

Implementation of Police-Related Programmes

Lessons Learned in South-Eastern Europe

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAR	After Action Report
BLA	Board and Lodging Allowance
CEPOL	European Police College
CPC	Conflict Prevention Centre
DHoM	Deputy Head of Mission
DHR	Department of Human Resources
DMF	Department of Management and Finance
DPED	Department of Police Education and Development
DPS	Department for Public Safety
DSA	Daily Subsistence Allowance
DSPS	Department for Security and Public Safety
EAR	European Agency for Reconstruction
EC	European Commission
EU	European Union
ExB	Extra-budgetary funding
GO	General Orientation Programme
HoLED	Head of Law Enforcement Department
HoM	Head of Mission
HQ	Headquarters
ICITAP	International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program
KCPSED	Kosovo Centre for Public Safety Education and Development
KPS	Kosovo Police Service
KPSS	Kosovo Police Service School
LED	Law Enforcement Department
MEPE	Multi-Ethnic Police Element
Mol	Ministry of Interior
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSA	Monthly Supplementary Allowance
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OECD DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Development Assistance Committee
OMIK	OSCE Mission in Kosovo
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PAR	Performance Appraisal Report
PAU	Police Affairs Unit
PCCSEE	Police Cooperation Convention for South East Europe
PC/DEC	OSCE Permanent Council Decision
PCU	Project Co-ordination Unit

PDD	Police Development Department
PIK	Police Inspectorate of Kosovo
PMG	OSCE Police Monitoring Group
POLIS	Policing OnLine Information System
SEPCA	Southeast Europe Police Chiefs Association
SPA	Senior Police Adviser
SPMU	Strategic Police Matters Unit
ToT	Training of Trainers
UB	Unified Budget
UN	United Nations
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNPSG	United Nations Police Support Group
UXO	Unexploded Ordnance

Preface and Acknowledgements

Since October 1998, when the OSCE succeeded the UN in monitoring multi-ethnic police forces in Croatia, the OSCE has become a key player in the field of training and reforming police agencies in South-Eastern Europe, with operations since: 1999 in Kosovo; 2001 in Serbia, Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and 2003 in Albania.

While bearing the main responsibility for the training of local police officers and providing assistance to local authorities in reforming police services, the OSCE Law Enforcement Departments (LEDs) have been co-operating with their counterparts from the UN (Croatia, Kosovo) and the EU (Albania, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo), as well as with a number of other international organizations, NGOs and bilateral state actors.

The OSCE's field operation staff in South-Eastern Europe has gathered a large body of experience and expertise in implementing police-related mandates during the last decade. It is a core objective of the Strategic Police Matters Unit (SPMU), to accumulate this information and guidance for use in the preparation and planning of future police-related activities. The SPMU has therefore initiated a series of lessons learned exercises with the OSCE's LEDs of the field operations in South-Eastern Europe, during which former and current senior mission management staff and programme managers exchanged their experiences on the challenges they faced when they developed and implemented police reform programmes in the context of post-conflict rehabilitation and transition from authoritarian and socialist states to democratic market economies. More importantly, participants did not only speak about the challenges but also about strategies and best practices to address these challenges. This lessons learned report is therefore also a compilation of good practices in implementing police-related programmes in challenging environments, which could be applied in future activities in South-Eastern Europe and, if adapted to regional and local circumstance, in other regions of the OSCE. While the field operations in South-Eastern Europe – particularly at the beginning of their deployment – often had to develop their strategies on an *ad hoc* basis without any templates and an institutional memory to rely on/refer to, it is envisaged that future field operations will profit from this collection of good practices.

The findings of this study are based on the analysis of a number of documents and research reports published by the OSCE and other international organizations and NGOs. Lessons learned were also exchanged between senior staff of the LEDs during a workshop of the Heads of OSCE Law Enforcement Departments (HoLEDs) in June 2008 in Skopje, and in the framework of subsequent field visits in South-Eastern Europe during August and September 2008, at which the HoLEDs, senior project managers and national project assistants were interviewed. These in-depth interviews were based on a comprehensive questionnaire, which was also sent to the former HoLEDs, in order to receive information particularly about the initial phase of the field operations. At an additional workshop of the HoLEDs in Vienna in October 2008, the first draft of the Lessons Learned report was reviewed. Finally, the lessons learned were shared with other thematic units in the Secretariat.

I am very appreciative of the efforts of the colleagues in the field operations and the Secretariat who devoted their time to this exercise. I am particularly grateful to those colleagues who have left the OSCE during the last ten years but were nevertheless willing to provide their valuable lessons learned.



Kevin Carty
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I. Introduction

OSCE's police-related activities in South-Eastern Europe have taken place in a challenging environment. In post-conflict societies, police forces had often been discredited by participating in fighting and engaging in serious violations of human rights against their people, or at least against certain segments of society. These police forces had to be reformed in order to gain public confidence in the police. This reform was a prerequisite for achieving acceptance of the state's monopoly of force and forestalling vigilantism. Furthermore, police forces in South-Eastern Europe displayed the typical deficiencies of the security sector of post-socialist transition states, such as over-centralization, politicization and militarization of the police apparatus as well as a reputation for human right abuses and endemic corruption.

The OSCE was forced to plan and implement its police training and reform projects in this challenging environment, often on short notice and without any templates or an organizational memory to rely upon.

This lessons learned report describes and compares the challenges the Law Enforcement Departments (LEDs) of the OSCE field operations faced when they implemented their mandates. Furthermore, the report compiles and compares the strategies and practices the LEDs applied to cope with the challenges.

In chapter II, a brief overview will be given of the mandates, including a description of the main tasks and the number of staff, with which the field operations/LEDs have been provided.

In chapter III, implementation challenges and strategies will be compared, focusing on the mission planning and set-up phase.

Chapter IV describes the general challenges the field operations faced during the police reform programme implementation phase.

Chapter V focuses on the challenges that came up during the implementation of projects in specific areas of police reform.

Chapter VI elaborates on the challenges occurring in the programme exit phase, and on the challenges for the sustainability of police reform.

In Chapter VII, conclusions are drawn and the recommendations/lessons-to-learned summarized.

II. Overview of Police-Related Mandates

II.1 OSCE Mission to Croatia

On 18 April 1996, the OSCE Permanent Council established the OSCE Mission to Croatia (PC.DEC/112). The Mission's task was to "provide assistance and expertise to the Croatian authorities at all levels, as well as to interested individuals, groups and organizations, in the field of the protection of human rights and of the rights of persons belonging to national minorities", thereby promoting "reconciliation, the rule of law and conformity with the highest internationally recognized standards".¹ The Mandate, however, did not refer to a police component.

It was only two years later that police-related tasks were specifically included in the Mission's Mandate. Based on PC.DEC/239 of 25 June 1998, the OSCE enlarged the Mission by deploying 120 police monitors to the Danube region. Their task was to succeed the monitoring work of the United Nations Police Support Group (UNPSG) that was expected to leave Croatia on 15 October 1998.² The monitoring task focused particularly on the performance of the Croatian police in connection with the return of displaced persons.

On 21 September 2000, the Permanent Council (PC.DEC/373) decided that the OSCE Police Monitoring Group (PMG) in Croatia would "cease operations as a distinct unit within the OSCE Mission to Croatia by 31 October 2000". The Mission in Croatia was authorized to integrate a number of officers from the PMG into the "regular" Mission structure. These officers would continue their "monitoring and advisory role in the Danube region, as well as in other parts of Croatia".³ Subsequently, police personnel of the "Police Affairs Unit" (PAU) was reduced to seven, a number which further decreased in the following years.

Based on a "Road Map for Developing a Modern Police Service in Croatia", which the PAU together with the MoI developed in 2004, complementing the MoI's own police reform programme "Action Strategy – Community Policing", the PAU broadened its focus of activities to three strategic areas:

- (1) Police reform, including the development of a modern human resources system in the MoI and the decentralization of the MoI; increasing the number of women and members of minorities; and restructuring the Border Police;
- (2) Regional and international police co-operation, by chairing the International Donors Co-ordinating Group on Police Assistance in Croatia;
- (3) Community policing; including training and preparation of Contact Officers, development of crime prevention and community partnerships, investigation of domestic violence and promoting reconciliation between different communities.

Taking into consideration improvements in the overall security situation in Croatia and in police performance, the PAU was downsized to one international and six national staff members in 2006, and finally closed at the end of that year.

¹ OSCE Permanent Council 1996, Decision No. 112, PC.DEC/112, 18 April 1996, p. 1.

² Cf. OSCE Permanent Council 1998, Decision No. 239, PC.DEC/239, 25 June 1998, p. 1.

³ OSCE Permanent Council 2000, Decision No. 373, PC.DEC/373, 21 September 2000, p. 1.

II.2 OSCE Mission in Kosovo

According to United Nations Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), of 10 June 1999, the mandate of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) focused *inter alia* on “establishing local police forces”.⁴ OSCE PC.DEC/305, of 1 July 1999 further laid out that the OSCE would “establish and operate” a “Kosovo Police School” to train “a new Kosovo Police Service” (KPS).⁵ Initially, a total of 3,000 KPS officers were expected to receive training over the next year. The OSCE announced the deployment of 150 international police instructors, seconded by OSCE participating States.⁶ In the following years, UNMIK expanded the size of the future KPS several times, from the original 3,100 to 7,500, a number to be achieved by December 2005.

The composition was to be multi-ethnic, with at least nine per cent Serbian officers and seven per cent of officers belonging to other minorities. Twenty per cent of the officers were to be women.⁷ Police cadets were supposed to undergo six weeks of basic training at the police academy in Vushtrri/Vucitrn, followed by 19 weeks of field training with UNMIK police officers, and an additional 80 hours of advanced classroom training provided by the Mission’s Department of Police Education and Development (DPED) at the new Kosovo Police Service School (KPSS), before they were eligible for certification and independent assignment. Following selection by UNMIK, the first class of recruits was due to begin their basic police training on 30 August 1999.⁸

Later on, academy training was extended, first from six to eight weeks in the year 2000, and then to twelve weeks in 2001. Another revision of the training curriculum in 2003 finally led to the extension of academy training to 20 weeks, starting in January 2004.

After a significant number of KPS cadets had finished their basic training in 2000, supervisory and specialist-training courses were introduced in anticipation of the hand-over from UNMIK police to the KPS.

In 2005, the KPSS was placed under the umbrella of the newly created Kosovo Centre for Public Safety Education and Development (KCPSED). In order to better reflect the broader context of its programmes with justice, safety and security sector development, the Mission’s DPED itself became the Department for Security and Public Safety (DSPS) in 2006. The DSPS experienced an acute reduction in its personnel figures, dropping from 30 international mission members and 57 local staff in January 2007 to 19 international and 36 local staff in December 2007. In 2008, the DSPS was renamed in Department for Public Safety (DPS).

The DPS focused on six general fields of activities:

- (1) Basic and Advanced Training at the KPSS/KCPSED;
- (2) Development of the KCPSED;
- (3) Community Policing;
- (4) Police Inspectorate/Police Accountability;
- (5) Public Safety Awareness;
- (6) Emergency Management Development.

⁴ United Nations Security Council 1999, UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999), On the situation relating Kosovo, at: www.un.org/Docs/scres/1999/99sc1244.htm (15 June 1999).

⁵ OSCE Permanent Council 1999, Decision No. 305, PC.DEC/305, 1 July 1999, p. 1.

⁶ Cf. OSCE Mission in Kosovo 1999, Background Information, at www.osce.org/kosovo/kos.bckgrnd.htm (26 August 1999).

⁷ Cf. UNMIK 2003, Pillar 1, Police and Justice, Presentation paper, p. 9, at: www.unmikonline.org/justice/documents/Pillar1_Report_Jul03.pdf (11 March 2004).

⁸ Cf. UNMIK 2000: Kosovo Police Service, 2f., at: www.civpol.org/unmik/kps.htm (21 December 2000); and OSCE Mission in Kosovo 1999, (op. cit. Note 5).

II.3 OSCE Mission to Serbia

PC.DEC/401 of 11 January 2001, established the OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the aim of providing “assistance and expertise to the Yugoslav authorities at all levels, as well as to interested individuals, groups and organizations in the fields of democratization and the protection of human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. In this context, the Mission would “assist in the restructuring and training of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary”.⁹

“Recognizing the need for developing a multi-ethnic police element in Presevo, Bujanovac, and Medvedja (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) as a key confidence building measure and as an important means of enhancing the stability in the area”, the Permanent Council decided on 7 June 2001, to “authorize the implementation of a two-phase policing programme in Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) in accordance with the proposal circulated by the Secretary General on 1 June 2001 (PC.IFC/42/01/Rev.1)”,¹⁰ The Permanent Council enlarged the mandate of the Mission in order to support the implementation of the so called “Covic Plan”, which aimed at bringing an end to the fighting between Serbian security forces and Albanian rebels in South Serbia. The “Covic Plan” laid out four objectives for the solution to the crisis:

- (1) “The elimination of all kinds of threats [...] to state sovereignty and the territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia”;
- (2) “The establishment of [...] security [...], freedom of movement [...], ensured by the complete disbanding and disarmament of terrorists, by the demilitarisation of the region and by allowing the return of all the refugees to their homes”;
- (3) “The development of a multi-ethnic and multi-confessional society, based on democratic principles and the respect of all human, political and minority rights”;
- (4) “Prosperous and rapid economic and social development [...]”.¹¹

Objective no. 3 was to be implemented with a view to the “harmonization of the ethnic structures of the employees in the civil services, [...] with the ethnic structure of the population”, meaning that Albanian police officers were to be integrated into the existing Serbian police in the three municipalities of Medvedja, Bujanovac, and Presevo. Ethnically mixed patrols were to be introduced, “when the indispensable conditions for that [were] fulfilled”.¹²

The ethnically mixed units were to be composed of a number of experienced Serbian and former Albanian police officers and 400 new police officers, of which more than half would be of Albanian ethnicity. Those 400 new officers were to be trained at the police training centre in Mitrovo Polje in three phases by May 2002. The tentative start for the first training phase was 21 May 2001. With PC/DEC/436/Corr.1 of 19 July 2001, the Permanent Council approved a supplementary budget in the amount of EUR 1300,900 to enable the Mission to implement the new part (the first two phases) of the mandate.¹³ The Permanent Council decided to provide 32 seconded police trainers for the training of the new Multi-Ethnic Police Element (MEPE).

⁹ OSCE Permanent Council 2001, Decision No. 401, PC.DEC/401, 11 January 2001, p. 1.

¹⁰ OSCE Permanent Council 2001, Decision 415, PC.DEC/415, 7 June 2001, p. 1.

¹¹ Covic, Nebojsa 2001, Program and Plan for the Solution of the Crisis in Presevo, Bujanovac and Medvedja Municipalities, in: Nebojsa Covic, Serbia after Milosevic. Program for the Solution of the Crisis in the Pcinja District, Belgrade, p. 70.

¹² Cf. *ibid.*, p. 79.

¹³ Cf. OSCE Permanent Council 2001, PC/DEC/436/Corr.1, 19 July 2001, p. 2.

In December 2001, the Serbian and Montenegrin Mols defined six priority areas of police reform:

- (1) Police Education and Development;
- (2) Accountability and Internal Control;
- (3) Organized Crime;
- (4) Forensics;
- (5) Border Policing;
- (6) Community Policing.

The OSCE offered its assistance in the implementation of these priority areas.

In November 2004, a MOU was signed by the Mol and the OSCE outlining eight priority areas of co-operation and assistance:

- (1) Police Accountability;
- (2) Organized Crime; encouraging the Mol in the process to develop a National Strategy for the Fight against Organized Crime
- (3) Border Policing/IBM;
- (4) Community Policing;
- (5) Police Training, Education and Development;
- (6) Crime Scene Management/Forensics;
- (7) War Crimes; and
- (8) Strategic Planning and Development.

Furthermore, the MOU officially designated the Mission as the co-ordinator of international assistance to police reform.¹⁴

II.4 OSCE Mission to Montenegro

Before the separation of Montenegro and Serbia, the OSCE's activities in Montenegro were undertaken under the umbrella of PC.DEC/401 of 11 January 2001, establishing the OSCE Mission to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia with the aim of providing "assistance and expertise to the Yugoslav authorities at all levels, as well as to interested individuals, groups and organizations in the fields of democratization and the protection of human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to national minorities. In this context, the Mission would "assist in the restructuring and training of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary".¹⁵

In general, the office in Podgorica focused on the same areas of police reform assistance as the LED headquarters in Belgrade, which had been defined by the Mols of Serbia and Montenegro in December 2001:

- (1) Police Education and Development;
- (2) Accountability and Internal Control;
- (3) Organized Crime;
- (4) Forensics;
- (5) Border Policing;
- (6) Community Policing.

¹⁴ Cf. Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia/OSCE Mission to Serbia and Montenegro 2004, Memorandum of Understanding, Belgrade, 17 November 2004, pp. 1f.

¹⁵ OSCE Permanent Council 2001, Decision No. 401, PC.DEC/401, 11 January 2001, p. 1.

The Mission's office in Podgorica, however, had a much smaller staff than the headquarters in Belgrade (2 internationals compared to 14 internationals and 18 nationals in Belgrade). Therefore, its primary function was to liaise with the Montenegrin Mol and assist the LED in implementing projects in Montenegro.

Assistance focused primarily on developing a Police Accountability Strategy and providing training for patrol, border and CID officers at the Danilovgrad Police Academy.

After the separation of Serbia and Montenegro on 3 June 2006, the Mission's office in Podgorica became the Headquarters of the new OSCE Mission to Montenegro which was officially established by PC/DEC 732 on 29 June 2006. The Permanent Council provided the Mission with a new Mandate, tasking it in general terms to "assist and promote the implementation of OSCE principles and commitments as well as the co-operation of the Republic of Montenegro with the OSCE, in all three of its dimensions including the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human aspects of security and stability".¹⁶

The police component of the Mission to Montenegro was enlarged to 5 international and five national staff members.

In 2007, the Mission supported the Montenegrin Police in drafting a *Strategy for the Development of the Montenegrin Police for the period from 2008 to 2013*.

A MOU of 8 July 2008 between the Mission and the Ministry of Interior and Public Administration said the Mission should "co-ordinate and be kept abreast on international assistance and support the Ministry in directing the said assistance" to the following areas:

- (1) Community Policing;
- (2) Police Accountability;
- (3) Enhancing Criminal Investigation Capacity/Organized Crime/Anti-Terrorism;
- (4) Border Policing;
- (5) Strategic Planning;
- (6) Police Education and Development.¹⁷

II.5 OSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje

The Mission received its first Mandate on 12 August 1992, when the then "Committee of Senior Officials of the CSCE" agreed to establish a Monitoring Mission in Skopje in order to extend the efforts of the European Monitoring Mission to neighbouring countries of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to help avoid the spread of tensions to their territories. The original mandate called on the Mission "to monitor developments along the borders with Serbia and in other areas which may suffer from spillover of the conflict in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in order to promote respect for territorial integrity and the maintenance of peace, stability and security; and to help prevent possible conflict in the region."¹⁸

Following a seven-month violent conflict between Albanian fighters of the so-called "National Liberation Army" and the security forces of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed on 13 August 2001. It outlined steps to be taken to ensure the functioning of democratic structures, the advancement towards Euro-Atlantic

¹⁶ OSCE Permanent Council 2006, Decision No. 732, PC.DEC/732, 29 June 2006, pp. 1f.

¹⁷ Republic of Montenegro, Ministry of Interior and Public Administration/OSCE Mission to Montenegro 2008, Memorandum of Understanding, Podgorica, 8 July 2008, pp. 1-4.

¹⁸ CSCE Committee of Senior Officials 1992, Mandate. Articles of Understanding Concerning CSCE Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje, 12 August 1992, p. 1.

institutions and the development of a civil society respecting ethnic identity. According to the provisions in Annex C of the Framework Agreement, and based upon PC/DEC/439 of 28 September 2001, the OSCE Mission was called upon to assist in a number of specific areas, which were added to its initial Mandate. They included *inter alia*:

- Facilitating the redeployment of police to the former crisis areas;
- Assisting the Government to increase representation of non-majority communities in public administration, military and public enterprises;
- Strengthening of the institutions of local self government;
- Projects in the area of rule of law.¹⁹

In order to facilitate the redeployment of the national police, the PC decided to increase the size of the Mission by 72 international confidence-building monitors and 60 police advisers who would be deployed together to the sensitive areas.²⁰ In the second half of 2002, the 60 police advisers were replaced by 20 Community Police Trainers who worked directly with the local police leadership and communities to assist in confidence building through the promotion of democratic policing models and practices.

With regard to police training, the PC enlarged the Mission staff by 17 police trainers, whose primary task was to assist the national authorities in the recruiting and training of minority police officers and in the implementation of the Police Academy project.²¹

By July 2002, 500 new police officers from minority communities were to be trained at the Police Academy in Idrizovo. One year later, about 1,000 Albanian officers were to be integrated into the national police. By 2004, the national police force was to generally reflect the ethnic composition and distribution of the country's population.²² The training curriculum developed by the OSCE, in co-operation with the national Ministry of the Interior (Mol), foresaw a three-month basic training course at the police academy in Idrizovo followed by six months of in-service training provided by national police officers.

In December 2001, a MOU between the host government and the OSCE clearly defined as objectives the recruitment, training and deployment of new officers and laid out a police training concept and a community policing approach.²³

In addition to fulfilling the above mentioned tasks, the Mission's Police Development Unit (PDU), which was renamed the Police Development Department (PDD) in 2004, focused on:

- (1) Basic and Advanced Police Training;
- (2) Border Policing;
- (3) Organized Crime;
- (4) Community Policing;
- (5) Co-operation and Co-ordination with Partner Organizations.

Since 2003, the EU police reform strategy became the major reference document for the Mol. In 2003, the government adopted a "Police Reform Strategy" and in 2004, the government adopted an "Action Plan for the Implementation of the Police Reform Process". The PDD developed its police assistance around this strategy.

¹⁹ Cf. Council of Europe 2001, Ohrid Framework Agreement, Annex C, Article 5.2, p. 5, at: http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_co-operation/police_and_internal_security/OHRID%20Agreement%2013august2001.asp (10 February 2002).
²⁰ Cf. OSCE Permanent Council 2001, Decision No. 439, PC.DEC/439, 28 September 2001, pp. 1-3.
²¹ Cf. Ibid, p. 3.
²² Cf. Council of Europe 2001, (op. cit. Note 19).
²³ Cf. Memorandum of Understanding, Skopje, 12 December 2001, pp. 1-3.

II.6 OSCE Presence in Albania

The OSCE Presence in Albania was established in 1997 following (PC.DEC/160) of 27 March 1997 in order to provide advice and assistance, in particular in the fields of “democratization; the media and human rights; election preparation and monitoring”; and to “explore other possibilities, including monitoring the collection of weapons”.²⁴ On 18 December 2003, a police-related component was added to the mandate, tasking the Presence’s Department for Security Co-operation to focus on “Police assistance, in particular training for border police, within a co-ordinated framework with other international actors in the field”.²⁵

To implement its police-related activities, the Department for Security Co-operation had a staff of three international and three national members in 2008.

²⁴ OSCE Permanent Council 1997, Decision No. 160, PC.DEC/160, 27 March 1997, p. 1.

²⁵ OSCE Permanent Council 2003, Decision No. 588, PC.DEC/588, 18 December 2003, p. 2.

III. The Mission Set-Up Phase

III.1 Clarity of the Mandate

While some of the initial Mission mandates focused in rather vague terms on the assistance for the police authorities in the Mission area, others were more specific, defining the establishment and training of multi-ethnic police forces as the primary task.

More clarification of the tasks and objectives was provided in a number of cases where the local counterparts, in consultation with the international community, had developed specific tasks and benchmarks in the framework of official agreements that brought an end to hostilities. In one case (PMG), the LED also signed a Memorandum of Understanding prior to deployment which defined the tasks, obligations and authority of the OSCE police component.

Lessons-to-be learned

The clearer a mission mandate is formulated, the easier is it for the LED to develop a strategic plan for implementing the mandate, including a definition of objectives, expected outcomes, benchmarks and an exit strategy.

Ideally, the mandate should also clarify the LED's tasks from that of other stakeholders to avoid "turf fights" which are contra-productive and slow the implementation process. In this best case scenario these task distinctions would also be written into MOUs signed by international organizations

Rather vague mandates, such as "assisting in police reform" inherently leave much room for interpretation and therefore provide the opportunity for flexible priority definitions. On the other hand, they open the door for other stakeholders, such as participating States or host governments, to demand completely controversial tasks from the LED, putting the LED into a dilemma of deciding between the requests of those who pay and those who benefit. In general, vague mandates should therefore be avoided.

In addition to the provisions of the mission mandates, MOUs should be signed with the host government, clearly defining the tasks and authority of the OSCE LED, in order to enable the LED to implement its mandate effectively (see also III.5.2).

A professional police expert with international mission experience in the region in question, should be involved in the negotiations with the host government, since he/she should be aware of potential administrative obstacles that might hamper the effective implementation of a mandate.

The police expert could also be supported in the negotiations by the SPMU (either by the SPA or his deputy, the Political Affairs Officer, and/or the Police Affairs Officer with the relevant thematic portfolio).

III.2 Planning Process

Except for the first OSCE Police Monitoring Group in Croatia and the Police Development Unit in Skopje, which had a pre-deployment planning time of about nine and six months, respectively, all other law enforcement departments were established in an *ad hoc* manner, without providing the opportunity for a smooth build-up of the LEDs. In the cases of the PMG

and the PDU, planning of the Mission was also facilitated by the integration of staff from the predecessor operation into the PMG and PDU.

Lessons-to-be-learned

Sufficient pre-mission deployment planning time provides the best opportunity for comprehensively planning a mission, including a thorough needs assessment (survey of the state of policing and the environment for reform). Pre-mission deployment planning should therefore start in advance of a decision by the PC to deploy a mission. In this planning stage the designated HoLED and senior representatives from the LEDs of neighbouring missions, the CPC, the Department of Human Resources (DHR), the Department of Management and Finance (DMF) and the SPMU should convene. Planning should also examine the potential support the neighbouring missions could provide to the incoming mission and consider the implementation of police-related activities in the wider context of the political and security landscape in the host country and in region, as well as other on-going or planned activity in the OSCE field operation within all three dimensions (see III.5.1).

Consideration could be given to developing a roster of serving senior mission staff, who would be called together for a certain time to support the designated HoLED during pre-mission planning and the initial start-up phase.

The designated HoM and HoLED should regularly consult during the planning process and the HoM should regularly be briefed by the HoLED and the SPMU about the policing needs in the host state to ensure a common understanding of the mandate.

If the new mission is to succeed the activities of another international organization, a joint steering committee should be established to prepare a smooth transition from one mission to the other, including the “hand-over” of its institutional memory, some of its assets, and if possible, of its personnel (in the case of overlapping memberships).

III.3 Needs Assessments

The most comprehensive assessment of the state of policing in the Mission area took place in Serbia and Montenegro with the Study on *Policing in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, written by a consultant to the Mission, Richard Monk, who made 106 recommendations for police reform. However, when the LED in Belgrade was suddenly mandated with the specific task to develop and implement the training of a Multi-ethnic Police Element (MEPE), a more case specific in-depth assessment was necessary, for which the LED, consisting of one police adviser only, had neither the time nor the capacity. Assessments were therefore based on discussions with the Serbian, MoI, police leadership and the leadership of the police training institutions.

The first assessments of the state of policing were hardly more comprehensive in the other field operations. The LEDs simply did not have enough time or resources to conduct comprehensive surveys that would have included a variety of sample groups and focused on a variety of policing issues.

Lessons-to-be-learned

A thorough needs-assessment should include a baseline study of the state of policing; and focus on the public’s perception of the police; victimization issues; the human rights situation, level of corruption, the needs and demands of communities; and on social and administrative structures.

The survey should cover representative samples of police staff and of society, including members of a variety of communities, including ethnic and other minority communities, civil society groups (NGOs), public social services and administrations, religious leaders or religious communities, the business sector, the media, etc., as well as relevant documentation (written policies, legislation, training curricula and other written assessments). Furthermore, the social, political and economic conditions in the society should be assessed in view of their potential for causing conflict between and within communities and between communities and the state agencies, particularly the police.

Baseline assessments and needs assessments could also be done in co-operation with the SPMU.

III.4 Development of a Strategy

At the beginning of each field operation, strategic planning at the different LEDs was not very advanced. In most cases, the LEDs focused exclusively on implementing their initial tasks, defined by their Mandates or other guideline documents (see. III.1). These were usually to prepare and implement the basic training of multi-ethnic police contingents and to deploy as many multi-ethnic police units as possible onto the streets in former crisis regions. As a result, no long-term police reform strategies were developed that would define comprehensive objectives and action plans, or provide benchmarks for evaluating the outcome and particularly the impact of the activities.

Lacking strategic benchmarks, the LEDs did not develop any exit-strategies.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

The development of a strategic police assistance programme plan should start at the earliest possible stage.

Strategies should define long-term programmes and short-term/annual projects that would provide all stake holders with a clear understanding of the planned activities, which is particularly important in view of unavoidable staff rotations in the mission and at other international and national stakeholders.

Based on the quantitative and qualitative information gathered in the assessment process, the plan should define realistic and achievable objectives, benchmarks and criteria of success to be achieved within a realistic timeframe. These benchmarks should be used later to evaluate the success and/or impact of the implementation of police reform programmes, and if met, to trigger the exit phase. The strategy for the exit phase should be flexible enough to be adaptable to any future developments.

The evaluation criteria should be “smart” (specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, trackable). The timetable should reflect the local state of policing and provide for more time in an environment where conditions for implementations are difficult. A minimum of three to five years might be appropriate in a challenging environment.

Furthermore, the strategic plan must provide detailed action or operational plans detailing how the different steps of implementation are put into practice.

This plan should identify the required organizational changes and resources (personnel, material and financial) for the different steps. With respect to resources, emphasis should be placed firmly on the most efficient use of available resources, rather than the provision of new hardware. While many police services will have legitimate requirements for infrastructure and equipment to support capacity-building, such equipment should only be

supplied to meet requirements clearly identified in a needs assessment and an accompanying development plan. This should be clearly communicated at the outset of any reform programme or the promise of material resources may detract from or undermine the more pressing business of institutional reform.

Action plans should closely refer to the annual “Performance Based Programme Budgeting” process (see also IV.2.2), including transparent information about the spending of the budget (UB and ExB).

Action plans should also focus on potential obstacles to implementation and therefore provide flexible approaches for implementation or even alternative projects, if the implementation of projects is delayed or obstructed in other ways.

The use of standardized strategic plans for mission set-up phases as well as action plan templates, including progress indicators for the evaluation of reform projects and programmes may be considered. These documents could be developed by the SPMU in co-operation with the CPC and the field operations.

III.5 Involvement of other Actors in the Planning Process

III.5.1 Involvement of other Mission Departments

Other units, except for the office of the HoM, were usually not involved to a great extent in the initial phase. Due to an initial lack of administrative mission structures and support, some of the initial projects were organized in a rather unprofessional manner, which brought them close to collapse. With the establishment of programme support or co-ordination units, project management improved.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

Other relevant mission departments (Administration; Human Resources; Logistics; Project Co-ordination Units; Strategic Planning and Evaluation Units; Legal Affairs; Media, Economic and Environment Dimension, Human Dimension etc.) should be involved at the earliest possible stage.

III.5.2 Consultation with Host Governments/ Winning their Support

All field operations planned their activities in close co-operation with the local counterparts (Mols, police directorates, training institutions) or in the case of Kosovo, where no local government structures were available, with the de facto government of the UNMIK.

Winning initial support for the LED's activities was not difficult in general, since the local counterparts had requested the OSCE's support and therefore appreciated the initiatives by the LEDs, particularly in post-conflict situations (for example in Croatia, South Serbia, or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia). As they noticed the positive results of initial monitoring and training programmes for the establishment of multi-ethnic police services, host governments also became supportive of general police reform approaches.

Unfortunately, some field operations did not have the capacities at that time to provide the host government with comprehensive police reform strategies. Some opportunities for using the momentum and speeding up police reforms were therefore missed.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

Local counterparts must be involved in the strategic planning from the beginning and their support must always be gained and maintained.

An essential prerequisite for the successful implementation of police reform is the commitment of all key political stakeholders in the government and relevant ministries to adopting the reform, particularly in countries with centralized command structures. Without a publicly stated commitment at the highest level, subordinate officials may either not dare or not be motivated to introduce police reform, particularly in politically sensitive areas as for instance, accountability, within the police agency. The most effective strategy to win their support is to present them with the benefits of police reform – the increased effectiveness and efficiency of the police’s crime prevention and crime reduction efforts.

In order to sustain their commitment, the leadership must also understand from the beginning the operational requirements and initial costs of the implementation process. Furthermore, external proponents of police reform (field operations, international NGOs, foreign national actors) must emphasize that their goals and strategies will fit into the host country’s national cultural context and that no inappropriate or un-adaptable external concepts will be imposed.

If national strategic reform plans already exist, it is important to adapt the mission’s strategy to the national strategy. If a national strategy does not exist, the mission must convince the national counterparts to develop such a strategy and must offer its assistance for developing such a strategy. The general strategy must define all objectives and areas of priorities as well as specific strategies for implementing reform of each priority area, for instance, national strategic plans on community policing, accountability, border policing, organized-crime, etc.

In addition to the adoption of official national strategies, the missions should also strive to sign MoUs with the host government, defining the tasks and authority of the missions, as well as the commitment of the national counterparts to adhere to the provisions of the strategic plan and the MOU.

The MOUs should also focus on provisions for documenting reform implementation to provide evaluators with valuable background information. Since governments or police authorities may be reluctant to publicize evaluation reports, particularly if they deal with tactically or operationally sensitive issues or show failure rather than success, it is important to decide on later publication during the planning stage and to request all stakeholders to commit to this decision.

III.5.3 Consultation with other International Actors

Initial planning was also done in close consultation with other international actors and donors (for instance, EU, EAR, CoE, NATO, ICITAP) present in the Mission area. An example of particularly close consultation and co-operation took place in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia where as of August 2001, the OSCE together with representatives from the EU Police Unit in Brussels and the US Government prepared the parameters for the implementation of police assistance which were followed by a number of in-country assessments, ultimately resulting in the *Concept Paper on Police Related Activities* (SEC.GAL/260/01/Rev.1 of 23 November 2001).

Lessons-to-be-learned:

Close consultation with other international stakeholders is crucial in order to develop coherent reform goals and strategies, and statements to/demands or expectations from the national counterparts.

Co-ordination can range from sharing of information about planned activities – which may result in the development of a matrix of the activities –, to adapting and harmonizing different activities to each other.

Close co-operation and co-ordination can help avoid contradicting project philosophies and implementation methodologies that could lead to considerable confusion and frustration among programme beneficiaries (state agencies as well as civil society).

In view of scarce financial and personnel resources, co-operation can help in building synergies, delegating and dividing tasks, avoiding duplications and incompatible equipment donations.

Co-ordination of activities should take place in international donor group meetings where all international organizations, participating States' embassies and private donor groups are represented that play a role in police reform.

The SPMU could promote political support among the participating States for a coherent and co-operative police reform approach of international donors in the field operation's host states.

It goes without saying that the recipients of international donations should be involved in the planning and co-ordination of international reform activities. Co-ordination on behalf of the recipient side could be facilitated by co-ordinating cells or steering groups within national core implementation groups, or by a lead agency among the international actors selected by the host government, which would be tasked with and empowered to co-ordinate the activities of all external agencies and stakeholders involved. The co-ordinating cell, steering group or lead agency could organize multidisciplinary meetings of all relevant actors on a monthly/regular basis to discuss activities and initiatives taking place notionally to ensure reduced duplication and increased effectiveness. These meetings should also be used to remove barriers to initiatives that face challenges.

III.6 Availability of Infrastructure, Material and Financial Resources

All LEDs with a major focus on training multi-ethnic police services faced an infrastructural challenge. Existing training facilities were in very poor condition sometimes requiring a complete refurbishment of classrooms and dormitories, heating and electricity systems, and the provision of furniture, office- and communication equipment and other training material. Since the unified budgets of the LEDs were never sufficient to cover the costs of refurbishment, the LEDs relied on extra-budgetary contributions and donations. Fortunately, participating States were willing to provide a sufficient amount of funding and donations. However, the allocation process of extra-budgetary funds at time delayed the refurbishment of the facilities.

With regard to the build-up of their own equipment, the LEDs were generally satisfied with the resources they received, particularly when the LED comprised only a small number of staff.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

The rapid establishment of field operations requires the availability of a sufficient amount of basic office and communication equipment and vehicles. This kind of equipment should be available on short notice, either in stock or through neighbouring missions.

In all training missions, a major obstacle to the implementation of the mandate has been the very poor condition of existing training facilities, which required considerable refurbishment before any training could begin. The provision of containers by the OSCE Secretariat and significant financial donations from participating States helped to improve these situations. In

the future, the Permanent Council should be prepared to make such resources available on short notice.

The SPMU might lobby political support for the LEDs' request for required funding, and might also support the LEDs in identifying donors for EXB projects among the participating States.

Procurement of assets and equipment should always be done in consultation with DMF and in consideration of a reasonable cost-quality ratio, since the cheapest equipment often bears the risk of being of low quality resulting in the need for early repairing or replacing.

III.7 Recruitment of OSCE Law Enforcement Staff

While the LEDs in Croatia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia focused initially on police monitors with general operational policing experience, the other LEDs focused predominantly on training experts. At the beginning, all field operations received a sufficient number of experts from the participating States. And where this was not the case due to short-notice periods, such as in Serbia, the LED was able to borrow instructors from the neighbouring Mission in Kosovo. OMIK's LED, the biggest of all LEDs in South-Eastern Europe had an international staff of over 200 people at its peak. The challenge was that some staff members lacked the qualifications to work as international instructors. Either, they did not speak English, did not have the training expertise required for their job, and/or were lacking experience in project management.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

DHR and the HoLED should be involved in Mission planning from the beginning, with the latter having input on the selection of his/her senior staff.

During the recruiting phase, consideration of the exact policing needs of a field operation should be considered. At the beginning of field operations, the requirements may concentrate on only a small field of expertise, while later they may evolve as the LED assumes new tasks (see also IV.2.4).

The use of the Policing OnLine Information System (POLIS) experts database, developed and maintained by the SPMU, should be considered in any case, as the database provides the means for the proper and quick selection of personnel available for short-term purposes. For long-term stays, the standard OSCE selection procedures must be used, according to the OSCE regulations.

Consideration should be given to the use of a pool of retired police officers for monitoring and advising missions. The advice of experienced retired officers will often be appreciated by local counterparts in the field.

In the recruitment process, field operations should consider the balance of gender and nationality of its staff, who will also serve as role models for national counterparts and demonstrate that different nationalities/ethnicities and gender can work together.

III.8 Preparation of OSCE Law Enforcement Staff

All former and current LED staff who were interviewed stated that they had not received any specific preparation for their police-related activities in the field operations during the pre-deployment training in Vienna. Nor had they received any in-depth training on project

management, data base management and change management, or negotiation skills — all fields of expertise that many found painfully lacking when confronted with their LED duties.

However, the five-day General Orientation (GO) Programme provided by the OSCE Training Section in Vienna, was not designed to be a skill-building programme, but rather an orientation programme, familiarizing staff and mission members with tools, concepts, priorities etc. and to make them aware of where they have potential developmental areas, that they need to follow-up on after their arrival at their position. It provides the participants with general information about the:

- OSCE history, structure, organizational goals and priorities;
- OSCE's management culture, policies, tools and procedures;
- Roles and responsibilities of the different bodies, institutions and field activities.

In addition, all GO participants received a self-guided resource CD at the end of the programme with supporting material, including a project management tool kit.

Furthermore, according to the OSCE Training Strategy, the GO programme was to be complemented by a duty station specific induction programme.

However, the quality of the induction training for new staff members upon their arrival in the field varied among the field operations and within field operations over a course of time. While most LED members received information about the Mandate of their Mission and were introduced to their specific tasks (though not to project management), the induction training often lacked information about the socio-political background of the host state, or important legislative information such as the local police laws or important regulations.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

Ideally, participating States would appropriately prepare their potential mission staff for their assignments focusing at least on the minimum requirements for working in international post conflict rehabilitation missions. In reality, however, incoming mission staff are often not prepared appropriately.

In a best case scenario, the OSCE, like the UN, would therefore send police training teams to the participating States to assist the States in the preparation of their potential police mission staff for OSCE field operations, or would prepare at least potential police mission management staff for their mission assignments, as the EU does with its CEPOL courses. In reality, however, the current OSCE Training Strategy only allows the OSCE Training Section to assist the participating States in the general preparation of their nationals for an OSCE mission assignment in the framework of the GO programme, but not for a function specific preparedness.

Nevertheless, the area of project management is undoubtedly a key area of knowledge necessary for law enforcement mission staff. Since the two hours in the GO programme merely provide an overview of the project cycle and the tools available, more in-depth training has to follow at mission level or at a regional level. Since the LEDs' police reform activities usually include the reform of police structures in the host country, a profound knowledge of "Change Management" should also be conveyed to every project manager in the framework of this in-depth training.

A network of project management resource persons has been established with a view to institutionalizing and enhancing project management across the organization. The Programme Evaluation Support Unit (PESU) of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), in close collaboration with the Training Section of the Department of Human Resources (DHR), is maintaining and supporting that network through specific project management training and onsite support visits. Specific joint mission support visits of the SPMU and the PESU should

be arranged, where necessary. Training Focal Points should be approached with specific training requests, ideally during the annual training needs assessment.

Such specific mission support visits could also be provided at a regular basis (every three or six months) at a location in each of the OSCE regions where field presences are located, for instance, in South-Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus. LEDs could then send their staff members to these regional trainings.

Field operations should use induction training for new mission staff, to provide them with all relevant information about their working environment. This would include information about:

- The mission mandate; the strategic programme plan of the LED;*
- Standard Operating Procedures and Standard Administration Procedures of the mission; PBPB and project management; donation rules; and rules on co-operating with implementing partners;*
- Co-operation links with other mission departments and thematic units in the OSCE secretariat in Vienna; as well as*
- The history of the mission and the historic and current political and socio-economic situation in the host state;*
- The structure of the MoI and the police;*
- Relevant legislation; and*
- Relevant external stakeholders and counterparts. (For a “tick list” of topics see also OSCE Director for Human Resources 2008, Staff Instruction No. 19/2005/Rev.1, Annex 2).*

Since OSCE LEDs often operate in post-conflict environments, training in mine and UXO awareness as well as first aid should not be neglected.

The HoLEDs should also be development-minded, promoting the continuous enhancement of knowledge of their staff.

Those leaving a mission and their successors should have a proper hand-over period to ensure that required information is preserved in the institutional memory, and to introduce the successor to all his/her relevant counterparts inside and outside the mission.

IV. The Programme Implementation Phase

IV.1 Evolution of the Mandate

IV.1.1 Definition of New Priorities by Mission Management

With the completion of their initial tasks, which was to monitor the performance of the local police (in Croatia and Skopje) and establish and train new multi-ethnic police elements, the LEDs broadened their scope of activities in all field operations. The focus of activities switched to a variety of issues in the general context of police reform, such as: Police Reform Advice at the strategic level, Accountability, Community Policing, Fight against Organized Crime, Forensics, Border Policing/Integrated Border Management. Training activities were expanded to specialized, advanced, and management training as well as training of trainers (see also V.1.3). The training philosophy switched from “producing” quantity (of multi-ethnic units to be rapidly deployed to the street) to quality of the performance of the officers.

Furthermore, the responsibilities for training activities (curriculum development, lesson plans) were handed over to the national authorities and the LEDs retained a sole focus on some specific and advanced trainings as well as curriculum development only (see also V.1)

While Mission Management was usually very supportive of the activities of the LEDs, in a small number of cases, a stronger commitment from Mission Management to support the continuation of assistance in certain areas of policing, such as community policing or training, would have been desirable. Over time, however, the LEDs in consultation with participating States, the OSCE Secretariat, and national counterparts were always able to change the attitudes of the Mission Management.

Moreover, some priorities of activities had to be redefined due to the host government's quests to fulfil the Copenhagen criteria for the start of the association process. Since the European Commission (EC) actively promoted the EU's demands for police reform and assisted the national governments in fulfilling the demands, the OSCE LEDs had to focus on different aspects of police reform in an effort not to duplicate the EC's efforts (see also IV.3.2). As some HoMs explicitly stated that the OSCE would not be the implementation agency for the EU, the LEDs tried to identify gaps in reform activities of the EU that could be filled by the LEDs.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

To avoid misunderstandings or significantly different interpretations of the field operations'/LEDs' mandate between the HoMs/DHoMs and HoLEDs, it would be useful, if designated HoMs received an in-depth briefing by the SPMU (beyond the general information being provided in the GO training) in advance of their deployment. The briefing would look at the OSCE's police-related activities in general and about the values of the concepts of change management, training and community policing. The reference to key buzz words such as the promotion of human rights, which is a cornerstone of police reform concepts, could have a positive effect on the opinion-forming process of the HoMs.

In cases of serious diverging views and priorities by the Mission Management and the HoLED, the SPMU might be called upon to mediate or to support the OSCE Secretary General or the Chairman in Office in a mediation process.

IV.1.2 Definition of New Priorities by Local Counterparts

In general, after accepting jointly developed and agreed areas of reform priorities, and in view of their striving to fulfil EU reform demands, the local counterparts did not change their priorities over time. However, the enthusiasm for actually implementing reforms varied over the years, particularly when new Ministers of the Interior took office after elections (see. also IV.1.3 and IV.3.3).

IV.1.3 Maintaining Support from Local Counterparts

Since the priorities of the local governments/Mols did not change over time in general, most of the LEDs did not face challenges in maintaining the support of their national counterparts in the Mols and the police.

The development of professional and trusting working relationships made it possible in most cases, to deal with politically sensitive issues such as war crimes investigations, police accountability or human rights. Without such positive working relationships, the LEDs' options for encouraging a sustained commitment to the reform process remained rather weak. With the exception of the OMIK/UNMIK which – at least for the first couple of years – held all administrative powers in their hands, the LEDs in the other field operations did not possess any “sticks” to sanction the breaking of commitments. The “carrots” at their disposal, in the form of political and financial incentives were also rather “meager”.

In view of the importance of good personal working relationships, any key staff changes carried the inherent risk, that support from new counterparts might be reduced. This made it important for the LEDs to establish good working relationships and to thoroughly explain the concepts and benefits of police reform time and again (see also IV.2.4). In several cases, the working relationships and support from the host governments deteriorated significantly after a change of government. The Mols and the police leaderships did not display any enthusiasm to continue with reform implementation in areas which were politically sensitive, such as accountability or even community policing (because of the concepts' implications for decentralization). On the contrary, the key stakeholders blocked the implementation process, provided no relevant information, such as strategy papers, and minimized the level of communication by setting up long bureaucratic procedures for requesting meetings, or by simply not answering such requests or not showing up at meetings.

In this difficult situation, key stakeholders did not change their minds despite financial incentives (donations in the framework of new projects) provided by the LED, existing MOUs which clearly defined commitments or the prospects for an EU accession process.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

Comprehensive police reform strategies, which have been jointly defined by the LEDs and the Mols and ratified in the forms of MOUs, provide the foundation for local ownership and commitment. And even if a government changes, the successor government may not be able to simply block or cancel the reform process, particularly if reform capacity-building has already taken place at every level of the hierarchy.

Since the SPMU is “far away in Vienna”, the LEDs have to take the lead in ensuring local authorities' co-operation. This can best be done by ensuring commitment in the form of written MOUs and by establishing close, trusting, reliable and professional working relationships with local counterparts. As implementing changes in the structures and culture of police services require generous amounts of patience, persuasion and persistence, a permanent presence of the OSCE reform agents is required. The prospects for police reform assistance from outside the country, and in the framework of short-term projects, are rather dim.

The LEDs should try to maintain good working relationships with and provide assistance even to those interlocutors who may seem unco-operative because they fear that appearing too progressive might incur their supervisor's displeasure. They may worry about their job security due to a lack of legal protection of their status as public servants. Under the right political circumstances they may become champions of change

In cases where local counterparts are not supportive of new reform initiatives, a suitable strategy for the implementation of reform programmes can be to shift the focus from developing new project proposals to completing projects which have already been developed, but not completed for various reasons. Local counterparts can also be encouraged to comply with their commitments for the implementation of ongoing projects by telling them that any new projects/donations can only be planned if ongoing projects have been completed.

Since OSCE LEDs usually have no means to enforce commitment from their national counterparts, the most suitable strategy to encourage local counterparts is to send joint and coherent messages with the EU pointing to the necessity for further reform activities in view of the accession process to the EU. Naturally, this strategy does not work in participating States that have no ambitions to join the EU.

IV.2 Programme Implementation

IV.2.1 Development of Long-term Programmes

Although most of the LEDs, over the years, developed reform strategies or “road maps” with their local counterparts, the development of concrete long-term programmes or projects proved to be very challenging. The challenges mainly derived from financial and human resources obstacles.

The financial uncertainties of future annual unified budgets did not allow financial planning beyond 12 months. Long-term projects therefore had to be split into short-term components, which lacked the certainty that sufficient funds would be available in future to complete the later stages of project implementation.

Since the availability of extra-budgetary funding by donors was also very uncertain, the application process for ExB (at least in the view of many LED staff members) was extremely bureaucratic and time consuming, and extra-budgetary funding limited the LEDs' flexibility in implementing its own strategies. Extra-budgetary funding usually played a minor role in LED project planning. The major exception was OMIK, where the US International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) provided, over many years, significant donations for the establishment and maintenance of the KPSS. Since the OSCE head of the KPSS was seconded from ICITAP, taking account of the ICITAP donations in the financial planning process was not a challenging task.

The implementation of long-term projects was also hampered by frequent staff rotations within the LED and the national agencies. As most of the project managers, who were police officers, were seconded for a period of between 12 and 18 months only, they could not handle the entire project implementation process. Their successors, on the other hand, were usually not involved in the planning process and therefore at times experienced difficulties in understanding the concept of the projects. This was particularly so when the hand-over of related documentation and other relevant information between the predecessors and their successors was not done properly.

An external challenge to the implementation of long-term projects was rooted in national counterparts' changing priorities, particularly when new counterparts took office with new

ideas in their minds. In this case, if a project was delayed or cancelled, the LED needed to have prepared alternatives for how to implement a project, or to have alternative projects prepared for which existing funds could be spent.

Lessons-to-be-learned

As the OSCE's Unified Budget only allows for budgeting of projects of up to 12 months, long-term programmes or projects must be split into year-long units.

In view of decreasing unified budgets, field operations should also solicit extra-budgetary funding, which, depending on the donor, can sometimes be used more flexibly and may allow the financing of a project beyond a fiscal year.

Since long-term projects run the risk of being altered or even cancelled due to new priorities by the national stakeholder (especially after the rotation of personnel after elections), they should either be developed flexibly enough to be adaptable to new circumstances; or alternative projects should be prepared which could be substituted in case the original projects are cancelled.

Given the high turnover of seconded police staff, a proper hand-over process must take place to ensure new project managers become familiar with the projects acquired from their predecessors. In addition to relevant documentation, information and explanation, programme managers should be introduced to all relevant stakeholders, if at all possible, by their predecessors.

In view of the high turn-over rates among local counterparts, field operations must retrain and educate their new counterparts again and again to make them familiar with the concepts and characteristics of ongoing projects.

IV.2.2 Evaluation of Outcomes and Outputs

As mentioned before, the LEDs, initially, did not carry out in-depth strategic planning, including objectives, expected outputs, and the definition of benchmarks and criteria for success for the evaluation of reform programme and project implementation.

Nevertheless, LEDs conducted a number of assessments on the current state of policing, including a series of public surveys in the context of community policing programmes. Training facilities regularly evaluated the skills of the students via exams and in some cases also asked the students to evaluate the quality of the lessons and the instructors, which facilitated the identification of gaps in the training and had an effect on curricula development.

Evaluation of projects, however, was usually limited to taking note of quantitative aspects, such as the amount of equipment being donated or the number of cadets and police officers being trained. The qualitative aspects and the impact of the projects were rarely evaluated, or at least not systematically. Often, LED staff were not trained in undertaking such comprehensive evaluations or were simply overburdened by the number of projects to be evaluated, particularly in LEDs comprising only a small number of staff.

In most cases, systematic strategic planning and evaluating of projects and programmes, however, started only as of 2007. This process was facilitated by the "Performance Based Programme Budgeting" system, which the OSCE secretariat introduced in 2007 for all OSCE executive structures for the preparation of their 2008 Unified Budgets. According to this structure, budgetary planning of programmes must define the objectives and expected outcomes and outputs of activities. However, a year later, it seemed that some staff members had problems in linking the budget process to the strategic plan.

Another point of concern mentioned by the staff of one LED was that only projects were evaluated and not the reform programme as a whole.

Finally, one LED was confronted with the obstacle that the national counterparts refused to have some (politically more sensitive) projects evaluated at all.

Lessons-to-be-learned

Evaluations are in line with a learning and accountability function to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of specific implementation activities. Their purpose is: to contribute to improving tactics, procedures and techniques; to consider a continuation or discontinuation of projects and programmes; and to account to stakeholders and donors for expenditures/the use of scarce resources. LEDs should therefore regularly assess the progress of their projects and evaluate the outcomes and impact of their activities. Public surveys have been a very useful tool for evaluating the performance of the police/the impact of police reform in general.

General criteria for evaluating police reform implementation processes, in accordance with the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria for evaluating development assistance would be: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability (see OECD (2006), DAC Evaluation Quality Standards, Paris 2006, at: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/62/36596604.pdf> (17 November 2007).

In the project development and approval phase, LEDs should also urge the host states to allow the LEDs to evaluate outcomes and impacts of the activities and to publish the results of the evaluations.

LED should have the capacity to conduct thorough project evaluations. If their capacities are not sufficient, they should be supported by the Mission's project co-ordination units or other units with evaluation capacities.

In order to avoid any perceptions of biased assessments or conflicts of interests, and to raise the credibility of evaluations, self-evaluations by the LED and the police could be complemented by independent external evaluation.

For more specific recommendations on evaluations see SPMU 2008, Good Practices in Building Police-Public Partnerships, pp. 58-62.

Internal and external evaluations should be based on a standardized methodology and a basic set of criteria for evaluating success, in order to ensure unbiased, fair and equal evaluations of the police reform activities of all LEDs alike. The methodology should be based on existing good practices and further refined and attuned to the working environment of OSCE field operations by the SPMU in co-operation with the CPC and field operations.

IV.2.3 Availability of Material and Financial Resources

As mentioned before, most of the LEDs projects were financed from the Unified Budget, which amounted to 65 and 95 percent of total spending of the different missions. The majority of the LEDs rated the amount of their budgets as sufficient, with the exception of OMIK's LED, which had been used to generous extra-budgetary funding until 2006.

LEDs complained instead that the UB approval process meant that funds were usually not available between December and February, which often caused delays in project implementation.

Another complaint from the staff of one LED was that every year each department of the Mission faced the same level of budget cuts regardless of what the different departments were actually doing or for what they needed their budgets.

A strategy the LEDs used to cope with scarce financial resources was to reallocate UB funding earmarked for positions standing vacant to operational costs.

LEDs also often mentioned bureaucratic and time-consuming procurement procedures, or administrative regulations to procure, for example, certain equipment only in Vienna because of window-contracts with these suppliers. Both often led to delays in purchasing and therefore in project implementation.

A LED-internal challenge mentioned by one HoLED was the non-transparent and unsound financial planning of projects. This could result in situations where funding was prematurely exhausted, or unspent funds were not relocated sufficiently to other projects.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

In view of their limited unified budgets, the LEDs may consider allocating more ExB funding.

A tactic to access donations more easily has been to request material donations directly from the embassies of the participating States instead of taking the official and more time-consuming way of developing ExB projects and uploading them into Irma.

Detailed and transparent budget planning will allow the timely reallocation of funding in cases where projects did not require as much funding as expected.

IV.2.4 Availability of Human Resources

While the LEDs did not face any challenges in receiving police monitors and instructors for basic police trainings initially, it became much more challenging to recruit training experts for specialized and advanced training, or experts for specific areas of policing such as community policing, border policing or forensics. It also turned out to be more particularly challenging to hire specialists in other fields of police reform, where no operational experience was required but managerial experience to advise local counterparts in the fields of human resource management and change management. There were a number of reasons for this.

Firstly, the “market” for such specialists is rather small, and particularly with regard to managerial issues, such as change management or human resources management, a specialist can ask for much higher salaries in the private sector than in a field operation.

Another reason was that participating States over the years grew increasingly reluctant to second (police) staff to field operations. For the LED of the OMIK, once by far the largest LED, the changes were felt most dramatically. From the peak of 267 international and 290 local staff members of the DPED in 2002, staff figures plunged to only 19 internationals and 36 national members in 2008, with many positions remaining vacant.

Compounding the declining interest of participating States to second staff members, police experts themselves showed ever less interest in applying to field operations. The image of closing Missions often discouraged goal-oriented energetic people. Financial incentives also diminished over time, with the loss of such benefits as hazardous duty pay. Moreover, although most of the field operations were declared as “Family Duty Stations” in March 2007, the field operations did not provide any incentives for potential staff with families, particularly for female officers (no flexi time arrangements, or support for school children).

Along with the decreasing number of nominations in total, the number of nominations per job offer also fell. While LEDs had easily up to 20 nominations for a vacant position in the early years, these numbers have dropped to significantly less than ten, and with regard to managerial positions, to only one or two.

This shortage of applications and staff resulted in further challenges for the quality of the staff. The LEDs often could no longer demand the highest requirements from the nominees and were forced to assign less qualified people. Sometimes, despite excellent CVs and good telephone interviews, an appointee's skills gap only became obvious upon arrival at the field operation.

Unclear descriptions of job duties also at times persuaded the wrong people to apply for these roles, according to the views of some LED managers. They therefore recommended avoiding generic job descriptions.

Furthermore, the shortage of (qualified) personnel dramatically increased the workload of the remaining LED staff, in turn causing suboptimal project results, delays in project implementation or the freezing or cancelling of whole projects.

The practice of secondments led to other general challenges of LED staffing. A number of participating States were very slow in informing Missions as to whether they were going to extend their secondees. If they then did not extend the secondments, that meant a delay in posting a new vacancy. It also meant that in some field operations, posts could only be refilled after the former staff member had taken their remaining annual leave and signed out of the mission. This procedure also forestalled the overlapping of the presence of predecessors and successors and subsequently a proper handover of assets, documents, training materials and the "institutional memory".

Another general shortcoming of the secondment system was rooted in the normally short duration of police officers' secondments of around 12 months. This led to frequent staff turnover with all its negative implications for (long-term) project implementation, such as officers lack of involvement in the entire implementation process and poor preparation for taking over projects because of inadequate hand-over processes (see IV.2.1). In addition, short-term secondees had less opportunity for a positive work impact, especially if they were serving in a field operation for the first time and had no experience in working in such an environment. Often, new Mission members initially faced a lack of acceptance and an unwillingness to co-operate from the local counterparts, who often tested their reaction to this resistance. It usually took some time to establish co-operative working relationships. And these challenges often increased, when local counterparts changed because of turnover in the Mol or the police. Furthermore, senior national police managers were also often reluctant to accept advice from junior OSCE staff.

The employment of qualified national staff was primarily a challenge for the OMIK. During the first years, the KPSS always lacked Serbian-language assistants and qualified national instructors, since no national instructors were available. The KPSS was able eventually to create a corps of good national trainers who were able to provide the training independently. However, during the transition phase from the OSCE budget to the Kosovo consolidated budget, with salaries dropping from some 800 Euros to 150 Euros per month, a loss of some 70 per cent of key qualified staff weakened the training institution. KCPSED did not recover from this loss, which resulted directly in a lower training standard. Furthermore, when the future of the OMIK became uncertain because of a dispute about Kosovo's status among participating States, many local staff members left the OMIK and joined other international organizations or the private sector.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

While it may be appropriate to focus on applicants with general operational policing skills for the implementation of monitoring mandates (except for specialized executive functions); training and advising missions require the deployment of specialists in basic and advanced training, and change management. Furthermore, in view of the project implementation character of training and advising missions, police advisers and trainers should have experience in strategic planning, and in developing, implementing and evaluating projects.

Vacancy notices should be very clear and specific ensuring the qualified persons to apply for the positions. At the same time the vacancy notices should avoid requesting “super hero qualifications” that may deter basically qualified and motivated staff that are not experienced in reading job descriptions. In contrast, vacancy notices should reflect realistic criteria.

The Senior Police Adviser to the Secretary General should regularly update the participating States’ delegations about the vacancy situations of the LEDs and encourage the delegations to nominate qualified secondees.

In order to select the best qualified applicants from those interviewed in telephone interviews, staff involved in the selection of applicants should participate in the highly recommendable “Telephone Interview-Training” offered by OSCE’s training section. Specific interview techniques will make it easier for the evaluators to recognize “false” information provided by the applicant.

Furthermore, the system of references should be used more regularly where recruiting staff would call former supervisors to inquire on their evaluation of the applicant.

To avoid high turnover of personnel in key positions these positions should be contracted and not seconded. Another option to keep seconded staff longer in the LEDs would be to provide them with short-term contract assignments, after their official secondments end. However, according to current regulations this would require that the short-term contractors would be willing to receive the Board and Lodging Allowance (BLA) only.

In cases of high turnover of seconded police staff, a proper hand-over process has to be ensured to allow new mission member to become familiar with their new positions and their working environment, and the LEDs strategic plan. This is particularly important for the senior management of the LEDs.

Project managers, who have to continue their predecessors’ projects must be informed about the background, concept, and challenges of the projects. In addition to provision of relevant documentation, information and explanation, an introduction of the programme managers to all relevant stakeholders should be made, ideally by their predecessors. The handover of documentation could be facilitated through the effective and efficient use of the OSCE digital library Doc.In.

In view of the decrease of qualified applicants during more recent years, incentives should be provided to qualified candidates to attract their attention. In cases where the security situation permits it, field operations should consider declaring the missions Family Missions, providing support to the families of a staff member, including, for instance, the support of school attendance for children, or flexible working time arrangements for the parents who work in the missions.

Another way to attract more attention from qualified applicants from EU participating States would be to raise DSA/MSA of mission staff to a level that can compete with the supplementary fees from the EU. Otherwise, potential staff may prefer to work for the EU.

LEDs should consider enhanced recruitment of civilian staff, not necessarily with a Police background, for areas of work such as Project management, analysis and reporting, higher education reform, certification and accreditation, etc. Civilian staff could be hired even for higher managerial posts in cases if they have the proper background.

Last, but not least, more national staff with the proper background and experience should be contracted for professional positions, since they bring a number of benefits to the Missions: They speak the local language, know the culture (also with regard to negotiations etc.), and maintain/cultivate the institutional memory of the field operation since they usually stay much longer in the field operation than the seconded international staff. The field operations should attempt to recruit a national staff that is ethnically and gender diverse and balanced, since these staff members may become role models in their future employment in the national agencies.

IV.3 Co-operation with other Actors

IV.3.1 Co-operation with other Mission Departments

With the exception of the Police Monitoring Group in Croatia – which operated as a nearly autonomous unit, resulting in a lack of communication with Mission Headquarters and in un-co-ordinated approaches to the government and duplication of efforts –, co-operation of the LEDs with other mission departments was usually rated as satisfying. Naturally, the request for support from other Mission units was more needed by those LEDs with only a small staff that lacked the capacity to take care of logistic and administrative issues. The loss of support was painfully apparent in the cases of the Mission to Montenegro and the Mission in Kosovo, when the LEDs lost the support of the Programme Co-ordination Units (after the separation of the small Mission in Montenegro from the much bigger Mission in Serbia, and after the interim dissolution of the PCU in the OMIK). In these cases, LED staff had to prepare their projects suddenly on their own, without having a lot of experience.

In general, LEDs were also satisfied with the Mission-internal co-operation with respect to cross-departmental projects, involving, for instance: Rule of Law; Democratization; Public Administration; Human Rights Monitoring; or Media departments. In most cases, the Rule of Law units were the most important partners for the LEDs, especially with regard to the development of police legislation or training curricula. Nevertheless, in one case, co-operation with the Rule of Law unit proved to be particularly poor with regard to the drafting of a new Police Law. The LED was not involved in the drafting process and only received the final draft for review at a stage when there was insufficient time to thoroughly revise it. As a result, practical issues of police work that require considerable training were not considered appropriately in the police law. This led to a lack of regulation with regard to the professionalization of the police and the required structural mechanisms of co-operation between different law enforcement bodies.

With the exception of some of the smaller field operations, all Missions had institutionalized formal meetings on a weekly basis, where the HoMs convened with all Heads of Departments focusing on operational and political objectives. However, these meetings were rarely used for co-ordinating activities, but rather for a general exchange of information. Furthermore, staff members often felt that even this general information was not transmitted sufficiently and transparently enough within the LEDs.

Concrete project co-ordination usually took place only at an informal level between project managers and was therefore dependent on interpersonal relationships. In an attempt to formalize co-operation and make it more transparent, the Spillover and Monitor Mission to Skopje institutionalized in 2007 a co-operation structure responsible for approving and assessing cross-departmental projects, comprising the Heads of Departments, Senior

Project Officers, Chief of Personnel, senior representatives from Administration and Finance, General Services, Communication and Legal Advisers.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

In addition to the required support from administrative departments (Human Resources, Logistics etc.) LEDs should closely co-operate with all other departments that play a role in the comprehensive approach to good governance and the reform of rule of law (Rule of Law, Democratization, Human Rights, Media, Environment etc.).

Such integrated approaches should not be based on personal relationships only but on institutionalized structures, comprising the Heads of Departments, Senior Project Officers, Chief of Personnel, senior representatives from Administration and Finance, General Services, Communication and Legal Advisers, if cross-departmental programmes or projects are to be developed.

The weekly meetings of the HoMs with the Heads of Departments have proven to be valuable for exchanging information. However, to make this information available to other LED members, to raise their awareness of the activities of other departments, it would be helpful to institutionalize procedures for forwarding relevant information within the LEDs.

If possible, field operations should establish project co-ordination- and -evaluation units, which would provide project managers support throughout the whole project implementation process, ensuring a common high standard of project quality in the whole Mission.

Clear communication/co-ordination between HoLEDs and HoMs is essential in order to allow for direct interventions by HoMs towards Prime Ministers in the host countries, in cases when the Mol blocks the work of the LEDs in any way.

IV.3.2 Co-operation with other International Actors

Being aware of the negative impacts of un-coordinated activities by different international actors, the LEDs of all missions established and usually chaired international co-ordination groups, comprising other international organizations, embassies of participating States and private donors. In a number of cases, the OSCE was officially entrusted by the host governments to chair the co-ordination groups.

However, in spite of these co-ordination structures, co-ordination and co-operation often remained difficult: a number of “partners” did not prioritize a holistic and complementary approach to security sector reform, and therefore did not see the necessity to share information, to develop and deliver joint statements to the host governments, and to combine their projects with those of other actors. On the contrary, they sometimes offered (training) projects that had been successfully implemented by the LEDs previously, and, even worse, followed contradictory approaches and pursued conflicting goals, leading at times to irritation, confusion, and finally to frustration among the recipients in the police and civil society. Examples of particularly poor co-operation were the implementation of anti-organized crime projects by five different actors in one country at one time and the initial implementation of community policing projects by four different actors in another country. This resulted in the provision of different concepts and methodologies and of equipment that was not compatible.

Even if the LEDs were managing the training facilities and had control of the training at the academy, the national Mols, police training and education directories often accepted trainings and projects, including donations of equipment, offered by other actors; not informing the OSCE but rather trying to pit one donor against the other in an attempt to receive as many contributions from the international community as possible.

In spite of the LEDs request for stronger involvement of the Mols in the co-ordination of activities, some of the Mols often did not show any interest in chairing and co-ordinating the donor groups, but remained passive or even blocked the sharing of information.

Some LEDs also complained about the wrong hierarchical level of the partner organizations, represented at the meetings. They criticized, for instance, that operational staff would be sent to meetings of a strategic nature, where the presence of the senior management would be more appropriate in order to develop joint strategic reform approaches.

Nevertheless, there were also many examples of good co-operation, such as the joint development of a Community Policing Strategy for Kosovo between more than seven international actors, the development of joint reform approaches and public statements by the EC delegation and the OSCE Mission in Serbia, and the joint investigative actions and coherent statements of the international actors in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in times of critical security incidents.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

Close consultation with other international stakeholders is crucial in order to develop coherent reform goals, strategies, and statements to/demands/expectations from the national counterparts.

Close co-operation and co-ordination would also help to avoid contradictory project philosophies and implementation methodologies that could lead to considerable confusion and frustration among the programme beneficiaries (state agencies as well as civil society).

In view of scarce financial and personnel resources, co-operation would help in building synergies, delegating and dividing tasks, avoiding duplications and incompatible equipment donations (for more see also III.5.3).

IV.3.3 Co-operation with National Mols and Police

In all field operations, the LEDs established formalized structures of co-operation with the counterparts from the Mols, the training institutions and police directorates. Examples being joint working groups and steering and advisory committees. On some occasions, the LEDs co-located advisers at the senior management level. The effectiveness of the joint working structures differed sometimes significantly, depending on the general level of enthusiasm for reforms among the participants and the political sensitivity of policing aspects the working groups were focusing on.

Most of the LEDs rated the co-operation with their high level counterparts as good and praised the open door policy of their counterparts. According to their experiences, shortcomings of co-operation derived rather from vertical communication deficits within the Mols and the police agencies. This resulted in a lack of information and understanding about the reform process among the interlocutors at the lower level of the hierarchy. Co-operation at the police station level was also rated as good in general, although project managers pointed to a number of cases, when local station commanders had not kept certain promises or had not met certain deadlines of project implementation. One LED, however, over the years, faced un-co-operative behaviour particularly at the highest level of the hierarchy (see IV.1.3) and was only able to maintain co-operative behaviour rather at the operational level between project managers and their counterparts in the Mol and the police.

Different LEDs also had different experiences in cases when the end of their mandate or dominating role came in sight. In the first case, the local counterparts became particularly co-operative in order to ensure the international “verdict” of “Reform Accomplished”. In the

latter case, they became more reluctant to accept advice and waited impatiently to take over full responsibility.

Lessons-to-be-learned

The LEDs should try to institutionalize co-ordination and co-operation structures with the local counterparts in the MoI and the police.

Joint working groups focusing on strategic and operational aspects of police reform should be established at all levels of the hierarchies of the MoI and police. These working groups should convene regularly and be co-chaired by high representatives of the LED and the national counterparts.

If possible (providing the human resources are available and the counterparts agree), LED staff should be co-located in the premises of their counterparts in the MoI, the police directorates, training facilities and police stations in order to provide advice on a frequent level and to monitor how the advice is used/considered in the reform implementation process. Such close and daily contacts will provide the basis for establishing good interpersonal working relationships, which in turn allows all actors a better understanding of the needs of their counterparts and may increase the openness of the local counterparts to accept advice from the LEDs.

IV.3.4 Co-operation with Civil Society

Co-operation of the LEDs with civil society focused primarily on the establishment and empowerment of structures of police-public-partnerships, where all segments of communities, including the police and other government agencies convened to jointly identify and develop solutions for crime prevention, safety and livability issues.

In the case of OMIK and the Mission to Skopje, where the development of such types of structures had passed the pilot project level, these structures were spread across different administrative levels (from the community level to the municipality and regional level) across the entire Mission area.

In another case, the decreasing willingness for co-operation and reform implementation on behalf of the MoI prompted close co-operation with civil society where it became increasingly important to promote police reform “around” the MoI. In this case, the LED identified a small pool of NGOs that were willing to promote the reform process in the local administrative structures, which made them particularly eligible for empowerment by the LED.

In addition to the development of such comprehensive structures of police-public partnerships, LEDs also co-operated with a number of NGOs who focused on specific issues. Some of these involved trafficking in human beings, and public oversight of the law enforcement sector.

Furthermore, some LEDs provided confidence-building assistance to certain segments of society on a bilateral level, for instance organizing youth camps for children of different ethnic backgrounds, or building confidence between police officers and school children.

Some LEDs, however, were also sceptical with regard to co-operation with NGOs based on negative experiences. In one of the most drastic examples, a NGO used the concept for a joint project that the LED had developed, and passed the concept off as its own in bilateral negotiations with third parties for project implementation funds.

Lessons-to-be-learned

In times when host governments become less supportive of reform activities, it can be of utmost benefit to engage civil society in the reform process, particularly through NGOs and local self-government structures, such as Citizens Advisory Groups. Since democratic police reforms require a multi-sector approach anyway, the focus should be placed on a variety of actors, with civil society being one of the most important ones.

By supporting the local civil structures, reform may even be promoted to some extent around the Mol, allowing local police commanders to see the benefits of the creation of police-public partnership structures.

The challenge of selecting the most appropriate NGOs for co-operation can be met by using selection criteria such as the NGOs' stability, accountability and authentic representation of their constituencies. OSCE Provisional Financial/Administrative Instruction Fifteen (FAI 15) on "Implementing Partners" provides guidance on the identification, selection and collaboration with NGOs.

V. Challenges in Specific Areas of Police Reform

V.1 Police Training

V.1.1 Basis for Training

In almost all cases, the LED's training activities were based on the Missions'/LEDs' mandates and upon requests from the host states. Based on their training needs assessments, the LEDs sometimes also encouraged the Mols to request specific training.

Training needs assessments were rarely conducted in a very comprehensive way, because sometimes, the time was simply lacking (particularly with regard to the basic training for the multi-ethnic police units), or due to a lack of relevant documentation. The LEDs, following the basic trainings, therefore usually provided advanced and specialized training on those topics that were also part of the reform process, and after negotiations with the Mols on what they requested.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

In order to decide on the proper short-, mid- and long-term LED strategy in the police training field it appears to be specifically important to base this decision on the thorough assessment of the local police training-related needs. Therefore, needs assessments should be agreed upon with local police authorities concerned and be carefully planned and properly executed. This would form a solid background for consistency in the OSCE LED's assistance in police training.

It may be advisable to share the needs assessment conclusions with international partners in the country, so they may benefit from it while planning their own police training-related assistance to the local police.

V.1.2 Curriculum Development

A major task of all LEDs has been to develop training curricula for basic, advanced and specialized training. This was because international policing standards, codes, experiences and practices were not well reflected in the existing curricula and local trainers were not able to make improvements.

The LED of the OMIK had gained a lot of experience in developing curricula in the post conflict transition environment of the former Yugoslavia since 1999, and had developed a comprehensive curriculum for all types of trainings before most other LEDs were created. The other LEDs thus used the KPSS curricula as templates for developing their own curricula.

Generally, the challenges in the development of curricula derived primarily from the lack of knowledge of the local legislation among (international) curriculum developers. In the case of the OMIK this problem was exacerbated by the uncertainties among the international administration about the legislative foundation for the curriculum, as the Kosovo Albanian counterparts made it clear that they would not accept the Yugoslav law of 1999, which they felt was discriminatory. As a compromise, the UNMIK selected the Yugoslav law of 1989 – which was the law applicable before the removal of Kosovar autonomy by Slobodan Milosevic –, as the applicable law, though subordinate to any further regulations promulgated by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General. Initially, curriculum developments were also hampered by different curricula approaches of staff members having different national backgrounds and experiences.

Another challenge, facing all LEDs in South-Eastern Europe alike, was that in the course of police reforms, national legislations were sometimes changed significantly, resulting in the need for frequent revisions of curricula to adapt new training topics in line with the police reform.

Another challenge in developing training curricula was to persuade the Mols of the necessity of a comprehensive in-service training vital to improving the country's professional police service. Some LEDs noted some progress in this area, as some Mols adopted an approach to vocational training.

Lessons-to-be-learned

Since all LEDs required some kind of templates for developing their own training curricula, the SPMU has developed a guideline document of "Good Practices in Basis Police Training – Curricula Aspects", which provides a skeleton of essential curricula aspects that are vital for providing basic training in democratic policing in the whole OSCE area. In the future, LEDs, as well as national training institutions in the entire OSCE region, can benefit from this compilation of good practices.

At the earliest possible stage, the OSCE LEDs should collaborate with their host countries in identifying national curriculum developers, who would receive consistent and continuous training and on-the-job coaching from their international counterparts to develop their capacities to perform the tasks independently and competently.

In cases where participating States do not have staff serving in this role, the field operations might confer with their host countries on the need for creating the appropriate job descriptions and organisational structure to support this new element.

V.1.3 Selection of Trainees

With regard to the selection of minority officers for the basic training courses, the LEDs faced the challenge, that the selection process was heavily influenced by the party affiliation of the applicants. This often lead to the selection of candidate who, because of a lack of education, a criminal background or other negative personality traits were not suitable to become police officers. However, since the OSCE, in most cases had only a supporting role with respect to recruitment, the organization's options for intervention were rather limited. In Kosovo, where the OSCE and the UN initially had the sole responsibility for recruiting, they faced serious problems in getting reliable information about the applicants, because relevant documents had vanished during the war.

With regard to the selection of trainees for the advanced and specialized trainings, a significant challenge was rooted in the lack of sound human resource systems in all host states (see also IV.5.2). This resulted in a complete lack of information on who in the police had been trained in what subjects.

High-ranking police officers often did not attend their training classes, as they did not see the necessity for further training, and therefore did not give training courses a priority in their schedules.

Lessons-to-be-learned

LEDs should insist on commitment from the local counterparts to select police applicants for basic training and police officers for advanced training independently of their party affiliation. In fact, selections should be based on clear recruitment procedures and transparent descriptions of basic qualifications.

This would also imply the development of sound career developments systems including transparent job descriptions (see also IV.5.1).

Chiefs of police should be the first training target group for any reform subjects. If they do not understand and support the reform concepts it will be rather difficult for their subordinates to put into practice the new ideas and concepts that they have learned in the police training. A reasonable combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches in the training process would be important.

V.1.4 Training of Trainers

All LEDs with a training mandate followed the training of trainers (ToT) approach in an attempt to cascade new training subjects throughout the entire police agency by local officers. In all missions, local trainers were trained to deliver basic training as well as most specialized and advanced trainings on their own. While, after a certain time, basic training was usually provided completely by local trainers, the LEDs, in some cases maintained the responsibility for developing and delivering advanced or specialized training because of a lack of local capacities.

All LEDs were to some extent sceptical about the sustainability of the successful ToT approach, as some senior training figures were going to retire and a number of trainers were transferred to non-training positions. In one host state, the LED noticed that only a third of the trained trainers remained actively involved in training.

One reason for the turnover of trainers was that official positions of trainers did not exist in the police service. Therefore, trainers trained by the LED were actually police practitioners and remained in their positions after the ToT training was completed. In some instances they were transferred to other positions. Being busy with their regular police duties they often had no time to cascade training to their colleagues.

Another reason for the loss of trainers was that many of them left the police service after having received extensive training in the application of new office technologies, and in human resource development. This made them very attractive for the private sector, which was able to pay better salaries (see also IV.2.3).

The high turnover rates necessitated the constant training of new trainers.

There was also a need for frequent retraining and the provision of practical training to refresh the teaching skills and knowledge of the trainers.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

LEDs should request commitment from the Mols, confirmed in MOUs, that the Mol would actually use the trainers for cascading the training and would not transfer them to non-training positions.

LEDs should also try to convince Mols to employ formal agreements with the trainers affirming that they would not leave the police service/training facilities for a certain period of time, or otherwise repay for the efforts that have been invested into them.

It is important to identify individuals and invest in their training as ToT instructors who will later on become messengers of the philosophy. So, even if they won't keep working as trainers, they still can convey their knowledge of reform concepts to their fellow colleagues, particularly if they are promoted to managerial positions.

In view of high turnover rates of local trainers, ToT programmes have to be regularly re-run.

In countries, where the position of trainers is not clearly defined in the human resource system, LEDs should urge the host state to resolve this shortcoming.

V.1.5 Study Tours

The organizing of study tours for high level representatives of the Mols, police leadership and police practitioners from the lower level of the hierarchy were reform implementation strategies commonly used by the LEDs in Missions (except for one that did not organize study tours). If successfully conducted, the study tours allowed local staff to achieve a good understanding of how certain fields of policing were done in other countries and empowered the local officers to propose and implement projects, influenced by the experiences from abroad.

The multi-national composition of the LEDs also facilitated the organization of study-tours to different participating States. Furthermore, upon request from the LEDs, the SPMU assisted in identifying host states/agencies for study tours.

While the usefulness of the study tours was commonly acknowledged, some LEDs, and particularly some specific units of certain LEDs, however, faced challenges of agreeing with the Mols on the selection of the participants of such tours. Often the Mols did not select the candidates proposed by the LEDs, particularly when practitioners of a lower hierarchical level were supposed to be selected, but nominated other officers lacking the professional background or having a much higher rank than the other participants. Consequently, some of the officers did not show much interest in the information-gathering part of the tours and some high ranking participants complained about the “inappropriate level of police ranks” that they met during the tours.

Other challenges, such as insufficient numbers of interpreters or administrative obstacles, such as the issuance of visa, seemed to be less problematic.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

Inviting local stakeholders for a study tour abroad to see the benefits of police reform (possibly to potential project donor countries) could be very valuable in winning their commitment. Key political stakeholders will be motivated by “what’s in it for them”. If this is not answered, they likely will not buy in. However, all stakeholders should be made that examples of successful police reform in one country cannot simply be replicated in another with different local circumstances.

LEDs should take care that the tour groups are composed in accordance of the purpose of the trip. High level staff should therefore only participate in high-level events and operational staff should participate in study tours that focus on operational issues.

LEDs should continue to request support from the SPMU in identifying host states and agencies for study tours.

As in the case of trained trainers, LEDs should request from the Mols, that study tour participants would work for a minimum period in the fields of policing for which they had acquired specific expertise during the study tours.

V.1.6 Provision of Technical Assistance

Most LEDs, particularly those with a bigger budget, who needed to equip training facilities from scratch provided a significant amount of technical assistance.

Some LEDs complained about the way OSCE regulations were interpreted in their respective Missions, prohibiting the donation of equipment.

With regard to the provision of equipment, the biggest challenges appeared in view of administrative obstacles (complicated and time consuming procurement processes, obligation to choose cheapest offers for services which often resulted in poor quality of services and equipment); as well the inappropriate use and maintenance of the equipment by the local police. Nevertheless, the LEDs stated that most of the equipment provided was used appropriately.

A rather surprising challenge was that local station commanders or heads of certain units would not use equipment for which they had signed if the equipment was particularly expensive.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

LEDs should request written commitments from the Mols in the form of MOUs that donated equipment would be used appropriately by the designated police units.

Furthermore, these MOUs should also establish that the LEDs would be authorized to check the appropriate use and maintenance of the equipment and the status of condition of the equipment. To make the implementation of the MOUs effective, the LEDs, however, would need the staff capacity to actually assume such monitoring tasks and regularly conduct inventory checks of equipment.

V.1.7 Co-operation with other International Actors

The vast majority of trainings provided by the LEDs were implemented without the involvement of other international actors. Nevertheless, the LEDs consulted other actors in the planning process to avoid duplications and ensure a comprehensive and complementary approach by the international community.

However, as mentioned earlier (see also IV.3.2), these consultations often had little impact on the agenda of other actors, and national Mols also tried to receive as many trainings (including donations of equipment) as possible. It was also disappointing for one LED, that the Mol did not make any use of a “Training Database”, which the LED had developed for co-ordinating police training within the Mol regardless of whether these trainings were organized by an international organization or the Ministry itself. The proper use of this database would have diminished the duplication of training activities.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

For the lessons-to-be-learned see II.5.3 and IV.3.2.

V.2 Police Accountability

V.2.1 General Challenges

In all mission host states in South-East Europe, the police displayed the typical structural deficiencies of organizations in transformation societies. These included over-centralization, politicization and militarization of the police apparatus, records of human right abuses, endemic corruption and non-transparent human resource systems that lacked clear job descriptions, minimum job security for civil servants, and career paths that were merit-based and not depending on nepotism and political influence. These structural deficiencies have posed significant obstacles to the creation of professional democratic police services.

In their quests for EU accession, all host governments had put police accountability high on their police reform agendas. The LEDs provided them with advice and support in legislative, educational and logistical terms. Nevertheless, developing functional accountability structures proved to be a very laborious and time-consuming endeavour.

Lessons-to-be-learned

Developing police accountability in countries in transition requires long term strategies and strong political commitment. In order to enhance the democratic aspect of accountability the civil society must be involved, and mechanisms must be developed so the citizens and their representatives can communicate what sort service they want from the police, and hold the police accountable for delivering it. In this regard, steps must be taken to make the police more transparent. People need to know and understand what their police are doing and why. This is important if the police are to command public confidence and active cooperation.

Enhancing police accountability means, among other things ,that deep rooted values and perceptions of how policing should be carried out must be challenged, and specific problems addressed such as undue political influence, corruption, nepotism and involvement by police officers in criminal activities. To assist the host country to solve such problems successfully requires long-term approaches. Furthermore, the LEDs must have dedicated and highly professional national and international staff available.

V.2.2 Legislative Foundation for Accountability

In general, the adoption of the basic legislative prerequisites for police accountability took quite a long time in all of the host states, often interrupted by parliamentary elections and subsequent new power relationships. However, by 2005 or 2006, most of them had adopted new Laws on Police, Codes of Police Ethics, Rules on Police Powers, Criminal Procedure Codes, Rules on Procedures for the Resolution of Complaints etc.

With regard to the establishment of oversight institutions, some parliaments, however, did not show the will to adopt legislation for the establishment of external oversight committees that would comprise representatives from civil society. Instead they preferred to establish parliamentary and internal oversight structures. The only institution of external oversight that was acceptable to them was that of an Ombudsperson.

V.2.3 Institutions of Internal and External Oversight

Internal oversight structures focusing on the police's performance in view of professional standards of efficiency and effectiveness, and investigating cases of police misconduct were created in all states, some reporting to the director of the police, some to the Minister of the Interior. Some of them also acted upon request from an ombudsperson, or upon complaints from individuals or civil oversight committees.

The capacities and performances of the oversight institutions differed quite significantly among the host states. While some LEDs were quite satisfied with the performance of the new oversight structures, (particularly the LED of the OMIK in view of the new Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK)), others were rather frustrated in this respect.

Although all LEDs had invested a lot of effort in the empowerment of the internal oversight mechanisms, by providing extensive training and providing equipment, some of these institutions remained rather weak for many reasons: some did not have enough manpower, or their heads were frequently replaced, or they were not able to investigate without being influenced from the political level. Often they became active only in high profile cases of police misconduct while investigations of low profile cases were conducted rather slowly or not at all.

In a number of cases, the capacities of the Ombudspersons and their performance were not evaluated much better.

Lessons-to-be-learned

Police accountability means that police activity – ranging from the behaviour of single police officers to the strategies for police operations, appointment procedures or budget management – is open to observation by a variety of oversight institutions. The development of functioning internal control institutions must therefore be complemented by the creation of effective external oversight mechanisms and institutions.

Oversight institutions may include the executive (policy control, financial control and horizontal oversight by government agencies), the legislature (members of parliament, parliamentary commissions of enquiry), the judiciary, as well as human rights commissions, civilian complaint review boards or independent ombudspersons. Furthermore, the media can play an important role in providing the public with information on police activities.

For a comprehensive overview of the structures and tasks of internal and external oversight institutions see SPMU 2008, Guidebook on Democratic Policing, pp. 39-42.

V.2.4 Politicization

The politicization of the police remained a big challenge for all LEDs. Political influence was obvious in a number of areas, ranging from the filling of positions, to the investigation of police misconduct, and the conduct of police operations.

Within the context of the creation of multi-ethnic police units, all political parties, which were affiliated with certain communities, tried to get as many members of their party included in the police as possible.

After elections, when new parties came to power, the replacement of the entire police leadership from the top level to the level of station commanders was a common practice, resulting in the challenging situation, that the LEDs had to establish new working relationships, often lost their champions of reform, and had explain their reform concepts again and again.

In an effort to decentralized the police structure to a certain extent and to lessen the political influence of the MoI, one Mission/LED had been able to promote the reorganization of the police service and structures at regional and local level, delegating more authority to the municipalities in selecting the local police leadership. Unfortunately, it turned out that local police commanders became only more politically influenced by party politics at the municipality level. Nevertheless, the LED saw no options for addressing these shortcomings as well, since new reform approaches would only have (further) frustrated the local counterparts.

V.2.5 Corruption

Corruption in the police was endemic in all host states with low salaries of police officers providing a fertile ground for this problem.

The LEDs assisted the anti-corruption initiatives of the MoIs by providing advice to the development of anti-corruption strategies and the creation of accountability oversight mechanisms.

Furthermore, the LEDs strived to raise awareness about the corruption problem in basic and advanced police trainings. They empowered officers and investigators to recognize and

investigate corruption, and tried to cascade police ethics and develop a corporate identity of professionalism in the police that would reject police corruption.

While some LEDs took notice of positive developments, corruption remained a major challenge.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

The fight against corruption requires the application of anti-corruption policies and codes of conduct for the correct, honourable and proper performance of police officers, as well as effective measures to implement those policies at all levels of the police. An effective solution must target not only the root problem of low incomes, and in particular opportunities in certain branches of the police (i.e. traffic or drugs units) for receiving bribes, but must also enhance the efficacy of the discipline and sanctions systems.

Thus, the “cautious anticipation of the dangers that might result from certain types of policing” in connection with the knowledge of the financial background of police officers and their potential conflicts of interest gained by demanding declarations of assets, should lead to the careful “selection of less vulnerable officers”. Further administrative measures could include removing opportunities for corruption by taking some decisions out of the hands of police officers, or by rotating officers on a regular basis.

For a comprehensive overview of anti-corruption measures in the police, see SPMU 2008, Guidebook on Democratic Policing by the Senior Police Adviser to the OSCE Secretary General, pp. 22-23; and OSCE Office of the Co-ordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities 2004, Best Practices in Combating Corruption, pp. 139-144.

V.2.6 Human Resource Development/ Career Development

The lack of sound and transparent human resource systems was apparent in all host states and posed a challenge to the work of the LEDs in various ways. As mentioned earlier, the selection of students for advanced and specialized trainings was often difficult because of a lack of local records regarding which officers had already received specific training. A lack of clear job descriptions and rank structures made it difficult to decide about the skills, officers required to work in specific fields of policing and to define what types of merits were required to become eligible for promotion. In a number of cases the lacking job descriptions about trainers made it difficult to select future trainers and to keep them in a training function afterwards.

Because of a lack of transparent and bureaucratic job structures that provided a certain amount of job security for civil servants, and making officers independent of the mercy of their superiors, many officers were reluctant to implement certain reforms because of the fear of making mistakes that could end their careers.

Other officers, who were not afraid of changes and became champions of change were nevertheless also in danger of losing their jobs, if their superiors did not like the outcome of successful reform implementation.

Until 2008, only one LED had been invited by its counterpart to assist in the development of a modern human resource system. In all other cases, the MoI had not shown any interest in such developments at all or had accepted the advice from other international organizations.

The LEDs on the other hand had also not pushed very hard towards reforms in this area because of a general lack of capacities to become engaged in an additional working field and because of a lack of the specific expertise required for this area.

Furthermore, the consequence of a new transparent system could have been that many (higher ranking) officers would have lost the legitimacy for holding their current positions. This would naturally have led to their resistance and would have increased the potential for a social crisis.

However, since the EU prioritized the developments of human resource systems in its reform agenda for South-Eastern Europe in 2008, most LEDs assessed the options for also providing advice in this area of reform.

V.3 Creation of Multi-Ethnic Police Services

In most of the cases, the creation of democratic multi-ethnic police services has been the initial task of the LEDs. The creation of such services was considered to be a primary step for establishing confidence of the population – and particularly of the minority groups – in the state's law enforcement bodies, and thereby (re-)legitimizing the state's monopoly of force.

V.3.1 Representation of Minority Groups in the Police

With regard to the quantitative objective of integrating a significant number of “minority officers” into the police services, the LEDs, in general, had been successful, although a really adequate representation, or even over-representation of minority groups had only been achieved by UNMIK/OMIK. This success was, however, severely challenged in 2008, when Serbian KPS officers left the police service following Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence.

In the other host states, it was rather discouraging, that minority officers had rarely been promoted or rarely integrated into specialized police units, which used to have a mono-ethnic structure before.

Since some Mols became reluctant to provide the LEDs with information about the further development of multi-ethnic police units after the completion of their initial creation, the LEDs did not have clear pictures about whether minority officers received adequate advanced and specialized training to become eligible for promotion or integration into specialized units.

Most of the LEDs therefore demanded more efforts from the national Mols to ensure access to senior positions for minority groups as well as the equal treatment and non discrimination of all non-majority members of the national police.

V.3.2 Level of Co-operation within Multi-Ethnic Units

In general, the LEDs rated the level of co-operation within the multi-ethnic police units as good, professional and collegial, despite certain examples of poor co-operation, where officers still did not speak the language of their colleagues or where station commanders and their deputies of different ethnic background would not share information about operational or disciplinary issues.

Usually, if co-operation was hampered it was due to political influence.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

The creation of a professional multi-ethnic police service (after inter-ethnic hostile conflict) can best be facilitated if future police officers have to work and live together at the beginning of their police career at a basic training academy. Here they can feel safe to start communicating with the colleagues of other ethnic backgrounds and can identify common

goals. The OSCE field operations have been successful in developing a corporate identity in the multi-ethnic police units, in which the officers consider each other, first of all, as fellow officers.

In order to be able to co-operate outside the “protective umbrella” of the OSCE, legal foundations must be adopted that provide for the creation of a working climate free from discrimination and politicization. This environment would allow all ethnic groups, as well as female and male officers, to feel comfortable in their working environment and to be promoted based on their merits. For a comprehensive analysis of appropriate recruitment procedures and working environments see SPMU 2008, Guidebook on Democratic Policing, pp. 51-55.

V.3.3 Public Confidence in (Multi-Ethnic) Police

In most of the cases, confidence of the minority population in the police had significantly increased with the introduction of multi-ethnic units due to the improved possibilities for communication and because of the political support from the leadership in the communities. In cases where the political leadership did not support the work of multi-ethnic police units they hardly had the chance to build confidence with the population even if they performed their duties professionally.

Lessons-to-be-learned

The creation of multi-ethnic police units has been a crucial element in (re)-building the trust of minority communities in the police. However, winning the trust of all ethnic groups requires a process of ethno-political rethinking and a learning process within all ethnic communities, something that is difficult to achieve. A necessary condition for such learning processes, in addition to favourable political conditions, is that multi-ethnic units must prove in practice that they are capable of securing the rights of all ethnic groups in an even-handed manner. Therefore, it is essential that the LEDs not only focus on establishing multi-ethnic police services but continue to facilitate their professionalization.

The introduction of community policing (see V.4) is an essential pillar of such professionalization and the building of police-public partnerships.

V.4 Community Policing

V.4.1 Community Policing as a Central Aspect of Police Reform

In all successor states of the former Yugoslavia, community policing has been deemed a central aspect of police reform. The LEDs were successful in winning public commitment at a rather early stage of their deployment. The implementation of community policing programmes thus became a major task of the LEDs.

Despite these official declarations, in a number of cases, the LEDs, however, had to urge the national authorities for quite a long time to actually adopt official community policing strategies, describing the country-wide implementation of the concept following successful introductions of the concept in pilot sites.

Moreover, there was one LED among the missions in South-Eastern Europe that had difficulties in convincing the host government of the concept's value in general. Furthermore the LED not only faced the challenges of convincing the host government, but also its own mission leadership and a number of participating States' delegations of the value of the introduction of community policing for the entire police reform process.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

Demonstrating to key stakeholders the benefits of community policing by using public surveys which show an improving perception of the police among the people after the introduction of community policing in pilot sites helps to a great extent to persuade the authorities of the values of the concept.

V.4.2 Understanding of the Concept

Most LEDs stated that, due to the extensive provision of training at all levels of the police hierarchy, a common understanding of the concept had been achieved among the vast majority of counterparts. A lack of understanding was sometimes noticed at the lower level of the hierarchy.

A strategy of a number of LEDs, to further cascade the understanding of the concept among the police, has been to introduce the position of specifically trained community policing experts (for instance, so called “Contact Officers”, or “Inspectors of Prevention”) who would be deployed to all police stations.

Besides those LEDs that were quite enthusiastic about the prospects of community policing in “their” host state, others were more concerned that the concept was understood by the key stake holders, but not embraced, due to the significant structural and cultural changes a thorough implementation of the concept would mean for the police.

V.4.3 Resistance to the Concept

As indicated already, the LEDs usually did not face specific resistance from the leadership in the Mol and the police. Initial scepticism usually disappeared when the key stakeholders saw the benefits of the concept for the relationship between the public and the police and between different communities. Some Mols became so supportive of the concept that pilot projects, such as the creation of police-public partnership forums were spread throughout the entire country and introduced in all municipalities. Competent staff was assigned to newly created positions to further promote the concept within the communities and the police.

In one case, however, the Mol did not show any interest in duplicating the successful examples of such partnership forums throughout the country, despite the calls from many police commanders to have similar structures developed in their own municipalities. In contrast some of the biggest promoters of the concept among station commanders were transferred to other positions. The Mol furthermore did not come forward with a national community policing strategy.

V.4.4 Role of Civil Society

Local communities and civil society organizations quickly embraced the concept, when they felt the confidence building effect of police-public partnership forums for the relationship between the communities and the police and between the communities, and when they saw the improvement of their security, safety and livability following the successful introduction of a problem-solving and crime-prevention approach in their municipalities.

In a number of cases municipalities were so enthusiastic about the results of the new co-operative problem-solving approaches that they did not ask for financial resources for further project implementation but were even willing to pay for further support from the LEDs.

The existence of police-public partnership forums also enabled the LEDs to engage with the police on the local level, when the Mol was not supportive of close co-operation with the LED in general.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

In all cases, the introduction of community policing has had a significant confidence building effect for the relationship between the police and the public as well as for the relationship between different communities.

Through the creation of police-public partnership forums, in which all segments of the communities and relevant government agencies co-operated in proactive problem-solving and crime prevention approaches, the security, safety and livability of the communities improved significantly.

The existence of police-public partnership forums also enabled the LEDs to engage with the police on the local level, when the Mol was not supportive of close co-operation with the LED in general.

For a comprehensive overview of good practices in introducing community policing see SPMU 2008, Good Practices in Building Police-Public Partnerships by the Senior Police Adviser to the OSCE Secretary General.

VI. The Exit Phase

VI.1 Development of an Exit Strategy

The first exit strategy being developed and implemented by a LED was the one leading to the closure of the OSCE PMG in Croatia in 2000. The Mission had established benchmarks, such as the performance of the local police, the security situation and the changing political environment, specifically the effect the changes had on the MoI. However, the exit strategy was developed in the Mission HQ with limited input from the PMG. As a consequence many monitors did not agree to an end of their Mission. In the course of phasing out the mission, starting from autumn 2000, the closing of PMG stations did not proceed in a slow and smooth way with officers working until their last day of assignment, but often in a sudden vacuum of inactivity of the co-located monitors that often lasted for weeks or even months. During the last four months the Mission was not able to comprehensively and systematically monitor the local police, let alone advise and assist.

In contrast to its predecessor Mission, the PAU leadership was much more involved in the planning of the exit phase and since the closing of the PAU was expected for a long time and was decided six months in advance of the actual closing, the PAU had enough time to properly terminate projects and handover projects to local counterparts.

The other LEDs in South-Eastern Europe have only recently started developing exit strategies. One programme-related exit strategy already developed for the transformation of the management of a training facility from the LED to the local counterparts showed some shortcomings. It did not include a well defined action plan and did not pay a great deal of consideration to the administrative issues and the preparedness of the local authorities. This resulted in the transition of the facility to the local authorities who were not really capable of managing the facility.

Another LED was also in the process of developing exit-strategies for projects that were phasing out because the objectives and benchmarks had been reached. However, the LED had many more difficulties in developing exit strategies in other areas of police assistance, since the MoI did not permit assessments of achievements in the politically more sensitive areas of policing, such as accountability.

Another LED was confronted by the challenge of a rather unclear political situation in the country, making it difficult to develop clear action plans and identify interlocutors for a potential hand-over process.

The staff of another LED stated that no benchmarks had been defined which would trigger the phasing out of specific projects, if being reached. There was even doubt that the Mission, in general, was enthusiastic about defining such benchmarks. Some staff members also wondered how long the LED should continue to stay in the country, as a prolonged presence might not have any further positive impact.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

The restructure and exit phase (of projects or of the whole reform programmes) should be triggered upon reaching the implementation benchmarks (outcomes and outputs) that have been defined in the planning phase and adapted to new developments.

Each restructure and exit phase should be concluded with an After Action Report (AAR). The main purposes for such an AAR would be to provide a useful contribution to institutional memory and to assist in the development of best practice. Just as an implementation plan is

best developed collaboratively between the OSCE field operation and the Secretariat, a similar approach with the AAR may lead to a more comprehensive AAR. The AAR should cover both successes as well failures and short-comings, and not be limited just to aspects covered in the implementation plan as others, equally pertinent, may arise during implementation. Moreover, the AAR should follow a set format as much as possible, as a standardised methodology aids corporate development.

The transition of responsibility from the LED staff to the national counterparts needs to be thoroughly planned, taking into account realistic time frames and the proper handover of necessary equipment, information, documentation, curricula etc.

VI.2 Sustainability of Reform Achievements

In general, the LEDs acknowledged that the host states had developed the legislative foundation for the sustainability of the police reform processes, and that the local counterparts had taken ownership of the reform processes – or at least of certain aspects of reform (i.e. those aspects that were less politically sensitive). A lack of ownership existed for with regard to accountability issues (e.g. external oversight, human resource system development, decentralization and de-politicization, or the fight against corruption).

According to the LEDs, sustainability of reform was primarily challenged by high turnover rates of senior staff following elections which sometimes brought new people into high level positions who did not have an idea of the reform process and/or set new priorities, sometimes contradictory to that of the predecessors.

Another obstacle to the sustainability of the reform process were vertical and horizontal communication problems within the Mols and the police directorates that lead to reform implementation delays. Resistance to reform implementation usually occurred at the mid-level management level, partly caused by horizontal communication problems but also because of the fear of mid-level officers to loose their jobs if they made make mistakes in the reform process due to a lack of job security for civil servants.

In the case of OMIK/Kosovo, another challenge of a rather political nature was the unclear situation with regard to the continuance of the Serbian officers in the police, which challenged the sustainability of a multi-ethnic KPS.

A rather structural challenge to sustainability was rooted in the lack of qualified local training staff at the training facilities. The lesser qualified staff was not able to ensure the maintenance and further development of high training standards. Sometimes, this lack of qualified trainers derived from the praxis of staff turnovers in the police or because qualified trainers left the police to work in the private sector or for international organizations, where they could ask for much higher salaries.

Similarly, the low salaries of civil servants also discouraged many highly qualified civilian professional staff members of the OSCE and other organizations to join the police or the Mol and bring in their deep rooted knowledge of police reform and foster local ownership.

Because of a lack of financial resources, police agencies were often not equipped sufficiently to perform their crime-fighting task effectively, particularly with respect to fighting organized crime which required high-tech equipment.

An internal mission challenge of fostering sustainability of the national police reform process was rooted in the high turnover rates among the LED staff who were usually only seconded

for a period of around 12 months. This severely hampered the continuous collaboration of LED staff with their national counterparts. Since even the HoLEDs were often seconded for a short period only, the sound continuation of the entire reform programmes was not ensured.

Another internal mission challenge of fostering sustainability and local ownership of the national police reform process sometimes derived from the reluctance of LED staff members to transition duties and responsibilities over to the national counterparts, as they did not believe the local counterparts could do the job or simply because they wanted to maintain their own presence/position in the host country.

Lessons-to-be-learned:

A basic pre-requisite for the sustainability of police reforms is the adoption of adequate legislation and national police reform strategies that provide the legal foundation for police reform and clearly define the long-term goals of the reform process and actions to implement the legal foundations and regulations.

To facilitate sustainability, local police staff must not only be trained to a high professional level, but also empowered to continue professional work once the international partners have gone. Therefore transition of responsibility must come along with the proper handover of necessary equipment, information, documentation, curricula etc.

Furthermore, properly trained national staff should remain in their functions/positions at least as long as it takes to consolidate/stabilize reform in their areas of work. The OSCE should therefore request commitment from the host states to keep the experts in their positions for an appropriate time.

Ownership among local authorities and their empowerment would also be supported, if the OSCE field operations would hire more professional contracted staff from the host country, who would constitute valuable staff for the national authorities, once they leave the field operations. However they will only join their civil services if the prospects for a reasonable income are given.

VII. Conclusions and Recommendations/Lessons-to-be-Learned

During the last ten years, the LEDs have become a key component of the OSCE's post-conflict rehabilitation operations and in the organization's democratization and rule of law activities in states of transition. In post-conflict environments of ethnically motivated hatred and social mistrust, the LEDs have been successful in creating multi-ethnic police agencies which have contributed significantly to building confidence between the public and the police. By introducing community policing in their host states, the LEDs have been able to further strengthen this confidence, laying the foundation for building police-public partnerships.

In addition to improving the relationship between the police and the public, the LEDs have achieved significant progress in many areas of police reform, ranging from the adoption of new police legislations by national parliaments, to the creation of modern training facilities, the development and implementation of new basic and advanced training curriculums, and to capacity building in many specialized areas of policing such as investigations, forensics, or border policing. Notable progress has also been achieved in a number of other reform areas such as accountability and regional police co-operation.

However, on various occasions the LEDs have faced significant challenges of a mission-internal or external nature to the implementation of their police-related activities resulting in certain shortcomings with regard to the comprehensiveness, completeness and sustainability of their reform activities.

The major challenges will be recapitulated in the following sub-chapter, followed by a number of suggestions of the role the SPMU could play in supporting the field operations in meeting these challenges. A summary of the lessons-to-be-learned, which have been identified in this report, will also be provided.

VII.1 Major Challenges to the Implementation of Police-related Activities

The LEDs of the OSCE field operations in South-Eastern Europe have often faced similar challenges with regard to the planning, implementation and finalization of police-related activities, rooted in mission internal as well as external causes.

The major causes for the challenges were:

- High turnover rates of staff within the LEDs and the MoIs/Police Directorates, caused by short-term secondments of international police officers and changes in key positions in the local police structures following political power changes after elections. The staff turnovers severely hampered the smooth and consistent continuation of project implementation as well as the sustainability of reform achievements.
- A lack of international staff in quantitative as well as qualitative terms, due to a decreasing interest of participating States to continue seconding staff, as well as shortcomings in mission preparations, both leading to the arrival of staff which were sometimes not prepared to effectively and efficiently fulfil their duties, particularly with regard to tasks of a managerial character, such as project planning/implementation/evaluation or advising local counterparts in structural reform and change management.
- A lack of strategic planning during the first years of mission deployment has lead to short-comings in effective and efficient planning of reform programmes; and missed

opportunities to influence strategic planning of the local counterparts, when they were particularly supportive of any OSCE activities.

- A decrease of political support from the local counterparts, caused by changing political environments, resulting in delays or cancellations of formerly agreed reform programmes and projects.
- A lack of co-operation between international organizations, participating States and other donors, resulting in a lack of coherent reform goals, strategies and demands from the beneficiaries; and leading to duplication of work, the conveyance of contradictory reform philosophies, and the provision of incompatible equipment donations.

An essential requirement for the successful implementation of police reform mandates is the provision of a sufficient amount of human, material and financial resources to the LEDs, and the political will of all international and national stakeholders involved to support a coherent and sustainable police reform process.

VII.2 The Role of the SPMU in Meeting the Challenges

The LEDs acknowledged the support the SPMU provided to them and expressed views about a potentially greater role for the SPMU in helping them to cope with their challenges and assisting them in the implementation of their tasks and programmes.

They promoted the idea of the SPMU providing more strategic direction and methodological assistance to the LEDs with regard to strategic planning and evaluating reform processes. In this context, they particularly acknowledged and appreciated the three guideline documents on *Democratic Policing*, *Building Police-Public Partnerships* and *Basic Police Training Curricula Aspects*, which the SPMU has developed recently.

The LEDs also welcomed further lessons-learned exercises in other geographical areas and in specific fields of police reform activities, to be lead by the SPMU.

Moreover, they promoted the idea of the SPMU evaluating their reform projects. These evaluations would be based upon a methodology that could be developed by the SPMU in co-operation with the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre and the field operations

The LEDs acknowledged the role the SPMU played in the recruitment process and suggested the SPMU could take on an even greater role in facilitating secondments of more qualified staff to the field operations via silent diplomacy and directly engaging with the participating States represented in Vienna.

A greater lobbying function for the SPMU was also envisaged by the LEDs with regard to the promotion of coherent and co-ordinated reform approaches by different donor states along with the identification of potential donors of ExB projects in Vienna.

The LEDs supported the idea of the SPMU advocating the work of the LEDs in Vienna and to serve as a mediator between the LEDs and the participating States. The SPMU could thereby develop an understanding of the situations and needs of the LEDs among the participating States. A forum for where the representatives from the participating States and the LED's could convene, would be the annual HoLEDs meeting in Vienna, to which the Chairmanship/Troika and delegations from participating States could be invited too.

With regard to information sharing, the LEDs also promoted the idea of having more regional meetings of LEDs in addition to the annual meeting of the Heads of Law Enforcement

Departments, at which they could exchange their experiences and co-ordinate joint activities, for instance in the framework of thematic meetings at the level of project managers. The LEDs suggested that the SPMU could facilitate these regional meetings. Furthermore, the regional HoLEDs could also convene in the margins of regional HoMs meeting.

Moreover, the LEDs welcomed the idea of the SPMU facilitating the greater involvement of the LEDs in regional meetings of partner organizations such as the Southeast Europe Police Chiefs Association (SEPCA) and the Police Cooperation Convention for South East Europe (PCCSEE).

More detailed descriptions of the tasks of the SPMU in the support of the field operations are included in the following summary of lessons-to-be-learned.

VII.3 Summary of the Lessons-to-be-Learned

Clarity of the Mandate and other Guidelines/Regulations

The clearer a mission mandate is formulated, the easier is it for the LED to develop a strategic plan for implementing the mandate, including a definition of objectives, expected outcomes, benchmarks and an exit strategy.

Ideally, the mandate should also clarify the LED's tasks from that of other stakeholders to avoid "turf fights" which are contra-productive and slow the implementation process. In this best case scenario these task distinctions would also be written into MOUs signed by international organizations

Rather vague mandates, such as "assisting in police reform" inherently leave much room for interpretation and therefore provide the opportunity for flexible priority definitions. On the other hand, they open the door for other stakeholders, such as participating States or host governments, to demand completely controversial tasks from the LED, putting the LED into a dilemma of deciding between the requests of those who pay and those who benefit. In general, vague mandates should therefore be avoided.

In addition to the provisions of the mission mandates, MOUs should be signed with the host government, clearly defining the tasks and authority of the OSCE LED, in order to enable the LED to implement its mandate effectively (see also III.5.2).

A professional police expert with international mission experience in the region in question, should be involved in the negotiations with the host government, since he/she should be aware of potential administrative obstacles that might hamper the effective implementation of a mandate.

The police expert could also be supported in the negotiations by the SPMU (either by the SPA or his deputy, the Political Affairs Officer, and/or the Police Affairs Officer with the relevant thematic portfolio).

Mission Planning

Sufficient pre-mission deployment planning time provides the best opportunity for comprehensively planning a mission, including a thorough needs assessment (survey of the state of policing and the environment for reform). Pre-mission deployment planning should therefore start in advance of a decision by the PC to deploy a mission. In this planning stage the designated HoLED and senior representatives from the LEDs of neighbouring missions, the CPC, DHR, DMF and the SPMU should convene. Planning should also examine the

potential support the neighbouring missions could provide to the incoming mission, and consider the implementation of police-related activities in the wider of context of the political and security landscape in the host country and in region, as well as other on-going or planned activity in the OSCE field operation within all three dimensions.

Consideration could be given to developing a roster of serving senior mission staff, who would be called together for a certain time to support the designated HoLED during pre-mission planning and the initial start-up phase.

The designated HoM and HoLED should regularly consult during the planning process and the HoM should regularly be briefed by the HoLED and the SPMU about the policing needs in the host state to ensure a common understanding of the mandate.

If the new mission is to succeed the activities of another international organization, a joint steering committee should be established to prepare a smooth transition from one mission to the other, including the “hand-over” of its institutional memory, some of its assets, and if possible, of its personnel (in the case of overlapping memberships).

Needs Assessments

A thorough needs-assessment should include a baseline study of the state of policing; and focus on the public’s perception of the police; victimization issues; the human rights situation, level of corruption, the needs and demands of communities; and on social and administrative structures.

The survey should cover representative samples of police staff and of society, including members of a variety of communities, including ethnic and other minority communities, civil society groups (NGOs), public social services and administrations, religious leaders or religious communities, the business sector, the media, etc., as well as relevant documentation (written policies, legislation, training curricula and other written assessments). Furthermore, the social, political and economic conditions in the society should be assessed in view of their potential for causing conflict between and within communities and between communities and the state agencies, particularly the police.

Baseline assessments and needs assessments could also be done in co-operation with the SPMU.

Development of a Strategy

The development of a strategic police assistance programme plan should start at the earliest possible stage.

Strategies should define long-term programmes and short-term/annual projects that would provide all stake holders with a clear understanding of the planned activities, which is particularly important in view of unavoidable staff rotations in the mission and at other international and national stakeholders.

Based on the quantitative and qualitative information gathered in the assessment process, the plan should define realistic and achievable objectives, benchmarks and criteria of success to be achieved within a realistic timeframe. These benchmarks should be used later to evaluate the success and/or impact of the implementation of police reform programmes, and if met, to trigger the exit phase. The strategy for the exit phase should be flexible enough to be adaptable to any future developments.

The evaluation criteria should be “smart” (specific, measurable, attainable, relevant, trackable). The timetable should reflect the local state of policing and provide for more time

in an environment where conditions for implementations are difficult. A minimum of three to five years might be appropriate in a challenging environment.

Furthermore, the strategic plan must provide detailed action or operational plans detailing how the different steps of implementation are put into practice.

This plan should identify the required organizational changes and resources (personnel, material and financial) for the different steps. With respect to resources, emphasis should be placed firmly on the most efficient use of available resources, rather than the provision of new hardware. While many police services will have legitimate requirements for infrastructure and equipment to support capacity-building, such equipment should only be supplied to meet requirements clearly identified in a needs assessment and an accompanying development plan. This should be clearly communicated at the outset of any reform programme or the promise of material resources may detract from or undermine the more pressing business of institutional reform.

Action plans should closely refer to the annual “Performance Based Programme Budgeting” process (see also IV.2.2), including transparent information about the spending of the budget (UB and ExB).

Action plans should also focus on potential obstacles to implementation and therefore provide flexible approaches for implementation or even alternative projects, if the implementation of projects is delayed or obstructed in other ways.

The use of standardized strategic plans for mission set-up phases as well as action plan templates, including progress indicators for the evaluation of reform projects and programmes may be considered. These documents could be developed by the SPMU in co-operation with the CPC and the field operations.

Involvement of other Mission Departments in the Planning Process

Other relevant mission departments (Administration; Human Resources; Logistics; Project Co-ordination Units; Strategic Planning and Evaluation Units; Legal Affairs; Media, Economic and Environment Dimension, Human Dimension etc.) should be involved at the earliest possible stage.

Involvement of the Host Government in the Planning Process

Local counterparts must be involved in the strategic planning from the beginning and their support must always be gained and maintained.

An essential prerequisite for the successful implementation of police reform is the commitment of all key political stakeholders in the government and relevant ministries to adopting the reform, particularly in countries with centralized command structures. Without a publicly stated commitment at the highest level, subordinate officials may either not dare or not be motivated to introduce police reform, particularly in politically sensitive areas as for instance, accountability, within the police agency. The most effective strategy to win their support is to present them with the benefits of police reform – the increased effectiveness and efficiency of the police’s crime prevention and crime reduction efforts.

In order to sustain their commitment, the leadership must also understand from the beginning the operational requirements and initial costs of the implementation process. Furthermore, external proponents of police reform (field operations, international NGOs, foreign national actors) must emphasize that their goals and strategies will fit into the host country’s national cultural context and that no inappropriate or un-adaptable external concepts will be imposed.

If national strategic reform plans already exist, it is important to adapt the mission's strategy to the national strategy. If a national strategy does not exist, the mission must convince the national counterparts to develop such a strategy and must offer its assistance for developing such a strategy. The general strategy must define all objectives and areas of priorities as well as specific strategies for implementing reform of each priority area, for instance, national strategic plans on community policing, accountability, border policing, organized-crime, etc.

In addition to the adoption of official national strategies, the missions should also strive to sign MoUs with the host government, defining the tasks and authority of the missions, as well as the commitment of the national counterparts to adhere to the provisions of the strategic plan and the MOU.

The MOUs should also focus on provisions for documenting reform implementation to provide evaluators with valuable background information. Since governments or police authorities may be reluctant to publicize evaluation reports, particularly if they deal with tactically or operationally sensitive issues or show failure rather than success, it is important to decide on later publication during the planning stage and to request all stakeholders to commit to this decision.

Involvement of other International Actors in the Planning Process

Close consultation with other international stakeholders is crucial in order to develop coherent reform goals and strategies, and statements to/demands or expectations from the national counterparts.

Co-ordination can range from sharing of information about planned activities – which may result in the development of a matrix of the activities –, to adapting and harmonizing different activities to each other.

Close co-operation and co-ordination can help avoid contradicting project philosophies and implementation methodologies that could lead to considerable confusion and frustration among programme beneficiaries (state agencies as well as civil society).

In view of scarce financial and personnel resources, co-operation can help in building synergies, delegating and dividing tasks, avoiding duplications and incompatible equipment donations.

Co-ordination of activities should take place in international donor group meetings where all international organizations, participating States' embassies and private donor groups are represented that play a role in police reform.

The SPMU could promote political support among the participating States for a coherent and co-operative police reform approach of international donors in the field operation's host states.

It goes without saying that the recipients of international donations should be involved in the planning and co-ordination of international reform activities. Co-ordination on behalf of the recipient side could be facilitated by co-ordinating cells or steering groups within national core implementation groups, or by a lead agency among the international actors selected by the host government, which would be tasked with and empowered to co-ordinate the activities of all external agencies and stakeholders involved. The co-ordinating cell, steering group or lead agency could organize multidisciplinary meetings of all relevant actors on a monthly/regular basis to discuss activities and initiatives taking place notionally to ensure reduced duplication and increased effectiveness. These meetings should also be used to remove barriers to initiatives that face challenges.

Availability of Financial and Material Resources

The rapid establishment of field operations requires the availability of a sufficient amount of basic office and communication equipment and vehicles. This kind of equipment should be available on short notice, either in stock or through neighbouring missions.

In all training missions, a major obstacle to the implementation of the mandate has been the very poor condition of existing training facilities, which required considerable refurbishment before any training could begin. The provision of containers by the OSCE Secretariat and significant financial donations from participating States helped to improve these situations. In the future, the Permanent Council should be prepared to make such resources available on short notice.

The SPMU might lobby political support for the LEDs' request for required funding, and might also support the LEDs in identifying donors for EXB projects among the participating States.

Procurement of assets and equipment should always be done in consultation with DMF and in consideration of a reasonable cost-quality ratio, since the cheapest equipment often bears the risk of being of low quality resulting in the need for early repairing or replacing.

Recruitment

DHR and the HoLED should be involved in Mission planning from the beginning, with the latter having input on the selection of his/her senior staff.

During the recruiting phase, consideration of the exact policing needs of a field operation should be considered. At the beginning of field operations, the requirements may concentrate on only a small field of expertise, while later they may evolve as the LED assumes new tasks (see also IV.2.4).

The use of the Policing OnLine Information System (POLIS) experts database, developed and maintained by the SPMU, should be considered in any case, as the database provides the means for the proper and quick selection of personnel available for short-term purposes. For long-term stays, the standard OSCE selection procedures must be used, according to the OSCE regulations.

Consideration should be given to the use of a pool of retired police officers for monitoring and advising missions. The advice of experienced retired officers will often be appreciated by local counterparts in the field.

In the recruitment process, field operations should consider the balance of gender and nationality of its staff, who will also serve as role models for national counterparts and demonstrate that different nationalities/ethnicities and gender can work together.

Preparation of Mission Staff

Ideally, participating States would appropriately prepare their potential mission staff for their assignments focusing at least on the minimum requirements for working in international post conflict rehabilitation missions. In reality, however, incoming mission staff are often not prepared appropriately.

In a best case scenario, the OSCE, like the UN, would therefore send police training teams to the participating States to assist the States in the preparation of their potential police mission staff for OSCE field operations, or would prepare at least potential police mission management staff for their mission assignments, as the EU does with its CEPOL courses. In reality, however, the current OSCE Training Strategy only allows the OSCE Training Section to assist the participating States in the general preparation of their nationals for an OSCE

mission assignment in the framework of the GO programme, but not for a function specific preparedness.

Nevertheless, the area of project management is undoubtedly a key area of knowledge necessary for law enforcement mission staff. Since the two hours in the GO programme merely provide an overview of the project cycle and the tools available, more in-depth training has to follow at mission level or at a regional level. Since the LEDs' police reform activities usually include the reform of police structures in the host country, a profound knowledge of "Change Management" should also be conveyed to every project manager in the framework of this in-depth training.

A network of project management resource persons has been established with a view to institutionalizing and enhancing project management across the organization. The Programme Evaluation Support Unit (PESU) of the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), in close collaboration with the Training Section of the Department of Human Resources (DHR), is maintaining and supporting that network through specific project management training and onsite support visits. Specific joint mission support visits of the SPMU and the PESU should be arranged, where necessary. Training Focal Points should be approached with specific training requests, ideally during the annual training needs assessment.

Such specific mission support visits could also be provided at a regular basis (every three or six months) at a location in each of the OSCE regions where field presences are located, for instance, in South-Eastern Europe, Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus. LEDs could then send their staff members to these regional trainings.

Field operations should use induction training for new mission staff, to provide them with all relevant information about their working environment. This would include information about:

- The mission mandate; the strategic programme plan of the LED;*
- Standard Operating Procedures and Standard Administration Procedures of the mission; PBPB and project management; donation rules; and rules on co-operating with implementing partners;*
- Co-operation links with other mission departments and thematic units in the OSCE secretariat in Vienna; as well as*
- The history of the mission and the historic and current political and socio-economic situation in the host state;*
- The structure of the MoI and the police;*
- Relevant legislation; and*
- Relevant external stakeholders and counterparts. (For a "tick list" of topics see also OSCE Director for Human Resources 2008, Staff Instruction No. 19/2005/Rev.1, Annex 2).*

Since OSCE LEDs often operate in post-conflict environments, training in mine and UXO awareness as well as first aid should not be neglected.

The HoLEDs should also be development-minded, promoting the continuous enhancement of knowledge of their staff.

Those leaving a mission and their successors should have a proper hand-over period to ensure that required information is preserved in the institutional memory, and to introduce the successor to all his/her relevant counterparts inside and outside the mission.

Change of Mandate/Priorities

To avoid misunderstandings or significantly different interpretations of the field operations'/ LEDs' mandate between the HoMs/DHoMs and HoLEDs, it would be useful, if designated HoMs received an in-depth briefing by the SPMU (beyond the general information being

provided in the GO training) in advance of their deployment. The briefing would look at the OSCE's police-related activities in general and about the values of the concepts of change management, training and community policing. The reference to key buzz words such as the promotion of human rights, which is a cornerstone of police reform concepts, could have a positive effect on the opinion-forming process of the HoMs.

In cases of serious diverging views and priorities by the Mission Management and the HoLED, the SPMU might be called upon to mediate or to support the OSCE Secretary General or the Chairman in Office in a mediation process.

Comprehensive police reform strategies, which have been jointly defined by the LEDs and the Mols and ratified in the forms of MOUs, provide the foundation for local ownership and commitment. And even if a government changes, the successor government may not be able to simply block or cancel the reform process, particularly if reform capacity-building has already taken place at every level of the hierarchy.

Since the SPMU is "far away in Vienna", the LEDs have to take the lead in ensuring local authorities' co-operation. This can best be done by ensuring commitment in the form of written MOUs and by establishing close, trusting, reliable and professional working relationships with local counterparts. As implementing changes in the structures and culture of police services require generous amounts of patience, persuasion and persistence, a permanent presence of the OSCE reform agents is required. The prospects for police reform assistance from outside the country, and in the framework of short-term projects, are rather dim.

The LEDs should try to maintain good working relationships with and provide assistance even to those interlocutors who may seem unco-operative because they fear that appearing too progressive might incur their supervisor's displeasure. They may worry about their job security due to a lack of legal protection of their status as public servants. Under the right political circumstances they may become champions of change

In cases where local counterparts are not supportive of new reform initiatives, a suitable strategy for the implementation of reform programmes can be to shift the focus from developing new project proposals to completing projects which have already been developed, but not completed for various reasons. Local counterparts can also be encouraged to comply with their commitments for the implementation of ongoing projects by telling them that any new projects/donations can only be planned if ongoing projects have been completed.

Since OSCE LEDs usually have no means to enforce commitment from their national counterparts, the most suitable strategy to encourage local counterparts is to send joint and coherent messages with the EU pointing to the necessity for further reform activities in view of the accession process to the EU. Naturally, this strategy does not work in participating States that have no ambitions to join the EU.

Development of Long-term Programmes

As the OSCE's Unified Budget only allows for budgeting of projects of up to 12 months, long-term programmes or projects must be split into year-long units.

In view of decreasing unified budgets, field operations should also solicit extra-budgetary funding, which, depending on the donor, can sometimes be used more flexibly and may allow the financing of a project beyond a fiscal year.

Since long-term projects run the risk of being altered or even cancelled due to new priorities by the national stakeholder (especially after the rotation of personnel after elections), they

should either be developed flexibly enough to be adaptable to new circumstances; or alternative projects should be prepared which could be substituted in case the original projects are cancelled.

Given the high turnover of seconded police staff, a proper hand-over process must take place to ensure new project managers become familiar with the projects acquired from their predecessors. In addition to relevant documentation, information and explanation, programme managers should be introduced to all relevant stakeholders, if at all possible, by their predecessors.

In view of the high turn-over rates among local counterparts, field operations must retrain and educate their new counterparts again and again to make them familiar with the concepts and characteristics of ongoing projects.

Evaluation of Outcomes and Outputs

Evaluations are in line with a learning and accountability function to assess the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of specific implementation activities. Their purpose is: to contribute to improving tactics, procedures and techniques; to consider a continuation or discontinuation of projects and programmes; and to account to stakeholders and donors for expenditures/the use of scarce resources. LEDs should therefore regularly assess the progress of their projects and evaluate the outcomes and impact of their activities. Public surveys have been a very useful tool for evaluating the performance of the police/the impact of police reform in general.

General criteria for evaluating police reform implementation processes, in accordance with the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) criteria for evaluating development assistance would be: relevance, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability (see OECD (2006), DAC Evaluation Quality Standards, Paris 2006, at: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/30/62/36596604.pdf> (17 November 2007)).

In the project development and approval phase, LEDs should also urge the host states to allow the LEDs to evaluate outcomes and impacts of the activities and to publish the results of the evaluations.

LED should have the capacity to conduct thorough project evaluations. If their capacities are not sufficient, they should be supported by the Mission's project co-ordination units or other units with evaluation capacities.

In order to avoid any perceptions of biased assessments or conflicts of interests, and to raise the credibility of evaluations, self-evaluations by the LED and the police could be complemented by independent external evaluation.

For more specific recommendations on evaluations see SPMU 2008, Good Practices in Building Police-Public Partnerships, pp. 58-62.

Internal and external evaluations should be based on a standardized methodology and a basic set of criteria for evaluating success, in order to ensure unbiased, fair and equal evaluations of the police reform activities of all LEDs alike. The methodology should be based on existing good practices and further refined and attuned to the working environment of OSCE field operations by the SPMU in co-operation with the CPC and field operations.

Availability of Material and Financial Resources

In view of their limited unified budgets, the LEDs may consider allocating more ExB funding.

A tactic to access donations more easily has been to request material donations directly from the embassies of the participating States instead of taking the official and more time-consuming way of developing ExB projects and uploading them into Irma.

Detailed and transparent budget planning will allow the timely reallocation of funding in cases where projects did not require as much funding as expected.

Availability of Human Resources

While it may be appropriate to focus on applicants with general operational policing skills for the implementation of monitoring mandates (except for specialized executive functions); training and advising missions require the deployment of specialists in basic and advanced training, and change management. Furthermore, in view of the project implementation character of training and advising missions, police advisers and trainers should have experience in strategic planning, and in developing, implementing and evaluating projects.

Vacancy notices should be very clear and specific ensuring the qualified persons to apply for the positions. At the same time the vacancy notices should avoid requesting “super hero qualifications” that may deter basically qualified and motivated staff that are not experienced in reading job descriptions. In contrast, vacancy notices should reflect realistic criteria.

The Senior Police Adviser to the Secretary General should regularly update the participating States’ delegations about the vacancy situations of the LEDs and encourage the delegations to nominate qualified secondees.

In order to select the best qualified applicants from those interviewed in telephone interviews, staff involved in the selection of applicants should participate in the highly recommendable “Telephone Interview-Training” offered by OSCE’s training section. Specific interview techniques will make it easier for the evaluators to recognize “false” information provided by the applicant.

Furthermore, the system of references should be used more regularly where recruiting staff would call former supervisors to inquire on their evaluation of the applicant.

To avoid high turnover of personnel in key positions these positions should be contracted and not seconded. Another option to keep seconded staff longer in the LEDs would be to provide them with short-term contract assignments, after their official secondments end. However, according to current regulations this would require that the short-term contractors would be willing to receive the Board and Lodging Allowance (BLA) only.

In cases of high turnover of seconded police staff, a proper hand-over process has to be ensured to allow new mission member to become familiar with their new positions and their working environment, and the LEDs strategic plan. This is particularly important for the senior management of the LEDs.

Project managers, who have to continue their predecessors’ projects must be informed about the background, concept, and challenges of the projects. In addition to provision of relevant documentation, information and explanation, an introduction of the programme managers to all relevant stakeholders should be made, ideally by their predecessors. The handover of documentation could be facilitated through the effective and efficient use of the OSCE digital library Doc.In.

In view of the decrease of qualified applicants during more recent years, incentives should be provided to qualified candidates to attract their attention. In cases where the security situation permits it, field operations should consider declaring the missions Family Missions, providing support to the families of a staff member, including, for instance, the support of

school attendance for children, or flexible working time arrangements for the parents who work in the missions.

Another way to attract more attention from qualified applicants from EU participating States would be to raise DSA/MSA of mission staff to a level that can compete with the supplementary fees from the EU. Otherwise, potential staff may prefer to work for the EU.

LEDs should consider enhanced recruitment of civilian staff, not necessarily with a Police background, for areas of work such as Project management, analysis and reporting, higher education reform, certification and accreditation, etc. Civilian staff could be hired even for higher managerial posts in cases if they have the proper background.

Last, but not least, more national staff with the proper background and experience should be contracted for professional positions, since they bring a number of benefits to the Missions: They speak the local language, know the culture (also with regard to negotiations etc.), and maintain/cultivate the institutional memory of the field operation since they usually stay much longer in the field operation than the seconded international staff. The field operations should attempt to recruit a national staff that is ethnically and gender diverse and balanced, since these staff members may become role models in their future employment in the national agencies.

Mission-internal Co-operation

In addition to the required support from administrative departments (Human Resources, Logistics etc.) LEDs should closely co-operate with all other departments that play a role in the comprehensive approach to good governance and the reform of rule of law (Rule of Law, Democratization, Human Rights, Media, Environment etc.).

Such integrated approaches should not be based on personal relationships only but on institutionalized structures, comprising the Heads of Departments, Senior Project Officers, Chief of Personnel, senior representatives from Administration and Finance, General Services, Communication and Legal Advisers, if cross-departmental programmes or projects are to be developed.

The weekly meetings of the HoMs with the Heads of Departments have proven to be valuable for exchanging information. However, to make this information available to other LED members, to raise their awareness of the activities of other departments, it would be helpful to institutionalize procedures for forwarding relevant information within the LEDs.

If possible, field operations should establish project co-ordination- and -evaluation units, which would provide project managers support throughout the whole project implementation process, ensuring a common high standard of project quality in the whole Mission.

Clear communication/co-ordination between HoLEDs and HoMs is essential in order to allow for direct interventions by HoMs towards Prime Ministers in the host countries, in cases when the Mol blocks the work of the LEDs in any way.

Co-operation with other International Actors

Close consultation with other international stakeholders is crucial in order to develop coherent reform goals, strategies, and statements to/demands/ expectations from the national counterparts.

Close co-operation and co-ordination would also help to avoid contradictory project philosophies and implementation methodologies that could lead to considerable confusion and frustration among the programme beneficiaries (state agencies as well as civil society).

In view of scarce financial and personnel resources, co-operation would help in building synergies, delegating and dividing tasks, avoiding duplications and incompatible equipment donations (for more see also III.5.3).

Co-operation with Local Law Enforcement Counterparts

The LEDs should try to institutionalize co-ordination and co-operation structures with the local counterparts in the Mol and the police.

Joint working groups focusing on strategic and operational aspects of police reform should be established at all levels of the hierarchies of the Mol and police. These working groups should convene regularly and be co-chaired by high representatives of the LED and the national counterparts.

If possible (providing the human resources are available and the counterparts agree), LED staff should be co-located in the premises of their counterparts in the Mol, the police directorates, training facilities and police stations in order to provide advice on a frequent level and to monitor how the advice is used/considered in the reform implementation process. Such close and daily contacts will provide the basis for establishing good interpersonal working relationships, which in turn allows all actors a better understanding of the needs of their counterparts and may increase the openness of the local counterparts to accept advice from the LEDs.

Co-operation with Civil Society

In times when host governments become less supportive of reform activities, it can be of utmost benefit to engage civil society in the reform process, particularly through NGOs and local self-government structures, such as Citizens Advisory Groups. Since democratic police reforms require a multi-sector approach anyway, the focus should be placed on a variety of actors, with civil society being one of the most important ones.

By supporting the local civil structures, reform may even be promoted to some extent around the Mol, allowing local police commanders to see the benefits of the creation of police-public partnership structures.

The challenge of selecting the most appropriate NGOs for co-operation can be met by using selection criteria such as the NGOs' stability, accountability and authentic representation of their constituencies. OSCE Provisional Financial/Administrative Instruction Fifteen (FAI 15) on "Implementing Partners" provides guidance on the identification, selection and collaboration with NGOs.

Basis for Training

In order to decide on the proper short-, mid- and long-term LED strategy in the police training field it appears to be specifically important to base this decision on the thorough assessment of the local police training-related needs. Therefore, needs assessments should be agreed upon with local police authorities concerned and be carefully planned and properly executed. This would form a solid background for consistency in the OSCE LED's assistance in police training.

It may be advisable to share the needs assessment conclusions with international partners in the country, so they may benefit from it while planning their own police training-related assistance to the local police.

Curriculum Development

Since all LEDs required some kind of templates for developing their own training curricula, the SPMU has developed a guideline document of "Good Practices in Basis Police Training – Curricula Aspects", which provides a skeleton of essential curricula aspects that are vital

for providing basic training in democratic policing in the whole OSCE area. In the future, LEDs, as well as national training institutions in the entire OSCE region, can benefit from this compilation of good practices.

At the earliest possible stage, the OSCE LEDs should collaborate with their host countries in identifying national curriculum developers, who would receive consistent and continuous training and on-the-job coaching from their international counterparts to develop their capacities to perform the tasks independently and competently.

In cases where participating States do not have staff serving in this role, the field operations might confer with their host countries on the need for creating the appropriate job descriptions and organizational structure to support this new element.

Selection of Trainees

LEDs should insist on commitment from the local counterparts to select police applicants for basic training and police officers for advanced training independently of their party affiliation. In fact, selections should be based on clear recruitment procedures and transparent descriptions of basic qualifications.

This would also imply the development of sound career developments systems including transparent job descriptions (see also IV.5.1).

Chiefs of police should be the first training target group for any reform subjects. If they do not understand and support the reform concepts it will be rather difficult for their subordinates to put into practice the new ideas and concepts that they have learned in the police training. A reasonable combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches in the training process would be important.

Training of Local Trainers

LEDs should request commitment from the Mols, confirmed in MOUs, that the Mol would actually use the trainers for cascading the training and would not transfer them to non-training positions.

LEDs should also try to convince Mols to employ formal agreements with the trainers affirming that they would not leave the police service/training facilities for a certain period of time, or otherwise repay for the efforts that have been invested into them.

It is important to identify individuals and invest in their training as ToT instructors who will later on become messengers of the philosophy. So, even if they won't keep working as trainers, they still can convey their knowledge of reform concepts to their fellow colleagues, particularly if they are promoted to managerial positions.

In view of high turnover rates of local trainers, ToT programmes have to be regularly re-run.

In countries, where the position of trainers is not clearly defined in the human resource system, LEDs should urge the host state to resolve this shortcoming.

Study Tours

Inviting local stakeholders for a study tour abroad to see the benefits of police reform (possibly to potential project donor countries) could be very valuable in winning their commitment. Key political stakeholders will be motivated by "what's in it for them". If this is not answered, they likely will not buy in. However, all stakeholders should be made that examples of successful police reform in one country cannot simply be replicated in another with different local circumstances.

LEDs should take care that the tour groups are composed in accordance of the purpose of the trip. High level staff should therefore only participate in high-level events and operational staff should participate in study tours that focus on operational issues.

LEDs should continue to request support from the SPMU in identifying host states and agencies for study tours.

As in the case of trained trainers, LEDs should request from the Mols, that study tour participants would work for a minimum period in the fields of policing for which they had acquired specific expertise during the study tours.

Provision of Technical Assistance

LEDs should request written commitments from the Mols in the form of MOUs that donated equipment would be used appropriately by the designated police units.

Furthermore, these MOUs should also establish that the LEDs would be authorized to check the appropriate use and maintenance of the equipment and the status of condition of the equipment. To make the implementation of the MOUs effective, the LEDs, however, would need the staff capacity to actually assume such monitoring tasks and regularly conduct inventory checks of equipment.

Police Accountability

Developing police accountability in countries in transition requires long term strategies and strong political commitment. In order to enhance the democratic aspect of accountability the civil society must be involved, and mechanisms must be developed so the citizens and their representatives can communicate what sort service they want from the police, and hold the police accountable for delivering it. In this regard, steps must be taken to make the police more transparent. People need to know and understand what their police are doing and why. This is important if the police are to command public confidence and active co-operation.

Enhancing police accountability means, among other things, that deep rooted values and perceptions of how policing should be carried out must be challenged, and specific problems addressed such as undue political influence, corruption, nepotism and involvement by police officers in criminal activities. To assist the host country to solve such problems successfully requires long-term approaches. Furthermore, the LEDs must have dedicated and highly professional national and international staff available.

Institutions of Internal and External Oversight

Police accountability means that police activity – ranging from the behaviour of single police officers to the strategies for police operations, appointment procedures or budget management – is open to observation by a variety of oversight institutions. The development of functioning internal control institutions must therefore be complemented by the creation of effective external oversight mechanisms and institutions.

Oversight institutions may include the executive (policy control, financial control and horizontal oversight by government agencies), the legislature (members of parliament, parliamentary commissions of enquiry), the judiciary, as well as human rights commissions, civilian complaint review boards or independent ombudspersons. Furthermore, the media can play an important role in providing the public with information on police activities.

For a comprehensive overview of the structures and tasks of internal and external oversight institutions see SPMU 2008, Guidebook on Democratic Policing, pp. 39-42. Police accountability means that police activity – ranging from the behaviour of single police officers to the strategies for police operations, appointment procedures or budget management – is open to observation by a variety of oversight institutions. The development of functioning

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Oversight institutions may include the executive (policy control, financial control and horizontal oversight by government agencies), the legislature (members of parliament, parliamentary commissions of enquiry), the judiciary, as well as human rights commissions, civilian complaint review boards or independent ombudspersons. Furthermore, the media can play an important role in providing the public with information on police activities.

For a comprehensive overview of the structures and tasks of internal and external oversight institutions see SPMU 2008, Guidebook on Democratic Policing, pp. 39-42.

Corruption

The fight against corruption requires the application of anti-corruption policies and codes of conduct for the correct, honourable and proper performance of police officers, as well as effective measures to implement those policies at all levels of the police. An effective solution must target not only the root problem of low incomes, and in particular opportunities in certain branches of the police (i.e. traffic or drugs units) for receiving bribes, but must also enhance the efficacy of the discipline and sanctions systems.

Thus, the “cautious anticipation of the dangers that might result from certain types of policing” in connection with the knowledge of the financial background of police officers and their potential conflicts of interest gained by demanding declarations of assets, should lead to the careful “selection of less vulnerable officers”. Further administrative measures could include removing opportunities for corruption by taking some decisions out of the hands of police officers, or by rotating officers on a regular basis.

For a comprehensive overview of anti-corruption measures in the police, see SPMU 2008, Guidebook on Democratic Policing by the Senior Police Adviser to the OSCE Secretary General, pp. 22-23; and OSCE Office of the Co-ordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities 2004, Best Practices in Combating Corruption, pp. 139-144.

Creation of Multi-ethnic Police Services

The creation of a professional multi-ethnic police service (after inter-ethnic hostile conflict) can best be facilitated if future police officers have to work and live together at the beginning of their police career at a basic training academy. Here they can feel safe to start communicating with the colleagues of other ethnic backgrounds and can identify common goals. The OSCE field operations have been successful in developing a corporate identity in the multi-ethnic police units, in which the officers consider each other, first of all, as fellow officers.

In order to be able to co-operate outside the “protective umbrella” of the OSCE, legal foundations must be adopted that provide for the creation of a working climate free from discrimination and politicization. This environment would allow all ethnic groups, as well as female and male officers, to feel comfortable in their working environment and to be promoted based on their merits. For a comprehensive analysis of appropriate recruitment procedures and working environments see SPMU 2008, Guidebook on Democratic Policing, pp. 51-55.

The creation of multi-ethnic police units has been a crucial element in (re)-building the trust of minority communities in the police. However, winning the trust of all ethnic groups requires a process of ethno-political rethinking and a learning process within all ethnic communities, something that is difficult to achieve. A necessary condition for such learning processes, in addition to favourable political conditions, is that multi-ethnic units must prove in practice that they are capable of securing the rights of all ethnic groups in an even-handed manner.

Therefore, it is essential that the LEDs not only focus on establishing multi-ethnic police services but continue to facilitate their professionalization.

The introduction of community policing is an essential pillar of such professionalization and the building of police-public partnerships.

Community Policing as a Central Aspect of Police Reform

Demonstrating to key stakeholders the benefits of community policing by using public surveys which show an improving perception of the police among the people after the introduction of community policing in pilot sites helps to a great extent to persuade the authorities of the values of the concept.

In all cases, the introduction of community policing has had a significant confidence building effect for the relationship between the police and the public as well as for the relationship between different communities.

Through the creation of police-public partnership forums, in which all segments of the communities and relevant government agencies co-operated in proactive problem-solving and crime prevention approaches, the security, safety and livability of the communities improved significantly.

The existence of police-public partnership forums also enabled the LEDs to engage with the police on the local level, when the Mol was not supportive of close co-operation with the LED in general.

For a comprehensive overview of good practices in introducing community policing see SPMU 2008, Good Practices in Building Police-Public Partnerships by the Senior Police Adviser to the OSCE Secretary General.

Development of an Exit Strategy

The restructure and exit phase (of projects or of the whole reform programmes) should be triggered upon reaching the implementation benchmarks (outcomes and outputs) that have been defined in the planning phase and adapted to new developments.

Each restructure and exit phase should be concluded with an After Action Report (AAR). The main purposes for such an AAR would be to provide a useful contribution to institutional memory and to assist in the development of best practice. Just as an implementation plan is best developed collaboratively between the OSCE field operation and the Secretariat, a similar approach with the AAR may lead to a more comprehensive AAR. The AAR should cover both successes as well failures and short-comings, and not be limited just to aspects covered in the implementation plan as others, equally pertinent, may arise during implementation. Moreover, the AAR should follow a set format as much as possible, as a standardised methodology aids corporate development.

The transition of responsibility from the LED staff to the national counterparts needs to be thoroughly planned, taking into account realistic time frames and the proper handover of necessary equipment, information, documentation, curricula etc.

Sustainability of Reform Achievements

A basic pre-requisite for the sustainability of police reforms is the adoption of adequate legislation and national police reform strategies that provide the legal foundation for police reform and clearly define the long-term goals of the reform process and actions to implement the legal foundations and regulations.

To facilitate sustainability, local police staff has not only to be trained to a high professional level, but also empowered to continue professional work once the international partners have gone. Therefore transition of responsibility must come along with the proper handover of necessary equipment, information, documentation, curricula etc.

Furthermore, properly trained national staff should remain in their functions/positions at least as long as it takes to consolidate/stabilize reform in their areas of work. The OSCE should therefore request commitment from the host states to keep the experts in their positions for an appropriate time.

Ownership among local authorities and their empowerment would also be supported, if the OSCE field operations would hire more professional contracted staff from the host country, who would constitute valuable staff for the national authorities, once they leave the field operations. However they will only join their civil services if the prospects for a reasonable income are given.

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