

**More trust in Electronic
Voting with E2E Verifiable
Voting Systems**

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Increasing trust ...



... in election results based on electronic voting
by

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... evaluation and certification

... based on international standards



https://www.bsi.bund.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/480286/publicationFile/29305/pp0037b_engl_pdf.pdf

... publishing the source code

... ideally without any time or location constraints (for instance downloadable from the Internet)

Is this enough?

... unfortunately not!

Why?

- ... because published and evaluated source code is not the same that is used
- ... because evaluators did not detect a backdoor/malfunction
- ... because manipulations cannot be detected

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Why verifiable electronic voting systems?




ACCOUNT STATEMENT

STATEMENT PERIOD: 01/01/2010 - 01/01/2011
ACCOUNT NO: 123456789
PAGE: 1/1

Date	Description	Credits	Debits	Balance
01/01/10	Deposit	\$100.00		\$100.00
01/02/10	Withdrawal		\$50.00	\$50.00
01/03/10	Deposit	\$200.00		\$250.00
01/04/10	Withdrawal		\$100.00	\$150.00
01/05/10	Deposit	\$50.00		\$200.00
01/06/10	Withdrawal		\$75.00	\$125.00
01/07/10	Deposit	\$150.00		\$275.00
01/08/10	Withdrawal		\$100.00	\$175.00
01/09/10	Deposit	\$300.00		\$475.00
01/10/10	Withdrawal		\$200.00	\$275.00
01/11/10	Deposit	\$100.00		\$375.00
01/12/10	Withdrawal		\$150.00	\$225.00
01/01/11	Deposit	\$50.00		\$275.00

This is an actual copy of just 2 days bank deposits. From our bank statements to 2010. This is not a bank error. This is only an example of our success. Your results may vary.



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One solution VVPATs

voter verifiable paper audit trails

... independent verification system to detect possible fraud or malfunction

... is readable by the human eye and voters can directly interpret their vote

... enables manual paper vote count if a recount is necessary



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... but a couple of open questions

- Manual tallying in how many polling stations in which situations?
- Which result is the legal one?
- What if printer crashes?
- What are the remaining advantages for electronic voting?
- First user studies show: most voters would not discover (malicious) modifications on paper
- Not applicable for remote electronic voting



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Alternative solution

cryptographic verifiability

- Provides “more” verifiability (namely E2E verifiability)
 - individual verifiability means that the voter can verify that his/her vote is ‘cast as intended’ and ‘stored as cast’
 - universal verifiability means that the voter / everyone can verify that all votes are ‘tallied as stored’

Alternative solution

cryptographic verifiability

- Provides more flexibility and is less time intensive
 - observation during the whole day is not required
 - verifiability can be done at any time from any place over the Internet
- trust in those proceeding the paper audit trails
- trust that at least some paper audit trails are manual recounted
- applicable for remote electronic voting

My recommendations

- Be as transparent as possible regarding
 - Source code, system descriptions, ...
 - Evaluation techniques and bodies
- Reduce trust by implementing verifiability
 - Cryptographic E2E verifiable voting systems in particular for remote electronic voting
 - Proper VVPATs with recounts in randomly chosen polling stations

Thank you for your attention!