

FSC.JOUR/980 5 May 2021

Original: ENGLISH

Chairmanship: Armenia

974th PLENARY MEETING OF THE FORUM

1. Date: Wednesday, 5 May 2021 (via video teleconference)

Opened: 10 a.m. Closed: 1 p.m.

2. <u>Chairperson</u>: Ambassador A. Papikyan

Prior to taking up the agenda, the Chairperson reminded the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) of the technical modalities for the conduct of FSC meetings during the COVID-19 pandemic, as outlined in FSC.GAL/31/21 OSCE+.

3. <u>Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:</u>

Agenda item 1: SECURITY DIALOGUE: UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1540

- Presentation by Mr. G. Kocharyan, Head of the Department of International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia
- Presentation by Mr. E. Rice-Howell, Vice-Chair of the 1540 Committee
- Presentation by Mr. G. Mashkov, Ambassador-at-Large, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
- Presentation by Mr. T. Perry, Special Coordinator for UNSCR 1540, US Department of State

Chairperson, Mr. G. Kocharyan (FSC.DEL/149/21), Mr. J. McCormick, Mr. E. Rice-Howell, Mr. G. Mashkov (Annex 1), Mr. T. Perry (FSC.DEL/145/21 OSCE+), Portugal-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro, North Macedonia and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment)

(FSC.DEL/158/21), United Kingdom (FSC.DEL/159/21 OSCE+), Russian Federation (Annex 2), Spain, Turkey (FSC.DEL/155/21 OSCE+), FSC Co-ordinator on Non-Proliferation Issues (Belarus) (FSC.DEL/147/21 OSCE+), Azerbaijan (FSC.DEL/146/21 OSCE+)

Agenda item 2: GENERAL STATEMENTS

Situation in and around Ukraine: Ukraine (FSC.DEL/148/21), Portugal-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, Montenegro and North Macedonia; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Andorra, Georgia, Moldova, San Marino and Ukraine, in alignment) (FSC.DEL/160/21), United States of America (FSC.DEL/150/21 OSCE+), United Kingdom (FSC.DEL/161/21 OSCE+), Canada, Russian Federation (Annex 3)

Agenda item 3: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) Training programme on "Conflict Prevention and Resolution through Arms
 Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in the OSCE Area":
 Representative of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre (Annex 4),
 Switzerland
- (b) Briefing on the 90th meeting of the OSCE Communications Group and the 2021 Global Exchange of Military Information, held via video teleconference from 27 to 29 April 2021: Representative of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre
- (c) Distribution of a synopsis of the status of small arms and light weapons and conventional ammunition projects in the OSCE as of 31 March 2021 (FSC.GAL/43/21 OSCE+): FSC Co-ordinator for Assistance Projects on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition (Austria)
- (d) Briefing on the "DACIA 21" military exercise: Romania

4. <u>Next meeting</u>:

Wednesday, 12 May 2021, at 10 a.m., via video teleconference



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Original: RUSSIAN

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FSC Journal No. 980, Agenda item 1

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Mr. Chairperson, Your Excellencies, Ladies and gentlemen,

First of all, I should like to express my gratitude to the Armenian Chairmanship of the Forum for the initiative to discuss at today's meeting United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 and the role of the OSCE in assisting States in the implementation of that resolution.

The Russian Federation considers resolution 1540 to be the key and, indeed, the most universal legally binding instrument in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Its main purpose is to obligate all United Nations Member States to create effective barriers at the national level to prevent WMD, their means of delivery and related materials from falling into the hands of non-State actors, including terrorists.

That being said, it is important that States determine for themselves how to implement the resolution and what specific steps they should take to strengthen their legislative framework and enforcement practices with a view to effectively countering the proliferation of WMD and related materials. The Committee is not tasked with monitoring these actions or evaluating countries' implementation of the resolution's provisions, nor are there uniform implementation formulas for all. The strength of the resolution 1540 framework will depend on the weakest link. We therefore have an interest in ensuring that all these links in the global system are equally strong. This is impossible to achieve without an atmosphere of mutual understanding and co-operation.

The most important element of co-operation is the possibility for countries that do not have the full range of domestic resources to request and receive assistance in implementing the resolution. At the global level, it is the United Nations Security Council 1540 Committee, tasked with matching requests and offers of assistance, that co-ordinates efforts in this area. International and regional organizations with the relevant expertise and capacity have a role to play here.

We consider the OSCE's efforts in this context to be a good example of such work. One can get an idea of these efforts from the document entitled "The OSCE's contribution to the 2020–2021 Comprehensive Review of the Status of Implementation of UNSCR 1540", which was approved by the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) in January this year, and the preparation of which was taken on by our Belarusian colleagues. I should like to take this opportunity to express our gratitude to them for their work on the text and their readiness to take into account the various parties' comments and suggestions. In the end, through joint efforts, it proved possible to put together high-quality and informative material summarizing what has been done at the OSCE on the resolution 1540 "track" since the previous comprehensive review in 2016 and outlining possible ways forward.

In our view, the key message for the OSCE is the point made in that document to the effect that facilitating the implementation of resolution 1540 remains one of the few activities of our Organization that opens up the possibility of overcoming the dividing lines in the Euro-Atlantic area. In other words, not only can the OSCE help countries to implement the resolution's goals and objectives, but the resolution also allows the OSCE to make better use of its unifying potential, thereby contributing to the establishment of a common security space from Vancouver to Vladivostok.

In the current challenging environment, marked by the scrapping or erosion of most of the fundamental agreements in the field of strategic stability (I might mention anti-missile defence, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, chemical weapons disarmament, the Treaty on Open Skies, and so on), the prevalence of approaches involving the use of force and unilateral approaches over political and diplomatic ones, and the critical dwindling of mutual trust among States, the importance and relevance of the unifying nature of resolution 1540 for the OSCE cannot be emphasized enough.

We believe that the areas of work, practices and tools for co-operation with States mentioned in the document on the OSCE's contribution to the 2020–2021 Comprehensive Review remain relevant. Organizational solutions such as the regular exchange of views on the resolution under the FSC Security Dialogue framework, the co-ordination functions of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), the technical assistance platform and country-specific dialogue are unique to the OSCE. I should also like to mention the practical experience gained by the OSCE in implementing projects that are already under way in various regions far beyond the OSCE area – voluntary peer reviews on resolution implementation, training courses for national Points of Contact on resolution 1540, assistance to States, upon their request, in developing voluntary National Action Plans (NAPs) and the exchange of best practices.

Of course, when it comes to NAPs, we are referring to purely voluntary measures, which can hardly serve as an adequate substitute for the long-term day-to-day work of States in meeting the requirements of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540. An NAP is a kind of road map for achieving the ultimate goal and not an end in itself.

As for the courses for OSCE countries' national Points of Contact on resolution 1540, I should like to stress that their success depends not only on the organizers of the events. We have held such events twice in Russia – in Kaliningrad (2016) and in Rostov-on-Don (2018). We would be ready to constructively consider possible CPC proposals for the continuation of

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such practices as soon as the public health situation allows. However, in order to maximize the added value of such events, they should involve a wide range of countries, both those equipped with experience and expertise and those interested in learning from partners about best practices in areas relevant to the implementation of resolution 1540.

Many Western countries did not come to Russia for political reasons. Let me be frank – we are not holding on to these courses and are ready to pass the baton to any other State. But we do not intend to hold meaningless events or to duplicate our efforts in acquainting interested countries from the Commonwealth of Independent States with the experience of our national implementation of resolution 1540. The point of these courses for us lies not in providing "catch-up" training for those lagging behind, but in giving a masterclass for all, regardless of their level of implementation of resolution 1540, to ensure that there is continuous further progress.

I should like to turn to an important aspect of the OSCE's work in facilitating implementation of the resolution, namely, developing a best practice guide. In May 2019, the Tajik FSC Chairmanship began work to summarize the relevant best practices of the OSCE countries. In late March of this year, the draft guide was distributed among the OSCE participating States. Although, from a conceptual point of view, the OSCE's initiative in this regard deserves nothing but support, we still have a lot of questions about how it is being implemented in practice. We made all our thoughts known at the informal meeting of the Group of Friends of Resolution 1540 on this issue co-chaired by Spain and Belarus. These concern the scope, definitions, the relationship between the non-proliferation and counter-terrorism components, the redundancy of the reporting section, attempts to develop agreed best practices, along with other issues.

We take the view that the guide should be a collection of national practices relevant to the implementation of the resolution and grouped according to the obligations under the resolution. It is not meant necessarily to be a consensus document and new national instruments should be able to be incorporated into it. Russia could share, for example, its experience in identifying controlled products, training specialists in export control, and so on.

And there is another no less important aspect. The resolution should not be weighed down with complex political questions, made to tackle extraneous issues, or be turned into a tool for ramming through one's own national priorities. This runs the risk of leading to confrontation that would permanently erode what little but steady progress the international community has made on non-proliferation. Only those who strive to illegally obtain access to WMD materials would benefit from this.

The United Nations Security Council recently extended the 1540 Committee's mandate until 28 February 2022. There is not much time for the review process. The question of holding open events during the process remains open owing to the coronavirus restrictions. Nevertheless, the document drawn up by the OSCE already allows the 1540 Committee to consider using the OSCE's experience in a broader context, including by reflecting certain elements of the document in the final recommendations of the comprehensive review and the future United Nations Security Council resolution on the extension of the Committee's mandate.

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In conclusion, I should like to reiterate that we consider it important and timely to talk about the OSCE's contribution to the implementation of resolution 1540. We are open to a constructive examination of all the proposals and initiatives voiced today. We trust that our meeting will give impetus to the development of a common understanding of the OSCE's future actions on the resolution 1540 "track", both for the forthcoming review process and for the post-review period.

Thank you for your attention.

I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



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ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

974th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 980, Agenda item 1

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Mr. Chairperson,

We should like to thank you for organizing today's plenary meeting on the theme of United Nations Security Council resolution 1540. We are grateful to the distinguished speakers – Mr. George Kocharian, head of department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Armenia, Mr. Todd Perry, representative of the Department of State of the United States of America, and Mr. Grigory Mashkov, Ambassador-at-Large with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia – for their interesting presentations and the work they have done. We should also like to express our support and gratitude to the Vice-Chair of the 1540 Committee, Mr. Edward Rice-Howell.

United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 remains the key and, indeed, the only universal legally binding instrument in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). It obligates all States to take effective measures to prevent WMD, their means of delivery and related materials from falling into the hands of non-State actors, including terrorists. Achieving the full implementation of the resolution by all countries is a pressing and extremely important task. Much still remains to be done to realize the basic premise – implementation of resolution 1540 by all and in full.

The Russian Federation continues to attach great importance to resolution 1540. In the current difficult political environment, United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 remains one of the few areas where constructive co-operation takes place and is being actively developed, where States continue their fruitful collaboration in the field of non-proliferation of WMD and related materials. This spirit of co-operation should be preserved, especially in the OSCE.

We recall that responsibility for implementation of resolution 1540 rests with States. It is important that international and regional organizations should be able to help these and to provide them with specific assistance as needed, based on their distinctive features, resources and expertise.

The comprehensive review launched last year of the status of implementation of resolution 1540, as provided for by United Nations Security Council resolution 1977, is

approaching completion. It should not be forgotten that there is an important task ahead of us all – to preserve the spirit of co-operation that has developed around the resolution. This is particularly important in the light of the current turbulence in international affairs: the resolution remains one of the few "oases" of stability and of a non-confrontational approach in multilateral diplomacy.

We note with satisfaction that the OSCE as a whole has succeeded in doing some truly important work on the resolution "track". The specific areas in which the Organization can facilitate the resolution's implementation without duplicating the functions of the 1540 Committee have been clearly defined, are well known and remain relevant. The main thing for all of us is to continue systematic work in these areas and also – bearing in mind the finalization of a draft document on the OSCE's contribution to global efforts on the 1540 "track" in the post-review period – to continue the discussion at the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) on a possible expansion of such a contribution by the OSCE. The OSCE's accumulated experience and plans for the future should be taken into account during the review process and included in the new United Nations Security Council resolution following the review, which, among other things, will guide the 1540 Committee's co-operation with international and regional organizations.

Mr. Chairperson,

We believe that the OSCE should also remain an important platform for the exchange of views, best practices and expertise among all of us and among the equal participants in global non-proliferation efforts. The rates of implementation of resolution 1540 in the OSCE area are the highest in the world and, on average, our countries have met about 85 per cent of the requirements laid down in that document. However, we should not rest on our laurels. The OSCE's assistance in strengthening the non-proliferation capacity of States, at their request, constitutes an important contribution to the implementation of resolution 1540. We advocate that the FSC could continue to serve as a platform for the exchange of views, and that the experience gained in the OSCE area could be used not only in the Euro-Atlantic area but also in other regions of the world, in particular Africa, Asia and Latin America, with a view to the work on the 1540 "track" being organized as effectively as possible.

Over the years, the OSCE has contributed to the holding of regional events on the resolution, not least in Russia. We note the readiness to consider the possibility of holding in Russia, with the assistance of the OSCE and the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, courses directed at OSCE countries' national Points of Contact on resolution 1540 for the exchange of experience and best practices in the resolution's implementation. We consider a more active involvement of all OSCE participating States in such an event to be vital.

We take note of the fact that the potential of such a format for sharing experience has not yet been fully exploited. It is worth analysing how to enhance the practical impact of these events. This involves looking at the make-up of the target audience and ensuring the representation of different country categories with different levels of development as regards national export control systems and non-proliferation capacity. The primary condition for the effectiveness of the training courses for national Points of Contact on resolution 1540 is not to make their participation dependent on the political situation.

We should like to caution against attempts to drag United Nations Security Council resolution 1540 into controversial discussions. The resolution is based on co-operation among all United Nations Member States and is not directed against individual countries. We believe that those who accuse others of "violation" of the resolution are not only placing their own political priorities above non-proliferation but also distorting its content and aims. As far as the discussion of the wide range of export control questions is concerned, there are appropriate multilateral mechanisms established for that purpose.

Mr. Chairperson,

Around the world, terrorist attacks cause immense destruction and suffering. Against this backdrop, the risks of terrorists gaining access to nuclear weapons or hazardous chemical and biological substances are even more alarming. The danger of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons finding their way on to the black market is still high. We should not underestimate the risks, given that in some cases terrorist groups have substantial military and financial resources or control significant expanses of territory.

In such circumstances, resolution 1540 remains an effective tool for resolving these problems. It is important that all participating States should place all existing WMD systems under strict control and adopt effective laws prohibiting any non-State actor from manufacturing, acquiring, transporting or using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons and from possessing them.

We advocate a substantive exchange of views on those specific aspects where the OSCE can contribute to the implementation of the resolution by participating States, and also to ensuring an effective comprehensive review of its implementation under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council 1540 Committee. We believe it is important to focus on these goals rather than on the continuing exchange of confrontational remarks.

Mr. Chairperson,

Overall, today's discussion shows that we are all interested in increasing the effectiveness of the Forum's activities, building on the unifying principles of resolution 1540. In today's world, effectively combating the proliferation of WMD is of particular importance for maintaining global and regional stability and reliably safeguarding the security of each and every State. In that connection we are counting on constructive, professional co-operation with all partners on the basis of the principles of equality and the forming of consensus through a balance of interests.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



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ENGLISH

Original: RUSSIAN

974th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 980, Agenda item 2

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Mr. Chairperson,

Our basic assessment of the causes and consequences of the internal Ukrainian conflict, as well as our fundamental approach to its settlement, are well known to our partners in the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) and remain unchanged. For more detailed information, colleagues are invited to refer to our previous statements attached to the FSC journals.

We recall that the parties to the internal Ukrainian conflict are clearly identified in the Package of Measures for the Implementation of the Minsk Agreements of 12 February 2015, endorsed by United Nations Security Council resolution 2202. They are the Ukrainian Government and the Ukrainian armed forces on the one hand, and representatives of certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and their armed formations on the other. We strongly condemn the Ukrainian Government's attempts to call into question the Minsk agreements and its continuation of the bloody punitive operation against the population of Donbas.

We are seriously concerned about the range of military assistance Western countries are providing to Ukraine, which makes them complicit in the crimes committed by the Ukrainian military and armed formations of Ukrainian nationalists in the region. Instead of pumping Ukraine full of hardware, there is a need to work closely and systematically with the Ukrainian leadership to put an end to the armed confrontation in Donbas as soon as possible.

We urge our colleagues to abandon their futile efforts to politicize the military exercises held on the territory of the Russian Federation in April. The tasks set for the training exercises in the Southern and Western Military Districts have been achieved. The exercises have come to an end. We assume that our position has been heard by our negotiating partners and that the discussion on this issue has been completely exhausted.

We are monitoring the movement of North Atlantic Alliance troops to the area of the forthcoming "Defender Europe 2021" exercise. We see that one of the main coalition groupings is being deployed to the Black Sea region. We are detecting an increase in military activity near Russia's southern borders. At the same time, the Ukrainian Government

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regularly conducts exercises involving aggressive scenarios and the participation of forces from NATO States, and is actively modernizing its military infrastructure and developing and deploying offensive weapon systems. This creates an unpredictable environment fraught with threats not only to Ukraine's population but also to neighbouring States. In the context of such overt military activity by NATO countries near Russia's borders and with the involvement of Ukraine, we consider the politicized statements made today about Russia's alleged "steps to escalate tensions" in the Black Sea to be inappropriate.

As for the choice made by the inhabitants of Crimea and Sevastopol to reunite with Russia, which was mentioned again today, it is completely legitimate and has to be respected.

The way to stabilize the situation in Ukraine is through a comprehensive political settlement of the internal Ukrainian conflict. We emphasize the need for full implementation of the Minsk Package of Measures through direct dialogue between the Ukrainian Government and the authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk. The Russian Federation, in its capacity as a mediator alongside the OSCE, Germany and France, stands ready to facilitate this in every possible way.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson. I request that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



FSC.JOUR/980 5 May 2021 Annex 4

Original: ENGLISH

974th Plenary Meeting

FSC Journal No. 980, Agenda item 3(a)

STATEMENT BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE CONFLICT PREVENTION CENTRE

Mr. Chairperson,

I should like to inform the participating States that the training programme on "Conflict Prevention and Resolution through Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-Proliferation in the OSCE Area" – which is aimed at young professionals, in particular women – will commence on 24 May 2021 with the online course. We envisage holding the one-week in-person course in Vienna in the second half of 2021 depending on COVID-19 pandemic restrictions. The programme is supported by the OSCE-UNODA Scholarship for Peace and Security.

This year we received almost a thousand applications. After a comprehensive selection process, for the eight-week online course we have selected 150 participants (86 per cent female and 14 per cent male) from 52 participating States and nine OSCE Partners for Co-operation. The participants come from various fields (e.g., law, security, humanities, social work and business) and have varying professional affiliations (e.g., governmental and non-governmental sectors).

The interactive online training will provide the participants with knowledge on politico-military issues, conflict prevention, arms control, and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). Moreover, it will increase their awareness and understanding of disarmament and non-proliferation issues in the OSCE area. Throughout the programme the participants will look at the roles of various relevant organizations and CSBM regimes. They will explore the links between disarmament, non-proliferation, development and gender. During the part of the programme devoted to the control of small arms and light weapons (SALW), ammunition and mines, they will learn about the commitments set out in the international and regional frameworks. They will also become familiar with the efforts of the United Nations and OSCE to prevent illicit trafficking of SALW.

As we conduct the training programme for the fourth year, it continues to increase the representation of women and youth in the security sector. The project continues to contribute to equal opportunities for women to participate fully in the policy-making, planning and implementation processes related to arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation.

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Moreover, the training programme will also give young professionals a good chance to build up their networks and increase their range of career opportunities.

Let me take this opportunity to thank the governments of Andorra, Germany, Finland, France, Ireland, Spain and Switzerland for their support for this year's training programme.

I would kindly ask you to attach this statement to the journal of the day.