



 Office of Internal Oversight

OSCE Community Policing Assistance, 2004-2018



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The conclusions of the report do not necessarily represent the views expressed by the stakeholders mentioned above.

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Executive Summary

Introduction

- I. In the OSCE setting community policing refers to a *partnership-based, collaborative effort between the police and the community to improve the quality of life for everyone by more effectively identifying, preventing and solving problems of crime, eliminating fear of crime, reducing physical and social disorder, enhancing safety and security, preventing neighbourhood decay and fostering community wellness*. The OSCE has delivered community policing assistance projects since 1998. By 2019, the large majority of the field missions have provided community policing assistance, with almost all project expenditures related to activities delivered in Serbia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Apart from the projects implemented in Armenia and Azerbaijan, these specific missions were launched in response to interethnic conflict.
- II. Community policing may refer to policing with a local/community level focus. In this case is about the police being locally involved, approachable, trusted, and informed and through this more successful in crime prevention and crime solving. It may also refer to policing between (ethnic) communities, which is similar to the first type of policing in that it is preventive in nature and that the goal is foremost to build trust and to reduce the risk of ethnic violence by being locally involved, approachable, and informed. The latter type is more of a conflict prevention and conflict management tool, rather than solely a crime prevention and crime management tool. The OSCE has provided both variants of community policing assistance, with the large majority of the funds dedicated to policing between (ethnic) communities.
- III. This cross-organizational evaluation covers the time from 2004 to 2018. Special attention was paid to the period from 2013 to 2018. It focuses on countries with the largest OSCE community policing assistance expenditures to ensure that the evaluation covers most of the activities and spending in this field. Since community policing assistance delivered in Kyrgyzstan via the Community Security Initiative (CSI) was already assessed by the OSCE, this evaluation focuses on the OSCE assistance provided by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK), the OSCE Mission to Skopje (OMSk) and the OSCE Mission to Serbia (OMtS).

Evaluation findings

- IV. The projects delivered a wide range of activities, including seminars, workshops, training to strengthen the capacity of police officers, outreach campaigns to inform the public on community policing, support to formulate community policing strategies and related implementation plans, establishment and training of community safety entities, and construction/renovation of police stations and training centres. As such, the activities covered the public/civil society as well as government entities.
- V. OIO found that the assistance activities, outputs and expected outcomes were overall **relevant** as they were aligned with the perceived and stated needs of government entities, and with needs identified through previous projects and assessments. OIO also noted that unless a national community policing policy or strategy was at hand that served to institutionalize and underpin community policing, the capacity building assistance was less relevant since it was less likely to lead to changed policing practices. OIO found this to be the state of affairs in one of the three cases, and partly also in another one. OIO meanwhile recognized that the assistance, and thus also its relevance, to some extent reflect the type of support that is accepted by local institutions

- VI. OIO also found that the OSCE's assistance was **efficient** in that most projects were delivered on time. To the extent that material underspending took place, it was either due to the non-implementation of tasks that were cancelled for various reasons, including delays in government approval of activities, or because the assistance could be delivered at a cost lower than projected.
- VII. OIO furthermore noted that projects were **monitored** at the *activity and output* level in that project officers were commonly informed of progress by being directly involved in delivering project activities. Regarding *results based monitoring*, for reasons of limited staff and financial resources, the missions generally did not follow up on *short-term* assistance results through, e.g., surveys and knowledge tests. While OIO did not encounter any *systematic* monitoring and recording of *mid-term results* with regard to policies either, observations related to this area were regularly made by project staff. Similarly, there was generally no direct *systematic* monitoring and recording of the extent to which assistance had changed *practices*. However, through constant interaction with various stakeholders, project staff were usually kept informed about the state of affairs. With regard to *long-term results*, the missions commissioned large-scale country-wide surveys to assess, inter alia, trust in the police. OIO welcomes this structured survey approach towards tracing long-term results.
- VIII. The assistance projects varied in terms of **short-, mid- and long-term effectiveness**. Concerning *short-term results* in terms of changed *knowledge* and *attitudes*, for reason of lack of data OIO was unable to independently assess to what extent such results had materialized. With regard to *mid-term results* in terms of changed *policies* and *practices*, OIO found that the assistance had resulted in community policing *policy changes* to various degrees. With regard to changes in policing *practices*, OIO observed some changes in two of the cases. However, the lack of central government priorities and policies/strategies on the subject matter meant that the institutionalisation and subsequent resourcing and implementation of community policing was often insufficient.
- IX. Turning to *long-term results* in terms of enhanced *trust* between ethnic communities, and enhanced *trust* in the police, given the limited short-term and mid-term results for two of the cases of this evaluation, OIO found no compelling reasons to expect, let alone attribute and assess changes in *aggregate* levels of trust in the police to the community policing assistance projects. Consequently, and while OIO had access to multi-year national level data on trust in the police, any substantial changes in public trust cannot credibly be attributed to the OSCE's community policing assistance.
- X. OIO found that the field missions had a **comparative advantage** vis-à-vis other potential assistance providers. First, they have been long-term partners with a good political understanding, flexibility, the ability to adjust plans at short notice, expertise and project funds. Moreover, the OSCE's assistance can cover inter-related and mutually reinforcing assistance themes. OIO meanwhile noted that, in all three cases, the OSCE was virtually the only substantial community policing assistance provider.
- XI. With regard to **gender mainstreaming**, since the projects focused on community policing and trust rather than gender equality-related issues, by definition none of the assistance projects *as a whole* could have had gender mainstreaming as the overall "principal objective." OIO found, however, that in recent years gender had been explicitly mainstreamed in almost all projects in terms of considering the gender balance of participants and/or including gender thematic issues, either as stand-alone activities, or incorporated into specific project activities.
- XII. OIO furthermore established that during the past five years **co-ordination** with other assistance providers varied, but was mostly sufficient given that the field missions had been close to the only community policing assistance providers in the countries included in this evaluation. Collaboration

between the three field missions was need-based and at the personal level. Similarly, co-ordination between the field missions and the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna was need-based and mostly for the purpose of information sharing rather than planning. At occasions, the OSCE Secretariat was invited to provide comments on project proposals, or to provide a speaker for an event or policy level support. Only rarely did the Secretariat receive requests for expertise.

- XIII. **Sustainability** of assistance results was assessed at four levels – strategic level; operative level, personal capacity level; and resource level – and concerns whether short-, mid- and long-term outcomes from the OSCE’s assistance can be sustained in the absence of external assistance. Overall, OIO found that sustainability was unsatisfactory in two of the three cases across all four levels, and constrained across the two latter levels for one case. In all three cases, community policing was for various reasons overall implemented as a separate and/or competing task among other police tasks, rather than regarded as the core philosophy of policing. Moreover, in all three cases OIO observed staff and material shortages within the police sector for the implementation of community policing practices.

Recommendations

- XIV. The evaluation recommends that the OSCE seeks to address five core evaluation observations relating to the assistance relevance, effectiveness, monitoring and sustainability of outcomes generated by the project:
1. Update the organization’s community policing concept and related assistance guidelines for Executive Structures.
 2. Develop a cross-organizational community policing assistance action plan/strategy that outlines the core elements of the OSCE’s community policing assistance, its main objectives, milestones, OSCE-level result indicators and benchmarks for the short-, mid- and long-term, and an exit/transition strategy.
 3. Prioritize supporting governments in developing national community policing policies and national strategies that regard community policing as the core policing philosophy. This includes strengthening ministerial level civil servant knowledge of, and commitment to, community policing.
 4. Initiate large-scale community policing capacity-building assistance to police officers and local safety entities only in the presence of national community policing policies and national strategies that prioritize community policing.
 5. Deliver community policing assistance in coordination and jointly with other resourceful international and national assistance providers.

1. Introduction and Purpose

1. In the OSCE, community policing refers to a *partnership-based, collaborative effort between the police and the community to improve the quality of life for everyone by more effectively identifying, preventing and solving problems of crime, eliminating fear of crime, reducing physical and social disorder, enhancing safety and security, preventing neighbourhood decay and fostering community wellness*.¹ Community policing is regarded as a subset of democratic policing involving in essence a police corps accountable to laws and democratic structures in the service of the public.²
2. Community policing may refer to policing with a local/community level focus: it is about the police being locally involved, approachable, trusted, and informed, and through this more successful in crime prevention and crime solving. It may also refer to policing between (ethnic) communities, but still similar to the first type of policing in that it is preventive in nature and that the goal is foremost to build trust, and to reduce the risk of ethnic violence by being locally involved, approachable, and informed.³ The latter type is meanwhile more of a conflict prevention and conflict management tool, instead of solely a crime prevention and crime management tool. The OSCE has provided both variants of community policing assistance, with the large majority of the funds dedicated to the latter⁴.
3. The first OSCE community policing assistance projects were launched in 1998 in Croatia⁵. Since 2002 the large majority of OSCE field missions have delivered community policing assistance, with almost all expenditures of such projects related to the OSCE missions in Serbia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.⁶ The projects were in all the mentioned cases (apart from Armenia and Azerbaijan) launched in response to interethnic violence and conflict, initially focused on addressing interethnic relationships, and later on incorporated into general police reform efforts across entire police corps.⁷
4. This evaluation is carried out for several reasons. First, community policing assistance has had a substantial financial scope, can be expected to be delivered in the future in OSCE participating States, and has previously not been exposed to independent evaluations by OIO. Second, mid- and long-term results of multi-year assistance of this type are unknown. Third and finally, the Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) at the OSCE Secretariat plans to review and update the OSCE's community policing concept, which makes this evaluation timely.
5. Since some assistance projects were on-going at the time of the evaluation, the evaluation is a combination of mid-term evaluation (formative) and a final end-of-activity or terminal (summative) outcome evaluation. It has two purposes. First, apart from constituting routine oversight, a more narrow purpose is to identify recommendations, lessons learned and best practices of relevance to the particular field missions directly covered by this evaluation. Second, the larger and strategic purpose is to assess to what extent the OSCE's community policing assistance has enhanced trust in

¹ OSCE (2008c: 5).

² Ibid., pp. 9-10.

³ OSCE (2006b).

⁴ Source: OSCE financial records and project documents.

⁵ Detailed mission specific accounts and overview tables of OSCE police activities can be found in OSCE (2002, 2003, 2004a, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011a, 2012a, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017a, 2018, and 2019), and OSCE/SPMU (2008, 2013, 2015). For an overview of the OSCE's community policing assistance, see Stodiek (2019). See also Stodiek (2006) and Stodiek&Zellner (2007).

⁶ Source: OSCE financial records.

⁷ Source: OSCE project documents.

ethnically divided societies between ethnic groups and between the public/ethnic groups and the police corps, and how the OSCE's assistance may be designed to more effectively generate results.

6. In the latter regard a strategic question for this evaluation was whether/how the OSCE's *policy and concept of community policing* should be revised in order to enhance assistance effectiveness. Moreover, the report addresses how assistance may be designed to assure that results are (self-)sustainable in the absence of external assistance.
7. The evaluation *scope* is cross-organisational and covers the time period 2004-2018, with special attention to the period 2013-2018 to ensure that conclusions are based on the current state-of-affairs and on a large number of observations. Almost all of the OSCE's community policing assistance expenditures are related to assistance activities by OSCE missions in Serbia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Consequently, these countries and projects entail a large amount of data that assist in generating conclusions. Moreover, the ability to identify *outcomes* is enhanced when evaluations are based on a large number of assistance activities delivered over a longer period of time. Finally, the focus on countries with the largest OSCE community policing assistance expenditures ensures that the evaluation will cover most of the activities and spending in this field. Since community policing assistance delivered in Kyrgyzstan via the Community Security Initiative (CSI) has already been assessed by the SPMU, this evaluation *focuses* on the assistance delivered by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK), the OSCE Mission to Skopje (OMSK) and the OSCE Mission to Serbia (OMtS), which constitute the evaluation sample⁸.
8. The evaluation adheres to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) standard evaluation criteria.⁹ More specifically, it assesses the *relevance, added value, efficiency, effectiveness, impact* and *sustainability* of the assistance. It covers short-term, mid-term, and long-term (impact) outcomes as allowed by data availability. It also assesses *vertical* (between field missions and the Secretariat) and *horizontal* (between field missions, and between field missions and other assistance providers) *co-ordination*, to what extent the OSCE *Gender Action Plan* has been applied, and the degree to which *output-* and *outcome-based project monitoring* has taken place.
9. Data was collected through desk reviews of OSCE documents, third-party data¹⁰ and documents containing qualitative and quantitative data.¹¹ As part of the evaluation OIO carried out three weeklong visits to the countries concerned, where it conducted interviews at numerous locations, including in the capitals and various regions, at local safety entities, mayors' offices, police stations, civil society organisations. Overall, OIO interviewed 105 individuals, including officials from the OSCE Secretariat and field missions, civil servants and civil society organisations. The full list of interviewees,

⁸ The CSI has been assessed three times by SPMU, including after it was closed. The community policing assistance delivered by OMtS and OMiK were assessed by SPMU in 2013 and 2015, respectively (OSCE/SPMU: 2013, 2015).

⁹ OECD-DAC (2010).

¹⁰ The third-party sources are detailed in the bibliography in the annex to this report. OIO examined all available project documents relating to the concerned projects instead of a random sub-sample.

¹¹ As is commonly the case there were limitations to the evaluation's ability to identify and attribute short-, mid- and long-term outcomes to the OSCE's assistance. However, since data sources were triangulated, these limitations did not materially undermine the ability to formulate broad and empirically supported conclusions. These issues and how they were addressed are outlined in the relevant sections of this report.

locations and affiliations is found in the annex to this report. OIO is grateful for the candid and detailed views provided by the interviewees.

10. This report presents the evaluation findings and provides a series of observations for further reflection and follow-up by OSCE management. Section 2 provides the policy background and information on the community policing assistance over the period 2002-2018, whereas section 3 gives an overview of the purpose and logic of the assistance, and provides an overview of funding, activities and output. Section 4 presents the case-level findings related to the key evaluation questions¹², whereas section 5 presents strategic level findings. Finally, section 6 provides a number of recommendations for consideration and follow-up by concerned OSCE management.

2. OSCE Community Policing Assistance: OMiK, OMSk and OMTs

2.1 Policy background

11. Whereas OSCE community policing assistance projects have been prevalent, OSCE decisions on the subject matter have been rare. In 2001, the Bucharest Ministerial Council Decision (MC.DOC/1/01) stated that OSCE pS should address “new security challenges” by, inter alia, “increasing community policing [...] capacities.” Two years later, in 2003, the *OSCE Action Plan on Improving the Situation of Roma and Sinti within the OSCE Area* (MC.DEC/3/03) was approved. The police matters related section of the action plan tasked the SPMU with:

- Developing policies that promote awareness among law-enforcement institutions regarding the situation of Roma and Sinti people;
- Developing training programmes to prevent excessive use of force and to promote awareness of and respect for human rights;
- Developing policies: (1) to improve relations between Roma and Sinti communities and the police, so as to prevent police abuse and violence against Roma and Sinti people; and (2) to improve trust and confidence in the police among Roma and Sinti people;
- Developing policies and procedures to ensure an effective police response to racially motivated violence against Roma and Sinti people;
- Assessing the gap between international standards on police and national practices in consultation with national police forces, NGOs and representatives of Roma and Sinti communities;
- In close partnership with international organizations and Roma NGOs, elaborating and, policy statements, codes of conduct, practical guidance manuals and training programmes;
- Encouraging Roma and Sinti people to work in law-enforcement institutions as a means of promoting tolerance and diversity

12. This Roma and Sinti people-focused action plan was followed by the OSCE’s official and generic concept of community policing in 2008, as cited above. It was also followed by *Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies* (2006), *Guidebook on Democratic Policing* (2006), *Good Practices in*

¹² Evaluation questions, indicators and data sources are found in the annex to this report.

Building Police-Public Partnerships (2008), *Police and Roma and Sinti: Good Practices in Building Trust and Understanding* (2010), *Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach* (2014), and *OSCE Guidebook: Intelligence-led Policing* (2017).

13. The *OSCE Strategic Framework for Police-Related Activities* (PC.DEC/1049) from 2012¹³ sets out guiding principles, lines of action, and thematic priorities of police-related activities, but gives only limited attention to community policing as one among a series of police-related matters. More specifically, the OSCE is tasked to promote “community policing as a core element of policing” and to support “efforts to create multi-ethnic police services.” Meanwhile, the OSCE does not have cross-organisational level strategies or plans with short-term, mid-term and long-term benchmarks that may serve to guide field missions and streamline assistance across its area of operations.
14. OIO notes that the OSCE’s community policing assistance practice commonly led – rather than trailed – the OSCE’s concepts and decisions on the subject matter. For instance, community policing assistance in multi-ethnic societies had been delivered for several years in Serbia and North Macedonia before the *Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies* guidebook was published in 2006. In other instances, technical handbooks were developed by the OSCE before the specific type of community policing assistance was delivered. This includes the handbook *Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization that Lead to Terrorism: A Community-Policing Approach* (2014) and the *OSCE Guidebook: Intelligence-led Policing* (2017).

2.2 Assistance context

15. In all the cases covered by this evaluation, the assistance projects were launched in response to inter-ethnic conflicts that in addition were inter-related and geographically adjacent to one another.¹⁴ Consistent with the *Recommendations on policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies*, *Good Practices in Building Police-Public Partnerships*, and *Guidebook on Democratic Policing*, the initially stated long-term and inter-related goals of these post-conflict projects were to enhance trust between ethnic communities in concerned areas, and between these ethnic communities and police corps. Over time the assistance purpose broadened beyond conflict prevention and management, and beyond the geographic areas of conflict, to also support community policing as a policing principle across the entire police corps in the concerned countries.
16. In the case of Kosovo, the armed conflict between the governments of Serbia and Montenegro and ethnic Albanian armed groups ended with the “Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Force (“KFOR”) and the Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia” in June 1999, followed by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. Consequently, the OSCE Permanent Council, through the decision no. 305, determined that the OSCE will contribute to the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1244. In particular, the OSCE was mandated to train new Kosovo police service within a Kosovo Police School which it will establish and operate.¹⁵

¹³ The strategic framework is summarized in Stodiek (2014).

¹⁴ For further overviews of the conflict related background to these cases, see Stodiek (2006) and Stodiek&Zellner (2007).

¹⁵ The agreement can be found at <https://www.nato.int/kosovo/docu/a990609a.htm>.

17. In the case of North Macedonia, the OSCE's assistance was originally part of the implementation of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement that addressed the violence between an ethnic Albanian armed group and the government in northern areas.¹⁶ The agreement included, inter alia, community level equitable representation of ethnic groups in the police by 2004, that local heads of police should be selected by local municipality assemblies, that 500 police officers from underrepresented communities would be hired and trained by July 2002, and that an additional 500 such officers would be hired and trained by July 2003. The OSCE (together with the European Union (EU) and the United States) were invited to support the implementation of the Ohrid commitments, including by providing training and supporting recruitment of police officers, developing a police code of conduct, and supporting the creation of multi-ethnic police units.
18. With regard to the case of Serbia, the 1999 agreement on Kosovo included a 5 kilometre wide demilitarized zone between Serbia proper and Kosovo, from which an ethnic Albanian armed group carried out armed attacks against Serbian security forces in south-western Serbia (Presovo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja municipalities) over the period 1999-2001. The violence ended through the "Program for the Solution of the Crisis in the Pcinja District" (i.e., "Covic plan")¹⁷ from 2001 that stipulates, inter alia, increased ethnic Albanian representation within the police corps and patrols by ethnically mixed police units in the concerned municipalities. While not called for in the Covic Plan, the OSCE has supported the implementation of the policing related parts since 2001.

3. Assistance Logic, Input, Activities, Outputs and Implementation Modalities

3.1 Purpose and theory of change

19. Consistent with the *Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies, Good Practices in Building Police-Public Partnerships*, and the *Guidebook on Democratic Policing*, and as commonly stated in project proposal documents, the initial broad long-term and inter-related goals of these post-conflict projects were to enhance trust between ethnic communities, and between ethnic communities and police corps, as a means towards reducing the risk for renewed armed conflict. Over time the assistance broadened beyond conflict prevention and conflict management and the geographic areas of conflict in North Macedonia and Serbia, to support community policing as a basic policing principle across the entire police corps and countries. Yet, the long-term goal of enhancing trust – between groups and in the police – has remained unchanged.
20. Whereas the project proposals of OMiK, OMSk and OMtS share the stated long-term goal of enhanced trust they involve different activities, vary in scope, and differ in how *activities*, *outputs*, and *outcomes* are formulated. In line with the OSCE's definition of community policing and the project proposals, the overall underlying stylized assistance logic is that
 - funds and staff (*input*) generate
 - assistance *activities* in terms of events, outreach and infrastructure support (e.g., seminars, workshops, training to strengthen the capacity of police officers; outreach campaigns to inform the public on community policing; support to formulate

¹⁶ The agreement can be found at <https://peaceaccords.nd.edu/accord/ohrid-agreement>. This source also provides a rating of the degree of implementation.

¹⁷ The agreement can be found at <https://www.peaceagreements.org/generateAgreementPDF/1431>.

community policing strategies and related implementation plans; establishment and training of community safety entities; construction/renovation of police stations and training centres; etc.) lead to

- *outputs* (e.g., trainees, information material, guidance documents, draft strategies, and various infrastructure, that lead to
- enhanced knowledge, skills and attitudes (*short-term outcomes*), which generate
- enhanced community policing practices and policies (including strategies and handbooks) (*medium-term outcome*), which generate
- enhanced inter-ethnic trust/reconciliation and public trust in the police, (*long-term outcome, or impact*), which leads to
- less ethnic violence and less crime (*objective*).

3.2 Input: funds and staff

21. OIO identified 93 projects that in full or in part involved community policing assistance delivered by OMiK, OMSk and OMtS over the period 2004-2018.¹⁸ The projects were framed almost exclusively as 1st Dimension projects. Total expenditures were €5.888.614, divided into €1.406.306 for OMiK, €1.529.231 for OMSk and €2.953.057 for OMtS, and of which more than 1/3 concerned infrastructure. Expenditures of individual projects varied considerably, from a low of €365 to a high of €806,236. OSCE staff costs for delivering these projects are unknown since ExB (Extra-budgetary) and UB (Unified Budget) projects typically only include operational expenditures, but not non-operational expenditures (OSCE staff costs and common operational costs). This means that total (operational and non-operational) expenditures are unknown.
22. These three OSCE missions have in recent years been the only substantial community policing assistance providers, and during earlier periods also the largest assistance providers, albeit with substantial donor contributions from various countries, including in particular Norway in the case of OMiK. To the extent that the EU provided policing assistance on its own it covered police reform in general rather than community policing in particular and focused foremost on North Macedonia.¹⁹

3.3 Activities and outputs

23. During thematic and cross-organisational evaluations OIO is commonly faced with the considerable and time-consuming task of conducting an initial mapping OSCE assistance activities and outputs. This evaluation was an exception in that the OSCE Secretariat and the missions have documented activities, outputs and also results through detailed annual as well as an multi-year activity overviews (by one of the field missions), various information products, multi-year summary reports by the OSCE Secretariat, surveys and SPMU-led evaluations. In addition, project proposals and related self-evaluation reports were generally detailed, and OIO had access to third party data sources, including surveys.

¹⁸ The number of projects per mission were 22 (OMtS), 34 (OMSk) and 37 (OMiK).

¹⁹ For instance, the European Commission provided €2.512.000 over 24 months to the North Macedonia Ministry of Finance for police reforms that partially covered support for community policing (European Commission, 2010). The project was delivered 2014-2016 (B&S Europe, 2016)

24. OIO finds this to be a welcome exception from the OSCE's general practice where such level of documentation and detail is commonly absent and the OSCE as an organisation consequently does not have a cross-organisational overview of its activities in specific areas.²⁰ Moreover, OIO has previously not observed that OSCE field missions have commissioned repeated country-wide surveys to assess progress and identify assistance needs.
25. In all three cases, the assistance project activities and related outputs combined a top-down approach with a complementary bottom-up approach, but in varying proportions. The top-down enhanced the capacity (knowledge, skills, training capacity, infrastructure) and policies (laws and strategies) of government entities to introduce community policing into police corps. Commonly, assistance activities were also carried out to assist in implementing laws, strategies, actions plans and manuals that the missions often had been instrumental in creating, either directly (provision of experts) and/or indirectly (funding of workshops, conferences and seminars). Mostly, though, the top-down assistance focused on capacity-building and to a smaller extent on supporting the creation or revision of laws, strategies and action plans that serve to institutionalize new practices.
26. The bottom-up approach involved support to local safety entities, and their preventive safety strategies, action plans, projects and campaigns intended to raise public awareness of community policing, and to assist the police to manage local safety problems that range from traffic related issues to regular crime and interethnic violence in schools. Often referred to as "police-public partnerships", this type of assistance is complementary to top-down approaches in that it focuses on supporting the effective and efficient local level *delivery* of community policing by the police corps, by enhancing trust in the police and by providing for a more locally informed police corps. Commonly, these community safety entities had a broad membership, including from various ethnic and religious communities.
27. OIO notes that the top-down approach is a precondition for the bottom-up approach to have added value: without the foundations for community policing in place within the police corps in terms of capacities and laws/strategies/action plans, it is of limited value to invest in local-level police-public partnerships, and it runs the risk of raising community level expectations among the general population to levels that cannot be met by the police corps. Moreover, and within the top-down approach, it is essential that the legal/strategy/action plan foundation (policies) is at hand, since without it training of police officers is less likely to lead to changed practices, since new practices will not be prioritized and resourced. These two issues will be returned to later in this report.

OMiK²¹

28. The community policing assistance delivered by OMiK was initiated in 2006 and focused initially on the creation of Local Public Safety Committees (LPSC)²² and training of its members. OMiK also

²⁰ Another exception are the detailed annual reports of OSCE's Office of Special Rep/Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings.

²¹ Unless otherwise indicated, data on activities and outputs are based on OSCE project documents and financial records, Stodiek (2006), Stodiek&Zellner (2007), OSCE/SPMU (2008, 2015), OSCE (2002, 2003, 2004a, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011a, 2012a, 2013, 2014a, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019), Peake (2004), Kosovo Police (2015a, 2015b, 2015c), Republic of Kosovo (2014a, 2014b) and interviews.

²² Advisory and preventive in nature, LPSCs were established through the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and intend to address the security needs of local communities and give them a voice in local policing (UNMIK: 2005). According to Article 7.5 of the Law on Police (Nr. 03/L-035) the General Director of the Kosovo

provided capacity building to members of the functionally overlapping Community Safety Action Teams (CSAT), the creation of which had been initiated by the United States in 2003.²³ From 2009 and onwards OMIK has supported the creation, funding of activities and training of Municipal Community Safety Councils (MCSC), which mimic the functions of LPSCs but are located at a higher administrative level.²⁴ Overall, the purpose and existence of these local community safety entities are aligned with the OSCE's guidelines *Good Practices in Building Police-Public Partnerships* and *Recommendations on Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies*.

29. The first instance of community policing training of police officers took place in 2009, and was scaled up in 2010 when Kosovo institutions initiated implementation of its community policing concept. From 2010 and onwards OMIK's assistance broadly included support to the formulation and implementation of community policing strategies and related action/implementation plans, manifested in various capacity-building events, conferences, and public outreach events.
30. The annual project budgets have almost continuously increased since 2010, and the activities have become more encompassing. Similar to the community policing assistance provided to North Macedonia and Serbia, substantial attention has been given to training of community safety entity members and to supporting the creation of local action plans and related implementation projects. In contrast to the case of North Macedonia (see below), the balance of the assistance to community safety entities and to the police corps have not shifted in favour of the former.
31. The outputs generated by OMIK's project activities are similar to those in Serbia and North Macedonia. They included the creation of MCSCs, LPSCs, trainees (police, MoI (Ministry of Interior), MCSC and LPSC staff, training-of-trainers), training curricula, various information materials, funding MSCS and LPSCS projects, and a large number of civilians reached by mission funded outreach activities delivered by the police corps, MoI and LPSCs. They also included various draft national strategies and plans relating to policing, including the 2011-2016 *National Strategy and Action Plan for Community Safety*, the 2012-2016 and 2017-2021 community policing strategies, and the *Outreach Strategy* and 2014 *Action Plan for the Public Safety Outreach Initiatives*.²⁵
32. In terms of capacity-building, over the period 2006-2018, project documents indicate that OMIK supported the training of close to 3.500 police officers (including trainers), some 1.100 LPSC members, 700 MSCS members and an estimated 100-150 MoI officials.²⁶ One interviewee stated that 6.000 police officers have been trained by trainers trained by the OSCE, and that the Kosovo police has 30 certified community policing trainers. OIO has been unable to determine the number of police officers trained on the basis of curricula and manuals developed by OMIK, and by the trainers capacitated by

Police is empowered to establish a LPSC within any municipality (Republic of Kosovo: 2008). See also Kosovo Police (2015b). As of 2018, LPSCs existed in 33 of Kosovo's 37 municipalities (Government of Kosovo, 2018). For details on MCSCs and LPSCs, including activities and organisational matters, see OSCE/OMIK (2011, 2017, 2019).²³ For details see Kosovo Police (2015b), OSCE (2009a) and United States Department of Justice (2018). As of 2013, 32 CSATs existed across Kosovo (Kosovo Local Government Institute, 2013).

²⁴ As of 2018 there were MCSCs in 34 of Kosovo's 38 municipalities (OSCE/OMIK, 2019), while the number of LPCs is larger than the number of municipalities (OSCE/OMIK, 2017).

²⁵ Note, once these draft strategies and plans were approved by the government, they constituted project outcomes instead of outputs.

²⁶ OSCE/SPMU (2015: iii) presents the figures of 5.000 police officials by 2015, but this figure refers to training carried out without direct OSCE involvement.

the mission. Moreover, OIO does not have complete data on the number of citizens who have been directly reached by local safety entities and the police corps' projects and outreach activities.

OMSk²⁷

33. The mission has delivered community policing assistance since 2001. The period 2001-2004 was related to the preceding armed conflict in that it focused on the northern part of the country. It included training, conferences, workshops and seminars for police officers, police trainers and MoI officials, the creation of a community policing handbook, infrastructure assistance in terms of refurbishment of the police academy buildings and police stations together with the provision of various office equipment. As such, the assistance was mostly of a top-down character.
34. OMSk also initiated bottom-up assistance in terms of the creation of citizen advisory groups (CAGs) in the area of conflict, whose purpose is to raise public awareness of community policing, assist the police in identifying and managing local community security and safety problems, and reduce local ethnic/religious tensions. OMSk provided training of CAG members, funding to formulate and implement CAG community safety projects and the production of information material, including flyers, brochures, and a TV programme on community policing directed at the general public. In 2005 OMSk initiated efforts to create CAGs in the rest of the country.
35. A new assistance item was initiated in 2007 in terms of the creation of Local Prevention Councils (LPCs), funding of their projects and activities, and training of their members. The LPCs are complementary to CAGs in that they cover larger administrative regions whereas CAGs are active at lower administrative levels.²⁸ Also in 2007, OMSk supported the development of police training curricula.
36. Two additional assistance features were implemented in 2008 and 2010. In 2008, OMSk trained 98 community policing Inspectors of Prevention (IoP) to enhance sustainability of its other capacity building measures.²⁹ In 2010, it co-located police advisors in local police stations to provide mentoring in project management and on community policing matters.
37. The period 2013 and onwards is characterized by a reduced assistance activity volume, and the assistance shifting from mostly enhancing the capacity (knowledge, skills, training capacity, infrastructure) and marginally enhancing policies (laws and strategies) of government entities towards supporting local community safety entities, local safety strategies, action plans, projects and public awareness campaigns intended to raise awareness of the concept of community policing and to assist the police to address local community safety problems. The number of training events, roundtables, seminars and conferences directed at police officers and MoI officials has decreased, which also applies to training of CAG and LPC members and support to CAG and LPC meetings and activities.
38. By 2013, the responsibility for CAGs and LPCs had been transferred to the government. Moreover, community policing assistance that was previously delivered as stand-alone projects was incorporated as tasks into projects that provide support to democratic policing and police reform in general. A new

²⁷ Unless otherwise indicated, data on activities and outputs are based on OSCE project documents and financial records, Stodiek (2006), Stodiek&Zellner (2007), OSCE/OMSk (2007, 2012a), OSCE (2002, 2003, 2004a, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011a, 2012a, 2013, 2014a, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019), Selimi&Bogdanovski (2015), OSCE/SPMU (2008), Peake (2004) and interviews.

²⁸ For summary information on CAGs and LPCs, see Selimi&Bogdanovski (2015).

²⁹ OSCE (2008d).

assistance element since 2013 has involved supporting regional police centres in formulating regional (prevention) action plans (RPAP), and the funding of related implementation projects. Another new assistance item as compared to the 2005-2012 period was the construction of community focused police stations in the vicinity of Skopje.

39. The outputs generated by the activities included the creation of multi-ethnic police units (first assistance phase), CAGs, LPCs, trainees (police, MoI, CAG and LPC staff, training-of-trainers), police stations/academy, training curricula, various information materials, infrastructure created by mission funded LPC and CAG projects (e.g., street lights), and civilians reached by a large number of mission funded outreach activities.
40. In terms output volumes, over the period 2002-2007, OMSk supported the training of close to 1.700 individuals, including 600 CAG members, some 100 police officer trainers, and additional MoI staff and police officers at various levels.³⁰ Similarly, for the period 2008-2012 the same sources indicate around 1.500 trained individuals, including 700 LPC and CAG members. For the period 2013 and onwards, project documents show that the training of police officers/trainers covered 50-150 individuals per year. However, OIO has been unable to assess how many police officers have been trained on the basis of the curricula and manuals developed by OMSk, and by the trainers capacitated by the mission.³¹ Meanwhile, in 2013/2014, at least some 19.000 students and some 800 citizens were covered by information outreach delivered by police sectors and funded by the mission.³² After a reduced output a couple of years, it increased again in 2018 when the activities covered some 2.500 students.

OMtS³³

41. Similar to OMSk and OMiK, OMtS' assistance covered the police corps/MoI, local community safety entities and the general public. In contrast to OMSk, the assistance has been steady from 2010 and onwards due to efforts to implement the government's community policing strategy with related action/implementation plans. It has not shifted its balance towards supporting community safety entities, local safety strategies, action plans, projects and public awareness campaigns at the expense of assistance to the police corps and MoI.
42. The assistance initiated in November 2003 was directly related to the preceding armed conflict in that it focused on south-western Serbia. It covered training of police officers, community liaison officers, and police trainers, included study visits abroad for police and MoI officials, and supported the creation of Multi-Ethnic Police Elements (MEPE). Additional activities included infrastructure support, construction and equipping of police corps classrooms, the creation of a basic police training centre and three training centres in the region.

³⁰ OSCE/OMSk (2012a).

³¹ In a large-scale survey commissioned by OMSk (OSCE/OMSk, 2014), 90.8% of police officers stated that they had received training in community policing, while 94.4% of the officers responded that they felt confident in delivering community policing.

³² OIO does not have an estimate of the total number of citizens who have been reached by the various outreach activities delivered by OMSk, the police service, MoI, LPCs and CAGs.

³³ Unless otherwise indicated, data on activities and outputs are based on project documents, financial records, OSCE/Mission to Serbia (2004, 2014), OSCE (2002, 2003, 2004a, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008a, 2008d, 2009a, 2009b, 2010, 2011a, 2012a, 2013, 2014a, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019), OSCE/SPMU (2008, 2013), Stodiek (2006), Stodiek&Zellner (2007), Ryan (2007), Peake (2004) and interviews.

43. In 2007 the mission commenced support to the creation of a community policing strategy, which existed as a draft by 2009 and was adopted by MoI in 2012. OMtS also facilitated the creation of a strategy implementation action plan that was issued in 2015 and ended in 2017. In addition, the mission supported the creation of a community policing action plan for 2018-2019.
44. OMtS supported the creation of Community Advisory Groups (CAGs) and Municipal Safety Councils (MSC), which have broadly the same purpose as the local safety entities in Kosovo and North Macedonia, and provided training to its members and funding for the implementation of its action plans that included awareness raising of the general public. For instance, 50 MSC outreach projects/events were financed by OMtS in 2012-2013 alone. OMtS also organized a conference for 400 members of the Standing Conference of Towns and Municipalities (STCM) on the MSC manual that was created in 2015. In addition it funded research by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on police reform, and trained NGOs in advocacy skills, funded panel discussions on police reform, TV spots, and organized national and regional community policing conferences.
45. The outputs generated by the activities included the creation of multi-ethnic police units (first assistance phase), CAGs, MSCs, trainees (police, MoI, CAG and MSC staff, training-of-trainers), police stations/academy, training curricula, various information materials, TV and radio spots, research publications, infrastructure created by mission-funded MSC and CAG projects, a community policing manual, and a large number of civilians reached by a large number of mission funded outreach activities. Additional outputs include the draft community policing strategy for 2013-2017 and the draft implementation action plans 2015-2017.³⁴
46. With regard to capacity building and outreach, for the period 2001-2018 project documents indicate that the mission trained around 2.800 police officers, a small number of MoI officials and more than 200 MCS members. The output related to outreach projects delivered by local police sections and MCSs is considerable. For instance, at least 20.000 civilians have been directly reached by these activities (meetings, school information campaigns, etc.) by 2012³⁵, and a mission funded project in 2018 printed 128.000 copies of a Child Safety Handbook intended for schools.

3.4 Implementation modalities

47. OSCE assistance projects commonly rely on partnerships with government entities, civil society organizations and international organizations. The community policing projects adhered to this common OSCE practice. As such they were delivered in close and multi-year partnerships with the beneficiary countries, including Mols, police corps, municipalities and local safety entities. Overall, the beneficiary partners selected training participants, and were involved in the design and implementation of the activities. The rare instances of outsourcing involved commissioned surveys of trust in the police and research on police-related matters. A small part of the training provided by OMiK was delivered in partnership with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP).

³⁴ Once approved by the government or MoI, these outputs became outcomes.

³⁵ OSCE/SPMU (2013).

4. Evaluation Findings: Case Level

4.1 Relevance

OMiK

48. OIO finds that the activities, outputs and expected outcomes were aligned with the perceived and stated needs of the government, including its various strategies and plans, and with needs identified through previous projects. All projects were formulated and delivered in continuous consultation with the local institutions. This includes projects implemented by local safety entities, which were formulated in dialogue with MoI officials and others. OIO recognizes that the assistance, and thus also its relevance, to some extent reflect the type of assistance that is accepted by local institutions.
49. The initial assistance activities were aligned with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244. The assistance was also explicitly aligned with the national strategy and action plan for community safety, community policing strategies and related action/implementation plans³⁶, as well as with continuous needs assessments outlined in project documents.
50. OMiK did not have a multiyear strategy and plan for its assistance apart from its security department's three-year plan. Interviewed OMiK officials stated that it relied on the government's strategies and plans to guide its assistance, with the long-term goal of full local ownership. Meanwhile, the Kosovo community policing strategy 2017-2021 is not synchronized with the general Police Development Plan 2016-2020 that does not mention community policing: whereas the strategy describes community policing as a basic policing philosophy, this is not reflected in the latter. During interviews local government officials agreed that the two documents are not fully aligned with one another.
51. In practice, community policing is regarded as a separate police task instead of constituting the core philosophy of all police tasks. Similar to – but to a smaller degree than – the situation in Serbia and North Macedonia, OIO finds that this state of affairs undermines the usefulness of the OSCE's capacity-building and support to local safety entities since local-level police-public partnerships are of limited utility unless coupled with the actual delivery of community policing. Moreover, for capacity-building to become effective, community policing should constitute the main principle of the entire police work, rather than one among several separate tasks allocated to select police officers
52. Beneficiary interviewees overall expressed satisfaction with the contents and magnitude of the training provided. Some voices expressed that senior level police staff got more training than junior level staff, and that OMiK should have invested more in junior level staff training. Another view was that LPC members only receive one-off trainings while they ideally should receive continuous/follow-up training, since there is a substantial turnover among its members. Yet another view was that the training is too theoretical and too little applied, and that it should include more study visits.

OMSk

53. The activities, outputs and expected outcomes identified through interviews and project documents were relevant in that they were aligned with the perceived and stated needs of the government, including its various strategies and plans. At a general level all projects were formulated in continuous consultation with the MoI and based on needs identified through previous projects and large-scale

³⁶ Project documents and Republic of Kosovo (2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2016, 2017a, 2018a).

surveys. Projects implemented by CAGs and LPCs were formulated in dialogue with MoI officials and others. OIO recognizes that the OSCE's assistance and thus its relevance also partly reflects the type of assistance that is accepted by local institutions.

54. Interview information showed that OMSk did not have a community policing assistance strategy of its own. As such, and which is common throughout the OSCE, its assistance was project-based instead of strategy-based. Apart from OSCE's annual UB budgets that undermine long-term planning, interviewees mentioned that the OSCE's project templates are limiting/not encouraging strategic thinking. Moreover, and in the words of interviewees, the assistance was supply-driven (i.e., suggested by the OSCE to the extent allowed by funding) instead of demand-driven (i.e., requested by the government), and activity-based with a short-term focus. As of May 2019, OMSk has not had a community policing assistance strategy apart from its UB program plan that spans 2-3 years.
55. The assistance was initially launched to support implementation of the Ohrid Agreement, including providing training and recruitment of police, development of a police code of conduct, and by supporting the creation of multi-ethnic police units. Further development of the assistance was based on a needs assessment in 2002 in the form of a large-scale survey that was distributed to more than 2.500 individuals, and which resulted in a policing strategy and implementation plan in 2002 that were developed jointly with the MoI. The mission has ever since carried out biannual surveys to monitor progress and identify assistance needs.³⁷
56. The projects were also aligned with the police development strategy 2016-2020³⁸ that outlines MoI's vision "to ensure the rule of law and ethical and professional work of the employees, as well as to develop the concept of intelligence-led policing, which in its scope sublimates community policing." However, community policing is just one of 47 objectives in the strategy, which also points out that "The lack of budget for introducing Community Policing activities has an adverse effect on the self-sustainability of Police activities in the area of Community Policing."
57. North Macedonia has never had a national community policing strategy. Many interviewees stated – and OIO concurs – that unless such a strategy is at hand that serves to institutionalize and underpin community policing, together with an implementation plan, the OSCE's assistance will not be effective in that it will not lead to mid- and long-term results as knowledge and attitudes acquired through the OSCE's assistance will not be implemented. Allegedly because of its limited annual budget and the annual character of projects, OMSk did not attempt to promote revisions or creations of laws and strategies since that would have involved a multi-year engagement. OIO therefore finds that the large bulk of the assistance, while relevant to the needs of North Macedonia, had probably an a priori limited effectiveness, since without a legal and policy foundation, community policing is less likely to become a government priority, resourced and translated into police practices.
58. OIO also finds that from 2013 and onwards OMSk's assistance has been less relevant in the sense that capacity building support to the government has been reduced, and the focus has been on strengthening police-public partnerships. Meanwhile, police-public partnerships are of limited utility unless coupled with capacity building and policy support to the government, since the purpose is to support the implementation of community policing. OIO finds that this undermines the usefulness of

³⁷OSCE/OMSk (2012b, 2014, 2017).

³⁸ Ministry of Interior of North Macedonia (2016).

the OSCE's capacity-building and support to local safety entities since police-public partnerships are of limited utility unless coupled with the actual delivery of community policing.

59. According to interview information, the reorientation and reduction of assistance is associated with an increasingly limited budget of OMSk. There is reportedly also limited MoI interest to mainstream community policing in the police corps, which according to interview information is due to a series of factors, including a general lack of funding for policing, limited interest among police officers, and an understaffed police corps that is focused on reactive incident type of policing instead of preventive community policing. In addition, community policing entails the need to decentralise decision-making in the police corps, which is not aligned with its current centralized character. Moreover, the concept of preventive community policing and the related concept of a "police service" are not aligned with the tradition of a "police force" and a traditionally reactive type of policing. Interview information indicated that "community policing" is widely not regarded as "real policing" by police officers.
60. Beneficiary interviewees generally considered OMSk's initial training assistance as important, though there were different views on whether the training had the right blend of theory and practice. Some interviewees viewed the volume as insufficient, whereas others stated that the police corps had not been able to utilize the skills gained from the training. Commonly, interviewees regarded the training delivered from 2013 and onwards as less relevant, as the training volume had been reduced and that government changes towards community policing reforms were perceived as having stagnated. For instance, the continuous need for training of – and follow-up training of previously trained – police officers was no longer addressed, since there is no "[training] plan from above" (i.e., from MoI) to assure that training is delivered to new staff.

OMtS

61. Similar to the previous two cases, and conditioned by available funds, the OSCE's activities, outputs and expected outcomes were relevant in that they were aligned with the perceived and stated needs of the government, including its various strategies and plans. All projects were formulated and implemented in continuous consultation with the government, and were based on needs identified through previous projects and large-scale surveys. This includes projects implemented by CAGs and MSCs. Similar to the other two cases in this evaluation, OIO recognizes that the assistance relevance reflects to some extent the type of assistance that is accepted by the local institutions.
62. Activities were initially aligned with the Covic plan in terms of increased ethnic Albanian representation within the police corps and patrols by ethnically mixed police units in the municipalities exposed to the armed conflict. They were also aligned with the "Monk report" of 2001 that was a needs assessment that recommended an overall modernisation of the police corps, including introduction of "full community policing and that international assistance be provided with its formulation and implementation" and "Community Consultative Groups" (i.e., CAGs and MCSs) that "provide a formal and regular means for the police to publicly consult their communities."³⁹ Moreover, the assistance has been aligned with the 2003 government adopted "Police Reform Strategy" that, inter alia, highlighted community policing, and the 2004 government "Action Plan for the Implementation of the Police Reform Process".⁴⁰ Community policing is also included in the

³⁹ OSCE (2001).

⁴⁰ OSCE/SPMU (2008: 15).

*Development Strategy of the Ministry of Interior 2011-2016*⁴¹, it is mentioned four times as a priority in *Mol's Public Security Strategic Assessment 2017*⁴², once in the *Strategic Police Plan for the Period 2018-2021*.⁴³ Moreover, the police law of 2016 makes community policing mandatory, but it is only covered in Article 27 and not elsewhere in this document of 124 pages.

63. Serbia's assistance needs were also analysed and identified in a mission report that, inter alia, recommended that individual level capacity building should be complemented by changes in laws and regulatory frameworks in order to ensure sustainable reforms.⁴⁴ It therefore recommended that OSCE should assist the government in creating a community policing strategy based on a 2003 vision document. The strategy was drafted 2004-2007 with OSCE assistance, finalized in 2009, and approved by the government in 2012. According to interview information, the strategy and the action/implementation plan (2015-2017) also constituted the mission's assistance strategy and the lens through which assistance projects were designed in recent years. This means that OMtS did not have an independent assistance strategy and plan of its own. Moreover, OMtS used its 2014 study⁴⁵ of the role of MCSs as part of its needs assessment for the support to community safety entities. In addition, it has carried out annual national surveys on police related matters since 2008 to monitor progress and identify assistance needs.⁴⁶
64. OIO finds that this state of affairs in Serbia is similar to the one in North Macedonia. Community policing is regarded as one among several tasks rather than the character of the entire police corps. By 2019 the government does not have an approved community policing strategy. Similarly, OIO finds that it undermines the usefulness of the OSCE's capacity-building and support to local safety entities: without a legal and policy foundation, capacity-building of police officers is less likely to be translated into changed police practices as community policing is not resourced and prioritized, while the very purpose of police-public partnerships is to support the implementation of community policing. Thus, support to police-public partnerships are of limited utility unless coupled with the delivery of community policing. Moreover, for the capacity-building of police officers to become effective, community policing should preferably constitute an element of the philosophy of all police tasks, rather than one among several competing tasks that for various reasons may not be widely implemented.
65. OIO received positive but varying assistance beneficiary views on how the OSCE should have designed its assistance to Serbia to make it more relevant. One view held that OMtS should have pursued more of a bottom-up approach, in that it should have invested more in educating the public and local municipality staff on community policing. Another view among some police officers was that the training paid too much attention theory and too little attention to applying the community policing concept. Citing the centralized structure of the police, still another view with which OIO concurs and which is aligned with the 2001 Monk report, was that a top-down approach should have been pursued to a larger extent. Such an approach would have focused on creating community policing strategies

⁴¹ Ministry of Interior of Serbia (2010). For instance, the objective of project 2400604 was to support implementation of the national community policing strategy that the mission was instrumental in drafting.

⁴² Ministry of Interior of Serbia (2017a).

⁴³ Ministry of Interior of Serbia (2017b).

⁴⁴ OSCE/OMtS (2004).

⁴⁵ OSCE/OMtS (2014).

⁴⁶ OSCE/OMtS commissioned survey data are found in Kantar TNS Gallup (2013, 2014, 2016), Kantar TNS (2017, 2018), IPSOS (2008, 2009 and 2010), CESID (2011) and Strategic Marketing and Research (2008).

and assisting in their implementation, and working more at the political level and together with the EU to make community policing a government policy priority.

4.2 Effectiveness: short-, mid- and long-term results

OMiK

Short-term results: knowledge and attitudes

66. OIO did not find a consensus among interviewees on the level of community policing *knowledge* among different stakeholders. One interviewee claimed that the community policing concept was “not well understood” among the general public, despite the OSCE-funded awareness raising activities delivered through LPCs, etc. Other interviewees stated that the police corps lacked knowledge, and that the OSCE’s training was of a too limited magnitude to make a difference, whereas still other interviewees stated that the police corps had a good understanding of the concept.
67. Whereas some training results in terms of knowledge gains among police officers, local safety entity members and the public may be safely assumed, for reasons of absence of data OIO has been unable to independently assess to what extent this has been the case. Systematically collected data on whether and to what extent knowledge, skills and attitudes were changed by the assistance activities provided to the police corps and to local safety entities does not exist, since training and awareness raising events were typically not followed up through, e.g., surveys and knowledge tests.
68. Interviewees more commonly credited OMiK with having changed *attitudes* in terms of overcoming some of the resistance against community policing within the police corps. Still, most interviewees indicated that negative attitudes or “resistance” among the general public still existed, which according to some of them may be conditioned by insufficient knowledge, by the fact that community policing was not exercised to a sufficient/expected degree, and that a traditional distrust in the police corps still existed. OIO notes that this state of affairs is similar to the ones observed in North Macedonia and Serbia.

Mid-term results: policies and practices

69. The most significant and easiest observable mid-term results are located at the policy level. OSCE has been instrumental in supporting the creation of the government adopted 2011-2016 *National Strategy and Action Plan for Community Safety*, and the 2012-2016 and 2017-2021 community policing strategies and related action/implementation plans. OIO also found that the assistance changed practices in that community policing training has become part of the standard police training curricula. For instance, police cadet training now includes 50 training hours in community policing.
70. On the other hand, interviewees commonly noted that police practices in the field were not aligned with the community policing strategies. The explanations included that the strategy was too general to be useful for implementation, the police being overstretched, and disinterest in community policing among police officers. OIO also notes that whereas the Kosovo Police is oriented towards community policing (as indicated by the repeated community policing strategies), it is by 2019 still regarded as a separate task rather than the underlying philosophy of all police activities in the general police development plan. Nevertheless, virtually all interviewees were of the opinion that since 2012 police practices have changed in the direction of paying more attention to prevention, and that the police corps was increasingly becoming a service and less of a force. This anecdotal evidence is corroborated

by recent large-scale public survey data that show that the public's perception of the police corps as foremost a "service" has increased from 57% in 2015 to 66% in 2017.⁴⁷

71. Another proxy indicator of improved services – which may or may not involve community policing – is public satisfaction with the police corps. Surveys carried out by UNDP since 2010 show large oscillations and a general increase in the proportion (%) of the public expressing satisfaction ("satisfied" or "very satisfied") with the police corps, from a low of 18.5% to a high of 40.6% over the period 2010-2016, and a satisfaction rate of 66% in 2018.⁴⁸ However, since the data is at the aggregate level, OIO has not been able to parse out to what extent community policing related activities account for the increased satisfaction with the police corps.
72. Turning to the work of the MCSCs, OIO was unable to determine whether OMiK's assistance changed the practices of local safety entities. Meanwhile, interviewees commonly described these entities as hampered by the lack of a legislative framework. Moreover, to a large extent interviewees described LPSCs and MCSCs as ineffective, allegedly for reasons of lack of funds, absence of meeting venues, because all members are volunteers, and because they carry out few meetings.⁴⁹ This suggests that to the extent that MCSCs have changed their practices, this is likely to have involved only a minority of the entities.

Long-term results: trust

73. The establishment of LPSCs and MCSCs, the one-off training of their members, and funding of some of their activities resulted in direct contacts between local safety entities and parts of the public. However, interviewees commonly stated that these entities did not sufficiently focus on safety and security issues.⁵⁰ OIO made similar observations on the safety entities in Serbia and Northern Macedonia. For instance, LPCs cover issues such as waste collection and road safety. Some interviewees claimed that it was unclear whether this led to enhanced trust between ethnic communities, whereas other interviewees said that the activities had indeed reduced interethnic incidents and contributed to integrating domestically displaced returnees. Interviewees also commonly stated that public trust in the police had improved, but that police activities had not improved inter-ethnic trust. One explanation offered for the latter was that issues of inter-ethnic trust could not be solved by the police but only by local safety entities, which is why they were created to begin with.


⁴⁷ Source: Belgrade Center for Security Studies (2017b, 2017c).

⁴⁸ Source: Raw survey data downloaded from UNDP's *Public Pulse Visualiser* website at <http://unckt.org/public-pulse/>. For stronger conclusions on the impact of community policing practices it would have been necessary to have data on the extent to which an *individual* has been in contact with community policing, and the individual level of satisfaction in the police.

⁴⁹ MCSCs are required to hold six meetings per year, which was recorded only for 10 of the 34 (of 38) municipalities where MCSCs have been established. This is an improvement over 2017 when this was the case for only one of the municipalities, and 2013 when only three municipalities with MCSCs met the requirement of six meetings (OSCE/OMiK, 2019; Republic of Kosovo, 2014a, 2017b, 2018b). For statistics of the number of MCSCs and their meeting frequency in 2010, see OSCE/OMiK (2011).

⁵⁰ Data from 2018 for MCSCs for show that 47% did not adopt work plans to address local safety and security concerns, and that 47% of their meetings did not cover security issues or concerns of non-majority communities (OSCE/OMiK, 2019).

74. Because of the lack of systematically collected data, OIO was not able to assess the veracity of the claims relating to inter-ethnic trust.⁵¹ However, given the limited functionality of most local safety entities, it may be conjectured that any impact on inter-ethnic trust should be limited. Consequently, any substantial changes in inter-ethnic trust and the number of inter-ethnic incidents would in general be difficult to convincingly attribute to the entities’ activities, and thus in extension to this specific element of OMIK’s assistance.
75. Graph I below provides data on public trust in the police over the period 2006 – 2019.⁵² The overall picture is one of either high – or increasing – levels of trust in recent years. OIO also notes that the level of trust in the police is the highest among the three case studies of this evaluation.⁵³



76. For reasons (barriers) similar to the ones in Serbia and North Macedonia, it is challenging to compellingly attribute and assess the contribution to aggregate level changes in trust to OMIK’s community policing assistance.⁵⁴ Also similarly, trust is contingent not only on the delivery of community policing, but also on perceived corruption, the handling of other police tasks (crime investigations, traffic incidents, handling of demonstrations, etc.) and other factors. Moreover, it is unclear how much community policing has been carried out. Since the extent of community policing

⁵¹ Raw survey data downloadable from UNDP’s *Public Pulse Visualiser* website at <http://unkt.org/public-pulse/>. provide multiyear ethnically disaggregated data on satisfaction with the police, but not on trust in the police.

⁵² Sources: Gallup (2008), Saferworld (2007, 2008, 2010, 2011), and Kosovo Center for Security Studies (2013, 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017, 2018a, 2018b, 2019).

⁵³ The Kosovo Center for Security Studies data include the response options “mainly trust” and “completely trust”, the earlier Saferworld survey data include the more restrictive response categories “completely trust” or “very much trust”, while the 2008 Gallup survey includes the categories “a lot” and “some.” This means that the data is broadly comparable across the different surveys.

⁵⁴ The fundamental problem in this case is that survey data is at the aggregate/population level instead of at the disaggregate/individual level. For stronger conclusions on the impact of community policing practices it would have been necessary to have data on the extent to which an individual has been in contact with community policing, and the individual level of trust in the police. This challenge applies also to trust surveys for the cases of North Macedonia and Serbia.

has apparently been limited, there are no compelling or logical reasons to expect that tangible aggregate level variations in trust are linked to community policing practices, and in extension to OMiK's community policing assistance. In addition, the OSCE and other actors have delivered other types of assistance to the police, which means that it is difficult to parse out the effect of the community policing assistance from the effect of other types of assistance with any precision.

OMSk

Short-term results: knowledge and attitudes

77. Interviewees were in general agreement that the assistance had enhanced knowledge, but also that significant knowledge gaps among police officers, local safety council members, and the general public exist. Moreover, after 2013 when the OSCE's training assistance was scaled down and the focus was directed to local safety entities, only very few OSCE-organized training were delivered to police officers. From this follows that the knowledge gaps among officers in 2019 are arguably larger than in 2013.⁵⁵
78. Similar to the case of Serbia, interviewees who claimed that sufficient knowledge existed among police officers, were of the view that knowledge implementation was hindered by negative *attitudes* against community policing, which was not considered to be "real" [i.e., incident management] policing, and a lack of resources (manpower and material). The latter has meant that the police corps is stretched thin and focuses on incident management instead of prevention. Likewise, interviewees shared the view that there was also "resistance" among the general public against the idea of community policing because of a traditional lack of trust in the police. Given that Serbia and North Macedonia stem from the same political system and police system/traditions, these virtually identical observations across the cases are not surprising
79. Whereas some impact from the OSCE's assistance on knowledge and attitudes may reasonably be expected, and while the anecdotal evidence may be representative and accurate, OIO is for reasons of lack of data unable to independently assess assistance short-term results. However, given that the training of police officers has been reduced since 2013, and the mission has focused on supporting local safety entities, the assistance impact on knowledge and attitudes among police officers is likely to be limited by 2019. This applies in particular to the awareness raising activities and projects delivered by local safety entities to the public.
80. Moreover, since most of the local safety entities have limited functionality, and only a small proportion of the country's population has been reached by the entities' small number of activities, the impact on knowledge and attitudes within the general population is likely limited. This conjecture is supported by survey data on the actual awareness of CAGs and LPCs. First, data over the period 2010-2014 show that in 2012, 75.4% and 73.4% of police officers were "completely or generally acquainted" with CAGs and LPCs, respectively.⁵⁶ By 2014 these figures had decreased to 63.2% and 65.8%, respectively.⁵⁷ Thus, even a sizeable proportion of among the police officers was not acquainted with

⁵⁵ This should be compared to a large-scale survey commissioned by OMSk (OSCE/OMSk, 2014), in which 90.8% and 94.4% of police officers responded that they to some – but an unknown – extent had been trained in community policing, and that they felt confident in delivering community policing, respectively.

⁵⁶ Source: OSCE/OMSk, 2014).

⁵⁷ Ibid.

local safety entities. Second, survey data show that the public's awareness of CAGs and LPCs has decreased, from 34.4% and 37.2% in 2010, to 28.8% and 27.6% in 2012, and to 27.5% and 29.4% in 2014, respectively.⁵⁸ Comparable survey data do not exist for recent years. Given the low degree of awareness, and OMSk's reduced assistance after 2013, the entities' impact on the public's knowledge of - and attitudes towards - community policing is likely increasingly limited.

Mid-term results: policies and practices

81. Interviewees commonly suggested a series of barriers apart from knowledge gaps and negative attitudes that undermined implementation of community policing. According to several interviewees, the OSCE's training of police officers was useful, but the police corps has not put the training to use. One commonly cited barrier was staff rotation of police officers and prevention officers within the police corps in that trained officers have been assigned roles other than community policing or prevention. For instance, of the 98 IoPs trained by the OSCE in 2008, around 95% have been assigned to non-community policing tasks.⁵⁹ The foremost alleged reasons include that prevention is not regarded as priority or "real" police work by officers and managers alike, that officers have a preference for repressive policing (i.e., incident management) instead of preventive policing (i.e., community policing), that there is no career path for community police officers, and that the police corps is so stretched that it can only focus on acute incident management instead of on prevention.
82. Moreover, whereas the mission spent a considerable effort on establishing and funding LPCs and CAGs, many of them are of limited functionality, due to a lack of resources for delivering activities, that members are volunteers, and that meetings are usually held only twice per year. OIO has been unable to determine whether OMSk's assistance has changed the practices of local safety entities. However, given that the functionality of most of these entities is constrained for reasons beyond the OSCE's control, it appears logical to infer that the assistance has overall likely not led to tangibly changed practices.
83. In addition, interviewees commonly cited the existence of other barriers, including the absence of a joint planning and a joint approach on community policing issues within the police corps, the absence of a legal framework and national strategy that institutionalize community policing, and the centralisation of the police corps and its decision-making. For instance, the 2016-2020 police development plan mentions community policing only in passing instead of highlighting it as the core task or underlying philosophy of all policing, thereby indicating that community policing is not a priority. Taken together, this means that the *a priori* case for a tangible change of practices in the direction of community policing is weak.
84. There were mixed views among interviewees on whether and to what extent the police corps has become more of a "service" and less of a "force", and more attuned to prevention and less focused on reactive incident management. When interviewees were of the view that a change had taken place, the change was regarded to be small. The anecdotal interview data is indeed corroborated by survey data that show the public's perception of the police corps as foremost a "service" (to the public) has

⁵⁸ Source: (OSCE/OMSk, 2014).

⁵⁹ Interview information.

increased from 27% in 2015 to 35% in 2016, and then decreased to 26% in 2017.⁶⁰ OIO notes that these rates are the lowest among the three cases of this evaluation

85. The data in the previous sections indicate that the OSCE's assistance has not led to tangible mid-term outcomes in terms of changed police practices. It has also evidently not led to changes in tangible police policies in terms of community policing. This means that most of the investment in training has been ineffective in generating new practices and policies, though for reasons that are beyond the control of the OSCE. Meanwhile, the assistance generated new official *policies* in terms of guidelines for LPCs in 2018⁶¹.
86. Because of the absence of data, OIO was unable to independently assess the degree of change in policing practices with any precision. A proxy indicator of changed practices is satisfaction with the police among citizens. Survey data show an inverted U-curve pattern with the % of citizens reported being "satisfied", increasing from 34% in 2008 to 40% in 2012, increasing to 52% in 2014, and then decreasing to 45% in 2017.⁶² This is indicative of either a worsening of police services/practices, and/or raised but unfulfilled citizen expectations, and resembles the inverted U-pattern pattern of the public's perception of the police corps as foremost a "service" to the public. Meanwhile, given the above observations on barriers against community policing, and the fact that a policy level change meant to underpin and drive changes in practices has been limited, there are no logically compelling reasons to believe that the assistance has – or could have – contributed to any tangible degree to aggregate level variations in satisfaction with the police.⁶³

Long-term results: trust

87. Interviewees commonly asserted that the assistance contributed to reduced inter-ethnic violence at some schools and to lower "tensions" in the country. OIO has been unable to locate multi-year data on interethnic trust and interethnic violence to independently assess these claims.⁶⁴ However, given the limited functionality of most local safety entities, it may be conjectured that any impact on inter-ethnic trust should at best be limited. Consequently, it would be difficult to convincingly attribute any substantial changes in inter-ethnic trust and the *aggregate* number of inter-ethnic incidents to the entities' activities, and thus in extension to this specific element of OMSk's assistance.
88. Graph II below displays data from OSCE and non-OSCE surveys on trust in the police over the period 2002 - 2018.⁶⁵ The OSCE data is similar to the non-OSCE data, likely because the surveys used similar response alternatives. The overall picture is one of fluctuating levels of trust, and a decrease of trust in recent years. OSCE data show a positive trend from 2008 and until 2014, after which trust

⁶⁰ Source: Belgrade Center for Security Studies. (2016a, 2016c, 2017b, 2017d).

⁶¹ Ministry of Interior of North Macedonia (2018).

⁶² Source: OSCE/OMSk (2012b, 2014, 2017).


⁶³ For stronger conclusions on the impact of community policing practices it would have been necessary to have data on the extent to which an individual has been in contact with community policing, and the corresponding individual level of satisfaction in the police.

⁶⁴ Data for a few individual years can be found in various sources, but it is insufficient for creating multi-year time-series data.

⁶⁵ Sources: OSCE/OMSk (2012b, 2014, 2017), Macedonian Center for International Cooperation (2010), UNDP (2005), Belgrade Center for Security Studies (2016, 2017b), and Center for Insights in Survey Research (2018). The non-OSCE survey figures are based on the sum of the response categories "very much trust/somewhat trust", "complete trust/somewhat trust", "great deal trust/quite a lot trust" and "completely trust/mainly trust." Similarly, the OSCE survey data is based on the response categories "completely trust/mostly trust."

decreased. Similarly, non-OSCE survey data show a downward trend for 2016 and 2017, albeit at slightly higher levels. OIO notes that the decrease coincides with – but may not be causally related to – the reduction in assistance and OMSK’s handover of responsibility for CAGs and LPC to the government. It also coincides with the decreased public satisfaction with police services. OIO notes also that the level of trust in the police in North Macedonia is the lowest among the three case studies of this evaluation.

89. Whereas the graph shows that trust in the police has decreased in recent years, there are no compelling reasons to expect that the assistance – partly for reasons beyond OMSK’s control – may have tangibly influenced aggregate levels of trust in any direction. For instance, for reasons specified in the section on mid-term results in terms of changed practices, there no logically compelling reason exists to expect that the assistance should have had any tangible long-term effects in terms of aggregate levels of trust. Hence, it is challenging to provide compelling reasons to expect, let alone attribute and assess changes in aggregate levels of trust to the OSCE’s community policing assistance projects.⁶⁶ Furthermore, trust in the police is contingent not on only the delivery of community policing, but also for instance on perceived levels of police corruption, the handling of other police tasks (crime investigations, traffic incidents, handling of demonstrations, etc.), and other types of police assistance that may have changed police practices.



OMtS

Short-term results: knowledge and attitudes

⁶⁶ The survey data is at the aggregate/population level instead of at the disaggregate/individual level. For stronger conclusions on the impact of community policing practices it would have been necessary to have data on the extent to which an individual has been in contact with community policing, and the individual level of trust in the police. This challenge applies also to trust surveys for the cases of Kosovo and Serbia.

90. OIO observed a consensus among interviewees in that the assistance had been valuable and enhanced *knowledge* among police officers. Interviewees also almost unanimously agreed that there are still community policing knowledge gaps among police officers, local safety council staff and the general public. A few interviewees claimed that officers did not have sufficient knowledge but were meanwhile in agreement with most other interviewees that some officers held negative *attitudes* in that community policing was not “real” [i.e., incident management] policing. Most interviewees also stated that there was resistance among the general public against the idea of community policing because of a traditional lack trust in the police.
91. As also mentioned in section 4.4 of this report, government approvals of OSCE projects have taken an unexpectedly long time, which meant that the assistance evolved slower than planned. It is reasonable to conjecture that the slowed down assistance deployment undermined its overall effectiveness in changing knowledge and attitudes, since assistance efforts were diluted, i.e., distributed over a longer period of time. In addition, OIO has not found that follow-up or refresher training had been offered to trainees.
92. Similar to the other two cases in this report, systematically collected data on whether and to what extent knowledge, skills and attitudes were changed by the assistance activities provided to the police corps and to local safety entities is lacking, since training and awareness raising events were typically not followed up through, e.g., surveys and knowledge tests. Whereas knowledge and attitude gains in the police corps from the assistance may be safely assumed, and whereas the anecdotal evidence in this regard may be representative and accurate, for reason of absence of data OIO has been unable to independently assess to what extent this has been the case. Meanwhile, since most of the local safety entities are not functional, and consequently only a small proportion of the country’s population has been reached by the small number of activities, the impact on knowledge and attitudes in the general population is likely limited.

Mid-term results: policies and practices

93. OIO found some evidence that the assistance led to tangible *policy* changes in terms of the now lapsed 2013-2017 community policing strategy⁶⁷, the community policing manual⁶⁸ and the MSCS manual⁶⁹. However, to the extent that government policies, laws and strategies are in place, they are according to interviewees not fully implemented by the police corps.
94. As barriers against changed police practices most interviewees mentioned, inter alia, that community policing is not institutionalized and underpinned by legislation and strategies, and that community policing is regarded as a separate task rather than the underlying philosophy of all police tasks. Another barrier commonly highlighted during interviews was the lack of inclusion of community policing in the 2009 EU accession agreement, and a government centralisation trend that allegedly started in 2009-2010 and stands in juxtaposition to the concept of community policing that is based on the decentralisation of decision-making.
95. Moreover, community policing has reportedly a perceived low status among police officers since officers are expected to patrol on foot, and that the policing tradition is geared towards crime

⁶⁷ Republic of Serbia (2012).

⁶⁸ Republic of Serbia (2015).

⁶⁹ Republic of Serbia (2017).

repression/incident management and the concept of “police force”, instead of crime prevention and the concept of “police service”, which is commonly not regarded as “real” police work. Second, according to interviewees, staff rotation within the police corps has meant that the OSCE’s investment in training has not been fully put into practice since trained staff was given limited community policing assignments in the past. Third, the police corps is commonly described as under-staffed, meaning that it focuses on acute incident management type of policing instead of preventive community policing.

96. In addition, whereas the mission invested in establishing and training MSCSs, of 119 MSCSs only 79 were confirmed to exist by a survey in 2019, of which only 1/3 were described as “active”.⁷⁰ Thus, the local safety institutions that intended to assist with the delivery of community policing and to create police-public partnerships are mostly not functioning at the expected level. OIO was not able to determine whether the assistance had changed the practices of the safety entities.
97. The mentioned barriers suggest that the OSCE’s investment in training – even if very effective in terms of changing knowledge and attitudes of police officers – has not generated tangible mid-term outcomes in terms of changed practices. Meanwhile, OIO repeatedly encountered claims of police practices having recently changed in the direction of having become more approachable and service-minded. For instance, in 2018 the MoI deployed more than 400 community policing officers, and community policing training became part of the basic police training curricula.⁷¹ In addition, the police corps’ Facebook page has started to list and detail community policing activities. Since OMTs has been the de facto only community policing assistance provider, there are compelling reasons to believe that recent actual change in terms of the deployed community policing officers and police training can indeed to some extent be attributed to its multi-year assistance efforts.
98. OIO was unable to independently assess the degree of change in policing practices with any precision. One proxy indicator of changed police practices is the extent to which the public perceives the police as increasingly working as a service to the citizens. Survey data over the period 2015-2018 show that the extent to which the public perceives the police corps as being foremost in the service of the public has indeed increased from 27% in 2015 to 38% in 2018⁷². Another proxy indicator is public satisfaction with the police. Once again, survey data show that among citizens who have been in contact with the police, satisfaction rates (% of citizens responded being “satisfied”) display an upward trend since 2012, by increasing from 27% in 2012 to 48% in 2018.⁷³ The satisfaction trend over the same time period for citizens who have been in touch with the police for personal protection/protection of property, or for issuance of personal documents, show positive – but less consistent – trends: in the former case the satisfaction rate increased from 9% to 41%, and in the latter case from 53% to 63%.
99. Whereas these data suggest that practices have changed in a positive direction, the nature of the data means that it is not clear to what extent changes can be attributed to *community policing assistance* versus other types of policing assistance delivered to Serbia, let alone to other factors.⁷⁴ Given the above observations on barriers against community policing, and the very recent deployment of

⁷⁰ Source: Interview with official at Serbia’s Standing Conference of Towns and Municipalities (SCTM).

⁷¹ Interview information.

⁷² Source: Belgrade Center for Security Studies (2015, 2016a, 2016b, 2017a, 2017b, 2018).

⁷³ Source: Kantar TNS (2018).


⁷⁴ For stronger conclusions on the impact of community policing practices it would have been necessary to have data on the extent to which an individual has been in contact with *community policing*, and the corresponding individual level of satisfaction in the police.

community policing officers, it is also challenging to make a compelling case that the community policing assistance has contributed to any tangible degree to these changes in *earlier* years.

Long-term results: trust

100. OIO did not have access to multi-year data on trust between ethnic groups. For this reason, OIO was unable to assess whether and to what extent interethnic trust in territories of concern had changed. However, given the limited functionality of most local safety entities it may be conjectured that their influence on inter-ethnic trust should at best be limited. Consequently, any substantial changes in inter-ethnic trust would be difficult to attribute to the entities’ activities, and thus in extension to this specific element of OMtS’s assistance.

101. Graph III below displays time-series data on trust in the police over the period 2002 – 2018 and shows contradictory patterns.⁷⁵ From 2016 until 2018 the OSCE’s surveys show a positive trend, whereas the pattern has oscillated in a cyclical manner over the period 2008-2018. The differences in trust over the period 2017-2018 are not statistically significant at or beyond the 0.05 level, meaning that there is no statistical evidence that trust has changed. Meanwhile, the difference between 2016 and 2018 is statistically significant. OIO notes that the levels of trust are virtually identical to the ones in North Macedonia and significantly lower than in the case of Kosovo.



102. Non-OSCE surveys show around 50% higher levels of trust 2016-2018. A possible partial explanation for the differences across the surveys is that the surveys employed different questions and are thus not fully comparable. The OSCE survey data in the graph is based on the response category “trust.” For non-OSCE data, the response categories are unknown for data 2003-2005 and 2007-2008, for 2006 the categories were “high trust/very high trust”, and for 2015-2018 “mainly trust/completely trust.”

⁷⁵ OSCE/OMtS commissioned survey data are found in Kantar TNS (2017, 2018), IPSOS (2008, 2009 and 2010), CESID (2011) and Strategic Marketing and Research (2011). Non-OSCE data are from Stojanovic (2009), World Value Surveys (2019) and Belgrade Center for Security Studies (2016, 2017a, 2017d, 2018).

This means that the OSCE surveys were more restrictive in that they did not provide the nuanced option *mainly trust* to complement the narrower *trust* option. This is likely to have resulted in a lower proportion of affirmative answers to the OSCE's trust question.

103. For reasons outlined in the section on mid-term results, it is challenging to provide compelling reasons to attribute – and there are methodological challenges to assess – the contribution of changes in aggregate levels of trust to the *community policing* assistance.⁷⁶ Moreover, trust in the police is also contingent on perceived police corruption, the handling of other police tasks (crime investigations, traffic incidents, handling of demonstrations, etc.) and other factors. The OSCE has also delivered other types of assistance to the police, which means that it becomes even more difficult to parse out the potential effects of different types of assistance. In conclusion, there is evidence that trust in the police has improved over the past four years, but there are no strong reasons to believe that the community policing assistance – as of yet and for reasons that are beyond the control of the OSCE – may have influenced aggregate levels of trust to any *tangible* extent.

4.3 Comparative advantage

104. Interviews across the three cases showed that the OSCE is viewed as having multiple comparative advantages vis-à-vis other potential assistance providers. First, it has been a long-term partner, while other assistance providers usually engaged for only shorter periods of time. In addition, its political understanding, clear objectives, flexibility, consistency, ability to adjust plans at short notice, expertise and funds were commonly highlighted as setting it apart from other assistance providers. One interviewee highlighted that because of the OSCE's good reputation and the general trust afforded to it by the public, its mere presence assisted in enhancing public trust in the police.

105. Moreover, OSCE assistance can cover inter-related and mutually reinforcing assistance themes and issues across all OSCE Dimensions. Thus the provision of these types of support alongside community policing assistance may create synergy effects. However, the assistance needs of the three countries in the area of community policing are large and long-term, meaning that perhaps no single international organization could be expected to fully address all of them. Still, in all three cases, the OSCE was virtually the only substantial assistance provider.

4.4 Efficiency

106. The assistance was efficient in the sense that most projects were delivered on time in terms of calendar year. Table I (Annex) shows that expenditures were within and below budgets for all projects. In most projects underspending was not of any material magnitude. To the extent that material underspending took place, it was due to either non-implementation of tasks that required/were cancelled for various reasons, including delays in government approval of activities or because the assistance could be delivered at a cost lower than originally projected. A special case are ExB projects

⁷⁶ The fundamental challenge in this case is that survey data is at the aggregate/population level instead of at the disaggregate/individual level. For stronger conclusions on the impact of community policing practices it would have been necessary to have data on the extent to which an individual has been in contact with *community policing*, and the corresponding individual level of satisfaction in the police.

in that pledges were sometimes considerably lower than budgets, which meant that expenditures were much lower than the original budgets in order to be aligned with actual donor pledges.⁷⁷

107. OIO was unable to assess the comparative value for money of the project outputs across the three cases. First, project staff costs were often covered by other budget cost categories (and are difficult to accurately estimate), and projects benefited from various degrees of economies-of-scale. Another reason is the difficulty of finding projects of similar character within and beyond these cases that can serve as comparison points. Furthermore, the projects covered a large variety of activities and outputs, from training to the construction of training centres, police stations, production of information material guidebooks, study visits, and financial support to local police entities' and community safety entities' multi-faceted projects. Thus, the costs per output unit are difficult to compare across countries and circumstances. OIO has also not been able to identify non-OSCE assistance projects of characters similar to those delivered by these three missions, meaning that there are no non-OSCE cases with which cost efficiency comparisons can be made.

4.5 Vertical and horizontal co-ordination

108. OIO found that during the past five years horizontal co-ordination with other assistance providers varied across the three cases, but was mostly sufficient given that the OSCE has been close to the only community policing assistance provider in the three countries.

109. According to interview information, OMtS usually shares information that covers security sector reforms with international stakeholders in Serbia every 2-3 months, but there is no joint planning. However, since other international actors deal with issues other than community policing, the co-ordination needs are limited. Concerning North Macedonia, co-ordination needs between OMSk and other international actors have also been limited. Interviewees stated that overlaps in terms of dates and themes of police related training offerings with those of other training providers have occasionally taken place in the past.

110. Project documents and interview information show that since 2012 OMiK's assistance has occasionally been co-ordinated with, e.g., ICITAP, Safer World, European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), UNDP and the European Union in Kosovo (EUOK), the latter two providing experts for some training sessions. Moreover, through a police co-ordination board OMiK exchanges information (75%) and co-ordinates plans (25%) with the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), EULEX, and ICITAP. Similarly, the Kosovo Police Co-ordination Office for Community Security includes OMiK and has the purpose to enhance co-ordination among MCSCs, LPCs and CSATs.⁷⁸ Meanwhile, LPCs and CSATs were commonly described as overlapping structures, with CSATs often described as redundant or even a competitor with the MCSCs and LPCs, and with insufficient co-ordination taking place.

111. OIO was informed that collaboration between OMiK, OMSk and OMtS was limited. Still, needs-based and personal level contacts were made, rather than regular cooperation at the institutional/formal level. OIO notes that overall, the missions' assistance activities were of similar character and focus.

112. Similarly, vertical co-ordination between the field missions and the SPMU in Vienna was needs-based and more of an information sharing character than of a planning/coordinating character. On

⁷⁷ For instance, pledges for project 2400411 were less than a third of the original budget. Similarly, project 2400143 was budgeted at €2.600.000 but received pledges for less than 1/3, or €730.757.

⁷⁸ For details, see Kosovo Police (2015c).

occasions, the SPMU was invited to provide comments on project proposals, provide a speaker for an event, or provide policy level support. Only rarely did the SPMU receive requests for expertise. Examples are requests for assessments and evaluations, which led the SPMU to carry out evaluations of the missions' community policing assistance.⁷⁹

113. Officials in one of the missions stated that they did not miss the absence of an OSCE policy on community policing since the mission's activities were "short-term and activity-based" rather than long term. Officials in another mission expressed an opposite view, in that they would have welcomed a more detailed OSCE strategy and policy on community policing that extends beyond the current general framework and provides more guidance on the OSCE's expectations and objectives that the mission could align its assistance to. The issue of a cross-OSCE assistance strategy will be returned to in section 5 of this report.

4.6 Gender mainstreaming

114. The 2004 OSCE *Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality* promotes equal rights and treatment of men and women and sets out that the OSCE should mainstream gender in its activities in order to promote these goals. Gender mainstreaming may be classified into whether gender equality is a "principal objective", a "significant objective" or a "limited contribution" of a project.⁸⁰
115. OIO found that in recent years, almost all projects were explicitly gender mainstreamed in terms of consideration of the gender balance of participants and/or inclusion of gender thematic issues, either as stand-alone activities where gender considerations were a "principal objective", or incorporated into specific activities and thus constituting a "limited contribution" to an activity. OIO notes that since the projects were technical and thematically focusing on community policing and trust rather than gender issues, by definition none of the projects *as a whole* had – or could have had – gender equality as the overall "principal objective."
116. A review of project documents shows that OMIK has sought "gender balance" and "gender equality" among training participants since at least 2010. Projects commonly also reported on efforts towards gender balanced training participants (as a tool for ensuring that men's and women's concerns and opinions are considered) and provided gender disaggregated participant statistics. During recent years projects also consistently sought to mainstream gender in their activities, and gender equality was discussed at various locations in the project proposals. It has also become increasingly common over time – and standard in recent years – that projects included gender specific themes, such as how community policing affects women in non-majority communities and safety security issues/concerns of particular interest for women.
117. Similarly, project documents show that OMSk has sought to "ensure that there is gender and ethnicity balance among participants especially referring to their public role and function" since at least 2007. During recent years projects also sought to mainstream gender in their activities, and gender considerations were raised at various locations in the project proposals, including in the general narrative and under "horizontal issues", and in the "impact" section in self-evaluation reports. In the

⁷⁹ OSCE/SPMU (2013, 2015).

⁸⁰ "Significant objective" refers to projects where "gender equality issues are mainstreamed fully at all stages of a project or to a significant extent." A "limited contribution" refers to projects that mainstream gender in terms of participation and/or only mainstream gender to a small extent (OSCE/OIO, 2018b: 34).

words of one interviewee, it is “very important to add more female officers to enhance public trust, since they have a different way of working than men.”

118. Several OMSk projects included training on “gender [roles] in the police”, including recruitment, discrimination and retention of women in the police corps. Projects also commonly reported on efforts to have balanced gender representation of training participants (as a tool for ensuring that men’s and women’s concerns and opinions are considered), and on occasions reported gender disaggregated participant statistics. Other examples include six trainings workshops on “Enhancing Police Gender Sensitivity in Violence against Women and Domestic Violence”, implemented in co-operation with the UNDP⁸¹, roundtables on “The Role of Women in Creating Safer Communities” and working towards the introduction of gender sensitive policing practices.⁸²
119. Project documents show that OMtS in recent years has addressed gender aspects in its projects. It regularly worked towards a gender balanced set of event participants, to various degrees presented gender disaggregated participants statistics in self-evaluation reports, and commonly included gender thematic issues, including paying attention to gender related safety concerns. For instance, one project focused on MCSCs and intended to improve the safety of both women and men, promoted equal participation of men and women in MSCs and the provision of gender sensitive training material. During the establishment of CAGs and MSCs, special attention was also given to the gender balance among training participants.
120. OMtS also commissioned studies on the needs and the position of women within police reforms, gave attention to the inclusion of female police officers in training activities, and advocated for the inclusion of gender aspects in local safety strategies. Other instances include seminars covering the status of women and men in the police organization, the recruitment of women in the police organization, retention and discrimination at the workplace, and career obstacles for women in the police. Moreover, training of Contact Police Officers on community policing addressed gender aspects in policing, and training (including a study visit to Austria in 2016) was delivered on gender-based violence, whereas another project supported a national discussion of the need to establish a National Network of Policewomen.

4.7 Monitoring and evaluation

Implementation-based monitoring

121. Interview information showed that project *implementation* across the three cases was continuously monitored at the activity and output level in that OSCE project officers stayed informed about, were in regular contact with beneficiaries, and commonly attended and were directly involved in delivering project activities. Especially in recent years, project proposals included a logframe that outlined monitoring indicators and means of verification. For larger projects mid-way progress reports were commonly created during the course of the project.
122. OIO considers these *activity and output-based* monitoring activities to be overall sufficient for the purpose of keeping project officers informed on project implementation. OIO also notes that OMSk compiled a detailed overview of its police assistance activities and outputs that covers the period

⁸¹ Project number 2600928.

⁸² Project number 2600884.

2002-2012, which would not have been possible had project implementation information not been continuously collected and recorded.

123. Projects across the three field missions were also commonly followed by end-of-project reports that summarized project inputs, activities, outputs, and to some extent also outcomes (as perceived by the specific projects). OIO found that project documentation on activities and outputs as well as project self-evaluations were overall detailed and comprehensive, and that project proposals were informative and commonly also included summaries and details of past activities and outputs. Especially in recent years, it was common to also find gender disaggregated statistics on training, seminar and workshop activities.

Results-based monitoring

124. Interview information and project documents show that the missions do not have formal M&E frameworks that cover project implementation and project results in the short-, medium- and long-term. Interviewed OSCE officials generally expressed that they experienced challenges regarding results-based monitoring. For reasons of limited staff and financial resources, they did not follow up on the short-term assistance results through, e.g., surveys and knowledge tests to assess whether and to what extent knowledge, skills and attitudes among police officers, local safety entity staff and the general public covered by police or local safety unit projects, were changed. OIO did not find any instances where gender-related outcome data had been collected.
125. Results-based monitoring of *short-term outcomes* was typically not carried out in any detail beyond contacts with – and feedbacks from – beneficiaries, and through project officers' observations. Among the rare exceptions is a project (2400615) delivered by OMtS that assessed short-term project results through public perception surveys conducted among the citizens of a city before and after project implementation. Another exception was a project (2400661) that carried out pre- and post-training knowledge test on police trainees. In Kosovo, it is according to OMiK staff the remit of the Kosovo Police – and not of OMiK – to measure knowledge results of the training supported by OMiK. Since the Kosovo Police does not carry out this type of monitoring, OMiK officials stated that they are reliant on anecdotes instead of systematic data to assess training effectiveness.
126. While there were generally no direct *systematic* monitoring and recording of *mid-term results* in terms of changed *policies*, observations of this character were regularly made by project staff, as indicated by information in project proposals, self-evaluation reports, and interview information obtained by OIO. This means that project staff were informed about mid-term policy/legislative/strategy results across all the three cases. For instance, in the case of Serbia, assistance results in terms of changed policies, including the MoI's acceptance of the community policing strategy, the community policing manual and the MSCS manual, were highlighted in project documentation.
127. Similarly, even though there was generally no direct *systematic* monitoring and recording of the extent to which assistance had changed *practices*, through the projects and constant interaction with the police corps, project staff were informed about the general state of affairs as indicated by interview information, project proposals and project self-evaluation reports. An exception is OMiK, which in the aftermath of a capacity building project of LPSCs would "monitor and assist the LPSCs and evaluate their level of functionality [...]"⁸³ Similarly, OMiK carried out monitoring of MCSCs' mid-term (six

⁸³ Project 2100407. See also project 2100605.

months) performance in the aftermath of capacity building (project 2100588), and of police officers' implementation of the *Community Policing Strategy and Action Plan* following training on the contents of the said strategy and action plan (project 2100749). OIO notes that ideally, surveys could have been systematically distributed sometime after the trainings to assess whether practices had changed as a result of the trainings, but this was not done.⁸⁴

128. With regard to *long-term results* in terms of enhanced trust between ethnic groups and trust between the public and the police, all missions commissioned large-scale annual or biannual country-wide surveys intended to, among other things, assess trust in – and satisfaction with – the police, and identify assistance needs, including in areas beyond community policing. In the case of Serbia, surveys have been carried out since 2008 and have, inter alia, honed in on trust as well as satisfaction ratings of police work by individuals who had been in contact with the police for various reasons (including having been victims of crime), including at the community local level, and on whether the police treats all nationalities, religious groups, etc., in an equal manner. Similarly, OMSk has commissioned annual surveys since 2002 to, inter alia, assess progress in terms of trust in the police, and to identify assistance needs.
129. OIO welcomes this structured survey approach towards tracing long-term results, and finds it to be unusual in the OSCE. OIO also considers that the survey approach should be more widely used across the organisation for the many instances when the OSCE engages in multi-year assistance engagements and there is a need for hard data to identify assistance results.
130. Meanwhile, the missions did not distribute annual surveys or in other ways tried to assess long-term results in terms of enhanced trust between ethnic communities. However, in particular UNDP, and various research organisations and NGOs across the three countries have carried out surveys of inter-ethnic relations, including of the trust in – and satisfaction with – the police by ethnic communities.⁸⁵

4.8 Sustainability of outcomes

131. Sustainability is assessed at four levels – strategic level; operative level, personal capacity level; and resource level – and concerns whether short-, mid- and long-term outcomes from the OSCE's assistance can be sustained in the absence of future assistance. Overall, by mid-2019 evidence suggests that sustainability is unsatisfactory in the cases of OMtS and OMSk across all four levels, and constrained in the case of OMiK across the two latter levels.
132. Whereas Kosovo stands out in terms of having community policing strategies and implementation plans in place, none of the three cases appear self-sufficient with regard to capacity building, but are dependent on continuous external financial assistance and expertise from the OSCE and other entities. Nevertheless, in all the cases community policing is a separate police or fringe/competing task among many other police tasks, rather than regarded as the underlying philosophy of all police tasks. Hence, the policy foundation is unsatisfactory across all cases, which raises questions of the sustainability of

⁸⁴ Such practice has been implemented by the OSCE Border Management Staff College (BMSC) on most of its staff courses since 2009, in that "impact surveys" are distributed to former trainees six months after the training. OIO has not previously observed such a practice for other OSCE projects

⁸⁵ The UNDP's *Kosovo Early Warning Project* existed over the period 2002-2010 and was replaced by UNDP's *Public Pulse* project (2019). The latter project reports can be found on the project's website, whereas the former reports can be found in various locations on the Internet but currently not through a single report repository page. The NGOs include SaferWorld, the Kosovo Centre for Security Studies (KCSS) and the *Point Pulse Network*.

assistance gains in also the case of Kosovo. Moreover, all three countries experience staff and material shortages within the police sector as well as in the local safety entity sector to implement community policing practices.

OMiK

133. This case stands out as the one with the highest levels of sustainability. The strategic and operative levels are partially satisfactory due to the 2012-2016 and 2017-2021 community policing strategies and related action/implementation plans, various regulations and administrative instructions. Still, community policing is a separate/competing police task among other police tasks, rather than the underlying philosophy and priority. Hence, the policy foundation is still unsatisfactory.
134. For various reasons the strategies have not been fully implemented, including personnel and human capacity levels, which are not regarded as sustainable. On one hand, community policing training has become part of the standard police training curricula, and cadet training includes 50 hours of training. Yet there still exist knowledge gaps and there is a need for more training, including follow-up training. In addition, the police is under-resourced in terms of personnel and vehicles, meaning that community policing is implemented to only a limited degree. Similarly, local safety entities demonstrate low levels of functionality and lack of resources, and are dependent on external assistance. OIO also notes that the Kosovo Police Co-ordination Office for Community Safety does not have a budget and is reliant on support from the OSCE.⁸⁶

OMSk

135. In comparison to the other two cases of this report, North Macedonia has made the least progress in the area of institutionalizing community policing. There is no national and dedicated community policing strategy with a related implementation plan, and the government is not in favour of decentralisation of decision-making, which is inherent in the concept of – and a precondition for – community policing. OIO therefore finds that strategic level and operative level sustainability are unsatisfactory.
136. Similarly, personnel and human capacity levels are assessed as unsatisfactory. Community policing has a low status among police officers, there are knowledge gaps among police officers, and the police corps is overstretched and focuses on incident management instead of on prevention. In addition, the staff rotation/turnover creates the need for continuous training, as previous trainees are rotated to non-community policing tasks. Interview information also shows that when OMSk reduced its training assistance it was not replaced by other training initiatives. Moreover, local safety entities are dependent on external assistance.

OMtS

137. Serbia has made progress in institutionalizing community policing, as indicated by the community policing manual and the manual for MSCs that were created with the assistance of the OSCE. The MSCs and their role are also established by law. OIO still finds the strategic level sustainability to be unsatisfactory since Serbia currently does not have a follow-up strategy in place to underpin and mainstream community policing. In addition, the framework underpinning community policing is

⁸⁶ Interview information.

limited in the Strategic Police Plan for the Period 2018-2021 and in the 2016 Law on Police, as the role of community policing is not framed as a separate task rather than a general policing philosophy and priority.⁸⁷ Similarly, OIO finds that operative level sustainability is unsatisfactory as no action plans with assigned responsibilities among government entities for implementing community policing has been developed

138. Sustainability at the personnel or human capacity levels is also assessed as constrained. On one hand, since January 2019, 416 community policing officers have been assigned across Serbia's cities, of which so far 200 have been trained, and the MoI plans to keep this number of officers (416) for two years. On the other hand, community policing has a low status among police officers and is regarded as a separate police task. There are also knowledge gaps among police officers, the policing tradition is by 2019 inclined towards crime incident management, and the police corps is overstretched and focuses on incident management instead of prevention. In addition, staff rotation/turnover creates a need for continuous training. In particular, the functionality of local safety entities is dependent on continued OSCE support for their functionality, which is already limited.

5. Evaluation Findings: Strategic Level

139. As set out in the introduction to this report, a key strategic question is whether/how the OSCE's *policy and concept of community policing* should be revised in order to increase assistance effectiveness in terms of enhancing trust.

140. Interviews showed that within the OSCE there is no consensus regarding the meaning of "community policing". Related to this was the opinion that the international community was not providing countries in need of assistance with a single coherent message on community policing. Different assistance providers (countries and organisations), and even different OSCE officials, have different concepts and models. One interviewee suggested that the OSCE should align itself with the United Nations Strategic Guidance Framework, parts of which cover community policing.

141. As mentioned in this report, officials in one of the missions stated they did not miss an OSCE strategy and policy on community policing since the mission's activities were "short-term and activity-based." Officials in another mission expressed an opposite view, in that they would welcome such an OSCE strategy and policy that provides guidance on the organisation's expectations and objectives, and which the mission can align itself with.

142. In some interviewees' opinion there is thus a need for a cross-organisational long-term action plan that guides and helps to focus and prioritize assistance activities in the field. These could be some of the guiding principles: In the absence of domestic political support and of a legal framework for community policing, and if community policing is regarded as one among several competing tasks, rather than as a basic policing philosophy, the OSCE's should de-prioritize training assistance, infrastructure support and support to local safety entities. The alleged reason is that these types of activities would not lead to the intended changed policing policies and practices.

143. Furthermore, the OSCE should consider focusing on working with government entities, deliver awareness raising activities, and support changes in country policies, laws and the creation of national strategies before additional and large-scale capacity-building assistance is considered. Finally, once

⁸⁷ Republic of Serbia (2016, 2018).

national policies and strategies are in place, the OSCE should consider providing wider capacity-building assistance to police officers. The current multi-year approach of “reform from below” in that multi-year capacity-building assistance preceded (rather than lagged) and was expected to lead to policy changes, has not worked. Another comment was that the OSCE needs a long time horizon (15 years) when supporting police reforms, since it takes a long time before tangible results can be discerned, even in cases where the assistance has been of a substantial size. OSCE should consequently plan and strategize for such a time period before initiating assistance efforts, and have muted expectations of the results that can be achieved in a shorter period time. Currently, such long-term planning is not practiced in the OSCE.

144. Several interviewees were of the opinion that assistance needs were commonly beyond the OSCE’s capacity, resources and expertise, and the OSCE should therefore not engage alone. Consequently, it was argued that OSCE training assistance should preferably be delivered in co-ordination and co-operation with other and more resourceful international actors, such as the UN or the EU. An example of past activities of this character is EU and UN financial support to – and co-ordination with – the OSCE community policing assistance activities in Kyrgyzstan.
145. The above interview feedback is corroborated by this evaluation. In all three cases, the OSCE went alone in providing capacity-building assistance. In two of three cases this was done in the absence of clear domestic political support and in contexts where community policing was not regarded as a basic policing philosophy. In particular in one of three cases (North Macedonia), the OSCE did not focus on government-level awareness raising and on achieving policy changes. As a consequence, despite the multiyear assistance provided by OMIK, OMSk and OMTS, this evaluation established that long-term tangible assistance results were likely absent, and that the overall sustainability of assistance results was to various degrees constrained.
146. OIO also notes that the call for a long-term horizon when supporting community policing, is not only supported by the findings in this evaluation, and international best practices and experience, but also by global data from the World Bank. Data covering 1985-2009 show that it took the 12 fastest reform countries on average 41 years to reach “good enough governance” or “adequacy” in the area of rule of law, whereas the fastest country reached that level in 17 years.⁸⁸ This should be compared with the 15 years (approximately) of OSCE assistance that was provided in the three cases covered by this evaluation.
147. This evaluation also confirms some of the interviewees’ top-down or trickle-down analysis, as it has found the same pattern across other thematic OIO evaluations carried out in recent years: unless government policies, strategies and priorities are at hand, investments in capacity-building are unlikely to lead to changed practices, since new practices are not resourced and prioritized by government entities. Across many of its thematic evaluations OIO has also repeatedly observed that the alternative and inherently plausible bottom-up/trickle-up approaches in terms of multi-year capacity-building at the local level intended to serve as a catalyst of change “from below”, have often not been successful in terms of generating government policies, strategies and priorities in a sustainable manner.
148. OIO recognizes that the assistance partially reflects the type of cooperation that is accepted by local institutions, and that assistance to create government policies and strategies may not be in demand

⁸⁸ World Bank (2012).

and can thus not be delivered. From that perspective, an “entry strategy” may involve capacity-building as a means for gaining acceptance and generating demand among local institutions for assistance geared at the policy and strategy level. Whereas this approach is logically compelling, over the course of many cross-organisational evaluations – including this one – OIO has observed that the success rate in terms of generating national policies and strategies is limited even in the long term.

149. This evaluation recognizes that in two of the three cases, peace agreements obliged the OSCE to provide training assistance rather than policy level assistance. However, over time the assistance expanded in terms of content as well as geographical coverage in a way that went beyond the initial obligations. This means that the current assistance is only to a limited extent an obligation and to a large extent a choice. OIO also recognizes that the OSCE is unable to deliver certain types of assistance (e.g., policy assistance) for financial reasons, or when it is not accepted by government entities, and that the support provided by the OSCE reflects this state of affairs to some extent.

6. Recommendations

150. Based on the findings presented in this report the OSCE Secretariat (SPMU), OMiK, OMSk, and OMTs are recommended to take the assistance to a second phase that holds a stronger promise of ensuring the implementation of community policing, and of contributing towards an enhanced and sustainable application of community policing practices among assistance beneficiary countries.

Relevance

151. **Issue 1.** The OSCE has not delivered community policing assistance on the basis of a unified community policing concept. The current community policing concept and guidelines are more than 10 years old, and there is no shared understanding across the OSCE of the meaning of “community policing”.
152. **Recommendation 1.** In consultation with concerned OSCE executive structures, and aligned with the cross-organizational community policing assistance action plan/strategy of Recommendation 2, the OSCE Secretariat (SPMU) should update the organization’s community policing concept and related assistance guidelines for Executive Structures. The concept and guidelines should preferably be revisited every 5 years.
153. **Issue 2.** The OSCE has delivered community policing assistance in the absence of an OSCE-wide and long-term community policing assistance (action) plan with an associated exit/transition strategy.
154. **Recommendation 2.** In consultation with concerned OSCE executive structures, the OSCE Secretariat (SPMU) should develop a cross-organizational community policing assistance action plan/strategy that outlines the core elements of the OSCE’s community policing assistance, its main objectives, milestones, OSCE-level result indicators and benchmarks in the short-, mid- and long-term, and an exit/transition strategy.
155. **Issue 3.** OSCE community policing capacity-building of police officers and local safety entities was sometimes delivered in the absence of government community policing policies and national strategies that prioritize that community policing skills are applied and community policing is resourced. The assistance has not led to all the expected mid- and long-term outcomes.
156. **Recommendation 3.1** In alignment with Recommendations 1 and 2 above, OMSk’s and OMTs’

community policing assistance should prioritize supporting governments in developing national community policing policies and national strategies that regard community policing as the core policing philosophy for all police work rather than as a separate and competing police task. This includes strengthening ministerial level civil servant knowledge of, and commitment to, community policing.

157. **Recommendation 3.2** OMSk and OMtS should consider initiating *large-scale* community policing capacity-building assistance to police officers and local safety entities only in the presence of national community policing policies and national strategies that prioritize community policing, and regard it as the core policing philosophy instead of as a separate and competing police task.

Effectiveness

158. **Issue 4.** The OSCE has commonly been the only provider of capacity-building assistance in the area of community policing, while the capacity-building needs have exceeded OSCE assistance capacities.
159. **Recommendation 4.** To enhance the effectiveness of its capacity-building assistance, OMiK, OMSk and OMtS should to a larger extent seek to deliver it to police officers and local safety entities in coordination and jointly with other resourceful international and national assistance providers.

Monitoring and evaluation

160. **Issue 5.** OMiK, OMSk and OMtS lack a system for systematically recording short-, mid- and long-term assistance results.
161. **Recommendation 5.** This issue is covered by Recommendation 1 above.

Sustainability of outcomes

162. **Issue 6.** In the cases included in this evaluation community policing assistance short-, mid-, and long-term outcomes are not sustainable in the absence of continued external assistance.
163. **Recommendation 6.** This issue is covered by Recommendation 2 above.

7. Management Response and Recommendation Implementation Plan

OVERALL MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

OMiK

OSCE Mission in Kosovo (the Mission) agrees in general with the findings of the report, being keenly aware and as mentioned, there was a limited timeframe (five (5) working days) for OIO to conduct a detailed research. Due to the existing time limit, the number of interviewees do not necessarily represent the relevant sample of the beneficiaries and other stakeholders involved in the entire community policing process and related activities.

It is important to read this report in parallel with the “OSCE Internal Assessment of the Community Policing and Public Safety Development Programme of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo” conducted in 2015 it took the TNTD/SPMU Assessment Team, which provided insights to the work of the Mission. In this report, it was cited that activities of the Mission are highly relevant. They are consistent with the Mission’s mandate, and in line with national community policing-related legislation and policies, such as, but not limited to, laws, by-laws, national strategies and action plans, terms of references, standard operating procedures and administrative instructions.

Also, it is worth mentioning the fact that MoIA representatives expressed their excellent co-operation with the Mission as well as the high level of professionalism, reliability and commitment demonstrated by OSCE staff. The majority of interviewees remarks of OMiK being their most important partner. All interviewees requested the continuation of OSCE assistance in strategy development, training, workshops, roundtables and outreach activities, as well as its financial support for LPSC activities.

Due to some internal matters, the OIO Team was not able to meet representatives from ICITAP and EULEX for questions/answers sessions, therefore the Report from 2015 is of reference here, stating that these organizations do not have the community policing portfolio anymore under their mandate. Thus, it is to note that other international partners (ICITAP, UNMiK, UNDP, EULEX) were also deeply involved in the past capacity building of the Kosovo community policing providers. From 2006 to 2009, the Mission worked hand in hand with ICITAP and jointly implemented a community policing capacity-building program. Since other international actors such as ICITAP and Saferworld have completed their assistance to Kosovo public safety forum initiatives due to the restructuring of those missions and/or deduction of their budgets in community policing projects, the Mission is currently the only international organization remaining engaged in supporting these important police-public partnership structures in Kosovo in a comprehensive way. The Mission’s involvement in community policing is based on the strategical priorities and stakeholders needs based on regular joint co-ordination and assessment activities. Despite the fact that the EULEX Mission in Kosovo did not have the mandate to train institutions including KP, in 2015 together with the Mission, EULEX was involved in training of KP officials from the Mitrovica/Mitrovicë North Region. This EULEX involvement was initiated by the Mission and conducted on a highly professional level.

It should be noted too, that the current report is predominantly based on the desk research of Mission's documents, for example, but not limited to, UBPs and several in-house and external thematic reports (DSPS/CSDS report on the performance and current capacity of Kosovo Local Public Safety Committees (2013); DSPS/PDMS assessment report of the functionality of LPSCs in Kosovo (March 2017); OSCE Internal TNTD/SPMU Assessment of the Community Policing and Public Safety Development Programme of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (2015), assessing the current capacity of the community policing providers in Kosovo. Additionally, relevant to the report is limited reference to scrutiny reports of other partner organizations and/or related reporting assessments (e.g. OSCE Internal Assessment of the Community Policing and Public Safety Development Programme of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, published June 2015), and unfortunately there was not enough time allowed to meet representatives from these organizations in regards to the related interviewing process.

Thus, only allowing a generalized state of play in community policing efforts and results. The time restriction of five (5) days did not allow for sufficient further cross-checking of data obtained from interviews and available documents. As mentioned above the report does not refer to previously conducted evaluations for the community policing portfolio within the Mission too, in order to compare the findings and show progress/regress.

Also, to note the Missions in the region have different and significantly relevant reasoning and approaches in addressing community security issues, similar to respective police reform activities. Understandably in such an region/area the evaluation covered, there is no one approach that fits all police services (i.e. the formation of the Kosovo Police by the international community and further development differs from other police services necessitating differentiating particularities to this evaluation process).

We are committed to regularly share experience and best practices with other OSCE Missions to improve our own programme.

The Mission will conduct a detailed evaluation of the LPSCs related efforts of the Mission over the last few years, including a wider sample of respondents to gather a clear and comprehensive picture on the realities on the ground, and for rendering a formalized report related thereto.

Finally, it is to note that, following the visit of the evaluation team and the initial findings presented to the Mission representatives, the Mission took a step forward to closely analyse the initial findings and evaluate best ways to address each applicable one proactively. To this end, the Mission conducted a monitoring activity and drafted a Monitoring report presenting an overview of performance and functionality of Municipal Community Safety Councils (MCSC) in 2019 (Currently in draft finalization).

OMSk

The OMSk's assistance to Police was originally part of the implementation of the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement. The OSCE (together with the EU and the US) were invited to support the implementation of the Ohrid commitments; supporting recruitment and training of police officers, developing a police code of conduct, and supporting the creation of multi-ethnic police units. From 2003, the OMSk established the CAGs and in the period 2008 – 2011, the LPCs. LPCs are OMSk's response to institutionalize the community policing philosophy, as sustainable and long-term police-public partnerships and institutional cooperation mechanisms between the Police, Local Self-Government and Citizens. In the period 2011 – 2013, OMSk provided capacity-building assistance to the Police and Local Community in the field of police-public partnership with special focus on inter-ethnic relations, and at the end of this period the responsibility for CAGs and LPCs was transferred to the government.

In 2014 the OMSk focused on Democratic Policing concept, being wider concept than Community Policing, including rule of law, police ethics and human rights, victim care, police accountability and transparency, police organization and managerial issues. Furthermore, community policing is one of the strategic goals in the Strategy for Development of the Police 2016-2020.

The OMSk is committed in supporting the implementation of democratic policing principles and further strengthening police professionalization by promoting community oriented police service, accountability and transparency. In 2019, OMSk assisted the MoIA working group and developed MoIA Strategy for Community Engagement and Communications 2020 -2022, with recommendations to elevate the Prevention Unit on the central level, and setting paths and tools for improvement of co-operation with community that would lead to improved safety for citizens, more efficient prevention of crime and better community oriented police service.

| Area | Issue | Recommendation | Evaluation Client | Accept Yes/No | Recommendation Implementation Plan (If not accepted, add management comments) | Implementation date (estimate) |
|-----------|--|---|-------------------|---------------|---|--|
| Relevance | 1. The OSCE has not delivered community policing assistance on the basis of a unified community policing concept. The current community policing concept and guidelines are more than 10 years old, and there is no shared understanding across the OSCE of the meaning of "community policing". | 1. In consultation with concerned OSCE executive structures, and aligned with the cross-organizational community policing assistance action plan/strategy of Recommendation 2, the OSCE Secretariat (SPMU) should update the organization's community policing concept and related assistance guidelines for Executive Structures. The concept and guidelines should preferably be revisited every 5 years. | SPMU | Yes | <p>The OSCE 'Community Policing' concept has been set out through the mentioned OSCE guidebook, which provides general principles and guidance on how to introduce, create and implement a community-policing model within a given police service/force. As such, our OSCE concept is one.</p> <p>The OSCE guidebook on community policing is of 2008 and therefore might seem old. In reality, while we should consider revisiting it, we should first contemplate on how to make sure that some participating States, which really need it to achieve the goal of the concept's implementation, already take its recommendations into account. Priorities lay at this level.</p> <p>Furthermore, consider to base the new concept and guidelines on the UN Strategic Guidance Framework (SGF) and</p> | <p>The tasks to revisit the OSCE guidebook on community policing and to possibly amend/update it have been already considered since some months, based notably on discussions with OIO and FOs colleagues.</p> <p>The task requires first adequate planning and then a certain amount of resources, which remain to be assessed. Besides, this work might be</p> |

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| | | | | | the Manual “Community-Oriented Policing in United Nations Peace Operation” to ensure that the OSCE and the UN have the same understanding of the meaning of “Community Policing”. | envisaged in co-operation with UNODC/UNDPO (see previous column) and also with the EU which have published a guidebook on the topic. Realistically, the task could be achieved within 2-year time (2022). |
| | 2. The OSCE has delivered community policing assistance in the absence of an OSCE-wide and long-term community policing assistance (action) plan with an associated exit/transition strategy. | 2. In consultation with concerned OSCE executive structures, the OSCE Secretariat (SPMU) should develop a cross-organizational community policing assistance action plan/strategy that outlines the core elements of the OSCE’s community policing assistance, its main objectives, milestones, OSCE-level result indicators and benchmarks in the short-, mid- and long-term, and an exit/transition strategy. | SPMU | Yes | Community policing assistance and support are/were providing to participating States on an ad hoc basis and following a customer-oriented approach. In other words, the OSCE is not in the position and not willing to decide on its own on how and what to deliver. Therefore, to speak about long-term assistance and strategy beforehand should be thoroughly considered. Assistance planning (from induction to exit phase – transfer of ownership) have to be designed in conjunction with the local counterparts and strongly agreed with them. | To set out general and transversal OSCE outlines on how to implement a project on community policing, from A to Z is indeed needed. Based on situations faced in the field, the requested means and the complicated issue, the exercise will require time. Realistically, first drafts could be obtained in 2021-22. |
| | 3. OSCE community policing capacity-building of police officers and local | 3.1 In alignment with Recommendations 1 and 2 above, OMSK’s and OMtS’ community policing assistance should | OMSK OMtS | 3.1 Yes Yes | 3.1 The OMSK will support the MoIA in implementing democratic policing principles and further strengthening | 3.1 December 2021 |

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| | <p>safety entities was sometimes delivered in the absence of government community policing policies and national strategies that prioritize that community policing skills are applied and community policing is resourced. The assistance has not led to all the expected mid- and long-term outcomes.</p> | <p>prioritize supporting governments in developing national community policing policies and national strategies that regard community policing as the core policing philosophy for all police work rather than as a separate and competing police task. This includes strengthening ministerial level civil servant knowledge of, and commitment to, community policing.</p> <p>3.2 OMSk and OMtS should consider initiating <i>large-scale</i> community policing capacity-building assistance to police officers and local safety entities only in the presence of national community policing policies and national strategies that prioritize community policing, and regard it as the core policing philosophy instead of as a separate and competing police task.</p> | <p>OMSk</p> <p>OMtS</p> | <p>3.2.</p> <p>Yes</p> <p>Yes</p> | <p>police professionalization by promoting community oriented police service, accountability and transparency. Particularly, by supporting the implementation of the MoIA Strategy for Community Engagement and Communications 2020 -2022, the OMSk will concentrate on elevating the Prevention Unit to central level, and setting paths and tools for improvement of co-operation with community, which would lead to improved safety for citizens, more efficient prevention of crime and better community oriented police service</p> <p>-----</p> <p>MoI highlighted community policing as one of the priority areas in “General Strategic Police plan” for 2018-2021. Serbian MoI, in cooperation with International Management Group, is currently conducting the evaluation of the existing strategy, action plan and projects implemented in the last 7 years. OMtS will actively take part in supporting government in developing national community policing policies and national strategies that regard community policing. OMtS will strongly advocate for strengthening the community-policing concept across the Ministry of Interior.</p> <p>3.2</p> <p>OMSk will consider initiating large-scale community policing training only in the</p> | <p>September 2020</p> <p>3.2</p> <p>December 2021</p> <p>January 2021</p> <p>Some small level of assistance budgeted in UB 2020 for the work with police supervisors</p> |
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| | | | | | <p>presence of a national community policing strategy.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>OMtS will consider initiating large-scale community policing capacity-building assistance to police officers from all lines of police work, as already foreseen in the current Community Policing Strategy (strategic goal 4.1 of old CP strategy)</p> | |
| Effectiveness | 4. The OSCE has commonly been the only provider of capacity-building assistance in the area of community policing, while the capacity-building needs have exceeded OSCE assistance capacities. | 4. To enhance the effectiveness of its capacity-building assistance, OMiK, OMSk and OMtS should to a larger extent seek to deliver it to police officers and local safety entities in coordination and jointly with other resourceful international and national assistance providers. | <p>OMiK</p> <p>OMSk</p> <p>OMtS</p> | <p>Yes</p> <p>Yes</p> <p>Yes</p> | <p>1. The Mission will continue working with other resourceful international and local assistance providers, active in the area of community policing, to ensure better efficiency and effectiveness of achieved results and sustainability.</p> <p>2. The Mission will continue working closely with the Embassy of Norway, as well as seek to ensure close co-ordination with the EU funded project (4,5 million budget), which is currently at the starting stage of its implementation and will be carried out by NI-CO targeting to support Kosovo Police reform, with a component dedicated to community and intelligence-led policing.</p> <p>3. The Mission will seek to strengthen the coordination with the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MoIA) and Kosovo Police, including through joint review of the current capacity of the community policing bodies.</p> <p>4. OMiK will strengthen joint work with its sister missions in implementing the Community Policing Programme.</p> | <p>December 2020</p> <p>December 2021</p> <p>April 2020</p> |

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| | | | | <p>5. The OMiK will continue hosting the representatives of its sister missions (Macedonia, Albania, Montenegro), as well as respective local ministries, police and community safety forums to promote successful experiences and best practices within community policing portfolio.</p> <p>-----</p> <p>The OMSk, in accordance with MoIA Strategy for Community Engagement and Communications 2020 – 2022 will focus on significant priorities, such as Local-level partnership building and Communication with Communities in case of major incidents and events aimed at raised competencies of Police Officers and LPC members for joint activities in communities and Transparent Community Policing. Training of Police Officers who shall work with communities in each region is one of the relevant activities foreseen in this particular regard</p> <p>-----</p> <p>OMtS already closely cooperates with relevant interlocutors like Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development, Ministry of Youth and Sports, local self-governments, Standing Conference of Towns and Municipalities, Commissioner for Protection of Equality, civil society organizations and international organization (UNODC), in enhancing</p> | |
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| | | | | | capacity building assistance in the area of community policing. OMTS will work on enhancing and spreading co-operation with other resourceful international and national assistance providers. | |
| Monitoring and evaluation | 5. OMiK, OMSk and OMTS lack a system for systematically recording short-, mid- and long-term assistance results. | 5. This issue is covered by Recommendation 1 above. | N.A. | | | |
| Sustainability of outcomes | 6. In the cases included in this evaluation community policing assistance short-, mid-, and long-term outcomes are not sustainable in the absence of continued external assistance. | 6. This issue is covered by Recommendation 2 above | N.A. | | | |

Annexes

Annex I: Glossary

| | |
|---------------|--|
| CAG | Citizen Advisory Group |
| CSAT | Community Safety Action Team |
| CSI | Community Security Initiative |
| DAC | Development Assistance Committee |
| EU | European Union |
| EUOK | European Union Office in Kosovo |
| EULEX | European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo |
| ExB | Extra-budgetary |
| GAP | Gender Action Plan |
| ICITAP | International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program |
| IoP | Inspector of Prevention |
| LPC | Local Prevention Councils |
| LPSC | Local Public Safety Committees |
| MCS | Municipal Safety Council |
| MCSC | Municipal Community Safety Councils |
| MEPE | Multi-Ethnic Police Elements |
| Moi | Ministry of Interior |
| NGO | Non-governmental Organization |
| OECD | Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation |
| OIO | Office of Internal Oversight |
| OMiK | OSCE Mission in Kosovo |
| OMSk | OSCE Mission to Skopje |
| OMtS | OSCE Mission to Serbia |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe |
| SPMU | Strategic Police Matters Unit |
| SCTM | Standing Conference of Conferences and Municipalities |
| UB | Unified Budget |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| UNMIK | United Nations Mission in Kosovo |

Annex II: Evaluation Terms of Reference

Purpose, Focus, Scope and Questions

1. The choice of community policing assistance activities as object of an independent evaluation is timely. First, the OSCE has delivered community policing assistance for 20 years. Second, the assistance has had a substantial financial scope, can be expected to be continued in the future in some countries, and has previously not been exposed to independent evaluations by OIO. Third, general mid- and long-term results of this multi-year assistance are unknown. Fourth and finally, the Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU) at the Secretariat plans to review and update the OSCE's community policing approach, which this evaluation hopes to inform.
2. The evaluation has two *purposes*. First, apart from constituting routine oversight, *a more narrow purpose* of the evaluation is to identify recommendations, lessons learned and best practices of relevance to the particular Executive Structures directly covered by this evaluation. Second, the *larger and strategic purpose* of the evaluation is to assess *to what extent the OSCE's community policing assistance enhanced trust in ethnically divided societies and reduced inter-ethnic violence, and how the OSCE's assistance may be designed so that it more effectively generates positive results*. That is, the over-arching question is how the added value of OSCE's assistance can be optimized.
3. A key strategic question in that regard is whether/how the OSCE's *policy and concept of community policing* need to be revised in order to enhance the added value. This includes the role (training, mentoring, policy or strategy development, etc.) that the OSCE should focus on in the future, given that the core objective of community policing is enhanced trust – and reduced inter-ethnic violence - in ethnically divided societies. It includes also the role of regional strategies and co-operation of the OSCE's community policing assistance, since interethnic issues in the OSCE area of operation are commonly of a cross-border/(sub-)regional character instead of geographically confined (sub-)national issues. It also includes how assistance should be designed to assure that the assistance results are (self-)sustainable in the absence of continued assistance.
4. The evaluation *scope* will be cross-organisational and cover the time period 2004-2018, with a special attention to the period 2013-2018 to ensure that lessons learned and best practices are generated from the current state-of-affairs and that they are based on a large number of cases. Almost all of the OSCE's community policing expenditures are related to assistance activities in Serbia, Kosovo, Northern Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. Consequently, these countries and projects will entail a large amount of data that will assist in generating conclusions. Moreover, a significant number of activities (as indicated by expenditures) increases the ability to identify *outcomes*, since a large number of assistance activities over a longer period of time is more likely to have generated observable outcomes, best practices, and lessons learned. Finally, focusing on the countries with the largest OSCE expenditures on community policing ensures that the evaluation will cover most of the OSCE activities and spending in this field. This evaluation will *focus* on the OSCE assistance delivered in Serbia, Northern Macedonia, and Kosovo.
5. The evaluation will adhere to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) standard evaluation criteria and the OECD Guidelines on Conflict, Peace and Development Co-operation evaluation criteria. More specifically, it will assess the *relevance, added value, efficiency, effectiveness, impact* and *sustainability* of the assistance. It will cover short-term, mid-term, and long-term (impact) results as allowed by data availability. It will also

assess vertical (between field operations and the Secretariat) and horizontal (between field operations) co-ordination, to what extent the OSCE Gender Action Plan has been taken into consideration, and the degree to which *output*- and *outcome*-based project monitoring has taken place.

6. OSCE community police projects involve different activities, are sometimes narrow, and differ partly in how they formulate *activities*, *outputs*, and *outcomes*. For instance the projects have included the following five major types of *activities* mostly relating to the professionalization of the police force:⁸⁹ legislative support and strategic support, and/or; training and capacity-building, and/or; facilitation of study tours, participation at conferences abroad, and/or outreach, and awareness activities; financial infrastructure support to (e.g., donations of vehicles). In line with the OSCE definition of community policing and the project descriptions, the overall underlying stylized and general theory of change is that
 - Funds and staff (*input*) generate
 - Capacity development events, outreach and infrastructure support (*activities*), which generate
 - Trained staff and infrastructure (*outputs*) that lead to
 - Enhanced capabilities in terms of staff knowledge, skills and attitudes, (*short-term outcome*), which generate
 - Enhanced community policing practices and policies (*medium-term outcome*), which generate
 - Enhanced inter-ethnic trust/reconciliation, and less ethnic violence (*long-term outcome*, or *impact*).
7. The detailed case-level evaluation questions, together with information on data sources and measurement, are found in the annex to this ToR. Findings from these case-specific questions will contribute to answering the strategic level questions of this thematic evaluation.

Approach, Methodology and Challenges

8. The evaluation will combine a desk review with field visits and interviews, and will draw on three data sources: [1] OSCE documents, including PC and MC decisions, project documents, financial records, and related material, [2] structured key informant interviews (OSCE staff, OSCE project beneficiary representatives [NGOs and governments], and international organizations [as appropriate]), and [3] third party studies and data. Since some assistance projects will be on-going at the time of the evaluation, the evaluation is a combination of mid-term evaluation (formative) and a final end-of-activity or terminal (summative) evaluation. Optionally, and to complement the mentioned data sources, electronic surveys may be distributed by OIO to a large number of individuals in these countries.
9. Evaluation questions related to “relevance”, “added value”, and “efficiency” are non-attributational and usually straight-forward to assess. As such they do not present any particular methodological

⁸⁹ The three first aggregate output categories are borrowed from the annual reports, but hide some of the variation across missions. For instance outreach activities in terms of information campaigns or financing of vehicles have been part of OSCE support. These two outreach categories have therefore been added.

inference-related challenges. In contrast, evaluation questions on outcomes as well as impact are attributional in terms of assessing the contribution of activities and outputs. In this regard, one challenge is that since this evaluation does not involve randomized trials and let alone the possibility to establish randomly selected comparison groups, also the related attribution problem needs attention. The evaluation will address this issue to the largest extent possible. It will also employ statistical analysis tools to the extent allowed by data quality and availability.

10. It is typically easier to assess short-term and mid-term outcomes than long-term outcomes or impact. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that it takes several years before long-term outcomes can be discerned. In addition, whereas OSCE training assistance can deliver on short-term outcomes, whether acquired knowledge and skills lead to mid-term outcomes in the form of changed policies and practices, and then to long-term outcomes, depends on the individuals receiving the training assistance, as well as other factors. Training assistance will thus not by default generate the desired long-term outcomes. The responsibility to implement the knowledge gains as generated by the assistance resides with the beneficiary rather than with the mission.
11. A third challenge is that the accuracy of interview information depends on the correct recall, candidness of interviewees, and staff turnover. To reduce this challenge the evaluation will triangulate information from several sources.
12. The evaluation will be carried out by an evaluation manager at OIO who is supported by an external expert consultant who has multi-year practical experience in community policing. The expert consultant will accompany OIO on all field trips where s/he will attend, and contribute to all meetings and interviews with questions and analysis. He/she will author a narrative analysis of some 15 pages after each field trip, containing expert insights, observations and conclusions regarding the relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability, etc., of the OSCE's community policing assistance in the concerned country, and what needs to change in OSCE projects of this type to make them more efficient and effective. The expert will also provide input and comments on the overall draft evaluation report prepared by OIO.

Output and communication strategy

13. The evaluation will generate one cross-case evaluation report that seeks to identify general lessons learned, best practices, and recommendations at the case specific level as well as at the strategic level. In addition, the findings will be communicated through OIO's evaluation newsletter *OSCEval News*, and potentially through presentations of selected findings and conclusions at selected OSCE events and conferences that are open to OSCE staff and OSCE participating States.

Annex III: Evaluation Matrix: Questions, Indicators and Data

| Issue | Primary evaluation question | Sub-question(-s) | Primary evaluation question indicator; frequency/timing of measurement | Baseline | Target | Data source/instrument |
|--|---|--|--|----------|--------|--|
| Relevance and added value | EQ1: Were the project <i>activities, outputs</i> , and expected <i>outcomes</i> aligned with the needs and plans of the beneficiaries? | Were the project based on a clear theory of change that connects inputs with outcomes? If not, why? | No – Partly – Yes; By event | N.a. | Yes | OSCE Documents, third-party studies/data, interview data |
| | EQ2: Were the project <i>activities</i> and expected <i>outcomes</i> (short-, mid- and long-term) aligned with OSCE's strategies, policies, and plans in this thematic area? | If not, why? Do the OSCE's strategies, policies, and plans provide sufficient guidance and clarity for the OSCE'S assistance projects in terms of suitable activities and desired outcomes? | No – Partly – Yes; By event | N.a. | Yes | Ibid. |
| | EQ3: Did the OSCE have an added value as an assistance provider in the area of community policing? | (a) expertise; (b) access to experience of other countries; (c) access to donor base; (d) long-term presence and related country expertise, network and political contacts, (e) No other actors addressing country needs; (f) synergies with other actors' support to the stakeholder; (g) synergies resulting from other OSCE activities in the stakeholder | No – Yes; annual | N.a. | Yes | Ibid. |
| Monitoring and Evaluation | EQ3: Did the assistance projects have a system for tracking <i>outputs</i> and <i>outcomes</i> ? | If not, why? | No – Partly – Yes; By event | N.a. | Yes | Project documents, interview data |
| Vertical and horizontal co-ordination | EQ4: Did vertical co-ordination take place between the Secretariat and field operations that provided project assistance? | If not, why? Was it timely, was it effective? What kind of assistance/co-ordination has been requested and provided? Did the assistance consider regional elements in cases where the inter-ethnic issues were of a cross-national/regional character? | No – Partly – Yes; Annual | N.a. | Yes | Project documents, interview data |
| | EQ5: Did horizontal co-ordination take place among concerned OSCE field operations, and with relevant international organizations? | Ibid | No – Partly – Yes; Annual | N.a. | Yes | Ibid. |

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| Efficiency | EQ5: Were activities delivered on time and on budget? | If not, why? | No – Partly – Yes; Annual | N.a. | Yes | OSCE Documents, third-party studies/data, interview data |
| | EQ6: Did the output represent value for money | If not, why? | <i>Non-comparative</i> , project cost-overruns; <i>comparative</i> , costs for delivering similar outputs by other entities | N.a. | Yes | Ibid. |
| Effectiveness | EQ7: Did project assistance <i>activities</i> enhance knowledge and skills (short-term outcome)? | What were the key barriers/facilitators to/for short-term outcomes? What type(-s) of activities were more effective? | % training participants reporting enhanced knowledge; Annual | Pre-project assistance level | Increase | Project documents, interview data |
| | EQ8: Did project assistance <i>activities</i> change community policing policies/practices (mid-term outcome)? | What were the key barriers/facilitators to/for mid-term outcomes? What type(-s) of policies and practices changed? What type(-s) of activities were more effective in creating change? | % training participants reporting changed policies/practices; government laws, policies, practices; Annual | Pre- project assistance level | Increase | Project documents, interview data |
| Impact | EQ9: Did project assistance <i>activities</i> enhance interethnic trust/relations and reduce interethnic violence (long-term outcome)? | Why, why not? Is the assistance on track for – and what progress – has been made towards – reaching long-term outcomes? What type(-s) of activities were more effective in creating change? | Survey data on interethnic trust/relations; Data on interethnic violence; Annual. | Pre-project assistance level | More (trust); Less (violence) | Project documents, interview data, third party data |
| Gender Mainstreaming | EQ10: Did the assistance integrate a gender responsive perspective? | Have the activities been informed by a gender analysis? How were gender equality related needs addressed by the project? To what extent (%) were women included in training, events? To what extent (%) were women used as instructors/ presenters? | Number of gender dimensions addressed by the project; % women included in training, seminars, etc.; (%) women-related issues addressed during training, seminars, etc.? | N.a. | T.B.D. | Project proposals and documents, third party data, interview information |
| Sustainability | EQ11: Are the assistance outcomes sustainable in the absence of continued assistance? | <i>Strategic level.</i> National implementation strategy/policy | No – Partly – Yes; annual | Pre-project assistance situation | Yes | Project documents, interview data, third party data |
| | | <i>Operative level.</i> National strategy implementation/action plan. | Ibid. | Ibid. | Yes | Ibid. |
| | | <i>Resource level.</i> Human and financial resources dedicated to community policing | Ibid. | Ibid. | Yes | Ibid. |

Annex IV: Reference Group Terms of Reference

Role

An evaluation reference group consists of key evaluation stakeholders who review and provide feedback on specific evaluation outputs. It is established at the start of the evaluation for the entirety of its duration.

The reference group forms an integral part of the quality assurance system of the evaluation. The group members act in an advisory capacity and do not have management responsibilities for the evaluation, or responsibility for the evaluation output's contents. Responsibility for approval of evaluation outputs rests with the evaluation manager (OIO).

Tasks

1. Review and provide comments on the draft evaluation plan
2. Provide advice through-out the evaluation process whenever solicited or on the group member's initiative, and assist with the identification of key stakeholders and data sources
3. Review and provide comments on draft evaluation reports
4. Assist with dissemination of evaluation findings within the OSCE as appropriate.

Composition

- Mr. Dmitry Kaportsev, Counter-Terrorism and Police Issues Adviser, OSCE Program Office in Dushanbe
- Ms. Eirini Patsea, Senior Project Assistant, Programming and Evaluation Support Unit, Conflict prevention Centre Unit, OSCE Secretariat.
- Mr. Jan Mill, Police Affairs Officer, Strategic Police Matters Unit, OSCE Secretariat
- Ms. Mona Nordberg, Police Affairs Officer, Strategic Police Matters Unit, OSCE Secretariat
- Mr. Sergei Sizov, Police Co-operation Officer, OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek
- Ms. Vera Strobachova Budway, Senior Co-ordination Officer, Gender Section, OSCE Secretariat

Annex V: Community Policing Related Projects Delivered by OMiK, OMSk and OMTs, 2004-2018⁹⁰

| Executive Structure | Project Number | Project Title (short) | Start/End year | Budget/Expenditures (as of December 31, 2018) |
|---------------------|----------------|------------------------------------|----------------|---|
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100159 | UB-PR-PM-CSD-08 | 2008/2008 | 84,736/75,047 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100181 | UB-PRI-PM-CSD-08 | 2008/2008 | 4,500/1,981 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100184 | UB-PRI-PM-CSD1-08 | 2008/2008 | 5,220/3,230 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100234 | UB-PRI-PM-KP CommunityTrust-09 | 2009/2009 | 500/365 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100235 | UB-PRI-PM-CapBuild of LPSC-09 | 2009/2009 | 5,310/4,502 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100273 | UB-PRI-PM-CPU Training-09 | 2009/2009 | 1,288/1,212 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100274 | UB-PRI-PM-CSTrainerTraining-09 | 2009/2009 | 1,740/1,300 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100350 | UB-PRI-PM- COPManagementTrng-09 | 2009/2009 | 565/565 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100352 | UB-PRI-PM-LPSCsCapBuilding-09 | 2009/2009 | 5,304/4,645 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100400 | UB-PRI-PM- CommunityPolicTrn-10 | 2010/2010 | 1,340/1,081 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100407 | UB-PRI-PM-Cap Building LPSC-10 | 2010/2010 | 15,245/14,408 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100588 | UB-PRI-PM- CapacityBuildMCSC-11 | 2011/2011 | 7,472/6,456 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100605 | UB-PRI-PM- CapacityBuildLPSC-11 | 2011/2011 | 21,410/20,881 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100625 | UB-PRI-PM- CommunitPolicTrng-11 | 2011/2011 | 725/610 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100646 | UB-PRI-PM- ComunityPoliceWks-11 | 2011/2011 | 2,874/2,874 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100681 | UB-PRI-PM-COP Conference-11 | 2011/2011 | 9,525/4,245 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100693 | UB-PRI-HD- IncrCommuntSafety-11 | 2011/2011 | 24,748/24,878 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100694 | UB-PRI-PM- IncrCommuntSafety-11 | 2011/2011 | 1,050/1,000 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100732 | UB-PRI-HD-StrengthCapac-KP-12 | 2012/2012 | 61,166/57,427 |

⁹⁰ Source: OSCE DoIn and OSCE Oracle financial system.

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| Mission in Kosovo | 2100734 | UB-PRI-PM-CapacityBuildLPSC-12 | 2012/2012 | 25,093/23,434 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100749 | UB-PRI-PM-ComunPolicingWksh-12 | 2012/2012 | 3,700/3,673 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100750 | UB-PRI-PM-CapacityBuildMCSC-12 | 2012/2012 | 7,098/7,015 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100807 | UB-PRI-PM-CapacityBuild KP-12 | 2012/2012 | 3,355/3,191 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100814 | XB-PRI-PM-LPSC Initiatives-12 | 2012/2017 | 601,604/565,203 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100817 | UB-PRI-HD-HumRightsKSPolic2-13 | 2013/2013 | 46,830/43,797 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100825 | UB-PRI-PM-CommunityPolicing-13 | 2013/2013 | 25,009/24,268 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100832 | UB-PRI-PM-CommuSafetyForums-13 | 2013/2013 | 38,035/32,653 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100889 | UB-PRI-PM-CSCOCapacBuildPrg-14 | 2014/2014 | 37,357/36,112 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100889 | UB-PRI-PM-EstablishmentCSAP-14 | 2014/2014 | 34,193/32,411 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100895 | UB-PRI-PM-KP StrategicFrame-14 | 2014/2014 | 10,227/9,736 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100929 | UB-PRI-HD-HRC MNG-15 | 2015/2015 | 56,553/33,429 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100942 | UB-PRI-PM-CapacityBuildCSCO-15 | 2015/2015 | 37,900/37,018 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100943 | UB-PRI-PM-KP Support CSAP-15 | 2015/2015 | 21,004/20,115 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100955 | UB-PRI-PM-KP-MoIA Support-15 | 2015/2015 | 42,019/40,255 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2100973 | UB-PRI-PM-CommuntSafetyMech-16 | 2016/2016 | 81,225/79,773 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2101001 | UB-PRI-PM-CommuntSafetyMech-17 | 2017/2017 | 66,758/64,449 |
| Mission in Kosovo | 2101020 | UB-PRI-PM-CommuntSafetyMech-18 | 2018/2018 | 125,492/123,067 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400106 | SS Comunity Policing Phase I | 2006/2008 | 781,948/704,028 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400143 | Police Centre Sremska Kamenica | 2006/2006 | 2,600,000/717,939 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400207 | UB-BLG-PM-NCP Strategy-07 | 2007/2007 | 5,500/425 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400269 | UB-BLG-PM-CP-08 | 2008/2008 | 8,300/8,168 |

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|-------------------|---------|--|-----------|-----------------|
| Mission to Serbia | 2400302 | UB-BLG-PM-DIVERSITY-09 | 2009/2009 | 5,800/4,420 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400355 | XB-BLG-PD-Continued Support-10 | 2010/2015 | 815,909/806,236 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400380 | B-BLG-PM-CPU Police Comm-10 | 2010/2010 | 800/437 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400382 | UB-BLG-PM-CPU Munic.Safety-10 | 2010/2010 | 28,800/26,674 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400411 | XB-BLG-PM-Police Reform II-10 | 2011/2011 | 39,400/10,841 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400449 | UB-BLG-PM-CPU Minority-11 | 2011/2011 | 10,100/9,742 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400519 | UB-BLG-PM-CPA Prevention-12 | 2012/2012 | 41,200/35,498 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400521 | UB-BLG-PM-CPA Minority-12 | 2012/2012 | 9,900/7,978 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400522 | UB-BLG-PM-CPA Partnerships-12 | 2012/2012 | 32,500/29,779 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400523 | UB-BLG-PM-CPA Standards-12 | 2012/2012 | 7,000/1,622 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400563 | UB-BLG-PM-PP PARTNERSHIPS-13 | 2013/2013 | 44,000/43,712 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400564 | UB-BLG-PM-DIVERSITY-13 | 2013/2013 | 33,600/27,317 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400604 | UB-BLG-PM-Comm. Policing-14 | 2014/2014 | 134,700/133,835 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400644 | UB-BLG-PM-Community Policing-15 | 2015/2015 | 110,000/108,965 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400661 | UB-BLG-PM-Community-16 | 2016/2016 | 70,500/70,000 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400690 | UB-BLG-PM-Community Policing-17 | 2017/2017 | 95,000/95,475 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400720 | UB-BLG-PAD-Community Police-18 | 2018/2018 | 29,744/29,743 |
| Mission to Serbia | 2400744 | UB-BLG-SCD-Community-18 | 2018/2018 | 81,056/80,223 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600015 | L59 Development and Long-term sustainability of Community Based Policing | 2004/2005 | 541,412/397,223 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600018 | Community Policing Coordinator Training Proposal | 2004/2004 | 9,786/8,898 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600019 | Community Policing Public Survey Proposal | 2004/2005 | 18,000/17,451 |

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|-------------------|---------|---------------------------------|------------|-----------------|
| Mission to Skopje | 2600161 | SKP – Community Safety in Chair | 2006/2007 | 5,987/5,981 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600169 | UB-SKP-PM-Commun Safety-06 | 2006/2006 | 4,550/2,673 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600296 | UB-SKP-PM-CAG training-06 | 2006/2007 | 39,660/31,483 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600359 | XB-SKP-PM-Police Media Rel-07 | 2007/2007 | 9,799/9,797 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600403 | UB-SKP-PM-Local Prev Council-07 | 2007/2007 | 570/570 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600408 | UB-SKP-PM-Inspect of Prev-07 | 2007/2006 | 2,869/2,364 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600409 | UB-SKP-PM-MOI Umbrella Proj-07 | 2007/2007 | 18,553/17,553 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600426 | UB-SKP-PM-ROMA POLICE 1-07 | 2007/2007 | 12,050/11,275 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600436 | UB-SKP-PM-MOI SUPPORT-07 | 2007/2007 | 26,827/26,600 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600460 | UB-SKP-PM-Local Prev Council-08 | 2008/2008 | 18,971/19,560 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600467 | UB-SKP-PM-CP UMBRELLA-08 | 2008/2008 | 25,608/21,279 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600469 | UB-SKP-HD-QUAL POL ROMA 2-08 | 2008/2008 | 13,458/13,458 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600491 | UB-SKP-PM-Extended Survey-08 | 2008/2008 | 14,750/13,275 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600521 | UB-SKP-HD-INSP OF PREV TRN-08 | 2008/2008 | 49,653/49,608 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600548 | UB-SKP-PM-CONFL PREV-09 | 2009/2009 | 3,825/3,825 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600576 | UB-SKP-PM-CP UMBRELLA-09 | 2009/2009 | 108,626/88,509 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600590 | UB-SKP-PM-PROJECT UMBRELLA-09 | 2009/2009 | 22,500/14,336 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600662 | UB-SKP-PM-COMUNITY POLICING-10 | 2010/2010 | 113,095/106,231 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600704 | UB-SKP-PM-UMBRL SUPP MOIA-11 | 2011/2011 | 70,526/61,627 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600742 | UB-SKP-PM-POLICE AFF UMBRE-12 | 2012/20112 | 74,779/74,425 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600785 | UB-SKP-PM-SUPP TO MOI UMBRE-13 | 2013/2013 | 94,099/90,349 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600804 | UB-SKP-PM-SURVEY POLICING-14 | 2014/2014 | 21,224/21,177 |

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|-------------------|---------|-----------------------------------|-----------|-----------------|
| Mission to Skopje | 2600817 | UB-SKP-PM-STRENT ETHN RELAT-14 | 2014/2014 | 48,959/47,954 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600825 | UB-SKP-PM-ACTIVE CITIZENRY-14 | 2014/2014 | 10,496/10,496 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600837 | UB-SKP-PM-FP SUPPORT MOIA-15 | | 114,887/113,889 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600868 | UB-SKP-PM-SURVEY ON POLIC-16 | 2016/2016 | 3,800/3,774 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600884 | UB-SKP-PM-DEMOCRATIC POLIC-16 | 2016/2016 | 44,106/43,005 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600906 | UB-SKP-PM-SURVEY 2017-17 | 2017/2017 | 19,188/18,696 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600908 | UB-SKP-PM-MU UMBRELLA 17 | 2017/2017 | 31,665/31,425 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600910 | UB-SKP-PM-DEM POLICING- 17 | 2017/2017 | 50,205/47,532 |
| Mission to Skopje | 2600928 | UB-SKP-PM-DEM POLICING- 18 | 2018/2018 | 106,327/102,953 |

Annex VI: List of Interviewed Individuals

OSCE Secretariat

Mr. Guy Vinet, Head, SPMU
Ms. Denise Mazzolani, Deputy Head, SPMU
Mr. Jan Mill, Police Affairs Officer, SPMU
Ms. Mona Nordberg, Police Affairs Officer, SPMU

German Police University in Munster

Mr. Thorsten Stodiek, Research Associate, German Police University; previously Police Affairs Officer, SPMU, OSCE Secretariat

North Macedonia (15-19 April, 2019)

OSCE Mission to Skopje

Ambassador Clemens Koja, Head of Mission
Ms. Aneta Manuilova, Senior Police Advisor Police Development Unit
Mr. Eben Friedman, Chief, Monitoring Unit
Mr. Faruk Ademi, Senior Program Assistant, Police Development Unit
Mr. Naser Nagavci, Program Assistant, Police Development Unit
Mr. Thomas Harte, Chief, Police Development Unit

Skopje

Mr. Ali Sadiki, Imam and secretary of El-Hilal NGO
Mr. Arben Imeri, Deputy Commander, Gazi Baba Police Station
Ms. Hrizantema Rendevska, Chief Prevention Unit, SIA Strumica
Ms. Rozalita Dojchinovska, Police Adviser for PPO and Prevention, Ministry of Interior
Mr. Sasho Velkovski, Commander, Gazi Baba Police Station
Mr. Toni Stankovski, Assistant to the Director of Police, Head of Unit for Strategic Planning, Standards and Quality Control, Ministry of Interior
Ms. Zaklina Prosaroska, Senior Police Adviser for PPO and Prevention, Ministry of Interior

Tetovo

Mr. Ahmet Qazimi, Chief of Education, Department Tetovo Municipality
Mr. Aleksandar Stojanovski, Senior Researcher, "Eurothink" Center for European Strategies
Mr. Amir Dalipi, Head, SIA Tetovo
Mr. Dukagjin Kashtanjeva, Police officer
Ms. Edita Xhemaili, Chief of Prevention, Tetovo
Mr. Enver Pajaziti, Mayor, Brvencia Municipality

Mr. Enver Selami, Commander, Police Station Bit Pazar
Ms. Magdalena Lembovska, Senior Researcher, “Eurothink” Center for European Strategies
Ms. Marija Atanasova, Project coordinator, “SUMNAL” Roma NGO
Mr. Riste Jovanovski, Chief of Prevention, Skopje
Ms. Sibel Ahmet, Project Co-ordinator, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in North Macedonia
Mr. Toni Jakimovski, Head, SIA Skopje
Ms. Zhane Kreshova, Head, “Women Forum” NGO, Tetovo
Mr. Vedat Zylbeari, State Employment Agency
Mr. Visar Durak, Principal, secondary school “Cvetan Dimov”

Kumanova

Mr. Ahmet Jasarevski, President, “DROM” NGO, Kumanovo
Mr. Sevdail Xhaferi, Assistant Head, SIA Kumanovo
Mr. Stojanche Velichkovich, Head, SIA Kumanovo
Ms. Violeta Bogdanovska, Chief of Prevention, Kumanovo

Kosovo (13-17 May, 2019)

OSCE Mission in Kosovo

Ambassador Jan Braathu, Head of Mission
Ms. Anita Pasha, National Programme Officer, Police Monitoring, Department for Security and Public Safety
Mr. Djordje Karan, Senior Community Policing Officer
Mr. Erduan Gjokolli, Senior Programme Assistant
Mr. Kilian Wahl, Deputy Head of Mission
Mr. Mats Turdell, Senior Community Policing Officer
Mr. Nikola Pajovic, National Programme Officer
Mr. Rifat Marmullaku, National Programme Officer
Mr. Stojanche Velichkovich, Head, SIA Kumanovo
Ms. Vlora Rizvanolli, Consultant
Ms. Yuliya Rangelova, Senior Community Policing Officer

Prishtinë/Priština

Mr. Arben Qirezi, Public Pulse Coordinator, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Lt. Col. Akrem Racaj, Director, Directorate for Advanced and Specialized Training, Kosovo Police General Directorate
Mr. Fatmir Bilalli, Coordinator, MCSC of Prishtinë/Priština

Lt. Fatmir Limani, Chief, Section for Coordinating with community safety forums, Directorate for Community Policing and Crime Prevention, Kosovo Police

Col. Gazmend Hoxha, Director, Public Safety Division, Kosovo Police General Directorate

Mr. Haqif Rrustemi, Coordinator, MCSC of Lipjan/Lipjan

Mr. Hetem Kupina, Leader, LPSC Bernice e poshtme/Donja Bernica, Prishtinë/Priština Municipality

Mr. Imer Thaqi, Chief of Division, Department for Public Safety, Ministry of Interior

Mr. Labinot Sadiku, Senior Officer for Analysis and Planning, Department for Public Safety, Ministry of Interior

Col. Lumni Graishta, (former) Director, Community Policing and Crime Prevention Directorate, Kosovo Police General Directorate

Mentor Cakolli, (former) Police Officer/ Officer for Crime Prevention and Child Delinquency, Kosovo Police Directorate for Community Policing and Crime Prevention

Mr. Mentor Vrajolli, Executive Director, Kosovo Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)

Ms. Mimoza Janova, Project Manager, Royal Norwegian Embassy Kosovo

Mr. Plator Avdiu, Researcher, Kosovo Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)

Col. Shefqet Beçaj, Advisor to General Director/Coordinator for monitoring implementation of Community Policing Strategy, Kosovo Police General Directorate

Fushë Kosovë/Kosovo Polje

Major Vjollca Hoti, Station Commander, Kosovo Polje Police Station

Mitrovica/Mitrovicë North

Capt. Aleksandar Filipovic, Police Commander, Police Station in Leposavić/ Leposaviq

Capt. Dragan Stefanovic, Police Commander, Police Station Zvečan/Zveçan

Mr. Fadil Avdyli, Police officer and Member of Bosnian Mahalla LPSC, Police Station Mitrovica/Mitrovicë

Capt. Milija Milosevic, Police officer, Police Station Mitrovica/Mitrovicë

Capt. Nenad Djuric, Regional Director, Police Mitrovica/Mitrovicë Regional Directorate North

Capt. Zvezdan Milivojevic, Police Commander, Police Station Zubin Potok/Zubin Potoku

Vushtrri/Vučitrn

Mr. Milaim Ramadani, Leader, LPSC 2 Korriku, Mitrovicë/Mitrovica South

Mr. Mirko Popović, Deputy Leader, LPSC Priluzhje/Priluzhë, Vushtrri/Vucitrn Municipality

Mr. Zarko Ristic, Leader, LPSC Zvečan/Zveçan Sector 2, Zvečan/Zveçan Municipality

Pejë/Peć

Mr. Gazmend Muhaxheri, Mayor, MCSC Chairperson, Pejë/Peć

Mr. Nenad Stasic, Deputy Leader, LPSC Drenoc/Drenovac village Klinë/Klina

Mr. Ramadan Rama, Leader, LPSC Drenoc/Drenovac village Klinë/Klina

Mr. Ranko Bakić, Leader, LPSC Ljevoša/Levoshë village Klinë/Klina

Serbia (27-31 May, 2019)

OSCE Mission to Serbia

Ambassador Andrea Orizio, Head of Mission

Mr. Edin Kalac, National Community Policing Officer, Security Co-operation Department

Ms. Jelena Matic, Senior Programme Assistant, Media Department

Ms. Marija Makevic, National Programme Officer, Security Co-operation Department

Ms. Milena Petrovic Ilic, Project Assistant, Security Co-operation Department

Ms. Milica Rodic, National Programme Officer, Democratisation Department

Mr. Miroslav Kragic, National Project Officer, Democratisation Department

Ms. Natasa Ristic, National Programme Officer, Security Co-operation Department

Mr. Robert Kucharski, Head, Security Co-operation Department

Mr. Umberto Severini, Senior Organised Crime Adviser, Security Co-operation Department

Ms. Valdete Osmani, National programme Officer, Security Co-operation Department

Mr. Vladimir Kostic, Project Assistant, Security Co-operation Department

Belgrade

Ms. Ana Zrnic, (former) Deputy Head, Department for Drug Addiction Prevention, Ministry of Interior

Mr. Aleksandar Vasilijevic, Deputy Head of uniformed Police, Ministry of Interior

Ms. Aleksandra Stankovic, Secretary, Police association European Roma Police Officers

Ms. Branislava Popovic Citic, CSO *CEPORA* Belgrade

Ms. Brankica Tarbuk Jankovic, CSO *Centre for Reintegration and Activism*

Mr. Zlatko Petrin, MCSC Zvezdara

Mr. Nenad Tairovic, Chairman, Police association European Roma Police Officers

Mr. Novak Gajic, Local and Regional Development Advisor, Standing Conference of Towns and Municipalities

Mr. Sasa Djordjevic, Researcher, Belgrade Centre for Security Policy

Ms. Tatjana Jokanović, Deputy Commissioner for Protection of Equality, Commissioner for Protection of Equality

Ms. Tatjana Prijic, Senior Advisor, Commissioner for Protection of Equality

Bujanovac

Mr. Adnan Salihi, Head of the Assembly of Bujanovac and former Head of Assembly of Bujanovac (2006-2008)

Mr. Giacomo Bosisio, Municipal Co-ordinator, OSCE Mission to Serbia South Serbia Programme

Mr. Ivica Stamenovic, Field Programme Assistant, OSCE Mission to Serbia South Serbia Programme

Mr. Nazmi Arifi, (former [2006-2008]) Head, Presevo Assembly

Mr. Sherif Abdili, Field Programme Assistant, OSCE Mission to Serbia South Serbia Programme

Novi Pazar

Mr. Hajrudin Hajrovic President, SC Novi Pazar (Via Skype)

Tutin

Ms. Dzeneta Agovic, CSO, Impuls, Tutin (Southwest Serbia) (via Skype)

Zemun

Mr. Marko Jankovic, President, MSC Zemun

Ms. Isidora Radovanovic, Community Policing Officer, Zemun Municipality

Annex VII: Bibliography

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