SDS	40.88%	81.79%	SNSD	49.69%	SDS	32.38%
Kiseljak	46.63%	HDZ BIH	66.02%	SDA	19.00%	46.62%	HDZ BIH	55.37%	SDA	26.07%
Kladanj	54.96%	SDA	56.08%	PDA	43.92%	54.99%	SDA	27.79%	PDA	14.67%
Ključ	34.80%	SDA	45.30%	NiP	30.45%	34.79%	SDA	33.08%	SDP BIH	21.05%
Kneževo	65.83%	SNSD	54.22%	IND	42.99%	65.85%	SNSD	48.78%	US	12.24%
Konjic	55.08%	SDA	62.14%	IND	26.36%	55.08%	SDA	54.61%	SDP BIH	18.57%
Kostajnica	55.56%	SNSD	50.21%	SDS	49.79%	55.56%	SNSD	32.73%	SDS	24.68%
Kotor Varoš	49.96%	PDP	62.16%	SNSD	32.94%	49.97%	SDS	31.24%	PDP	20.07%
Kozarska Dubica	49.78%	SNSD	44.66%	NPS	42.32%	49.76%	SNSD	38.66%	NPS	34.32%
Kreševo	51.39%	HDZ BIH	100.00 %	—	—	51.39%	HDZ BIH	63.00%	SDA	18.48%
Krupa Na Uni	55.55%	NPS	45.58%	SNSD	35.49%	55.55%	SNSD	29.36%	SDS	23.94%

Municipality	Mayoral Turnout	Mayoral First Place	First Place Vote Share	Mayoral Second Place	Second Place Vote Share	Legislative Turnout	Legislative First Place	First Place Vote Share	Legislative Second Place	Second Place Vote Share
Kupres	40.04%	HDZ BIH	100.00%	—	—	40.20%	HNP	36.20%	HDZ BIH	22.06%
Kupres (RS)	60.31%	SP	56.15%	SDS	43.85%	60.31%	SNSD	36.96%	SDS	26.09%
Laktaši	56.96%	SNSD	100.00%	—	—	56.96%	SNSD	74.17%	US	9.28%
Livno	33.06%	HDZ BIH	50.26%	HDZ 1990	40.19%	33.06%	HDZ BIH	37.91%	HDZ 1990	34.55%
Ljubinje	66.24%	SDS	60.20%	SNSD	39.80%	66.21%	SDS	38.82%	SNSD	23.11%
Ljubuški	49.94%	HDZ BIH	100.00%	—	—	49.94%	HDZ BIH	82.91%	HDZ 1990	11.66%
Lopare	56.94%	SDS	50.22%	IND	27.74%	56.94%	SDS	48.84%	SNSD	18.78%
Lukavac	49.97%	SD BiH	48.05%	SDA	39.96%	49.97%	SDA	39.31%	SD BiH	23.53%
Maglaj	49.89%	SDA	49.73%	SDP BIH	44.09%	49.90%	SDP BIH	35.46%	SDA	34.12%
Milići	58.71%	SNSD	72.99%	SDS	27.01%	58.70%	SNSD	47.94%	SP	10.91%
Modriča	47.65%	SDS	51.06%	SNSD	48.94%	47.66%	SDS	28.42%	SNSD	27.10%
Mrkonjić Grad	52.44%	SNSD	59.42%	Za Pravdu i Red – Lista Nebojše Vukanovića	29.68%	52.43%	SNSD	50.74%	SP	13.04%
Neum	49.87%	HDZ BIH	100.00%	—	—	49.87%	HDZ BIH	69.34%	HDZ 1990	16.98%
Nevesinje	62.99%	SNSD	54.99%	Za Pravdu i Red – Lista Nebojše Vukanovića	41.29%	62.99%	SNSD	34.57%	SP	16.10%
Novi Grad	45.25%	SNSD	56.14%	PDP + SDS	43.86%	45.25%	SNSD	43.74%	PDP – SDS	18.52%
Novi Grad Sarajevo	41.36%	SBiH	74.34%	Koalicija Trojka (SDP + NiP + NS)	25.66%	41.36%	SBiH	31.32%	SDA	19.91%
Novi Travnik	55.86%	HDZ + HDZ 1990 + HSS	45.94%	SDA	40.03%	55.86%	HDZ + HSS	33.54%	SDA	28.81%
Novo Goražde	65.02%	SNSD	55.69%	SDS	36.27%	64.95%	SNSD	40.42%	SDA + SBiH	16.57%
Novo Sarajevo	41.22%	Koalicija Trojka (SDP + NiP + NS)	42.21%	SBiH	40.41%	41.24%	SDA	18.08%	SDP BIH	18.01%
Odžak	32.51%	SDA	38.60%	HDZ BIH	37.40%	32.52%	HDZ BIH	39.42%	SDA	25.82%
Olovo	58.31%	SDA	100.00%	—	—	58.31%	SDA	50.93%	Stranka za Općinu Olovo	15.97%
Orašje	38.85%	HDZ BIH	77.79%	HDZ 1990	22.21%	38.86%	HDZ BIH	71.93%	SDA	9.56%
Osmaci	58.05%	SNSD	74.53%	SDS	25.47%	58.05%	SNSD	36.11%	SDA	10.02%
Oštra Luka	43.73%	SNSD	65.05%	RSS	25.17%	43.73%	SNSD	23.12%	DNS	15.70%
Pale	66.16%	DEMOS	55.54%	SNSD	44.46%	66.16%	SNSD	34.77%	DEMOS	25.98%
Pale (FBiH)	77.67%	SDA	63.33%	SDP BIH	36.67%	77.83%	SDA	52.15%	SDP + NiP	28.57%
Pelagicevo	51.44%	SNSD	52.63%	SP	37.01%	51.50%	SNSD	25.65%	US	15.13%
Petrovac	69.00%	SNSD	55.84%	IND	23.49%	69.00%	SNSD	31.99%	DNS	22.89%
Petrovo	54.69%	SNSD	73.13%	SDS	26.87%	54.71%	SNSD	34.21%	SP	20.10%

Municipality	Mayor-al Turnout	Mayoral First Place	First Place Vote Share	Mayoral Second Place	Second Place Vote Share	Legis-lative Turnout	Legis-lative First Place	First Place Vote Share	Legislativ-e Second Place	Second Place Vote Share
Posušje	35.85%	HDZ BIH	100.00 %	—	—	35.86%	HDZ BIH	62.24%	HDZ 1990	10.57%
Prijedor	37.84%	SNSD	63.66%	SDS	36.34%	37.87%	SNSD	28.29%	US	9.15%
Prnjavor	44.37%	SNSD	62.88%	SDS	37.12%	44.37%	SNSD	42.18%	SDS	23.46%
Prozor – Rama	47.48%	RNS	65.82%	HDZ BIH	18.32%	47.48%	RNS	39.47%	HDZ BIH	23.53%
Ravno	41.11%	HDZ BIH	100.00 %	—	—	41.11%	HDZ BIH	81.61%	SNSD	15.11%
Ribnik	59.04%	SNSD	52.30%	IND	47.70%	59.06%	SNSD	52.94%	SDS	26.59%
Rogatica	70.56%	SNSD	66.26%	SDS	33.74%	70.56%	SNSD	50.19%	SDS	16.36%
Rudo	51.79%	SNSD	56.21%	NF	43.79%	51.81%	SNSD	40.48%	US	18.97%
Šamac	50.77%	SDS	60.55%	SNSD	39.45%	50.79%	SDS	42.01%	SNSD	24.12%
Sanski Most	26.08%	SDA	49.95%	SDP BIH	27.62%	26.08%	SDA	47.49%	SDP BIH	22.02%
Sapna	42.72%	SDA	78.32%	SBiH	21.68%	42.72%	SDA	65.43%	SBiH	17.47%
Šekovići	71.41%	SNSD	64.92%	NPS	35.08%	71.41%	SNSD	44.35%	NPS	12.12%
Šipovo	59.53%	SNSD	46.63%	NF	40.38%	59.53%	SNSD	32.68%	NF	16.13%
Široki Brijeg	39.59%	HDZ BIH	72.01%	HDZ 1990	27.99%	39.59%	HDZ BIH	71.14%	HDZ 1990	10.67%
Sokolac	69.44%	SNSD	60.86%	SDS	39.14%	69.48%	SNSD	40.96%	SDS	23.32%
Srbac	58.01%	SNSD	64.91%	SDS	35.09%	58.02%	SNSD	49.72%	US	14.78%
Srebrenica	55.37%	SNSD	68.39%	IND	30.68%	55.40%	SNSD	29.13%	SDA + SBiH	16.61%
Srebrenik	45.90%	Koalicija Trojka (SDP + NiP + NS)	55.90%	SDA	39.05%	45.89%	SDA	32.71%	NiP	20.68%
Stanari	63.67%	US	40.69%	SP	29.69%	63.67%	SP	29.52%	US	25.70%
Stari Grad Sarajevo	42.25%	SDP BIH	64.42%	SDA	35.58%	42.28%	SDP BIH	23.91%	SDA	22.57%
Stolac	63.24%	HDZ BIH	62.55%	SDA + SDP	37.45%	63.24%	HDZ BIH	21.73%	SDA	20.04%
Teočak	39.78%	SDA	100.00 %	—	—	39.78%	SDA	60.84%	SBiH	13.32%
Tešanj	43.81%	SDA	56.08%	SDP BIH	23.28%	43.81%	SDA	34.89%	NPD	17.79%
Teslić	49.48%	SDS	53.53%	SNSD	46.47%	49.50%	SDS	34.62%	SNSD	26.34%
Tomislavgrad	41.48%	HNP + HDZ 1990	56.87%	HDZ BIH	43.13%	41.52%	HNP	38.90%	HDZ BIH	24.07%
Travnik	48.93%	SDA	57.52%	HDZ BIH	26.77%	48.94%	SDA	49.26%	HDZ + HSS	23.12%
Trebinje	60.00%	SNSD	54.15%	Za Pravdu i Red – Lista Nebojše Vukanovića	44.81%	60.04%	SNSD	40.52%	Za Pravdu i Red – Lista Nebojše Vukanovića	14.55%
Trnovo	77.62%	SNSD	100.00 %	—	—	77.70%	SNSD	58.79%	DNS	30.10%
Trnovo (FBiH)	75.91%	SDA	78.23%	SDP + NiP	21.77%	75.91%	SDA	72.79%	NiP	8.75%
Tuzla	40.47%	SDP BIH	75.95%	SDA	19.42%	40.48%	SDP BIH	26.52%	SDA	17.28%
Ugljevik	67.80%	SNSD	52.82%	SDS	35.87%	67.80%	SNSD	27.69%	SDS	23.93%
Usora	34.71%	HDZ BIH	64.52%	HDZ 1990	35.48%	34.71%	HDZ BIH	54.42%	HDZ 1990	24.70%
Vareš	46.49%	HDS	40.04%	SDA	21.20%	46.49%	SDA	24.88%	HDS	14.56%

Municipality	Mayor-al Turnout	Mayoral First Place	First Place Vote Share	Mayoral Second Place	Second Place Vote Share	Legis-lative Turnout	Legis-lative First Place	First Place Vote Share	Legislativ e Second Place	Second Place Vote Share
Velika Kladuša	37.81%	Zajedno za Velika Kladuša	48.57%	Laburisti BiH	36.83%	37.81%	LS BiH	34.73%	SDA	18.99%
Višegrad	60.35%	SNSD	63.85%	NF	13.63%	60.39%	SNSD	32.86%	DNS	11.97%
Visoko	49.12%	SDA	64.04%	SDP BIH	22.97%	49.12%	SDA	52.00%	SDP BIH	15.15%
Vitez	53.51%	HDZ + HDZ 1990 + HSS	54.56%	SDA	45.44%	53.55%	HDZ + HSS + HKDU BiH	43.50%	SDA	39.27%
Vlasenica	61.02%	SNSD	55.03%	SDS	44.97%	61.03%	SNSD	47.15%	SDS	19.72%
Vogošća	44.36%	SDA	56.83%	Koalicija Trojka (SDP + NiP + NS)	43.17%	44.38%	SDA	36.96%	SDP BIH	18.71%
Vukosavlje	49.69%	SDP BIH	39.73%	SNSD	39.41%	49.67%	SNSD	30.75%	SDP BIH	21.90%
Zavidovići	47.91%	SDA	33.97%	SN	32.83%	47.91%	SDA	29.51%	SDP BIH	22.20%
Zenica	44.49%	BHI	45.34%	SDA	38.48%	44.49%	SDA	31.94%	BHI	30.80%
Žepče	51.54%	HDZ BIH	39.16%	SDA	39.00%	51.55%	HDZ BIH	33.93%	SDA	27.31%
Živinice	50.95%	SDA	62.76%	SDP + NiP	37.24%	50.95%	SDA	40.47%	NiP	14.12%
Zvornik	51.71%	SNSD	71.38%	NF	28.62%	51.71%	SNSD	51.56%	DEMOS	14.12%

Source: [CEC results webpage](#)

**ANNEX II: LIST OF OBSERVERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL ELECTION
OBSERVATION MISSION**

ODIHR EOM Short-Term Observers

Ermir	Çota	Albania
Kujtim	Morina	Albania
Manfred	Aschaber	Austria
Harald	Rainer	Austria
Jana	Černohorská	Czech Republic
Martin	Hejlek	Czech Republic
Natálie	Ježková	Czech Republic
Olga	Koldová	Czech Republic
Martin	Nekola	Czech Republic
Petr	Přebinda	Czech Republic
Pavel	Sedlák	Czech Republic
Ott	Laido	Estonia
Sasha	Billard	France
Julien	Cazala	France
Anais	Fiault	France
Camille	Forite	France
Gabrielle Louise Cécile	Jouve	France
Jeanne	Magnan	France
eric	mirguet	France
Guillaume	Pichelin	France
Christophe	Picot	France
Auriane	Piveteau	France
Jasmine	Salhab	France
Tamar	Kapanadze	Georgia
Sofio	Rurua	Georgia
Stefan	Alscher	Germany
Julia	Baumann	Germany
Lisa	Becker	Germany
Franziska	Best	Germany
Lasia	Bloss	Germany
Rolf	Boehnke	Germany
Anja	Bronny	Germany
Patricia	Enssle	Germany
Irene	Fellmann	Germany
Alice	Halsdorfer	Germany
Reinhard	Hesse	Germany
Rainer	Höchst	Germany
Michael	Jelonek	Germany
Harald	Klier	Germany
Peter	Kohlmeier	Germany
Andreas	Lange	Germany
Kristin	Liedtke	Germany
Simon	Muschick	Germany
Christian	Nusser	Germany
Marielle Véronique	Ratter	Germany
Marion	Sandner	Germany

ODIHR EOM Short-Term Observers

Florence	Schimmel	Germany
Martin	Schuster	Germany
Stefan	Siegert	Germany
Lars-Christopher	Stövsand	Germany
Peter	Vogl	Germany
Edith	Weber	Germany
Bianca	Wieland	Germany
Dimitrios	Kanakidis	Greece
László	Stock	Hungary
Brynhildur	Bolladóttir	Iceland
Andri	Egilsson	Iceland
Marie	Baker	Ireland
Caroline	Brennan	Ireland
Timothy	Carey	Ireland
Sarah	Greene	Ireland
Aidan	O Shea	Ireland
Cathal	O'Hagan	Ireland
Joseph	Scanlon	Ireland
Giorgio	Cella	Italy
Monica	Simeone	Italy
Valeria	Verdolini	Italy
Jelena	Cvijovic	Montenegro
Andrea	Rovčanin	Montenegro
Ali	Al Hadaui	Netherlands
Marion	Biermans	Netherlands
Nicole	Sprokel	Netherlands
Adrianus	Zagers	Netherlands
Kjire	Delov	North Macedonia
Zoran	Ilieski	North Macedonia
John Mendoza	Myraunet	Norway
Bergny	Ofstad	Norway
Kjersti	Sjaatil	Norway
Torill	Wanvik	Norway
Ivan	Mihajlovic	Serbia
Aleksandar	Tomić	Serbia
Irena	Čačić	Slovenia
Cristina	Araque Martinez	Spain
María del Mar	Niñerola Marco	Spain
María Magdalena	Rincón Goicoechea	Spain
Silvia Carmen	Sanchez Cruz	Spain
Paula	Sanchez-Carretero	Spain
Samuel	Toledano	Spain
Francisco Manuel	Villegas Cara	Spain
Kersti Cecilia Gunnarsdotter	Aengelid	Sweden
Eva Kari Sofia	Berg	Sweden
Malin	Björk	Sweden
Sven Tommy	Bringholm	Sweden
Jaqueline Cecilia Therese	Carleson	Sweden
Sara Elin Elisabet	Fallström	Sweden

ODIHR EOM Short-Term Observers

Latifa	Gharbi	Sweden
Stig Lennart	Glans	Sweden
Sara Karolina	Hakansson	Sweden
Erik Hjalmar Knutsson	Hammarskjöld	Sweden
Cecilia Anna Marta	Hull Wiklund	Sweden
Christina	Perez	Sweden
Bertil Andreas	Persson	Sweden
My Emmicki Charlotta	Roos	Sweden
Ann-Sofie Maria	Sten	Sweden
Aleksandra	Pajevic	United Kingdom
John	Ault	United Kingdom
Mercedes	Broad	United Kingdom
David	Letteney	United Kingdom
Luke	Meaton	United Kingdom
Anttoni	Numminen	United Kingdom
Julian	Nundy	United Kingdom
Nighut	Sarwar	United Kingdom
Alexander	Scales	United Kingdom
Joseph	Worrall	United Kingdom
Janet	Wynne	United Kingdom
Lee	Bauer	United States
James	Berk	United States
Paul	Binkley	United States
Bradley	Buitenhuys	United States
Dawn	Cooper	United States
Kasey	Dresser	United States
Ackem	Evans	United States
Blanche	Fawell	United States
Fred	Feller	United States
Jeffrey	Gregerson	United States
Christopher	Hall	United States
Jermaine	Hartsfield	United States
Leon	Hartwell	United States
Marvin	Heinze	United States
Javier	Hernandez	United States
Leslie	Hess	United States
Katherine	Igras	United States
Ernest	Jones	United States
Kira	Kay	United States
Sunni	Kim	United States
Alka	Kothari	United States
Thomas	Lecato	United States
Megan	McCullough	United States
Tristyn	Mitchell	United States
Brooke	Nagle	United States
Paul	Neuman	United States
Nour	Nourey	United States
Tara	O'Connor	United States
Anthony	Orlando	United States

ODIHR EOM Short-Term Observers

Harold	Otto	United States
Susana	Peruzzi	United States
Emily	Rome	United States
Andriy	Shymonyak	United States
Daniel	Simon	United States
Gregory	Slotta	United States
Shapari	Taxell	United States
Tanya	Urquieta	United States
Armen	Vardanyan	United States
Sonia	Vasile	United States
Deborah	Walker	United States
Melissa	Walsh	United States
Rebecca	Webb	United States
Anne	Wick	United States
Sydney	Wilke	United States

ODIHR EOM Long-Term Observers

Miroslav	Poche	Czech Republic
Olga	Švepešová Blat'aková	Czech Republic
Niels	Boel	Denmark
Thomas	Boserup	Denmark
Véronique	Lasserre-Fy	France
Bertrand	Remy	France
Elene	Nizharadze	Georgia
Sophie	Haring	Germany
Fabian	Jung	Germany
Eithne	MacDermott	Ireland
Mansiya	Samambet	Kazakhstan
Wilhelmina	Theuws	Netherlands
Daniela	Malijanska-Mitevaska	North Macedonia
Tonje	Viken	Norway
Patricia	Cavanagh	United Kingdom
Gillian	Gloyer	United Kingdom
Robert	Mangham	United Kingdom
Syeda Sameera	Ali	United States
Daniel	Drigot	United States
Anne	Peskoe	United States

ODIHR EOM Core Team Members

Corien	Jonker	Head of Mission	Netherlands
Aliaksandr	Chaliadzinski		Belarus
Lenka	Homolková		Czech Republic
Stefan	Krause		Germany
Slaviša	Kotlaja		Montenegro
Gent	Ramadani		Norway
Ewa Marta	Niedzielska		Poland
Joanna	Porczyńska		Poland
Svetlana	Chetaikina		Russian Federation
Saša	Pokrajac		Serbia

ODIHR EOM Core Team Members

Ivan	Godársky	Slovakia
Anders Uno	Eriksson	Sweden
Yevheniia	Zamrii	Ukraine
Nicholas	Jahr	United States

Council of Europe Congress of Local and Regional Authorities

Carla	Dejonghe	Head of Delegation	Belgium
Marcin	Golaszewski	Deputy Head of Delegation	Poland
Hannes	Weninger	Congress	Austria
Jana	Fischerova	Congress	Czech Republic
Zdenek	Broz	Congress	Czech Republic
Kirsten Morild	Andersen	Congress	Denmark
Irina	Talviste	Congress	Estonia
Christa	Carpelan	Congress	Finland
Dominique	Leveque	Congress	France
Mathilde	Girardi	Congress Secretariat	France
Stéphanie	Poirel	Congress Secretariat	France
Martine	Roudolff	Congress Secretariat	France
Soeren	Schumacher	Congress	Germany
Cecilia	Friderics	Congress	Hungary
Gobnait	Ni Mhuimneacain	Congress	Ireland
Alberto	Mazzoleni	Congress	Italy
Giammaria	Milani	Staff of Delegation	Italy
Vents Armands	Krauklis	Congress	Latvia
Truls	Gihlemon	Congress	Norway
Joao	Esteves	Congress	Portugal
Gratiela	Dumitrescu	Congress Secretariat	Romania
Ganimet	Shala	Congress	Slovenia
Karin	Thomasson	Congress	Sweden
Günes	Pehlivan	Congress	Türkiye
Amanda	Serjeant	Congress	United Kingdom

European Parliament

Lucia	Annunziata	Head of Delegation, MEP	Italy
Martina	Hesse	Staff of Delegation	Belgium
Blagoy	Klimov	Staff of Delegation	Bulgaria
Davor Ivo	Stier	MEP	Croatia
Francesco	Miatto	EP Secretariat	Italy
Raffaele	Luise	EP Secretariat	Italy
Anna	Książczaková	Staff of Delegation	Poland
Daria	Wojcicka	EP Secretariat	Poland
António	Tânger Corrêa	MEP	Portugal
Sebastião	Bugalho	MEP	Portugal
Șerban-Dimitrie	Sturdza	MEP	Romania
Juan Fernando	López Aguilar	MEP	Spain
Nicolás	Gonzalez Casares	MEP	Spain

ABOUT ODIHR

The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) is OSCE's principal institution to assist participating States "to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, to abide by the rule of law, to promote principles of democracy and (...) to build, strengthen and protect democratic institutions, as well as promote tolerance throughout society" (1992 Helsinki Summit Document). This is referred to as the OSCE human dimension.

ODIHR, based in Warsaw (Poland) was created as the Office for Free Elections at the 1990 Paris Summit and started operating in May 1991. One year later, the name of the Office was changed to reflect an expanded mandate to include human rights and democratization. Today it employs over 150 staff.

ODIHR is the lead agency in Europe in the field of **election observation**. Every year, it co-ordinates and organizes the deployment of thousands of observers to assess whether elections in the OSCE region are conducted in line with OSCE commitments, other international obligations and standards for democratic elections and with national legislation. Its unique methodology provides an in-depth insight into the electoral process in its entirety. Through assistance projects, ODIHR helps participating States to improve their electoral framework.

The Office's **democratization** activities include: rule of law, legislative support, democratic governance, migration and freedom of movement, and gender equality. ODIHR implements a number of targeted assistance programmes annually, seeking to develop democratic structures.

ODIHR also assists participating States' in fulfilling their obligations to promote and protect **human rights and fundamental freedoms** consistent with OSCE human dimension commitments. This is achieved by working with a variety of partners to foster collaboration, build capacity and provide expertise in thematic areas, including human rights in the fight against terrorism, enhancing the human rights protection of trafficked people, human rights education and training, human rights monitoring and reporting, and women's human rights and security.

Within the field of **tolerance and non-discrimination**, ODIHR provides support to the participating States in strengthening their response to hate crimes and incidents of racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and other forms of intolerance. ODIHR's activities related to tolerance and non-discrimination are focused on the following areas: legislation; law enforcement training; monitoring, reporting on, and following up on responses to hate-motivated crimes and incidents; as well as educational activities to promote tolerance, respect, and mutual understanding.

ODIHR provides advice to participating States on their policies on **Roma and Sinti**. It promotes capacity-building and networking among Roma and Sinti communities, and encourages the participation of Roma and Sinti representatives in policy-making bodies.

All ODIHR activities are carried out in close co-ordination and co-operation with OSCE participating States, OSCE institutions and field operations, as well as with other international organizations.

More information is available on the ODIHR website (www.osce.org/odihr).