



 Office of Internal Oversight

Evaluation Synthesis 2017-2020



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CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations	3
Executive Summary.....	i
Section 1: Introduction	4
1.1 Background and purpose	4
1.2 The component evaluations	4
1.3 Methodology.....	5
Section 2: Relevance	6
Section 3: Coherence	8
Section 4: Effectiveness	11
Section 5: Impact	16
Section 6: Efficiency	17
Section 7: Sustainability.....	19
Section 8: Gender.....	21
Section 9: Comparative Advantages	23
Section 10: Evaluation Recommendations	25
Section 11: Implications for the future.....	26
Annex 1: Terms of Reference.....	29
Annex 2: List of evaluations for synthesis.....	32

List of Abbreviations

CD	Cross-dimensional
CSO	Civil society organization
EED	Economic and environmental dimension
FRA	The Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union
HD	Human dimension
NGO	Non-governmental organization
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OECD	The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECD DAC	Development Assistance Committee
OIO	Office of Internal Oversight
OSCE	The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PM	Politico-military dimension
RBM	Results based management
UB	Unified budget

Executive Summary

Introduction

Evaluations provide evidence-based insights about the relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability of the OSCE's work. They inform about achievements, point to shortcomings and areas where improvement is needed, and provide essential inputs that inform decision-making, policy development and programming by management. As such, they are not only indispensable for the successful implementation of the OSCE's mandate today, but also help the organization remain relevant in the future.

To support learning from evaluations, the Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) commissioned a synthesis of both Independent Evaluations conducted by OIO and of a set of decentralized evaluations of OSCE interventions commissioned by executive structures. Evaluations were analysed according to a structured analytical framework, oriented to the six OECD DAC Evaluation Criteria (relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability). Gender was also included, along with other key themes identified during the analysis. The synthesis describes performance in these areas, extracts lessons, and proposes areas for OSCE future consideration.

It included a total of 47 evaluations from the period 2017-2020, 15 of them OIO-conducted and 32 decentralised evaluations. The majority of the interventions evaluated pertained to the Human Dimension.

Findings

Evaluations presented a mixed picture of the OSCE's performance in the various areas analysed. For instance, evaluations reported very positive results with regards to the **relevance** of the OSCE's interventions. The vast majority of the evaluations found OSCE interventions fully or mostly responsive to national/regional needs, policies and priorities. This included strong alignment with national or regional policy priorities or plans and/or relevance to OSCE goals and policies. Relevance was, however, constrained to some extent by poor quality intervention designs. Flaws included a short-term vision, weak analytical basis, and interventions being spread too thinly.

With regards to coherence, most evaluations that reported on it, found strong **external coherence** of the OSCE's activities with the interventions of partners. This was being supported by investing substantial efforts in donor co-ordination, and by assisting national coalitions/movements on specific issues. Weaknesses were observed in the OSCE's **internal coherence**, i.e. with regards to the coordination of interventions within the organization. Specific weaknesses included reactive/needs-based co-ordination between field operations and the Secretariat; and largely personalised contacts, rather than systematic or institutionalised engagement between field operations and Secretariat structures.

Evaluation findings related to **effectiveness** were also mixed. The majority of evaluations found that interventions had fully or mostly achieved their intended *outputs*. These included enhanced public knowledge of an issue; improved capacities and awareness of local stakeholders, including local authorities, civil society, national governments and politicians; as well as data generation and the creation of tools. Evaluations observed weaker results with regards to the achievement of longer term objectives. Only a little over one third of the evaluations reported that *outcomes* had been fully or mostly achieved. Most observed outcomes were related to improved policy frameworks; enhanced institutional governance/practice; and strengthened political participation. Results at the *impact* level were even harder to discern. Only two of the evaluations found that the OSCE had made a significant contribution to higher-level results.

Overall, this shows that in OSCE interventions, demonstrable results become progressively weaker as they move up through the results chain, and effectively dissipate by the impact level. It comes as no surprise then, that many evaluations, including a recent OIO evaluation on Results Based Management in the OSCE, identified gaps in terms of results measurement. These included a focus on activities and outputs, rather than on outcome monitoring, and a weak or limited use of monitoring and evaluation systems overall.

This synthesis revealed positive results related to the **efficiency** of the OSCE's interventions. Most evaluations that reported on economic efficiency found strong financial management, with OSCE initiatives having delivered within or below budget and/or monies spent within timeframe, as well as good results with regards to their cost-efficiency. Findings were split in terms of timeliness. Half of the evaluations found that interventions were delivered on time, while half encountered delays, caused by factors including slow donor disbursement and late national approvals/endorsement.

Sustainability of the OSCE's interventions was identified as one of the weakest areas, with less than 20 percent of the evaluations having identified strong potential for the sustainability of the interventions. Almost half of them found little or no potential for sustainability. Shortcomings that hampered sustainability included a short-term vision and approach; no exit or transition strategy; standalone activities rather than national ownership/integration into national systems; a focus on developing policy frameworks rather than on supporting their implementation; insufficient attention paid to building political commitment and ownership to an issue; emphasising individual, not institutionalised, change; and limited scope for replication.

With regard to the implementation of the OSCE's 2004 Action Plan for the Promotion of **Gender Equality**, around half of the evaluations found interventions fully or mostly gender-mainstreamed, while the remaining were either partly gender-mainstreamed, or had little to no gender mainstreaming at all. The main weakness in gender mainstreaming was a focus only on 'women's inclusion' in interventions, rather than adopting more progressive or structural approaches. Other constraints included limited gender analysis in design; unsystematic approaches to gender mainstreaming across activities, and lack of gender-sensitive data collection.

The evaluations included in this synthesis also identified five **comparative advantages** of the OSCE in terms of its strategic and operational positioning and approaches. These were *intellectual leadership*, including acting as a 'thought leader' in areas such as human rights and anti-discrimination, democratisation, freedom of religion or belief, combating violent extremism, and the justice and police sectors; the OSCE's *professional credibility* as a regional security organization in providing both an entry point for engagement and a legitimisation for activities; *its political neutrality*, permitting (often unique) engagement in sensitive areas such as anti-corruption, freedom of religion and belief, or electoral and wider political reforms; the organization's *convening power*, which enabled it to bring stakeholders together and create synergies around sensitive issues; as well as its *cross-dimensional assistance*, which allowed the OSCE to work on issues which cover inter-related and mutually reinforcing themes, such as human rights and anti-money laundering and countering financing of terrorism.

Implications for the future

Based on the evidence, the synthesis identified eight lessons and operational implications for the OSCE's programming and practice going forward. They are summarised below, with more details in the full report. It is in this context important to note that overall, this synthesis found similar weaknesses to those previously reported in a meta-evaluation published by OIO in 2018, which had analysed 46 OIO evaluations from 2010 – 2017 for recurring themes and issues. This shows that while efforts to improve the OSCE's work were made over the past years, many fundamental issues have so far not been resolved at the level of the organization. Addressing these once and for all will require a concerted and

organization-wide effort that takes the lessons of this synthesis into account. In particular, attention needs to be paid to:

- 1) **Building stronger designs of OSCE interventions** by strengthening their analytical basis through better and more consistent analysis of needs, gender implications and stakeholders' capacities; gearing them to a common higher-level goal; and enhancing gender mainstreaming beyond the equal participation of women as a core requirement for all intervention designs.
- 2) **Planning interventions with a view to the medium term and embedding sustainability planning from the outset**, including by anchoring activities in national systems and structures, rather than as standalone interventions; prioritising national ownership; building political momentum; engaging in communication and visibility-raising exercises; ensuring ongoing organizational learning, and planning for exit and handover as part of project design and implementation.
- 3) **Strengthening results based management and performance monitoring** by setting clear higher-level and medium term goals to which the interventions will contribute (not be responsible for achieving) as well as a clear theory of change or logical framework, and assessing progress regularly, particularly against outcomes and for contributions to impact.
- 4) **Improving internal coherence of the OSCE's interventions and learning within and across executive structures** by opening up activities to greater internal review and exchange, in order to benefit from wider institutional experience and support and help build a less silo'd, more open, and ultimately more informed organizational culture.

Section 1: Introduction

1.1 Background and purpose

The OSCE operates in complex and dynamic political, social and economic environments. Frequently, its interventions are implemented under conditions of unpredictability, uncertainty and even instability.

The Evaluation Unit of the OSCE generates evaluation findings to support decision-making; enhance accountability; and build organizational learning for improving the OSCE's work. It both commissions centralized evaluation and supports OSCE's decentralized evaluations, namely those commissioned by other OSCE structures.

This synthesis brings together the findings of 47 evaluations of OSCE interventions, conducted over the period 2017-2020. Its purpose is to describe performance, extract lessons, and propose areas of consideration for the future. It aims to support accountability, contribute to learning, and help the OSCE fulfil its partnerships with participating States.

1.2 The component evaluations

The evaluations analysed here were conducted by the Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) and commissioned by other OSCE executive structures. Analysis for this synthesis began with a sample of 55 evaluations, provided by OIO. Five (all decentralised) were screened out, on the grounds of insufficient evidence/poor quality.¹ Three further evaluations from the sample were 'cross-cutting reports' conducted by OIO,² which synthesize findings from case study/country and include additional information on the Secretariat's policy level work. To avoid 'double counting', these reports were analysed separately. Figures are therefore reported below against a total of 47 reports, with 'cross-cutting' findings separately reported where available.

Some of the reports – particularly those conducted by OIO – cover several projects or initiatives; for example, a centralised evaluation of OSCE projects delivered through the Århus Centre Network, 2002-2017, covered over 90 projects. Decentralised evaluations however commonly cover a single initiative; while some evaluations cover a thematic area or internal initiative, rather than 'projects' *per se*; and some do not specify their coverage in terms of discrete interventions. The unit of analysis for this synthesis is therefore the evaluation report, and the aggregated findings therein (where more than one intervention was evaluated), rather than 'projects' *per se*.

The 47 evaluations had the following features:

- 15 evaluations were OIO-conducted and 32 were decentralised evaluations.

¹ Those screened out were: External Evaluation of Patrol Programming and Leadership Project III, #5500252 in the area of Border Management and Security (Apr 2015 - Sep 2017); External Evaluation of 'Strengthening Border Guard Capacities in Turkmenistan' in the area of Border Management and Security; Enhancing capacities of national agencies for forensic (SEE); Five UB projects aimed at improvement of state e-governance; Evaluation of the Projects on Equal Access to Justice for the Roma Communities, for the period 2009-2016.

² Evaluation of the OSCE Work With and For Youth - cross-cutting report (2019);

Evaluation of Capacity Development and Learning in the OSCE (Cross-Cutting Synthesis Report) (2018);

Evaluation of the OSCE's Assistance Projects on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism, 2006-2016 - cross-cutting report (2017).

- Two interventions, in Serbia and Ukraine, were evaluated both at midterm and project end-stage.³ These are treated as separate reports.
- The majority of the interventions (and their evaluations) were conducted in the Human Dimension (HD). The second largest group of evaluations was Cross-Dimensional (CD). The others assessed interventions in the Politico-Military Dimension (PMD) and in the Economic and Environmental Dimension (EED) (Table 1):

Table 1: Dimensions

	CD	EED	HD	PMD	TOTAL
Decentralised	5	2	17	8	32
Centralised ⁴	7	4	3	1	15
TOTALS	12	6	20	9	47

1.3 Methodology

Evaluations were analysed according to a structured analytical framework, which was oriented to the six OECD DAC Evaluation Criteria, namely Relevance, Coherence, Efficiency, Effectiveness, Impact and Sustainability.⁵ Gender was also included, and other key themes geared to explanatory factors, such as management and leadership, communication and dissemination, knowledge management, human resource capacity, monitoring and evaluation, results based management, financial resourcing, and particularly the comparative advantages of OSCE identified by evaluations, were extracted as analysis proceeded. Policy level findings from centralised evaluations were integrated into the analysis as it proceeded.

The synthesis also builds on OSCE’s 2018 meta-evaluation⁶ which analysed 46 evaluations for recurring themes and issues. This highlighted five key areas for OSCE improvement: Internal co-ordination and collaboration; monitoring and evaluation; knowledge management; gender mainstreaming; and sustainability. It was not possible to use this report as a formal baseline, however, since its analysis was limited and did not specify the number of evaluations reporting against a given theme. It was therefore applied as a reference point, and is noted accordingly within this text.

1.4 Limitations

Limitations to the synthesis include:

- Decentralised evaluations were of notably weaker quality⁷ than those conducted centrally by OIO. Evaluation reports included in this synthesis all met minimum standards in terms of (i) addressing the international evaluation criteria; (ii) applying a clear methodology; (iii) providing supporting evidence for findings; and (iv) analysing data to generate findings. Nonetheless, their depth and rigour varies considerably.

³ 'Strengthening dialogue among civil society and with key government stakeholders in Ukraine on human dimension issues' Project'; Dialogue for Reform and Social Cohesion in Ukraine (ExB 3200354), final evaluation; Consolidating Democratization Process in the Security Sector in Serbia; Consolidating Democratization Process in the Security Sector in Serbia (2016-2018).

⁴ Excluding three cross-cutting reports.

⁵ <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

⁶ OIO (2018) Meta-Evaluation of Recurrent Findings in OIO Evaluations, 2010-2017 Report Number:

⁷ In terms of reporting against evaluation criteria; methodologies applied; evidence and data applied; and analysis of data to reach findings and conclusions.

- ii. The synthesis report could not independently validate the evidence presented in the individual evaluations. Its findings therefore rely on the evidence presented in the component reports.
- iii. Four evaluations were mid-term evaluations, which did not report on final results. A maximum of 43 evaluations could therefore report on effectiveness
- iv. Outcome and impact reporting is notably weak. Most reporting is provided in terms of outputs, and to a more limited extent on outcomes. While some reports comment on impact, the term is not used with rigour, and few reports provide evidence of contribution to higher level results', as per the international definition of impact.⁸ Analysis against the criteria of effectiveness and impact is therefore limited, with fewer evaluations reporting on these concerns.

Despite these constraints, this synthesis has identified findings of importance and, it is hoped, interest, to the OSCE, based as they are on four years of evaluative evidence, and covering OSCE investments in most of its countries of operation.

1.5 Structure of the report

The report is structured in eleven sections, as follows:

- Section 1: Introduction
- Section 2: Relevance
- Section 3: Coherence
- Section 4: Effectiveness
- Section 5: Impact
- Section 6: Efficiency
- Section 7: Sustainability
- Section 8: Gender
- Section 9: Added value/comparative advantages of OSCE
- Section 10: Evaluation Recommendations
- Section 11: Areas for development

Section 2: Relevance

Relevance asks: '*Is the intervention doing the right things?*' It considers the extent to which the intervention objectives and design respond to beneficiaries', global, country, and partner/institution needs, policies, and priorities, and continue to do so if circumstances change.⁹ It places a focus on intervention design.

Accordingly, this section of the synthesis asks;

- How responsive were OSCE initiatives to needs, policies and priorities in participating States?
- What was the quality of OSCE interventions' designs?

⁸ <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

⁹ Ibid.

1.1 How responsive were OSCE initiatives to needs, policies and priorities?



Figure 1: Proportion of evaluations reporting on relevance

All 47 evaluations (100%) reported on relevance (Figure 1). The vast majority - 41/47 - found OSCE interventions to be fully or mostly responsive to national/regional needs, policies and priorities in their countries of implementation (Figure 2).

Alignment with national or regional policy priorities or plans 41/47 interventions were well-aligned with national policies and priorities. For example, in Ukraine, the evaluation found a need and implicit demand for national dialogue on social cohesion and reform.¹⁰




Figure 2: Relevance to needs, policies and priorities

Relevance to OSCE goals/policies All 28 reporting evaluations found interventions aligned with relevant OSCE policies and priorities. For example, simulation-based training on combating human trafficking along migration routes for practitioners in the area was aligned with OSCE goals to assist participating States to implement the relevant commitments.¹¹

Where interventions were not fully relevant (six cases), the following shortcomings were identified:

- **Lack of focus on country strategic needs** such as governmental capacity for democratic governance in the environmental area and women's needs in Tajikistan respectively;
- **Lack of full alignment with national priorities**, e.g. hate crime and hate speech in North Macedonia;
- **Lack of consideration of wider strategic policies**, e.g. United Nations Economic Commission for Europe strategic plans and work programmes in projects delivered through the Århus Centre Network;
- **Lack of clear national strategy or policy in the area**, for example community policing in Serbia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan.
- **Financing of questionably-relevant activities**, e.g. international travel for government officials from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to attend events or meetings overseas.

What was the quality of OSCE interventions' design?

Despite strong strategic relevance, the majority of evaluations found weak or limited intervention designs. Of 24 evaluations commenting, 15 found design flaws, which could undermine relevance and later implementation (Figure 3):

¹⁰ 'Strengthening dialogue among civil society and with key government stakeholders in Ukraine on human dimension issues' Project'.

¹¹ Evaluation of Capacity Development and Learning in the OSCE (Case Study III: Combating Human Trafficking along Migration Routes - Live Simulation-based Training Course).

The main gaps identified were:

- **Short-term vision.** At least eight evaluations found relevance constrained by the lack of a longer-term goal or vision. For example, the OSCE’s assistance on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism in Uzbekistan, Montenegro and Kyrgyzstan lacked a clear strategy or long-term vision for its assistance, or any exit or transition strategy - despite a 10-year period of assistance. This compromised the initiative’s relevance to national needs, as well as having significant other effects (see Sections 4, Effectiveness and 6, Sustainability).
- **Weak analytical basis of design.** At least five evaluations found gaps in early analysis, which would have improved later relevance. These included generating an understanding of young peoples’ needs, which would have improved the relevance of OSCE’s youth-focused activities in Kyrgyzstan; of women’s needs, which would have supported gender-focused initiatives in Tajikistan; and the needs of the justice system in Kosovo, which would have helped tailor activities to critical reform needs.
- **Fragmented activities/being spread too thinly.** At least five evaluations found fragmented activities with no coherent overarching framework or objective. For example, the OSCE’s gender activities in the EED dimensions were often small-scale projects, which limited any potential scope for improving women’s economic status. Similarly, in Serbia, efforts to counter violent extremism and radicalization adopted a dispersed approach to targeting the community level, without any overarching policy level focus.




Figure 2: Quality of design

Of the eight evaluations, which found high quality intervention designs, two main features supported relevance:

- **Stakeholder consultation/inclusion in design.** Examples include the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights’ (ODIHR) Programme on Freedom of Religion or Belief in Central Asia and Ukraine, which undertook extensive consultations to tailor its activities to the needs of counterparts and participants. The same office’s programme to understand and address anti-Semitic hate crimes and identify the security needs of Jewish communities in Bulgaria and Greece, also worked closely with security sector institutions to ensure a robust design.
- **Tailoring to national context.** In the OSCE’s work with youth in Serbia, implementing partners appreciated the OSCE Mission’s customized approach for youth in different parts of the country. Similarly, in Belarus, frequent consultation with Belarusian stakeholders enabled tailoring of activities to needs as expressed by the stakeholders.

Section 3: Coherence

Coherence asks: ‘How well does the intervention fit?’ It checks for the compatibility of the intervention with other interventions in a country, sector or institution.¹²

Coherence has two dimensions: Internal and external. Accordingly, this section of the synthesis asks:

¹² <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

- i. How well did OSCE interventions cohere with those of other partners in the context? (external coherence)
- ii. How well were OSCE interventions internally-co-ordinated? (internal coherence)

3.1 How well did OSCE interventions cohere with those of partners?



Figure 3: Reporting on external coherence

30 evaluations commented on the OSCE’s external coherence (Figure 4). Of these the vast majority (24/30) found strong coherence with other interventions in the context, while five found some gaps and one found almost no external coherence at all (Figure 5):

Strong coherence and co-ordination with other actors and interventions in the context: The 24/30 interventions that had strong external coherence had made efforts in two main areas:

- **Investing substantial efforts in donor co-ordination** in fields where international engagement is crowded, as on human development in Ukraine;¹³
- **Supporting national coalitions/movements** on issues to ensure coherence with national actors as in work on Hate Crimes, Hate Speech in North Macedonia.




Figure 5: External coherence

The OSCE’s work to build a comprehensive criminal justice response to anti-Semitic hate crime showed ‘exemplary’ external co-ordination, given its comprehensive approach to stakeholder involvement throughout design and implementation (Box 1):

Box 1: Stakeholder engagement

The final Assessment of the intervention ‘Building a Comprehensive Criminal Justice Response to Hate Crime’ found that the project had secured strong external co-ordination by involving a wide range of stakeholders, including the Fundamental Rights Agency of the European Union (FRA), the Council of Europe, European Union institutions, and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Where external coherence was more limited, this related to ad-hoc, unsystematised co-ordination with other actors; to narrow networks; to overly technical co-ordination meetings which were limited to information-sharing only; and to limited external communication about activities.

3.2 How internally coherent were interventions?

The 2018 Meta-evaluation reiterated known weaknesses in OSCE’s internal coherence. Challenges were:

- Co-ordination and collaboration gaps between OSCE field operations and the Secretariat, as well as between OSCE field operations
- Ad-hoc rather than planned and systematic co-ordination, such as between field operations

¹³ ‘Strengthening dialogue among civil society and with key government stakeholders in Ukraine on human dimension issues’.

- Lack of Secretariat-provided strategic guidance in some areas, such as anti-money-laundering and gender
- Challenges working across the three OSCE Dimensions.

These findings are replicated in this 2020 synthesis. 28 evaluations commented on internal coherence (Figure 6):



Figure 6: Reporting on internal coherence

Of these, only seven found strong internal coherence, while 13 found limited or only partial internal coherence. Eight found little to no internal coherence (Figure 7):

The seven interventions with strong internal coherence had two main features:

- **Good vertical co-ordination between field structures and the Secretariat**, for example the OSCE’s efforts to reduce the risk of weapons and ammunition proliferation in North Macedonia;
- **Some strong internal horizontal co-ordination between mission departments**, for example in projects working on the judicial response to/monitoring of corruption cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina. (However, two evaluations also found scope for greater co-operation in-house e.g. with election observation and gender functions.)




Figure 7: Internal coherence

Where internal coherence was weak or limited, gaps were:

- **Lack of proactive seeking of internal coherence**, either upwards to the Secretariat or horizontally with other field missions or internally
- **Limited vertical co-ordination with Secretariat structures** who could potentially offer guidance, expertise and support
- **Reactive/needs-based only co-ordination between field operations and the Secretariat**, with contact focused mainly on information-sharing rather than on joint-planning/implementation
- **Largely personalised contacts** with either field operations or Secretariat structures, rather than systematic or institutionalised communications mechanisms.

Secretariat-specific weaknesses included:

- In common with the 2018 Meta-evaluation: A lack of internal awareness and/or visibility of an issue, and weak internal guidance e.g. on issues such as youth, gender, anti-discrimination, security sector reform, anti-money laundering.
- Challenges working with administrative internal departments.

Section 4: Effectiveness

Effectiveness assesses ‘*Whether the intervention has achieved its objective and results.*’ This may include differential results across groups.¹⁴ The synthesis therefore assesses:

- Whether OSCE interventions achieved their intended outcomes (and why/not)
- Whether OSCE interventions achieved their intended outputs and why/not

Analysis for this synthesis found challenges in both the results-based design of interventions, and of monitoring and evaluation. These shortcomings affect the assessment of effectiveness.

4.1 Results based management

The draft Results Based Management evaluation report of December 2020 found a series of operational level barriers to results based management, including a lack of multi-year planning, results level indicators and reporting on results, as well as a lack of staff understanding of, and capacity for, results based management. These findings are reflected in this synthesis. Issues raised were:

- **Lack of long term vision compromising results logic.** Linked to the uncondusive environment in the OSCE for longer term planning noted in the 2018 Meta-Evaluation report,¹⁵ evaluations found no clear line of sight to a longer-term vision (see Relevance, above). This compromised the intervention logic, in that inputs, activities, outputs and outcomes were not consistently geared to a single, overarching goal, and limited awareness of progress towards longer-term aims. It also constrained the OSCE in demonstrating progress towards longer term/higher level results.
- **Weak or absent theory of change.** At least eight evaluations found no or very limited theories of change or logical frameworks. A further four found weak internal logic, meaning unclear linkages between activities and the results they were supposed to produce.
- **Weak indicators.** Evaluations found weak indicators, compromising project measurability. This included gaps in indicators for some activities; weak or absent outcome level indicators; and a lack of qualitative indicators.

¹⁴ <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

¹⁵ The 2018 Meta-Evaluation report identified OSCE’s annual Unified Budget cycle, the dominance of political considerations as compared to programmatic priorities in some areas, high staff turnover, as well as the nature of the organization’s overall accountability framework as ‘complicating factors’ in the development of an RBM culture.

4.2 Monitoring and evaluation

The 2018 Meta-Evaluation found gaps in monitoring and evaluation systems to generate data on the implementation, progress and results of programmes and projects. These gaps continue in 2020.



Figure 8: Reporting on monitoring and evaluation

32/47 evaluations assessed M&E systems (Figure 8). Of these, only four found largely strong internal monitoring systems at activity and output level, though noting constraints at outcome level. As a positive example, the OSCE Project on Security Sector Governance and Reform developed and implemented a professional monitoring and evaluation component from the outset, which enabled to identify and address strengths and shortcomings in the course of the project implementation.

By contrast, 28/32 evaluations found shortcomings in monitoring and evaluation system designs. These included:

- (i) **Weak or limited use of M&E systems.** Nine evaluations found gaps or weaknesses in the monitoring systems applied. These included:
 - No or only very limited monitoring
 - Lack of use of available logical frameworks
 - Only narrative reports produced
 - Lack of overview monitoring where projects were regional or implemented in several locations simultaneously
 - Weak or inexact reporting
- (ii) **Monitoring activity delivery rather than outputs or outcomes.** Eleven evaluations found monitoring focused on activity delivery rather than outputs or outcomes achieved. For example, the Evaluation of Capacity Development and Learning in the OSCE (Cross-Cutting Synthesis Report) found that monitoring of activities and outputs was conducted routinely by the projects, but only two of the projects monitored outcomes.
- (iii) **Lack of use of monitoring data.** Where monitoring data was available, even if limited, few evaluations noted its use for performance improvement. In Kosovo, for example, the OSCE's work in trial monitoring and rule of law was undermined by the lack of a strategic vision on how to use monitoring data to improve justice in the country, turning a potential strength into a weakness.




Figure 9: M&E

4.3 To what extent did interventions achieve their outputs?



Figure 10: Reporting on outputs

43/47 evaluations reported on output achievement (Figure 10). The vast majority (35/43) found that interventions had fully or mostly achieved their intended outputs, while eight had partly achieved these (Figure 11).

As per the volume of activities, outputs achieved were concentrated in the Human Dimension, and thereafter in the remaining four dimensions. Across all dimensions, achievement mainly occurred in five areas (Table 2):

- (i) Enhanced public knowledge of/debate on an issue;
- (ii) Improved capacities and awareness of local stakeholders, including local authorities, civil society, national governments and politicians
- (iii) Creation of national-level networks and dialogue;
- (iv) Data generation and tool creation, particularly on the theme of social inclusion.




Figure 11: Achieving outputs

Table 2: Outputs achieved - key areas

Enhanced public awareness of an issue – 27 evaluations	Improved capacities/awareness of local stakeholders – 29 evaluations
Environmental awareness	Environmental knowledge in NGOs
Freedom of religion and belief	Anti-money laundering and the countering the financing of terrorism activities
Human rights	Anti-corruption monitoring and judicial responses
Conflict awareness	Cybercrime and cyber-enabled crime among Criminal Justice Practitioners
Hate crime	Freedom of religion and belief
Gender equality	Gender equality in governance
Rome issues	War crimes case processing
Youth issues	Population registration
Data generation and tool creation - 6 evaluations	Civil society engagement in governance
Status of women	Human rights in governance and human development activities
Roma inclusion	Combating hate crime
Reporting on corruption trials	Engaging with youth/countering youth radicalisation
Population registration	Disaster risk reduction and emergency management
Creation of national/regional-level networks and dialogues- 18 evaluations	Anti-trafficking
Gender equality	Security sector reform/managing armaments
Social cohesion	Academic skills and capacities
Anti-hate crimes	
Youth issues	

Security sector governance and reform	
Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization	
Anti-trafficking	
Environmental concerns	
Academic networks	

The greatest density of outputs achieved therefore – reflective of where the OSCE has dedicated its effort in recent years – is in improved capacities/awareness of local stakeholders and enhanced public awareness of an issue, and particularly in the Human Dimension, where OSCE efforts have been most concentrated within this set of evaluations.

Reasons for only partial achievement of outputs were:

- **Variable or uneven achievements across different activities or geographical areas**, e.g. economic and environmental activities in Tajikistan;
- **Weak organizational mainstreaming of an issue**, e.g. gender and security sector reform, which constrained output achievement;
- **Limited visibility of an initiative inside the OSCE**, such as of the Strategic Policy Support Unit, where limited awareness constrained its take up and use by national stakeholders.

4.4 To what extent did interventions achieve their outcomes?

29/47 evaluations – including all 18 centralised evaluations – reported on outcome-level results (Figure 12).



Figure 12: Reporting on outcomes

Reporting here however had significant weaknesses, including little reporting on results against specific targets, and in decentralised evaluations particularly, output and outcome terminology frequently confused. Categorisation of outcome-level results here has therefore been done by the author.

Achievement of outcomes was weaker than for outputs. Just 11/29 evaluations found either full achievement of outcome-level aims, and/or few/no limitations or caveats. 15 found partial outcome achievement, or achievement with limitations (Figure 13). In three interventions, outcomes were explicitly not achieved.




Figure 13: Achieving outcomes

Outcomes achieved – across all dimensions - fell into three main categories: (i) improved policy frameworks; (ii) enhanced institutional governance/practice; (iii) enhanced political participation. Of these, the greatest density of outcome level results was in improved policy frameworks – across dimensions. Four evaluations also reported changed behaviour (Table 3):

Table 3: Outcomes achieved – key areas

Improved policy frameworks - 17 evaluations	Improved institutional governance/practice – 4 evaluations
Community policing frameworks and practice	Internal reform processes within the Ministries of Interior and the Police Directorates
Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism in and	Improved quality of investigations, witness support, indictments, prosecutions and court decisions on war crimes cases
Security sector reform	Improving the policies and practices of youth-focused organizations
Gender action plans	The development of an effective infrastructure to respond to HC and HS
Mainstreaming youth-focused concerns into national and local procedures, policies and practices	Improved political participation - 5 evaluations
Legislative improvements on personal data and cybersecurity	Of women
Improving the consultative basis of policy formulation in the area of human rights and security sector reform with the inclusion of civil society	Of youth
Translating normative guidance e.g. on freedom of religion/belief into national guidance	Changed behaviour – 2 evaluations
	Youth in terms of strengthening inter-ethnic dialogue in their communities;
	Attitudes to gender
	New behaviours as a result of capacity strengthening activities.

Constraints to achieving outcomes were linked to those listed above in Relevance, including a short term vision and the fragmented or dispersed nature of designs, which constrained outcome achievements:

- **Short term vision** Eight evaluations reported that a limited project vision restricted outcome achievement. For example, in Serbia, a focus on short-term activities rather than a focus on policy-level change in the medium term, was a missed opportunity to achieve wider-ranging change in countering violent extremism and radicalization threats.
- **Fragmentation.** Where interventions had dispersed or fragmented designs, they were limited in later outcome achievement. For example, in Ukraine, the thirteen different activities under the ‘Strengthening dialogue among civil society and with key government stakeholders on human Dimension issues’ project made it challenging to achieve higher level or broader outcome-level results.

Other factors included:

- **Limited scale.** At least three evaluations found that the small scale of an intervention constrained its potential contributions to higher-level changes. Examples include work with youth in Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia and Kyrgyzstan, where the OSCE’s small-scale initiatives could only make change at the community level. In Tajikistan, the OSCE’s Economic and Environmental Programme was ‘barely noticeable’ among larger interventions.
- **Project communication and ‘visibility’.** At least 6/7 evaluations commenting found shortcomings in project communication and visibility, which limited the intervention’s take-up

with local populations and/or the engagement of national stakeholders. The exception was the OSCE's efforts to build a comprehensive criminal justice response to hate crime' (Box 3):

Box 3: Communication and dissemination

The multi-country 'Building a Comprehensive Criminal Justice Response to Hate Crime' project undertook substantial efforts to communicate activities and outputs, including through the use of innovative tools such as 'Facebook boosting'. Partners were also encouraged to communicate events on their websites and to the press.

Other interventions needed more explicit attention to communication and outreach as project components; a broadening of target audiences; more public reporting; and a more conscious approach to integrated knowledge-sharing as part of the OSCE's everyday operations and partnerships.

Knowledge Management The 2018 Meta-Evaluation found internal shortcomings with knowledge management in the OSCE, with knowledge transfer initiatives ad-hoc, limited in scale and depth, and not fully institutionalized. This theme continues in 2020, with only one evaluation finding positive (and successful) efforts at knowledge management, while others noted very limited knowledge exchange, both internally and externally.

Section 5: Impact

Impact asks: *'What difference does the intervention make?'* It considers the extent to which the intervention has generated or is expected to generate significant positive or negative, intended or unintended, higher-level effects.¹⁶

The use of the term 'impact' is highly varied across OSCE evaluations. Particularly in decentralised evaluations, achievements labelled as 'impact' are in fact outputs/outcomes. As for outcomes, therefore, categorisation here has been conducted by the author.

Only five centralised evaluations – perhaps recognising the robust methodologies and strong data streams needed to assess impact - reported on impact, and four of these were the combined case studies and the cross-cutting report for OIO's evaluation of Anti Money Laundering and Counter Terrorism Financing.

¹⁶ <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>



Figure 14: Reporting on impact

Overall, only 13/47 evaluations reported impact-level results (Figure 14). Of these, only two found a significant contribution to higher-level results (Figure 15), namely:

- The Portfolio of Population Registration Projects and ODIHR technical assistance on population registration and identity management to participating States had generated a measurable increase in the numbers of the population registered in Albania, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, promoting social inclusion.
- The OSCE’s Human Rights Work in Albania (2010 – 2016) had made a significant contribution to the progress that Albania made in terms of human rights during the evaluation period.




Figure 15: Impact

Three evaluations found some *potential* (not actual) contributions to higher-level results; namely in economic and environmental programming in Tajikistan; in transboundary co-operation and integrated water resources management in the Dniester Basin; and in trial monitoring and the rule of law in Kosovo. Eight evaluations found explicitly **no/little contribution** to higher-level results. These included:

- Anti-money laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism initiatives in Uzbekistan, Montenegro and Kyrgyzstan, where ten years of co-operation had not been followed by any notable impact (and where the evaluation recommended modification or closure of the initiative);
- Low numbers of students graduating from the OSCE Academy and entering into jobs that have an impact on security and co-operation in Central Asia, which constrained any significant impact in a large region;
- Few improvement in trial monitoring in Kosovo, due to passivity in generating systemic and thematic reports on fair trial, human rights and other topics relevant to the state of Kosovo’s judicial system;
- Limited effects for partner States of the OSCE Project on Security Sector Governance and Reform, partly due to misunderstandings about the nature of SSG/R as well as fears that the concept may be used to justify interference in States’ internal affairs.

Demonstrable results therefore become progressively weaker as they move up through the results chain, and effectively dissipate by impact level.

Section 6: Efficiency

Efficiency asks: ‘How well are resources being used?’ It assesses the extent to which the intervention delivers, or is likely to deliver, results in an economic and timely way.¹⁷

¹⁷ <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/dacriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

This synthesis therefore considers efficiency from two perspectives: *Economic efficiency* (including (i) Sound financial management (i.e. spending all allotted resources and/or delivering the initiative on or below budget) and (ii) more strategically, cost efficiency) and *timeliness*.

6.1 How economically efficient were interventions?




Figure 16: Reporting on economic efficiency

OSCE financial management of its initiatives appears strong. Of 20 evaluations reporting on economic efficiency (Figure 16), 17 find OSCE to have delivered the initiative within or below budget and/or to have spent resources within the allotted timeframe (Figure 17):

The remaining three evaluations found delivery to be mostly within budget, and/or with justifiable reasons for any overspend. The main reason was implementation delays (see Timeliness, below), which increased administrative costs.

More strategically, 18 evaluations commented on cost-efficiency. Of these, 14 found OSCE activities to be fully or mostly cost-efficient (Figure 18):

Reasons provided were:

- **Appropriate allocation and use of resources** in terms of a balance between inputs and outputs;
- **Cost-saving measures implemented**, for example by organizing events in conjunction with local partners, as in the multi-dimensional initiative in the economic, environmental and political-military arenas in Ukraine and/or to partner with other projects to save money by combining activities, as in the Enabling transboundary co-operation and integrated water resources management in the Dniester Basin" project;
- **Using a 'stimulus' or cascade approach**, as in the North Macedonia, where work in Anti-Discrimination used a 'stimulus approach' to address hate crimes and hate speech; and to promote women's participation in public and political life in Tajikistan, where a cascade model was used for training.

The four remaining evaluations found two main reasons for inefficiencies;

- **Poorly targeted resources**, cited in four evaluations. For example, OSCE's efforts to counter money-laundering and financing of terrorism were constrained by the large proportion of the budget dedicated to international travels for government officials, which did not lead to changed practices.




Figure 17: Delivering on budget




Figure 18: Cost-efficiency

- **Insufficient staffing**, noted in five projects led to low administrative costs, but created strategic-level cost inefficiencies, given the thin spreading of resources.

6.2 How timely were interventions?



Figure 19: Reporting on timeliness

Only 14 evaluations comment on timeliness (Figure 19). Of these, seven found that interventions were timely, while seven encountered delays (Figure 20), including the Project 'Technical Assistance for Roma Inclusion, which was delayed by two years. Reasons included donor disbursement delays in two projects and implementation challenges in two, including slow UB and national approvals/endorsement.




Figure 20: Timeliness

Section 7: Sustainability

Sustainability asks: 'Will the benefits last?' It assesses the extent to which the net benefits of the intervention continue, or are likely to continue.¹⁸

The 2018 meta-evaluation found some weaknesses in the OSCE's approach to sustainability. Despite good benefits gained from the OSCE's work to strengthen policies, strategies and legislation, reported above in Section 4, Effectiveness, it also highlighted the lack of long-term strategies and clear guidelines for planning for sustainability. It found limited evidence on the consistent implementation of strengthened policies, and uncertainties on the translation of capacity development gains into new practices and behaviours. Other threats included uncertain financial sustainability, and limited OSCE and national staff capacities in planning for sustainability.



Figure 21: Reporting on sustainability

¹⁸ <https://www.oecd.org/dac/evaluation/daccriteriaforevaluatingdevelopmentassistance.htm>

In 2020, the evidence largely coheres with these findings. 38/47 evaluations commented on sustainability, all from the perspective of *prospective* (rather than actual) sustainability (Figure 21). Of these, only seven found projects to have a strong likelihood of sustainability in most areas, while 15 had potential for sustainability in some areas, albeit with gaps, while 16 had little or no potential for sustainability (Figure 22):




Figure 22: Sustainability

Factors supporting potential sustainability in relevant interventions were:

- **Early planning for sustainability.** Only one evaluation found strong early planning for sustainability. The Words in Action project, focused on addressing Anti-Semitic hate crimes and the security needs of Jewish communities in Bulgaria and Greece, designed its individual outputs with attention to sustainability in mind, for example the establishment of co-ordination structures and co-operation agreements with national authorities.
- **Long-term agreements between participating States and OSCE.** Where such agreements were in place, it allowed a long-term commitment on both sides. For example, in Ukraine, Memorandums between OSCE and national bodies indicated a long-term commitment by Ukrainian state authorities to work with the OSCE on human rights issues.
- **Building local ownership.** Two evaluations, of work with youth in Kyrgyzstan and reducing risks to the proliferation of weapons and ammunition in North Macedonia, reported that local ownership was developed, resulting in the institutionalisation of project achievements and contributing consequently to enhanced sustainability.
- **Securing local budgetary commitment.** The 'Technical Assistance for Roma Inclusion (TARI)' project in Serbia had secured a commitment to continuing a large number of outputs, to be financed either through the national, local or the EU budget.
- **Use of lessons learned to inform future design.** One evaluation, of the ODIHR 'Building a Comprehensive Criminal Justice Response to Hate Crime' initiative, found that lessons were being learned from what was considered a 'pilot' initiative, that would eventually allow it to be 'mainstreamed' up to the level of all participating States.

Projects achieved sustainability at different levels. For example, three Anti-Money laundering projects achieved strategic sustainability, in that new laws and policies were developed concerning money laundering, but operative sustainability was not achieved, since there was no evidence of the implementation of these policies and laws when the evaluation was conducted.

Evaluations found seven shortcomings in intervention design and implementation, which compromised sustainability. Specifically:

- **Short-term vision.** As for Relevance and Effectiveness, 7 evaluations found sustainability compromised by their short-term vision and approach. This undermined later sustainability. For example, the lack of a long-term assistance plan to strengthen government compliance with the Århus Convention meant that countries benefiting from the OSCE's support delivered through the Århus Centre Network might cease their efforts, once the project closed.
- **No exit or transition strategy.** Five evaluations found no clear exit strategy developed and implemented. For example, the Trial Monitoring/Rule of Law Portfolio of the OSCE Mission in

Kosovo lacked any clear graduation programs or phase out plans for its technical assistance to institutions.

- **Standalone activities rather national ownership/integration into national systems.** Four evaluations found activities implemented in isolation of national structures and processes, rather than being integrated with them. For example, community policing in Serbia, Kosovo, North Macedonia, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia and Azerbaijan was implemented as a separate and/or competing task among other police tasks, rather than being embedded in policing philosophy. Similarly, in supporting dialogue for reform and social cohesion in Ukraine, the OSCE's intervention became an external structure, whose practices the local partners had not appropriated.
- **A focus on developing, rather than implementing, policy frameworks.** OSCE's assistance to Anti-Money Laundering and Countering of Financing of Terrorism in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Montenegro had successfully developed laws, strategies and action plans, but the lack of attention to implementation meant a risk of deterioration in the absence of OSCE support.
- **Insufficient attention paid to building political commitment/ownership to an issue.** At least three evaluations found limited OSCE attention to building political commitment – particularly at local level – which in turn constrained sustainability. For example, a lack of political consensus around the concepts of security sector governance and reform compromised sustainability in OSCE's work in this area.
- **Emphasising individual, not institutionalised, change.** Five evaluations found insufficient attention to institutionalising capacity development gains, which limited sustainability. For example, youth trainees in Kosovo benefited from individual training on how to address intolerance and violent extremism, but lacked institutional backing or support to help them continue with local initiatives after project termination.
- **Limited scope for replication.** Two evaluations, both from the multi-case Evaluation of Capacity Development and Learning in the OSCE, signal limited scope for replication in constraining sustainability. Both link to the unique comparative advantages of the OSCE (Section 9 below). OSCE-provided simulation-based training for combating human trafficking along could not be easily replicated by any other organization, limiting its potential sustainability. Similarly, activities to promote women's participation in public and political life could not be replicated in Tajikistan, since OSCE's convening power (see section 9) was unique in bringing all political camps together to discuss common goals around promoting women's role in leadership.

Section 8: Gender


Institutional background on gender. The 2018 evaluation of the Implementation of the OSCE's 2004 Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality found significant weaknesses in the OSCE's programmatic approach to gender equality. It pointed to limited leadership and management commitment, as well as insufficient organizational prioritisation of gender, while programmatic attention mainly rested in the Human Dimension. These findings were echoed by the 2020 evaluation of Results-Based Management in the OSCE, which found low levels of gender-specific and gender - mainstreamed projects.¹⁹

¹⁹ Independent evaluation of Results-Based Management in the OSCE (2015-2019()). 53% of projects were characterised by "limited gender mainstreaming", and a further 3% of projects had not been gender mainstreamed at all.



Figure 23: Reporting on gender

For this synthesis, 29 evaluations in total address gender equality (Figure 23), of which five are evaluations of gender-focused initiatives, including the thematic Evaluation of the Implementation of the OSCE’s 2004 Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality. Excluding these five, 11/24 interventions were fully or mostly gender-mainstreamed, while six were partly gender-mainstreamed, and 7 had little to no gender mainstreaming at all (Figure 24).



Where gender was well mainstreamed, successful approaches included:

- Addressing gender inequalities in training activities
- Embedding a focus on gender based violence into activities
- Conducting gender-related research, for example on the gender pay gap and on women and in the labour market and on women’s role in countering violent extremism and radicalization.

Box 4: Gender and Consolidating the Democratization Process in the Security Sector in Serbia

The evaluation of the Consolidating the Democratisation process in the security sector in Serbia initiative found a very deliberate and specific gender focus in design. This had a positive and measurable impact on project design, implementation and results, creating a required framework that with time became accepted and then expected. The presence and use of in-house OSCE gender expertise placed emphasis on the gender aspects of the Project. The evaluation found that *‘there is no question that ‘gender’ is a real topic now – and the Project is an excellent example of mainstreaming gender in the security sector.’*

The main weaknesses in gender mainstreaming was a focus only on ‘women’s inclusion’ in interventions, echoing the Thematic Evaluation on gender: *‘Overall...the focus of gender mainstreaming interventions is on ensuring women’s participation in programming as an end in and of itself. There is a lack of creative thinking and use of transformative approaches that would entail challenging gender stereotypes and cultural attitudes...This was particularly prominent in the first dimension.’²⁰*

Other factors explaining weak gender mainstreaming were:

- **Limited gender analysis**, noted in 3 evaluations. For example, the OSCE’s projects delivered through the Århus Centre Network lacked analysis regarding women’s and men’s differential understanding of their environmental rights or their differential access to justice.
- **Unsystematic approach to gender mainstreaming across activities**, with gender addressed in some areas – notably human dimension projects- rather than adopting a systematic or comprehensive approach, such as in OSCE’s work with and for youth.
- **Lack of gender-sensitive data collection** noted in four evaluations – even though this was often promised at design or proposal stage.

²⁰ Thematic Evaluation of the Implementation of the OSCE’s 2004 Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality

Gender results. Very few gender-specific results are reported in evaluations, other than those presented in the Thematic Evaluation (Box 5). Most results are in the Human Dimension.

Box 5: Gender results:

The Thematic Evaluation of the Implementation of the OSCE’s 2004 Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality found the following gender results:

- Improvements in the gender balance in security institutions (police, border control)
- Use of varied mechanisms to increase overall gender sensitivity (support for women’s associations, development of strategies, training programs, training of trainers) as well as increased female participation in public safety initiatives at the community level.
- Capacity building in gender-responsive budgeting; gender-sensitive legal reform; women’s political participation and empowerment; addressing gender-based violence; and gender analysis and research.
- Gender mainstreaming in projects on strengthening electoral processes and citizen participation in political life have led to positive results for women, both in terms of women as potential candidates and as voters

One exception was the initiative in Bosnia and Herzegovina to ensure the effective processing of war crimes. The training led to changed practices with regard to the handling of cases involving sexual violence, including the manner in which witnesses were approached and how victims were treated.

Section 9: Comparative Advantages

The 47 evaluations, and associated cross-cutting reports synthesised here reveal five identified comparative advantages of OSCE in terms of its strategic and operational positioning, compared to other organizations. These are (Box 6):

Box 6: Comparative advantages

- Intellectual leadership
- Professional credibility
- Political neutrality
- Convening power
- Cross-dimensional assistance.

These comparative advantages have helped OSCE gain entry points in countries, sectors and with partners, but have also allowed it to play leading roles where they have been strategically deployed to support OSCE’s aims. As follows:

Intellectual leadership Twelve evaluations highlight the intellectual leadership of the OSCE, including its own staff and the technical experts it appoints. Its role as a ‘thought leader’ in specific areas was widely praised, including in the fields of: youth, human rights and anti-discrimination, democratisation, freedom of religion or belief, combating violent extremism, the justice and police sectors and population registration and identity management. Box 7 provides examples:

Box 7: Intellectual leadership

Promoting democratisation and human rights in Belarus In Belarus, OSCE’s added value was praised for its outstanding technical capacity, with partners noting the quality of the ODIHR experts

and staff... Stakeholder feedback suggested that ODIHR performed particularly well in terms of mobilising international experts with relevant experience from the Commonwealth of Independent States

Freedom of Religion or Belief Programme. The intellectual leadership exercised by ODIHR, on Freedom of Religion or Belief, together with its Panel of Experts, was recognised as one of the organization's major comparative advantages.

Hate Crimes, Hate Speech in North Macedonia OSCE is praised for playing the lead role on the issue of discrimination, holding a particular expertise that is widely and well regarded and enjoys high levels of trust with the partner organizations. The evaluation notes that there is no other organization that could replace the OSCE and achieve similar results, and that OSCE has a special role in the host country.

Professional credibility Eleven evaluations note the OSCE's professional capital as a regional security organization in providing both an entry point for engagement and a legitimisation for activities. For example, in the security sector in Serbia, the OSCE's credibility allowed it to legitimise activities to promote the democratisation process. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the OSCE's authority and reputation opened up access to files of corruption cases, to support the transparency and credibility of trials through monitoring. In Ukraine, OSCE's status as a respected and influential intergovernmental organization allowed for democratisation reforms to be speeded up and reducing resistance displayed by some public officials.

Political neutrality, permitting (often unique) engagement in sensitive areas. At least five evaluations signalled OSCE's ability to engage in politically-sensitive areas, where other actors who lack the same perceived neutrality, cannot. Examples include:

- OSCE was the only actor to directly and explicitly engage in the anti-corruption agenda in Tajikistan, other actors focusing more obliquely on 'good governance' to avoid any potential controversy
- OSCE stood out for being able to engage with Belarusian actors who had not previously engaged with European/international actors on promoting democratisation and human rights in Belarus
- Across Europe, OSCE's reputation, expertise and weight as an inter-governmental organization allowed it to legitimize and mobilize on the issue of freedom of religion and belief issue, in places where these freedoms are not or only partly respected;
- OSCE's neutrality and generally positive image in Ukraine allowed it to generate a neutral and apolitical venue for supporting reforms and dialogue on 'hot', contested issues;
- Applying the entry point of civil / population registration allowed the OSCE to work on improved election processes in participating States, for which the OSCE is uniquely positioned.

Box 8: Neutrality as a comparative advantage

The External Evaluation of the Trial Monitoring/Rule of Law Portfolio of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo found that '*OSCE's reputation as a neutral, objective, impartial and constructive observer of the court system is widely accepted as the main strength of its rule of law activities by justice system stakeholders. The professional, impartial and ethical conduct of trial monitors is highly appreciated by justice stakeholders. CSOs also consider Mission's trial monitoring as a role model, which they strive to implement due to the undisputed neutrality, objectivity and professionalism of OSCE staff.*'

Convening power Thirteen evaluations highlight the OSCE's special convening power, enabling it to bring stakeholders together and create synergies around often sensitive issues. Examples include:

- In Ukraine, OSCE's status as a respected and influential intergovernmental organization, with access to the corridors of power in Ukraine, enabled it to connect civil society with state authorities;
- In Serbia, the OSCE's convening power allowed it to bring a wide range of stakeholders around the table at national and local level in support of youth policy-making;
- In Albania and Kosovo, the OSCE's reputation as a credible international actor allowed it to adopt an inclusive approach, connecting stakeholders at all levels of the justice system.

Box 9: Convening power

The OSCE Survey on the Well-being and Safety of Women in South East and Eastern Europe was facilitated by OSCE's large network of field presences. *'Virtually no other intergovernmental actor has such continuity, depth and variety of partnerships in the OSCE area... The standing of the OSCE enables a convergence of collaborations of state entities, international organizations and NGOs on a large scale, which was instrumental to the success of this project.'*²¹

Cross-dimensional assistance Six evaluations also identify the OSCE's ability to implement cross-dimensional assistance programmes as a strong comparative advantage. Its assistance to Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism in Montenegro, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, for example, could cover inter-related and mutually reinforcing assistance themes and issues across all OSCE Dimensions. This was one of the Mission's comparative advantages vis-à-vis other assistance providers. In Albania, the OSCE's willingness to adopt a multi-disciplinary approach where relevant provided added value to its human rights work.


Section 10: Evaluation Recommendations

The combined set of 47 evaluations (plus three cross-cutting reports) provided a total of 223 recommendations, almost all of which were accepted by management. Many recommendations were highly specific to individual interventions, particularly those of decentralised evaluations that focused on a single intervention. Nonetheless, analysis found commonality, which reflects a) the findings above, and b) systemic issues being repeatedly highlighted by evaluations.

Figure 25 shows the number of reports that made evaluation recommendations in given areas, indicating the main areas of commonality (i.e. where most recommendations were made):

²¹ Evaluation of the OSCE Survey on the Well-being and Safety of Women in South East and Eastern Europe; External Evaluation of the Project 'Technical Assistance for Roma Inclusion (TARI)

Figure 25: Frequency of evaluation recommendations



Therefore, recommendations reflect the systemic issues highlighted in Findings, above, and which provide useful indicators for future direction in the OSCE’s planning and programming (see Section 11 below). Namely: The need for a more strategic and longer-term approach; the need to improve communication and dissemination of activities for greater visibility; stronger and deeper partnerships; improvements in results based management and monitoring and evaluation; enhancing gender mainstreaming and knowledge management; defining approaches to sustainability; and improving internal synergies.

Section 11: Implications for the future

Drawing from the evidence above, this report highlights the following eight lessons and related implications for OSCE’s programming and practice going forward:

Lesson 1: A weak analytical basis constrains relevance to needs on the ground

Implication 1: All interventions should be required to set out a clear analytical basis as part of their justification and rationale. This may draw on existing analysis available in the context, but should include: analysis of the target population/area needs in relation to the proposed intervention; gender analysis (of the target population/area); and capacity analysis of national stakeholders – an important dimension for later sustainability.

Lesson 2: Although a systemic constraint within the OSCE, given short term planning and financing cycles, a short-term vision constrains the relevance, effectiveness and sustainability of programming.

Implication 2: Interventions need to be planned with a view to the medium term. This includes identifying to which national priorities and goals the intervention will contribute and how; how capacities will be built with a view to systemic and institutional change; how policy frameworks will be revised and implementation assured – and clear goals set to accompany these aims, to which all activities (and the monitoring and reporting of them) should be geared.

Lesson 3: Shortcuts in design undermine programme relevance and later effectiveness, as well as sustainability.

Implication 3: Stronger designs are needed to ensure that the OSCE generates maximum value for participating States for the investments it makes. This includes: A sound analytical basis (above); a focused set of interventions (rather than dispersed or fragmented activities) geared to a common higher-level goal; clear integration into national systems; and effective local partnerships, all geared to the medium term view above. Developing stronger designs means extensive consultation with relevant national stakeholders from the outset; and investing time, thought and dialogue in the design progress.

Lesson 4: Weaknesses in results based management and performance monitoring not only constrain the OSCE in gearing its initiatives for results, but also in demonstrating progress achieved.

Implication 4: Both a systemic and a culture change are needed; from ‘producing data’ to ‘managing performance’ as core OSCE business. Linked to the medium term vision, above, all interventions need to set (at minimum) clear higher-level and medium term goals to which the intervention will *contribute* (not be responsible for achieving). All interventions should develop a clear theory of change or logical framework, where outputs, outcomes and impacts intermesh with a clear vertical logic, using organizationally recognised understandings of these terms. Performance monitoring should assess progress regularly, particularly against outcomes and for contributions to impact.

Lesson 5: Inadequate gender mainstreaming – and an understanding of gender equality as ‘equal participation of women’ - puts the OSCE out of step with the international discourse on gender and international co-operation and behind its peers in ensuring gender-sensitive approaches

Implication 5: The OSCE should develop and communicate a clear leadership-level message: that gender is more than ‘including women’; that equal numbers alone do not generate equal rights; and that delivering gender-transformative change is not an option but an organizational priority. Comprehensive gender equality mainstreaming should be a core requirement – not an option – for all intervention designs. This should go above ‘including women’ and address more progressive concerns, such as women’s and men’s respective societal roles; equal social, economic and political participation; and equal access to services. Intervention approval should be dependent on a clear statement of how gender equality will be addressed, and what contribution the intervention will make to OSCE’s institutional gender equality goals.

Lesson 6: Failure to plan for sustainability from the start undermines the later benefits of OSCE investments

Implication 6: Key implications for the OSCE in improving the sustainability of its interventions are: Embed sustainability planning and clear goals from the outset; anchor activities in national systems and structures, rather than as standalone interventions; embed project activities and results in national institutions; prioritise national ownership; build political momentum; include sustainability-promoting actors in project organization and develop their sustainability competencies; engage in communication and visibility-raising exercises; and ensure ongoing organizational learning. At the same time, planning for exit and handover - and executing these plans - is an essential part of project design and implementation.

Lesson 7: Communicating activities and achievements is not merely a matter of publicity, it is a substantive element of project design and intervention. It delivers benefits in terms of public

awareness and national stakeholder engagement – enhancing relevance effectiveness and later sustainability – and should be prioritised accordingly.

Implication 7: Interventions should develop a communications plan from the outset of delivery, including opportunities for dissemination; intended audience; and channels of communication. Both a strategic and an opportunistic approach should be taken, which combines the implementation of a thought-through plan with seizing chances and openings as they arise. Communication should be monitored, tracked and reported upon, so that dissemination’s substantive benefits can be captured as they arise.

Lesson 8: Weak internal coherence constrains the availability of guidance, expertise and support

Implication 8: Proactively seeking out internal coherence will allow the OSCE – across its executive structures and in terms of co-operation between field missions/institutions and the Secretariat - to build more systematically the sort of horizontal and vertical networks, which play major roles in intervention success. Operationalising this may include: Identifying internal stakeholders across structures and at different levels of the organization, and setting up dissemination or reference groups, in order to broaden the intervention’s internal ‘reach’ and benefit from a broad range of internal expertise. It implies a proactive approach from the outset, identifying which internal units and structures can provide technical and strategic support, and which may benefit purely from information sharing. It implies opening up activities to greater internal review and scrutiny – but at the same time, benefiting from wider institutional experience and support; gaining from new ideas and reflections; and contributing to a less silo’d, more open, and ultimately more informed organizational culture.

Annex 1: Terms of Reference

Title:	Consultant to synthesize cross-cutting and recurrent findings from OSCE evaluation reports 2017-2020 (both independent and decentralized), as well as international good practices and lessons learned related to the sustainability of results from programmes and projects.
Location:	Home-based. Discussions with OIO to be conducted online (Webex or Zoom).
Start of assignment:	19-10-2020
End of assignment:	29-01-2021

Background:

The Office of Internal Oversight (OIO) is part of the OSCE Secretariat in Vienna, Austria. OIO is responsible for planning and delivering internal audits, investigations, and independent evaluations of the Organization's activities, including those conducted by field operations.

The OIO's Evaluation Unit contributes to organizational learning and performance by discharging its duties in line with the OSCE Evaluation Framework Administrative Instruction No. 1/2013 (SEC.GAL/23/13). The Unit conducts independent strategic evaluations that cover the work of one or more OSCE executive structures (incl. field operations, institutions, or departments of the OSCE Secretariat). It also supports the OSCE's decentralized evaluation system, whose pivotal element are decentralized evaluations commissioned by OSCE executive structures and conducted by external consultants.

OIO uses evaluation findings for informed decision making, for accountability purposes, organizational learning for improving the OSCE's work, and for strengthening the organization's overall evaluation culture. In this spirit, a review ('meta-evaluation') of OIO's independent evaluations was undertaken in 2017. Sustainability of the OSCE's work was one of the areas identified by the meta-evaluation as requiring increased attention.

OIO is currently planning a broader and more in-depth synthesis of the OSCE's evaluations. The scope will include both independent evaluations conducted by OIO, and decentralized evaluations commissioned by other OSCE executive structures over the period 2017-2020. It will be complemented by a review of international good practices and lessons learned about ensuring sustainability of the results of international co-operation programmes and projects.

Position description:

OIO is looking for an evaluation expert consultant to review and synthesize findings in OIO's independent evaluations and decentralized evaluations commissioned by OSCE executive structures from 2017 to date, as well as to review evidence in international literature of good practices and lessons learned with regards to ensuring sustainability of the results of projects and programmes. The expected total number of evaluations to be reviewed is 55, comprising of 18 OIO evaluation reports and 37 decentralized evaluation reports.

The overall purpose of this exercise is to:

- 1) synthesize cross-cutting and recurrent findings from OSCE independent evaluations and decentralized evaluations. The OECD-DAC evaluation criteria as well as thematic areas identified during the review will serve to structure the synthesized information;

- 2) review findings from international literature on good international practices and lessons learned related to ensuring *sustainability* of the results of international co-operation and development, and to high-light those of particular relevance for a regional security organization such as the OSCE.
- 3) Based on the above synthesis (of OSCE evaluations) and review (of international practices and lessons learned related to sustainability), provide recommendations as to how the OSCE's programmes and projects could be improved in the future.

As both a retrospective and forward looking exercise, this exercise will not only inform the organization's future evaluation work, but also the decision making and management practices of the OSCE's executive structures. As such, it will contribute to enhancing the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, impact and coherence of the OSCE's work. The results of this review will be communicated to the OSCE's senior management, including (but not limited to) the Secretary General, Heads of Missions and Institutions, and Directors. They will also be disseminated across the Organization with a view to increasing awareness, informing decision-making and programming, and enhancing learning; and they will be shared with selected external stakeholders.

Tasks and Deliverables:

The assignment will be managed by OIO and conducted by an external evaluation expert consultant. OIO will provide the consultant with all the OSCE evaluation reports to be reviewed. International literature related to sustainability is to be collected by the consultant, who will share it with OIO.

Task 1: Synthesis of OSCE evaluation reports

The consultant is expected to review 55 OSCE evaluation reports (incl. 18 of OIO's independent evaluation reports and 37 decentralized evaluation reports) issued over the period 2017-2020, and to synthesize cross-cutting findings and recurring issues. The information shall be organized in line with the DAC evaluation criteria (relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, impact, coherence) on one hand, and across particular recurrent programme and project themes identified during the synthesis on the other hand. The latter could include the integration of gender equality, partnerships and co-operation, dialogue, knowledge management, and monitoring and evaluation practices in the OSCE, and any others that the consultant will identify through this exercise.

Task 2: Review and identification of international good practices and lessons learned with regards to ensuring the sustainability of the results in international co-operation and development

This exercise involves a review of literature in this area, including but not limited to evaluation reports of other international organizations and dedicated academic research, and the preparation of a synthesis of those insights that are of particular relevance for a regional security organization such as the OSCE.

The main question to be answered by this review is: *What programme/project-specific and what context-specific factors affect the sustainability of the results of programmes/projects in international co-operation and development?*

The review shall cover sustainability at four levels: strategic, organizational, individual capacity, and resources.

Task 3: Identifying key lessons that will help the OSCE improve its work in the future

Based on the above synthesis of OSCE evaluations, and the review of international literature related to sustainability, provide a set of key lessons and recommendations for the OSCE moving forward.

The consultant is expected to submit the following deliverables:

- 1) An inception report (5 pages max.) that includes a detailed methodology for the synthesis of findings from OSCE evaluations, as well as for the identification and synthesis of findings from international literature on sustainability, and a proposed structure of the overall report.
In particular, the inception report shall present the analytical framework or scoring board that specifies principles for data collection, data collation and analysis. It shall be clear how each OSCE evaluation report will be assessed/coded.
- 2) A draft report on the results of the synthesis of OSCE evaluations and review of international literature on sustainability, including key lessons for the way forward (30 - 40 pages max. excl. annexes).
- 3) A final report (following OIO's internal review and with OIO's comments integrated).
- 4) A PowerPoint presentation presenting the main findings of the review (7 – 10 slides).

The following tentative timelines apply:

Task/Deliverable	Timeline 2020 / 2021 Week	Payment upon receipt of deliverable
Kick-off and inception report (incl. OIO internal review)	43 (2020)	-
Synthesis of selected OSCE evaluation reports and review of international literature	44 (2020) - 1 (2021)	-
Draft report	2 (2021)	60%
Final report and PPT presentation (incl. OIO internal review)	4 (2021)	40%
TOTAL		100%

Necessary qualifications:

- A Masters or higher level degree in social sciences or a related field (development studies, political sciences, economics, evaluation, etc.);
- A minimum of 5 years documented evaluation experience, which could include managing and/or conducting evaluations of development projects or programmes with an international organization, an NGO, with a government department, or evaluation research experience with a university or academic institution. This includes proven knowledge of evaluation methodologies and approaches;
- Documented previous experience in conducting evaluation syntheses and literature reviews;
- Documented multi-year experience with gender mainstreaming in evaluation;
- Documented professional experience working with international and/or regional organizations (specific knowledge of the OSCE would be an asset).
- Proven experience in producing coherent and clear analytic reports.
- Professional fluency in English (both written and spoken).

Annex 2: List of evaluations for synthesis

1. Independent Evaluations conducted by the Office of Internal Oversight

Year	Status	Title	Type	Dimension
2020	Ongoing	Results-Based Management, 2015-2019	Independent Evaluation	CD
2019	Completed	Evaluation of the OSCE Work With and For Youth	Independent Evaluation	CD
2019	Completed	Evaluation of the OSCE Work With and For Youth	Independent Evaluation	CD
2019	Completed	Evaluation of the OSCE Work With and For Youth	Independent Evaluation	CD
2019	Completed	OSCE Community Policing Assistance, 2004-2018	Independent Evaluation	PMD
2018	Completed	OSCE Projects Delivered through the Århus Centre Network, 2002-2017	Independent Evaluation/ Internal Audit	EED
2018	Completed	Evaluation of Capacity Development and Learning in the OSCE (Case Study I: Executive Gender Coach Programme)	Independent Evaluation	CD
2018	Completed	Evaluation of Capacity Development and Learning in the OSCE (Case Study II: Promotion of Women's Participation in Public and Political Life at the Local and National Level)	Independent Evaluation	HD
2018	Completed	Evaluation of Capacity Development and Learning in the OSCE (Case Study III: Combating Human Trafficking along Migration Routes - Live Simulation-based Training Course)	Independent Evaluation	CD
2018	Completed	Evaluation of Capacity Development and Learning in the OSCE (Case Study IV: Ensuring the Effective Processing of War Crimes Cases in BiH through Comprehensive Capacity Building, 2014-2017)	Independent Evaluation	HD
2018	Completed	Evaluation of the Programme on Freedom of Religion or Belief of the OSCE/ODIHR	Independent Evaluation	HD

2017	Completed	Evaluation of the OSCE's Assistance Projects on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism, 2006-2016	Independent Evaluation	EED
2017	Completed	Evaluation of the OSCE's Assistance Projects on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism, 2006-2016	Independent Evaluation	EED
2017	Completed	Evaluation of the OSCE's Assistance Projects on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism, 2006-2016	Independent Evaluation	EED
2017	Completed	Thematic Evaluation of the Implementation of the OSCE's 2004 Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality	Independent Evaluation	CD

2. Decentralised Evaluations managed by executive structures

Year	Status	Title	Type	Commissioned by	Dimension
2017	Completed	Central Asia Education Programme (Phase II)	Commissioned Evaluation	High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM)	HD
2017	Completed	External Evaluation of the Project 'Technical Assistance for Roma Inclusion (TARI)'	Commissioned Evaluation	Mission to Serbia	HD
2017	Completed	Strengthening dialogue among civil society and with key government stakeholders in Ukraine on human dimension issues' Project	Commissioned Evaluation	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)	HD
2017	Completed	Portfolio of Population Registration Projects and ODIHR technical assistance on population registration and identity management to participating States	Commissioned Evaluation	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)	HD
2017	Completed	Evaluation of OSCE Presence in Albania Human Rights Work (2010-2016)	Commissioned Evaluation	Presence in Albania	HD
2017	Completed	Evaluation of POiD Economic and Environmental Programme (2013-2017)	Commissioned Evaluation	Programme Office in Dushanbe	EED
2017	Completed	Dialogue for Reform and Social Cohesion in Ukraine (ExB 3200354), <u>mid-term evaluation</u>	Commissioned Evaluation	Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine	HD
2018	Completed	OSCE Mission's engagement in combating hate- and bias-motivated incidents and crimes through supporting the Coalitions against Hate	Commissioned Evaluation	Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina	HD
2018	Completed	Consolidating Democratization Process in the Security Sector in Serbia	Commissioned Evaluation	Mission to Serbia	PMD
2018	Completed	Assessment of Promotion of Tolerance and Non-Discrimination, including hate crimes/hate speech portfolio, 2013-2018	Commissioned Evaluation	Mission to Skopje	HD

2018	Completed	External Assessment of the OSCE Academy Project (2004-2017)	Commissioned Evaluation	Programme Office in Bishkek	HD
2018	Completed	Evaluation of the Office's Anti-Trafficking Activities (2012-2017)	Commissioned Evaluation	Programme Office in Dushanbe	HD
2018	Completed	EEPM programme of the PCU (five UB projects)	Commissioned Evaluation	Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine	PMD, EED
2018	Completed	Supporting Ministry of Social Policy in addressing gender based violence and safe (re)integration of conflict affected population (UB 3200416)	Commissioned Evaluation	Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine	CD
2018	Completed	Evaluation of the OSCE Project on Security Sector Governance and Reform	Commissioned Evaluation	Secretariat, CPC	CD
2019	Completed	Final Independent Project Evaluation: Roll-out of 'Leaders against Intolerance and Violent Extremism' (LIVE) Training Course for Youth in the Kosovo area	Commissioned Evaluation	Mission in Kosovo	PMD
2019	Completed	External Evaluation of the Trial Monitoring/RoL Portfolio of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo	Commissioned Evaluation	Mission in Kosovo	HD
2019	Completed	External evaluation of the OSCE Projects 'Assessing Needs of Judicial Response to Corruption Through Monitoring of Criminal Cases (ARC)' and 'Strengthening Effectiveness, Local Ownership and Visibility of Activities Related to the Monitoring of Corruption Cases in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ARC Bis)'	Commissioned Evaluation	Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina	CD
2019	Completed	Model OSCE – Engaging Moldovan Youth in Conflict Resolution	Commissioned Evaluation	Mission to Moldova	PMD
2019	Completed	Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalization Threats in Serbia through Community-Based Early Warning and Preventive Engagement	Commissioned Evaluation	Mission to Serbia	PMD
2019	Completed	Consolidating Democratization Process in the Security Sector in Serbia (2016-2018)	Commissioned Evaluation	Mission to Serbia	PMD
2019	Completed	Final Assessment: 'Building a Comprehensive Criminal Justice Response to Hate Crime'	Commissioned Evaluation	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)	HD
2019	Completed	External Evaluation of Five Activities with the ODIHR Project to "Increased Human Security Through Respect for Human Rights Diversity and Democratic Inclusiveness"	Commissioned Evaluation	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)	HD
2019	Completed	Words in Action - 'Implementation of the ODIHR's Understanding Anti-Semitic Hate Crimes and Addressing the Security Needs of Jewish Communities: A Practical Guide in Bulgaria and Greece'	Commissioned Evaluation	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)	HD
2019	Completed	Evaluation of the ExB Project Supporting and Strengthening the Women's Resource Centres in Tajikistan, Phase II, #5500355 (2018-2020)	Commissioned Evaluation	Programme Office in Dushanbe	HD, EED
2019	Completed	Mid Term Review - ExB project "Enabling transboundary cooperation and integrated	Commissioned Evaluation	Secretariat, OCEEA/Environmental Co-operation Unit	EED

		water resources management in the Dniester Basin" (Project No. 1101924)			
2019	Completed	Evaluation of the OSCE Survey on the Well-being and Safety of Women in South East and Eastern Europe	Commissioned Evaluation	Secretariat, OSG/Gender Section	CD
2019	Completed	External Evaluation of the Strategic Policy Support Unit, Office of the OSCE Secretary General (December 2017-September 2019)	Commissioned Evaluation	Secretariat, OSG/Strategic Policy Support Unit	CD
2019	Completed	Capacity Building for Criminal Justice Practitioners Combating Cybercrime and Cyber-enabled Crime in South-Eastern Europe	Commissioned Evaluation	Secretariat, TNTD/Strategic Police Matters Unit	PMD
2020	Completed	Interim Evaluation of ExB Project 2600896, Reduction of the risk for proliferation of weapons and ammunition in the Republic of North Macedonia (2017-2019)	Commissioned Evaluation	Mission to Skopje	PMD
2020	Completed	Promoting Democratization and Human Rights in Belarus	Commissioned Evaluation	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)	HD
2020	Completed	Dialogue for Reform and Social Cohesion in Ukraine (ExB 3200354), <u>final evaluation</u>	Commissioned Evaluation	Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine	HD

Additionally analysed:

2019	Completed	Evaluation of the OSCE Work With and For Youth - <u>cross-cutting synthesis report</u>	Independent Evaluation	CD
2018	Completed	Evaluation of Capacity Development and Learning in the OSCE - <u>cross-cutting synthesis report</u>	Independent Evaluation	CD
2017	Completed	Evaluation of the OSCE's Assistance Projects on Anti-Money Laundering and Countering Financing of Terrorism, 2006-2016 - <u>cross-cutting report</u>	Independent Evaluation	EED