



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Permanent Council**

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Spanish Chairmanship

2007 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE

Vienna, 19 and 20 June 2007

CONSOLIDATED SUMMARY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
Decision No. 779 on the dates of the 2007 Annual Security Review Conference	1
Decision No. 795 on the agenda and organizational modalities of the 2007 Annual Security Review Conference (2007 ASRC)	2
Chairperson's perception on the outcome of the 2007 Annual Security Review Conference	8
Opening session	10
Working session I: Review of the implementation of the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century	16
Working session II: Challenges in the politico-military aspects of security dimension.....	19
Working session III: A coherent approach towards the OSCE activities in relation to early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation	26
Closing session	31
List of suggestions and recommendations	32



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Permanent Council**

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1 February 2007

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648th Plenary Meeting
PC Journal No. 648, Agenda item 6

DECISION No. 779
DATES OF THE 2007 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE

The Permanent Council,

Taking into account the recommendation of the Forum for Security Co-operation,

Decides that the 2007 Annual Security Review Conference will take place in Vienna on 19 and 20 June 2007.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Permanent Council**

PC.DEC/795
17 May 2007

Original: ENGLISH

666th Plenary Meeting

PC Journal No. 666, Agenda item 3

**DECISION No. 795
AGENDA AND ORGANIZATIONAL MODALITIES OF THE 2007
ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE (2007 ASRC)**

The Permanent Council,

Recalling Porto Ministerial Council Decision No. 3 on the Annual Security Review Conference,

Taking into account its Decision No. 779 on the dates of the 2007 Annual Security Review Conference,

Taking into account the recommendation of the Forum for Security Co-operation,

Decides to organize the 2007 Annual Security Review Conference (2007 ASRC) in accordance with the programme, agenda and organizational modalities contained in the annexes to this decision.

2007 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE (2007 ASRC)

Vienna, 19 and 20 June 2007

Programme

Tuesday, 19 June 2007

10 a.m.–1 p.m. Opening session

3–5.45 p.m. Working session I: Review of the implementation of the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century

Wednesday, 20 June 2007

10 a.m.–1 p.m. Working session II: Challenges in the politico-military aspects of security dimension

3–5.45 p.m. Working session III: A coherent approach towards the OSCE activities in relation to early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation

5.45–6 p.m. Closing session

Agenda

Opening session (19 June 2007, 10 a.m. – 1 p.m.)

The opening session will provide an opportunity for the participating States and other participants in the Conference to share their views on the evolving security environment in the early twenty-first century and on the new challenges created for all, from North America to Europe and Central Asia, and to review the existing co-ordination mechanisms between the OSCE and other partner international organizations with a view to enhancing an integrated multidimensional approach in the multilateral efforts to prevent and combat threats to stability and security.

Working session I: Review of the implementation of the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century (19 June 2007, 3–5.45 p.m.):

Working session I will focus on a review of the response by participating States to the threats identified in the OSCE Strategy adopted in Maastricht in 2003, in particular in addressing threats related to terrorism and other criminal activities, including the threat of illicit drugs, the discrimination and intolerance, and other threats in the sphere of economy and the environment. This session may also reflect on the overall capacity of the OSCE to address inter-State and intra-State conflicts throughout the whole OSCE area.

Working session II: Challenges in the politico-military aspects of security dimension (20 June 2007, 10 a.m.–1 p.m.):

Working session II will review the implementation of existing OSCE documents and instruments adopted within the politico-military aspects of security dimension. This session will, in particular, reflect on the effectiveness of existing documents agreed by the Forum for Security Co-operation. This session may contribute to identifying common ground for improving and enhancing, where needed, specific tools that may help to address challenges in the politico-military aspects of security dimension.

Working session III: A coherent approach towards the OSCE activities in relation to early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation (20 June 2007, 3–5.45 p.m.):

Working session III will offer an opportunity to engage in a dialogue and exchange experiences gained at the national level and in co-operation with other international organizations and institutions regarding the OSCE activities in relation to early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. This session will also reflect on conflicts in the whole OSCE region and politico-military aspects thereof.

Closing session (20 June 2007, 5.45–6 p.m.):

The Chairperson will present a first perception on the outcome of the Conference, based on the contributions of the rapporteurs.

PC.DEC/795
17 May 2007
Annex 2

ORGANIZATIONAL MODALITIES OF THE 2007 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE (2007 ASRC)

Vienna, 19 and 20 June 2007

Background

The Porto Meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council, by adopting its Decision No. 3, dated 7 December 2002, established the Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC) to provide a framework for enhancing security dialogue and for reviewing security work undertaken by the OSCE and its participating States, to provide an opportunity to exchange views on issues related to arms control and confidence and security building measures, and to promote the exchange of information and co-operation with relevant international and regional organizations and institutions.

Organization

A representative of the Chairman-in-Office will chair the opening and closing sessions. The Secretariat will issue a journal of the Conference.

Each working session will have one moderator and at least one rapporteur. The rapporteur(s) will serve as co-ordinator(s) for preparing the session.

The FSC contribution to the ASRC includes the chairing of the second session by a member of the FSC troika or the Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre.

The Rules of Procedure of the OSCE will be followed, *mutatis mutandis*, at the Conference. Also, the guidelines for organizing OSCE meetings (PC.DEC/762) will be taken into account.

Interpretation into all six working languages of the OSCE will be provided at the opening, working and closing sessions.

The Chairman-in-Office will distribute a comprehensive report on the Conference before the summer recess.

The Press and Public Information Section (PPIS) will inform the press, as appropriate.

Participation

Participating States are encouraged to be represented at a high level, by senior officials responsible for security-related policy in the OSCE area.

The OSCE institutions will participate in the Conference, as will the Secretary General and the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC). The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, and the Partners for Co-operation will be invited to participate.

Other international organizations to be invited are the security-related organizations mentioned in Permanent Council Decision No. 745/Rev.1 of 30 November 2006.

Consideration is to be given to the possibility of inviting security-related scientific institutes, "think-tanks" of international standing, and NGOs to send keynote speakers or to be represented as members of national delegations.

General guidelines for participants

The work of the ASRC will be conducted in five sessions. The opening session is intended to provide an opportunity for formal statements to be delivered and to set the stage for substantive, focused and interactive discussions at the working sessions. The opening session will include the welcoming remarks by the Chairman-in-Office or his representative and the report by the FSC Chairperson.

The working sessions will concentrate on one topic, introduced by one or two keynote speakers, whose addresses may be followed by a discussion of any number of relevant subtopics that delegates may wish to raise.

The aim is to have an interactive and free-flowing discussion.

Each of the sessions mentioned in the agenda has been assigned a number of the above-mentioned subtopics for illustrative purposes. The FSC will circulate a list of suggested topics for each session. These lists are not exhaustive. In order to reinforce the effectiveness of security activities across all three dimensions of the OSCE, it is expected that, at each of the sessions, the interfaces of security, and also the question of co-operation with other international organizations will be addressed.

To promote interactive discussion, formal statements at the opening session and interventions at the working sessions should be as concise as possible and should not exceed five minutes. Prior circulation of statements and interventions will enhance the possibility for engaging in discussion.

Guidelines for keynote speakers

The contributions of the keynote speakers should set the scene for the discussion at the sessions and stimulate debate among delegations by raising appropriate questions and suggesting potential recommendations based on OSCE realities, and should concentrate on the highlights of their contribution in the presentation. They should dedicate part of their speech and/or written contribution to the enhancement of the security dialogue on work undertaken by the OSCE and its participating States.

The maximum available speaking time is 15 minutes per keynote speaker.

Keynote speakers should be present during the entire session at which they are speaking, and should be ready to engage in the debate following their presentation.

Guidelines for moderators and rapporteurs

The moderator chairs the session and should facilitate and focus the dialogue among delegations. The moderator should stimulate the debate by introducing items related to the subject of the opening and working sessions, as appropriate, in order to broaden or focus the scope of the discussion.

The rapporteurs' written reports should address issues raised during the relevant sessions, and should cover problem areas, improvements, suggestions made at the session, and other relevant information.

Personal views shall not be advanced.

Guidelines for participation of other international organizations

Other international organizations may participate in all sessions. They are invited to concentrate their contributions on aspects of co-operation with the OSCE.

Guidelines on timing of the submission and distribution of written contributions and factual information

By 24 May 2007, keynote speakers should submit a written contribution. International organizations are invited to submit factual information on their organization that would be useful for the participants of the ASRC in writing. Such information should not be brought to the attention of participants during the Conference.

By 30 May 2007, the participants in the Conference should inform the OSCE Secretariat of the composition of their delegations to the ASRC, in response to the information circular regarding organizational aspects of the Conference to be sent out by the OSCE Secretariat.

By 12 June 2007, participating States and other participants in the Conference are invited to submit any written contributions they may have, including those that contain reactions to the keynote speeches.

Written contributions and factual information should be submitted to the CPC, which will then distribute them. The information could also include contributions from OSCE institutions and other international organizations, if appropriate.

CHAIRPERSON'S PERCEPTION ON THE OUTCOME OF THE 2007 ANNUAL SECURITY REVIEW CONFERENCE

As had been anticipated at the outset, the fifth Annual Security Review Conference, focused strongly on two questions related to arms control that are of particular interest to the participating States. In the first place, regret was expressed that the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) held the previous week had ended without agreement on the adoption of a document containing final conclusions; on the other hand, there had been an exchange of views on the arguments, technical approaches and practical effects associated with missile interception systems in the European space.

The desire for transparency in these matters was well received. The principle of the indivisibility of security in the OSCE area was also reiterated, and it was agreed that this principle was applicable to any initiative designed to improve conditions of security and stability in the entire geographical area covered by the Organization. In this context there were numerous appeals for dialogue among the participating States in the most appropriate forums, and for dialogue both on technical matters and also on political decision-making. It was also pointed out that the two questions of the CFE regime and the anti-missile defence system should not be linked.

The proposal to hold a seminar in October on the future prospects of arms control regimes and on confidence-building measures seems to have gained support, to judge from the various statements we heard in the second working session. This could be considered a positive result of the Conference.

In addition to what has been said so far, and in anticipation of reading greater detail in the rapporteurs' reports, other important questions were considered in the course of the Conference, and are summarized below.

There was unanimous agreement that the threats described in the OSCE Strategy still existed, but speakers stressed that participating States should take a firm stand on the need to make greater efforts in combating criminal activities: in particular, in the struggle against drug-trafficking and the eradication of hatred. Furthermore, special attention was required to combat challenges in the energy sphere and in economic matters generally. As far as the prevention and combating of terrorism was concerned, it was pointed out that the instability generated in uncontrolled territories could give rise to terrorist activities and organized crime, making the resolution of long-term conflicts that much more difficult. It was also pointed out that there were no uncontrolled territories as such, that they just happened to be uncontrolled by those who thought they were the legitimate authority that should control them, and that it was really a clever deflection to always assume that crime, terrorism and everything else emanated from the miasma of decadence in uncontrolled territories. We also heard an analysis of possible gaps in the Strategy, relating in particular to the fight against terrorism and to border security. It was pointed out that in the context of the fight against terrorism it was essential to pay attention not only to land borders but also to maritime and sky borders. The need to continue giving special consideration to the victims of terrorism had now been recognized, as had the need to work on a definition of that concept as pointed out by one delegation. At all events, an appeal had been made to all participating States to ratify and

apply all conventions and protocols of the United Nations relating to the prevention and combating of terrorism, and also to respect human rights in this area.

The debate on the politico-military dimension was carried on with special fervour, in addition to the points I have already referred to. The importance for the Forum for Security Co-operation of the dialogue on security was once again stressed, and an appeal was made to improve the agenda in this area; and perhaps even more importantly, it was emphasized that we should step up our discussions on various proposals relating to confidence-building measures that have been put on the table but that some feel have become “frozen” recently. Some delegations showed an inclination to discuss improvements to the Vienna Document 1999 and the Code of Conduct, given that the new challenges confronting us at the present time did not seem to be covered by those political instruments. It was also suggested that it might be appropriate to launch discussions on a new generation of confidence- and security-building measures. This is a matter of particular importance for participating States that do not belong to organizations such as NATO or other international bodies of a politico-military nature.

In the third and final section of this analysis of the discussions held during the Conference, I should like to stress the necessity defended by various delegations and speakers of consolidating both effective multilateralism within the OSCE and also effective synergy in our co-operative relationships with other international organizations as regards early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, and the rehabilitation phase. In the same context, stress was laid on the need for all interested parties to display the most earnest political will in freeing the OSCE area from such conflicts as still persist. It has become plain that only a coherent focus that takes into account the multi-dimensional character of the conflicts can help us to meet the challenge which such conflicts represent for the participating States. Similarly, respect for the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity was invoked on various occasions during the third working session.

In conclusion, we may say that this fifth Annual Security Review Conference took a somewhat different tack from its predecessors; it may have disappointed some, but it was useful to others in giving them an opportunity to exchange points of view and information of great importance for security. However, our Chairmanship believes that for all practical purposes we have succeeded in making the true concerns of participating States more transparent. The delegations present here have on various occasions spoken of the crucial role of civil society in matters of conflict prevention.

Without wanting to deny the legitimate discrepancies that remain in the arms control sphere, we may be sure that, at least during these two days, we have succeeded in developing genuine dialogue among all participating States of the OSCE in an atmosphere of complete equality. As the Spanish Chairmanship said at the beginning of the Conference, when we meet in Madrid we shall be grateful to have removed the most problematic of the obstacles that cast a shadow on us during these last few years. Thank goodness we have succeeded in ironing out our differences.

OPENING SESSION

Opening address by:	Ambassador Carlos Sánchez de Boado y de la Válgoma, Chairperson of the Permanent Council
Report by:	Ambassador Vladimir Matek, Chairperson of the Forum for Security Co-operation
Special guest:	H.E. Aleksander Kwasniewski, former President of the Republic of Poland
Moderator:	Ambassador Peter Lizák, Chairperson of the Security Committee
Rapporteur:	Ms. Egle Morkunaite, Lithuanian delegation

At the opening session, the participants shared their views on the current security situation, highlighting the OSCE's role and its contribution to strengthening the security environment. They also emphasized the importance of the Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC), an essential forum which was for the fifth time offering a platform for dialogue and consultation involving all the relevant players.

The Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council, Spanish Ambassador Carlos Sánchez de Boado y de la Válgoma, encouraged the participants of the conference to promote dialogue among States focusing on elements that united rather than separated.

The Chairperson of the Forum for Security Co-operation, Ambassador of Croatia Vladimir Matek, reviewed the progress and activities of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC).

The special guest of the opening session, former President of the Republic of Poland Aleksander Kwasniewski, made a survey of the roots of the Helsinki process and emphasized the role of the OSCE, a unique organization dealing with an incomparable range of issues and covering the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. He said that it was high time to take a new look at the military problems of the security dimension. President Kwasniewski also stressed that introducing a new type of arms control based on the philosophy of inclusiveness and consolidation of international multilateral institutions would minimize the probability of outbreak of a war, and that the OSCE was well placed to help the participating States do this.

Many speakers referred to the progress and achievements made during the previous year in the security dimension in the OSCE area. The security threats and challenges were discussed by the participants and the interrelation of security risks and issues of the other OSCE dimensions was underlined. The participants agreed that the OSCE should continue to respond to new security trends and keep improving its capacities. Some delegations referred to the process of reform and strengthening of the OSCE.

The necessity of effective multilateralism and co-operation with the other international organizations was also underlined as an important mechanism that created additional synergies.

The issues of conflict settlement, arms control, and implementation of commitments were discussed by some of the delegations. Many speakers regretted that the expected measure of progress had not been made at the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty and expressed their hopes that the dialogue between the States Parties would be resumed soon. Some delegations also made references to the anti-missile defence system in the Europe.

Detailed report of the opening session

Opening remarks

At the beginning of the session, the moderator Ambassador Peter Lizák underlined the key importance of the review of existing commitments and stressed the goal of the Annual Security Review Conference (ASRC), namely, to check the status of implementation of the commitments of the participating States.

In the opening address, Ambassador Carlos Sánchez de Boado y de la Válgoma reminded the participants of the main objective of the ASRC, which was to examine the state of the work of the OSCE and its participating States in strengthening the security dialogue. On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the ASRC, a reference was made to the “lustrum” an important ancient Roman purification ceremony celebrated every five years. Ambassador Sánchez de Boado urged participants in the opening session to hold a frank and open debate and to focus on issues in which they shared common ground rather than concentrating on ones in which they were at loggerheads, not only in the context of disagreements regarding the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), but also at the forthcoming OSCE Ministerial Council meetings. He also stressed the importance of real and effective political will, which would promote consolidation of the global security concept of the OSCE with its triple perspective of the politico-military, economic and environmental, and human dimensions.

Ambassador Sánchez de Boado highlighted the relevance of the politico-military dimension of the OSCE and of its instruments, and welcomed the progress achieved during the last five years in the fulfilment of the Organization’s political commitments of in important areas of security, especially those related to border management, the prevention of and fight against terrorism, conflict prevention, and police activities.

Ambassador Vladimir Matek presented an outline of the activities of the FSC since the 2006 ASRC. He stated that the Forum continued to lead the OSCE’s work in politico-military aspects of security and was deeply involved in a wide range of arms control and confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs). He stressed the indispensable role of the OSCE in discussing military aspects of security, arms control, and confidence-building in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Participants were also briefed on the various workshops, special meetings, conferences, and discussions on specific topics in which the FSC had been engaged in the course of the year. Proposals relating to confidence-building measures and a suggestion by

some delegations for a special FSC meeting in the autumn on prospects for arms control regimes and CSBMs were noted, and numerous projects implemented in a variety of countries were reviewed.

Ambassador Matek said that the expansion of the role of the FSC had created a platform connecting the Forum with other organizations and relevant actors. He also took positive note of the new focus on improving the synergy between the FSC and the Permanent Council.

The special guest of the opening session, H.E. Aleksander Kwasniewski gave a short account of the genesis of the Helsinki process initiated 35 years ago. The Helsinki process had sought answers to the problem of how to bring about peaceful changes in Europe in changing conditions, and had been based on a political philosophy founded on inclusiveness. The OSCE, an organization unique amongst its kind with participating States (and Partners) covering the area from Vancouver to Vladivostok, had made a significant contribution to ending the Cold War, erasing important dividing lines, and to extinguishing conflicts. President Kwasniewski emphasized the fundamental difference between a multipolar world and a multilateral world and noted that it was in everyone's interest to consolidate international multilateral institutions.

He also stressed the growing role and importance of eminent intellectuals and thinkers as an instrument of guidance in a world dominated by uncertainty and unpredictability, making specific reference to the works of Samuel Huntington, Francis Fukuyama, Jan Gotlib Bloch, Fiodor Martens, Jerzy Giedroyć, Julisz Mieroszewski, Rudolf Bindschedler, Adam D. Rotfeld, and others. In the past, thinkers had played an especially important role when political transformation and European integration processes had been followed by the need to rearrange relations with neighbours. In the current perspective, they were important in the preparation of new initiatives and solutions in foreign and security policy.

Mr. Kwasniewski also expressed concern regarding the gradual but constant erosion and failure of the armament control regime, as exemplified by the 2005 Review Conference of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT Review Conference) and the still unclear future of the CFE Treaty. He emphasized that the time had come to look at military problems in a different way and to avoid a return to Cold War rhetoric. It was now time to minimize the outbreak of war by establishing a new type of arms control. Mr. Kwasniewski said that this approach applied to the debate on the missile defence system in Europe, which was intended to improve the security of the European and North American States.

Discussion

One delegation stressed the necessity of effective security based on a broad security concept and maintained that the fight against terrorism, organized crime, illicit drugs, trafficking, and intolerance should remain high on the OSCE agenda. The delegation expressed its regret that no final document had been agreed upon at the recently held Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty. It also emphasized that, as to the protracted conflicts in the Republic of Moldova and Georgia and the conflict dealt with by the Minsk Group, much remains to be done to achieve a peaceful settlement. In spite of the continued efforts of the OSCE and very much to its regret, it had so far seen little success to date. This delegation pointed out that the recent OSCE project for the rehabilitation of the

South Ossetian Region in Georgia, which is heavily funded by the EU, gives cause to hope. It said that it is starting to produce results, thus proving that the old OSCE recipe of mixing economic development with confidence-building measures still works. The same delegation called upon all those concerned to engage in an open dialogue, to show readiness for compromise and to refrain from all action that could further heighten tensions. It expressed its hope that on this basis a reopening of the 5+2 negotiations for resolving the Transnistrian conflict will be possible in the very near future. This delegation expressed its readiness to support all steps which contribute to a peaceful resolution of the protracted conflicts in the Republic of Moldova and Georgia based on the principles of territorial integrity of these countries, and to the complete fulfilment of the 1999 Istanbul Commitments.

Another delegation called for closer co-operation and co-ordination both amongst OSCE participating States and also with other international organizations faced with the main security challenges. It also expressed its conviction that confidence-building measures were a vital means of working towards the resolution of protracted conflicts. The delegation expressed its conviction that it was possible to agree on the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security and welcomed the work of the FSC in this regard. It also supported the increased focus of the OSCE on environmental security and expressed its appreciation of the work undertaken by the ODIHR and the OSCE field presences.

One delegation focused on the main priorities in the security area: terrorism, organized crime, illicit drugs, and trafficking in human beings. It also stated that strengthening the effectiveness of the OSCE had to remain one of the core tasks for the participating States, and for the OSCE institutions and missions. It was vitally important that the OSCE should be turned into a fully fledged international organization. The delegation regretted that the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty had not yielded any positive outcome. It said that the FSC's potential had not been fully used and contended that it should be made more effective. The delegation expressed its hope that the special FSC meeting on developing pan-European arms control and CSBMs would identify concrete measures and help to resolve existing differences of opinion.

On a more positive note, another delegation pointed out that combating criminal activities remained an important issue among the OSCE priorities and made a specific reference to the OSCE pilot project to train Afghan drugs police. The delegation regretted that progress in the area of CSBMs had come to a standstill and that no agreement had been reached during the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty, emphasizing the necessity of the renewal of arms control instruments.

The same delegation also made a reference to the plans of one OSCE participating State to establish additional elements of its strategic anti-missile defence elements in Europe. It also expressed its trust that the new confidence-building measures it had proposed would be elaborated in the FSC format. It emphasized that uniform approaches and principles must be applied in the conflict resolution process throughout the OSCE area. A reference was made to the ongoing strengthening of the effectiveness of the OSCE.

One delegation stressed the importance of effective multilateralism and of additional synergies between the OSCE and other multilateral organizations such as NATO, the European Union, and the Council of Europe. It also regretted that it had not been possible to reach agreement on a final document in the CFE Extraordinary Conference. The delegation welcomed the initiative of the special FSC meeting in the autumn and expressed its support

for the OSCE's efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement of the protracted conflicts. It stated that the fight against terrorism was closely connected with the fight for human rights, tolerance, and human dignity, calling for a greater measure of outreach to civil society and the private sector.

Another delegation commented on certain thoughts expressed by the special guest in his opening speech, in particular, the distinction between multipolar and multilateral worlds, and the notion of reflection, which seemed to be sorely lacking in the current deliberations. It also looked at the possible ways of answering the question of how to measure success in the area of security. Since it was very hard to measure achievement in this field, maybe the fact that there were no new conflicts and crises might be a sign of success? The delegation noted that success had to be measured by results achieved. Nevertheless, there was often a problem when the success of a venture was measured not so much on output as, rather, on input.

The representative of the Executive Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) informed the participants about the measures put in place by the CIS to address security threats and challenges. According to his statement, in the framework of the CIS, an effective system had been created in order to fight threats, and it was foreseen that the programmes would be implemented until the year 2010. During the last years, joint measures in fight against the trafficking of illicit drugs had been implemented with a special focus on Afghanistan. The representative of the Executive Committee of the CIS stated that co-operation within the framework of the CIS had been very effective in fighting corruption.

One delegation gave a survey of a wide range of security issues, including those related to the fight against terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Such aspects of the fight against terrorism as protecting human rights and combating the financing of terrorism were mentioned. The delegation stated that its government had developed a series of bank system instruments to combat money-laundering. It also underlined the interdependence of the security objectives and the values of tolerance and non-discrimination, and pointed out that this interdependence necessitated similarly complex approaches to dealing with the problems in question.

Another delegation drew the attention of the participants to a new security threat, cyber disruption, which had been faced by one OSCE participating State a few weeks before. It stated that the participating States should think about their possible roles in addressing this issue. The delegation expressed its readiness to ratify the adapted CFE Treaty once the troops of another country stationed in Georgia and Moldova had been removed. It also stressed the importance of the fight against international terrorism, for which the OSCE border security concept offered a well-developed framework. The delegation stated that the request for assistance and border security from the partner State of Afghanistan deserved urgent attention and encouraged the OSCE participating States to consider what assistance they might contribute. The issue of increased missile delivery capabilities was also mentioned, along with its relevance to the challenge of countering the WMD threat.

Another delegation stressed the importance of the diversification of energy supply in the OSCE area, which was one of the new challenges in a changing security environment. The delegation also highlighted the fight against international terrorism, organized crime and drug trafficking as main objectives of the GUAM. The delegation emphasized that security and stability is highly dependent on the final settlement of the protracted conflicts in the eastern districts of Moldova, in the Abkhaz and Tskhinvali regions of Georgia, and in the

Nagorno-Karabakh region. It stressed that there was no alternative to the peaceful resolution of those conflicts, based on the norms and principles of international law, and on respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the inviolability of the internationally recognized borders state borders.

The representative of NATO briefed the participants about NATO activities and noted that NATO valued co-operation with the OSCE, especially in the fields of crisis management and SALW and also in combating human trafficking, and terrorism and other security threats. Reference was made to how NATO was developing its comprehensive approach to operations, strengthening its own crisis-management instruments, and intensifying practical co-operation with other international organizations. It was stated the NATO was implementing a project on training counter-narcotics police officers, similar to a project mentioned by another delegation. The representative of NATO also expressed his regret that it had not been possible to achieve agreement on the final document in the CFE Extraordinary Conference.

WORKING SESSION I: REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE OSCE STRATEGY TO ADDRESS THREATS TO SECURITY AND STABILITY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

Keynote Speakers: Ambassador István Gyarmati, Director of the International Centre for Democratic Transition, based in Budapest
Dr. Peter R. Neumann, Director of the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College London

Moderator: Ambassador Rytis Paulauskas

Rapporteur: Mr. Korkut Güngen, Turkish delegation

Working session I, which was moderated by Ambassador Rytis Paulauskas (Lithuania), focused on the response by participating States to the threats identified in the OSCE Strategy adopted in Maastricht in 2003, in particular in addressing threats related to terrorism and other criminal activities, including the threat of illicit drugs, that of discrimination and intolerance, and other threats in the economic sphere. Conflicts throughout the OSCE area were also addressed. At the outset, Ambassador Paulauskas put forward the following questions: Are we united on the threats as it was outlined in 2003 and reiterated at the last ASRC? Do we have new emerging threats which the OSCE community has to address? When reviewing our implementation of the Strategy what would be the areas where OSCE has a comparative advantage or the niche capabilities vis-à-vis other international structures? What could be done to improve the capabilities of the Organization to implement the Maastricht Strategy?

The first keynote speaker, Ambassador Istvan Gyarmati, Director of the International Centre for Democratic Transition, based in Budapest, stressed that the OSCE continued to be relevant in the face of new challenges. He said that everything started with realities on the ground and that the importance of the changes that had taken place was not fully recognized, although those changes were more important than the fall of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. He stressed that a new era was beginning and that the Westphalian order, in which States had been the only meaningful actors, had come to an end. Although the nation State continued to be important, it was no longer the only actor. Non-State actors, such as international media, international NGOs and international companies, which were all legal in character, influenced politics. On the other hand, terrorism, organized crime and proliferation of WMD constituted the destructive part of that aspect. Society hardly knew how to address those problems. Its instruments were international law, international organizations and military and soft power. Soft power was the most promising among those instruments. However, there was no unity in efforts, even among the like-minded. That was where the OSCE could be useful by providing a place for strategic dialogue. He stated that the threat had to be determined, while maintaining political correctness. However if that notion was exaggerated, that could prove dangerous. Questions such as "Who are the terrorists?" and "Why do we see the rise of populism?" should be answered. He stated that traditional threats was being ignored. Threat perception had to be united, but different perceptions should also be allowed. Cyber-threats also had to be addressed. Instruments like international law were not geared to dealing with non-State actors, and the right mix between military and non-military capabilities had to be found. He

argued that today in Europe, the use of force was not a threat, but in some situations the use of force was necessary. The experience of Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan was extremely helpful in that respect. He emphasized that international co-operation was essential, as no one could solve the existing problems alone. One of the problems of the international organizations was their rigidity, and that was where the OSCE had an advantage owing to its flexible structure. He stressed that the OSCE was a capable organization.

The second keynote speaker, Dr. Peter R. Neumann, Director of the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College in London, focused on terrorism. He said that the OSCE in many instances was engaging in counter-terrorism activities. He concentrated on the reasons why a person might turn into a terrorist, describing three key stages in the radicalization process, namely alienation, grievance or perceived grievance, a "tipping point" experience and an opportunity to link up with a terrorist network. Another element was the availability of a legitimizing ideology, which should however be seen as an all-pervasive influence. It was necessary to understand the conditions under which terrorists thrived. However, there was no single cause of terrorism. The best way to address the problem was by maintaining open political systems. In that respect, the OSCE's efforts to fight discrimination and intolerance as well as to promote good governance were important. The building of effective democratic institutions was, in essence, a form of fighting terrorism. Capacity-building in the area of human rights and the rule of law could help to reduce the occurrence of tipping points. The OSCE was right to point to the danger of allowing terrorists to establish safe havens and places of open congregation. It was also correct in warning of the danger of a nexus between terrorism and organized crime. In that context, he stressed the importance of border security. He also touched upon the issue of trust between relevant agencies, arguing that an informal bottom-up approach was necessary. The OSCE could be useful in building trust. The OSCE could make a significant and valuable contribution by addressing pressing issues like the rise of the Internet in terrorist recruitment and propaganda.

During the discussion, one delegation stated that OSCE's counter-terrorism model should be taken as an example in other areas. The necessity of developing close co-operation between civil society, the business community and the government was stressed. The same delegation also highlighted the importance of efforts in the context of fighting the threat of illicit drugs by drawing attention to their national experience on the basis of statistical data.

The representative of the ODIHR, referring to the text of her statement, which had been circulated in advance, focused on discrimination and intolerance, and terrorism. She stressed the importance of understanding other cultures. She said that hate crimes were committed not only against their immediate victims, but had an impact on entire communities. The ODIHR had focused on the development of concrete tools such as training programmes for police, prosecutors and judges, or support for the strengthening of regional networks to facilitate information-sharing. She especially stressed that the promotion and protection of human rights and the rule of law were essential components of any effective counter-terrorism strategy.

One delegation stated that the main generator of instability was uncontrolled territories which also provided a breeding ground for threats such as terrorism and organized crime. The same delegation stressed the need for result-oriented and concerted action by the OSCE with a view to resolving protracted conflicts. Another delegation, mainly focusing on the threat of terrorism, also mentioned territories beyond the control of governments as breeding grounds for illegal activities, pointing out that illicit profits gained in those areas

were used to feed armed separatism. The same delegation also underlined the importance of energy security and that point was also supported by another delegation. The importance of tolerance and fighting discrimination were also stressed. Unbiased teaching of history was vital in that context. The participants were also told that linking any particular religion with terrorism was not acceptable.

One delegation said that terrorism could take advantage of any loophole to try and break in, if not sufficiently checked. In that context, the OSCE Border Security and Management Concept, as well as the OSCE Strategy, could offer an excellent framework. The same delegation stressed that, not only land borders but also air and sea borders, had equal importance, and drew the attention of the participants to the proposal of the Chairman-in-Office that a workshop on maritime borders should be held.

Another delegation said that all perceptions of threat were filtered through domestic political concerns and calculations. If that were not the case, it would mean arbitrary despotism. The same delegation stated that terrorists also had perceptions and that they were not inert objects. They also adapted and changed their strategies. It was argued that, although “uncontrolled territories” were talked about as the mother of all evil and the den of criminality, most of such territories were well-controlled.

One delegation pointed out that the OSCE Strategy provided a valuable basis and guidance in addressing the threats to security and stability in the twenty-first century. That delegation said that the UN was the main international platform for forging common efforts in the fight against terrorism. However, other international and regional organizations, such as the OSCE, could make valuable contributions in that endeavour. The same delegation thanked the Chairman-in-Office for his strong support for the OSCE’s counter-terrorism activities. Referring to the high level meeting on victims of terrorism to be held in Vienna on 13 and 14 September 2007, it noted the need to devise a clear and accurate definition of the term “victims of terrorism”. The same delegation stated that the definition of “victim” should include military and security personnel who came to harm due to their duties in the fight against terrorism, as well as the relatives of such personnel. The same delegation also expressed support for the OSCE’s border security and management and police activities. Attention was drawn to the OSCE’s continued focus on racism, xenophobia, chauvinism, aggressive nationalism and anti-Semitism and particular attention to the escalating problem of Islamophobia was called for. In that context, importance of the continuation of the mandates of the Personal Representatives of the Chairman-in-Office to combat various forms of intolerance and discrimination was emphasized.

On the basis of a comment made by one delegation, the keynote speakers stated that a long-term engagement was necessary in efforts aimed at countering terrorism.

At the end of the session, Ambassador Paulauskas concluded that, with its comprehensive, indivisible and co-operative approach to security, the OSCE should continue to act as a regional security organization. The threats mentioned in the OSCE Strategy continued to be relevant. He noted that cybercrime was also mentioned as a new form of threat during the session. He pointed to the importance of strengthening international co-operation in combating the existing threats.

WORKING SESSION II: CHALLENGES IN THE POLITICO-MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY DIMENSION

Keynote Speakers: Mr. Daniel P. Fata, United States Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for European and NATO Policy
Mr. Dennis Mays, Director for Systems Engineering at the U.S. Missile Defense Agency

Moderator: Ambassador John H. Bernhard

Rapporteur: Mr. Anton Eischer, Austrian delegation

Working session II of the ASRC covered security issues in relation to arms control, disarmament, non-proliferation and confidence- and security-building measures. Its main focus was a discussion on missile defence.

The keynote speeches concentrated on the plan for a United States missile defence system in Europe and its implications for security. Mr. Fata provided information about the United States' perception of the growing ballistic missile threat, the composition and the capabilities of the United States missile defence system in Europe, its integration into NATO's missile defence and the United States' outreach efforts to the allies, non-allied countries and Russia. Mr. Fata's speech was followed by a presentation by Mr. Mays, who provided background on the technical aspects of the United States missile defence system in Europe. He outlined the missile threat and gave a description of the elements and capabilities of the United States missile defence system in Europe. Finally he responded to Russian concerns.

The ensuing discussion focused mainly on missile defence, but also included more generic statements, perceptions, comments and suggestions. The statements addressed the OSCE's role in security, the need for an assessment of new threats and challenges, the applicability of existing instruments, as well as further implementation. The development of the *acquis* and the reassessment and prioritization of the FSC's work programme in order to increase its effectiveness and productivity were stressed.

Regarding missile defence, the United States briefing was widely recognized as important and useful. Some delegations welcomed the initiation of a discussion on the subject in the OSCE. Other delegations considered other forums to be more appropriate.

The proposal for a special session of the FSC on prospects for arms control and confidence- and security-building measures in the OSCE was widely welcomed. Many delegations expressed their hope for an assessment of arms control in Europe, the results of which might provide incentives for the future work of the FSC.

Detailed report of the session

In his opening remarks, the moderator reiterated the aim of the working session, which was to review the implementation of existing OSCE documents and instruments adopted within the politico-military dimension. It was to reflect on the effectiveness of

existing documents agreed by the Forum for Security Co-operation and contribute to identifying common ground for improving and enhancing specific tools that might help to address challenges in the politico-military aspects of the security dimension.

In that regard, he thanked the Chairperson of the FSC for the list of politico-military elements contained in document FSC.DEL/164/07/Rev.3, and highlighted a few topics. The validity of the traditional arms control and CSBM regimes was under consideration by some delegations. He reminded the participants of the important work that had been done with regard to the OSCE Documents on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition. Lastly, he anticipated the wish of delegations to comment on the Extraordinary Conference on the CFE Treaty that had taken place during the previous week and on security concerns in general.

Keynote speeches

Mr. Fata's keynote speech focused on the growing ballistic missile threat, the composition and the capabilities of the United States missile defence system in Europe, its integration into NATO's missile defence and the country's outreach efforts to the allies and Russia.

Before going into details, he stated that the current United States administration had decided to extend the national missile defence system also to Europe and its allies with the aim of developing a capability to protect the United States, as well as its European allies and forces in Europe.

Regarding the growing ballistic missile threat, he noted that more than 20 States or non-State actors were seeking to acquire ballistic missile technology. For the United States, Iran was of the greatest concern. The United States and the Russian Federation were both of the opinion that Iran was actively trying to acquire ballistic missile technology, but they had different estimates of the perceived timelines. The United States missile defence system had proven to be successful. Currently, the United States was pressing to add a European component to the system. Time is always a factor when dealing with missile defence because it takes years to deploy such a system which could serve as a deterrent. Fata was clear in his conviction that neither the United States nor its allies should be taken hostage or blackmailed by a country or actor with a ballistic missile capability.

Mr. Fata described the United States missile defence system for Europe as a long-range system which consisted of a radar station in the Czech Republic, an interceptor station with ten interceptor missiles in Poland and a forward-based radar in South-Eastern Europe. This forward-based radar would be within a thousand-kilometre band of the expected hostile launch site. That scheme would allow for the greatest possible coverage. The system was defensive only and posed no threat to Russia.

NATO's Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Programme (approved in 1999) should be complemented by that long-range system in order to cover the entire transatlantic and NATO territory. The United States would retain the command and control of the long-range system costing approximately USD 3 billion for its construction. Besides the United States, the Czech Republic, and Poland, the United Kingdom and Denmark also have a role in the missile defence scheme through complementary radar systems. The deployment of the system would only start after the successful completion of

negotiations with the Czech Republic and Poland. First talks had already started in May 2007 and were expected to be finished at the end of 2007. After approval had been obtained from the Czech Republic and Poland, the United States would begin construction in 2008. The system was intended to reach its initial operating capability in 2011 and its full operating capability in 2013.

Mr. Fata stressed that since February of the current year, the United States had intensified its outreach efforts and briefed the NATO-Russia Council three times on the topic of missile defence regarding Poland and the Czech Republic. On a bilateral basis, the United States discussed missile defence with the Russian Federation for the past two years. The United States also shared information about the threat and tried to convince the Russian Federation that the system was not directed against it. The United States welcomed the proposal by the President of the Russian Federation on using a radar station in Azerbaijan, which in reality was discussed earlier in the process as a possibility for a forward-based radar. Currently the United States is looking at the technical aspects of the proposal and suggested a bilateral meeting at the expert level with the Russian Federation in order to provide a better understanding of the system. However, such a meeting would not alter or change the United States intentions of negotiating with Poland and the Czech Republic.

In conclusion, Mr. Fata highlighted United States efforts with regard to transparency and co-operation with Russia.

Mr. Mays' presentation was intended to provide detailed information about the technical aspects of the United States missile defence system in Europe. His briefing consisted of an assessment of the missile threat and a description of the elements and capabilities of the United States missile defence system in Europe, as well as an overview of the United States perception regarding Russian concerns.

He reminded the participants that the threat of ballistic missiles was real. Missiles were already used for coercion. North Korea had managed to develop intercontinental-range capabilities starting from short-range missiles and Iran was developing a medium-range system. The United States had indications that Iran would develop long-range missiles by 2015. Mr. Mays' emphasized that a missile defence system could not be built in a short period of time.

In order to ensure the best coverage, the planned United States missile defence system in Europe was composed of a mid-course tracking and discrimination radar station in the Czech Republic, and ten ground-based interceptor missiles stationed in Poland. Those components were part of a layered ballistic missile defence system. The radar site in the Czech Republic would supplement existing sites in the United Kingdom and Denmark. The interceptor missiles proposed for Poland would not have the capability to intercept Russian missiles. For a missile defence system in Europe, a delicate balance was needed. The sites in Poland and the Czech Republic would provide the best coverage and provided the highest possibility to intercept missiles launched from the south of Iran.

With regard to the Russian concerns, he stated that other locations, such as Turkey, Italy or France, did not provide the best coverage against long-range ballistic missiles from Iran. He further lamented that the debris after an interception would be small with 40 per cent destroyed by the impact, 40 per cent destroyed in re-entry, and the remaining 20 per cent relatively small in size (5 to 15cm and spread over a large area; therefore, proving less

harmful than a ballistic missile hit). These missiles were not designed nor would be easily modified to catch a Russian Federation missile.

In conclusion, Mr. Mays stated that the threat was real and growing and United States ballistic missile defence was working and was having a positive impact. The United States would continue to build on the system, and to defend the United States, its allies and European States, and was further working together with partners to improve the system.

Discussion

On missile defence, one delegation stressed the usefulness of the discussion in the OSCE, especially for those countries that did not participate in other forums. That delegation inquired about the existence of a “plan B”, if the Czech Republic or Poland did not agree to the United States plans.

That delegation was of the opinion that the OSCE has always been and should remain an appropriate and useful platform to address security issues within the Eurasian and Transatlantic area and beyond. In tackling new threats, each body of the OSCE needed to have clear fields of responsibilities. Duplications should be avoided. The Forum for Security Co-operation should re-concentrate itself on its core business and core competencies. It supported the creation of the Security Committee when bringing real added value, which should be confirmed at the next Ministerial Council meeting in Madrid.

To facilitate the setting of clear priorities, a more systematic analysis of security threats and security concerns should be conducted. Such risk assessment analysis could make possible negotiations regarding security issues of common interest. The implementation of existing arms control instruments and the development of new ones were not mutually exclusive. Since new threats and challenges were not all covered by the OSCE *acquis*, participating States had to strive to further improve the implementation of agreements and retain the central *acquis*.

A combined approach — further improving the implementation of agreed measures and adapting or developing new ones — was needed. As priorities, the current *acquis* had to be emphasized; the Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting should be better used; expert knowledge should be better incorporated into activities; the meeting of heads of verification centres was important; and new challenges had to be discussed. The proposal for a special seminar of the FSC on arms control in October of the current year was a good one.

The OSCE was a unique platform for addressing all security issues. An in-depth discussion of security was needed. Past agreements had to be implemented, and new challenges had to be addressed with adapted and/or new tools.

Another delegation focused in particular on the politico-military dimension. Due to a number of reasons explained at the recent CFE Treaty extraordinary conference, that country had had to consider the possibility of a moratorium on the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE). In its view, the crisis regarding the CFE Treaty was exacerbated by the movement in the first dimension of the OSCE towards marginal issues and by the assignment of priority to lesser issues that were not important. The delegation’s intention was to have a more effective FSC and to revive its agenda through the introduction of new confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), as well as the discussion of the

anti-ballistic missile (ABM) issue. The proposed special session of the FSC in October should result in a joint assessment of the politico-military situation and make the Forum more productive. Some provisions of the Vienna Document (VD99) were outdated and an amendment would help to improve Europe's security.

The same delegation expressed disagreement with the keynote speaker's premises regarding the United States missile defence system in Europe. In its view, Iran would not have long-range missiles in the coming 15 to 20 years. Iran's missiles were based on SCUDs, which had a limited range and could not be developed easily into intercontinental missiles. The construction of the ballistic missiles facilities proposed by the United States would have an impact on the capabilities of the country represented by the delegation. Use of the proposed radar station in Azerbaijan would not pose a threat to the country represented by the delegation. In its view, the United States plan to build a missile defence system in Europe would provoke the start of an arms race. The United States should freeze its plans. In conclusion, the same delegation reaffirmed its readiness to work together with United States colleagues. It reiterated its intention to have all Europeans on board and asked for further information on the issue.

At the end of the session, the same delegation again took the floor and welcomed the United States briefing on missile defence. The United States decision to extend the missile defence system to Europe also had implications for the OSCE. Therefore, it supported the proposal of another delegation to discuss the topic further within the OSCE. The delegation's concerns were that the OSCE should remain relevant and that discussions on security issues such as the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document and missile defence should be pursued.

In that regard, the proposed special session of the FSC was timely and should aim at a new programme providing for a strategic dialogue on security issues, missile technology and also weapons of mass destruction. Lastly, the same delegation expressed its insistence that the content of the current discussion should not be lost, and that it provided a basis for further work.

One delegation asked about a "plan B" for United States missile defence in Europe in case there was no agreement by the Governments of Poland and the Czech Republic. Mr. Fata stated that the United States did not have an alternative plan. The United States administration hoped that, by the end of 2007, the negotiations with Poland and the Czech Republic would have been successfully concluded. United States missile defence and the stationing of troops in Europe were not linked with the CFE Treaty. Regarding the proposal that a radar station in Azerbaijan be used, there was no reaction from the United States. The United States was continuing with discussions in Poland and the Czech Republic, and the development of the United States missile defence system in Europe neither posed a threat to Russia nor would it lead to an arms race. The United States did not have a plan to upgrade the system, and diplomacy always came first. Lastly, if the United States system failed, Russia could also be subject to blackmail by Iran or other rogue nations armed with long range missiles. With regard to a question of timing, he added that Iran could easily obtain knowledge from open sources and technology from North Korea, which had managed to develop a three-stage missile. The United States missile defence system for Europe would take time to build up, and the construction should start now.

Another delegation welcomed the transparency regarding missile defence issues and highlighted the indivisibility of security as well as the importance they attach to the equitable

sharing of risks, benefits and burden regarding the missile defence. It reiterated the importance of arms control and the CFE Treaty, including its flank regime. The developed *acquis* continued to serve European security. It should not only be preserved and implemented, but also further improved. Dialogue was the only positive approach. The OSCE had to maintain the political will to overcome all problems and had to utilize specific OSCE tools in order to address challenges in the politico-military aspects of security.

Another delegation strongly supported the idea of discussing the United States plans to deploy a missile defence system in Poland and Czech Republic in the OSCE, as it affects the security of all States in the region. It expressed no objection to the dialogue on this subject in other forums and formats, such as the NATO-Russia Council, but since not all OSCE participating States are members of the NATO-Russia Council, the discussion on missile defence should also take place in the OSCE.

This delegation noted that several OSCE participating States have opposite views on strategic missile defence in Europe. It stated that this development did not contribute to the concept of indivisible security, but could rather create dividing lines. The delegation proposed a joint assessment of threats and risks in the missile sphere, and their impact on European security. It suggested interested States to think of preparing a list of contradictions with regard to missile defence and start discussing it with a view to eliminating all concerns and contradictions.

This delegation argued that arms control had seen better days. The instruments of arms control were lagging behind current military doctrines of participating States. It also supported the idea of conducting a seminar on the prospects of arms control and CSBMs in the OSCE area, claiming that it could provoke a discussion in the FSC on further improvement of existing and possible development of new confidence- and security-building measures.

Another delegation reminded participating States that the existing OSCE *acquis* was a unique arms-control network and was considered a model outside Europe. Since the development of those instruments, the European security environment had changed. Additional challenges, such as asymmetric warfare, had evolved. Those developments did not render the existing *acquis* useless. On the contrary, the *acquis* was still the basis for further update and adaptation. The same delegation saw a need for an assessment and discussion of the existing *acquis* as well as its conformity to the current situation. The ASRC should give some impetus to that assessment and discussion, as well as to the proposed special session of the FSC on prospects for arms control and confidence- and security-building measures in the OSCE area. As to the United States ballistic missile defence system in Europe the same delegation welcomed the presentation by the US at the ASRC. It called on all parties involved to use the NATO-Russia Council as well as bilateral channels for building transparency, confidence and co-operation.

Another delegation attached great importance to security measures in the FSC and elsewhere. Essential issues were how participating States handled security, which challenges they faced, which new technological developments had an influence and how existing instruments could meet the challenges. This delegation as well as several other delegations showed their interest in organizing the proposed special session of the FSC on prospects for arms control and confidence- and security-building measures in the OSCE, which would be an important event. Participants should be looking for new security measures to enhance

transparency, and should use the OSCE as a platform for updating instruments. It was crucial to move forward with the whole CSBM issue.

Another delegation stressed the importance of transparency. Regarding the proposal on arms control prospects, the delegation was looking forward to the special session in October. It was clear that there was disagreement between the United States and the Russian Federation on the assessment of technological missile capabilities and ballistic missile threats. Technology moved more rapidly than assessed and the planned missile defence system was aimed at destroying a missile, so it would have no destabilizing effect. Until now, the only European-based existing missile defence system was in Russia.

Conclusion by the moderator

The moderator, as incoming chairperson of the FSC, noted the remarks by delegations, especially with regard to future priorities and the work programme of the FSC, as well as to the utilization and consideration of the results of working session II of the ASRC. In closing, he thanked the speakers and expressed gratitude to those delegations that had taken an active part in the discussion.

WORKING SESSION III: A COHERENT APPROACH TOWARDS THE OSCE ACTIVITIES IN RELATION TO EARLY WARNING, CONFLICT PREVENTION AND RESOLUTION, CRISIS MANAGEMENT, AND POST-CONFLICT REHABILITATION

- Keynote Speakers: Professor Heinz Gärtner, Austrian Institute for International Affairs
 Mr. Kairat Abdrakhmanov, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Charge d'Affaires a.i. of the delegation of Kazakhstan
- Moderator: Ambassador Herbert Salber, Director of the Conflict Prevention Centre
- Rapporteur: Mr. Jacek Emmel, Polish delegation

In his brief introductory remarks, moderator, Ambassador H. Salber stressed that many OSCE activities might be perceived as belonging to the broad categories of early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation. He expressed satisfaction that the previous year's deliberation in the ASRC session devoted to the same subject had not been forgotten and that some of the recommendations had been reflected in subsequent OSCE undertakings: gender perspective, UNSCR 1325, and public-private partnership in combating terrorism. In his opinion, one of the primary lines of thought should focus on the question whether and where the OSCE can add value to the efforts of international actors in this complex area.

In his keynote speech (PC.DEL/599/07), Professor H. Gärtner made a review of the historic approaches to the nature and roots of conflicts, stressing that in the academic community there was no coherent approach to these issues. He underlined the importance of the theory, supported by the research of the World Bank, that homogeneity of societies/nations is not a guarantee of peace and stability; on the contrary, heterogeneous nations were less likely to suffer from civil war and unrest.

With reference to the contemporary conflicts, he stated that it was lack of legitimate government rather than war between States that constituted the greater danger for international stability. In his view, conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization today meant building functioning States capable of protecting their own citizens (this is now a primary role of armed forces) and managing ethnic, religious and cultural diversities. Peacekeeping was no longer sufficient.

In this context he touched on the question of the "responsibility to protect", arguing that if a State is not able or willing to guarantee security to its citizens, the international community should step in.

The second keynote speaker Minister K. Abdrakhmanov began by declaring his trust in the efficiency of the OSCE in early warning and conflict prevention. He pointed to the number of the OSCE tools and mechanisms useful in this area: the Vienna and Moscow

mechanisms, the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration, and the Valletta mechanism. He continued by presenting a whole catalogue of lessons that might be learned from the OSCE experience. He claimed that in spite of a number of existing “frozen conflicts”, conflict prevention efforts did bear fruit. Conflicts were of cyclical nature, so post-conflict peace-building was not the end of the whole process but the beginning of the new process of conflict prevention. Settlement of a conflict required full understanding of the reasons for the conflict and of its historical background. Conflict prevention required a cross-dimensional approach and mobilization of political will. There was also a need for international co-operation and division of tasks and responsibilities to overcome the limits to any country’s capacities. One should not underestimate the role of civil society, promotion of trust, development, justice, equality, human rights, and democratic government.

In conclusion, the keynote speaker stated that the OSCE’s focus on human rights detracted from certain principles of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act such as non-interference in internal affairs and territorial integrity, as well as a basic principle of international law, namely, the prohibition on the threat and use of force. The use of force should be regarded as the last available measure, most conflicts in recent history having proved that diplomatic and legal strategies were more effective. Finally he stressed that the OSCE’s capacities in conflict prevention were limited, and that we should not expect from the Organization what it is not able to do. However the flexible OSCE’s machinery offered significant potential in conflict prevention and stabilizing efforts.

During the discussion, the first delegation to take the floor presented a comprehensive overview of that country’s approach to the subject of the session and activities undertaken in this field. It started by stressing the importance of the FSC’s work, mentioning in particular the implementation of SALW and of the Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, field operations dealing with protracted conflicts in the OSCE areas, and the work of the High Commissioner on National Minorities.

The delegation laid emphasis on the need to respond quickly and with appropriate means when crisis erupts, on effective and targeted post-conflict reconstruction based on democratization, good governance, vibrant civil society, and local ownership of the reconstruction process.

The situation in Afghanistan was quoted as a challenging and complex case that demanded wide co-ordination of military, development and diplomatic activities to provide opportunity for stabilization and the creation of a self-sustaining State.

The same delegation highlighted the role of the Stabilization and Reconstruction Task Force (START) mechanism created in 2005. This tool not only facilitated an integrated approach, co-ordination among departments in the government for full and effective use of assets, but also managed a special fund for peace-building, disaster response, and democratic transition. In addition to the activities built on START, the delegation underlined other efforts made by its country within the OSCE area related to policing, the High Commissioner on National Minorities, and mine action.

The same delegation further stressed the role of human rights and the rule of law in counter-terrorism efforts, quoting the relevant appeal made during the G8 Summit of 8 June and recalling its financial contribution to the ODIHR’s Human Rights and Terrorism Programme.

All the above-mentioned efforts demonstrated reorientation in the country's strategic approach towards international engagement, which is founded on the assumption that assisting fragile States promotes international stability and security.

Another delegation focused in its intervention on the challenges its country faced in conflict resolution on its territory. The delegation expressed regrets that the negotiation process was blocked, and appealed to negotiators and observers to convince one negotiating party to return to the negotiation table. It also expressed its desire to transform two observers into fully fledged participants. The dialogue in the "5+2" format should be built on a plan presented by one participating State, on documents adopted by the parliament of the country, and on the OSCE mission in the country. The delegation noticed that the majority of the settlement plans presented so far had concentrated on the status of the disputed region and had not touched a wide range of other aspects. In this context the need to respect the fundamental principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity was stressed.

The same delegation emphasized that the demilitarization of the disputed region on its territory was a crucial aspect of the settlement. The delegation mentioned the transparency of military potential, the monitoring of the industrial complex, and the complete withdrawal of the military troops and munitions of the other participating State as necessary components of the demilitarization process.

The same delegation expressed its dissatisfaction at the effectiveness of the current peacekeeping mechanism, highlighting tensions not prevented by the mechanism. The delegation suggested that the future mission should be entirely civilian, operating under OSCE mandate.

Finally, the economic aspects were raised. The delegation noted progress, resulting from co-operation in border security and customs control with one participating State and the European Union Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM), in the registration of the enterprise from the disputed region by the constitutional authorities. This was seen as an important step towards economic reintegration.

In conclusion the delegation reaffirmed its commitment to the peaceful reintegration of the country, and hoped that it would be supported by its partners.

Another delegation began by declaring that settlement of conflict was one of the priorities of its country's foreign policy, given the number of citizens and compatriots living in the conflict zones and its cultural, historic and economic ties with the region of conflicts. The delegation underlined that the conflict must be resolved in compliance with Helsinki Final Act, stressing, *inter alia*, consideration of each party's concern, the unacceptability of use of force or economic pressure, a scrupulous approach to the existing formats of peacekeeping and negotiations, the priority of confidence-building measures, and the development of dialogue.

The delegation, recalling the intervention of the president of the country, put emphasis on the principle of territorial integrity. In the view of the delegation, if this principle was to be overrun by the right of nations to self-determination, this should be equally reflected in the approach to conflict in every region of the world.

The same delegation emphasized that responsibility for the conflict settlement lay with the parties directly involved in them. Equal treatment of the parties involved and the rejection of the solutions imposed from outside remained preconditions for reaching a sustainable agreement. In this context, the recent practice of creating parallel authorities and new regimes were criticized.

The delegation advocated the OSCE taking a more active role in conflict settlement, using the existing peacekeeping and negotiation format. It underlined the importance of having post-conflict rehabilitation even before final conflict resolution, as could be seen in one of the conflict zones, where OSCE economic rehabilitation activities were promoting a political settlement.

In the more general intervention another delegation encouraged participants to look more deeply into the causes and nature of the conflicts. It argued that there was often a tendency to rely on the easiest explanations of the conflict's roots, to categorize the parties of conflict and attribute bad will to one of them, which was not beneficial for the conflict resolution process.

The same delegation noted that success in conflict prevention depended on the phase of the emerging conflict in which preventive action begins. In this sense people must be aware of the "turning points" when prevention is no longer enough and is replaced by resolution. These "turning points" or "lines of no return" usually occur when humiliation, distrust, and discrimination have reached intolerable levels.

The delegation expressed also its doubts about the significance of political will in conflict resolution, believing that conflicts should not last too long, pointing to the situations in Kashmir and Israel.

One delegation reaffirmed the importance it attached to the theme of the session. However, despite the fact that conflict settlement should be at the heart of the OSCE's activities and that it had been successful in many other different areas, the OSCE experienced serious difficulties in being in conformity with agreed norms and principles in conflict resolution. In the view of the delegation, the unresolved conflict on the territory of its State is an example.

The delegation further confirmed that the position of its country on the settlement process remained unchanged. The process ought to be based on reintegration of conflict-affected territory with the political, economic and social system of the country. The delegation further argued that the OSCE participating State involved in the conflict should withdraw its forces from the territory of the participating State represented by the delegation, and IDPs should be enabled to make a safe and dignified return to their places of origin. This should create the conditions for the subsequent restoration of inter-communal relations and co-operation of a special humanitarian nature on tolerance and education.

The delegation expressed its conviction that the preservation of the status quo was not in the interest of either side to conflict, and underlined its determination to break the stalemate and solve the issue in a constructive manner.

The delegation concluded by appealing to those concerned to remain faithful to the created norms and principles and to respect them.

In the brief concluding remarks, Professor Gärtner once again stressed the role of State authorities in guaranteeing human security, respect for human rights, and the rule of law. He suggested that consideration should be given to the establishment of an expert commission responsible for developing objective criteria to measure good governance, human rights, and the rule of law. He added that one of the participating States had some experience in this field.

The second keynote speaker Minister Abdrakhmanov underlined the potential inherent in using different measures of conflict prevention and resolution, combining national and international experience. In his opinion, Central Asia might be considered a good example of how to overcome difficulties and avoid conflicts. He reiterated his trust in the role of political leaders in the conflict settlement.

CLOSING SESSION

Closing address by: Ambassador Carlos Sánchez de Boado y de la Válgoma,
Chairperson of the Permanent Council

Rapporteur: Mr. Kasper Juul Gimsing, Danish delegation

The Chairperson of the Permanent Council, and representative of the Chairman-in-Office, Ambassador Carlos Sánchez de Boado y de la Válgoma, presented a first perception on the outcome of the conference.

The ASRC was convened immediately after the recently held Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the CFE Treaty (12–15 June 2007), which ended without a final document.

Ambassador Sánchez summarized the matters touched upon during the ASRC as follows:

- Views were exchanged on missile defence, and it was noted that security among OSCE participating States was indivisible — numerous calls were made for the dialogue to continue;
- The apparent stalemate within the field of confidence- and security-building measures was commented upon, and it was suggested that it might be appropriate to initiate debate on the introduction of new CSBMs. Support for the proposed special FSC meeting on prospects for arms control and CSBMs in the OSCE area appeared to be growing, which was highlighted as one of the successes of this year's conference;
- Conflicts within the OSCE area needed to be resolved — especially since instability in uncontrolled territories might lead to terrorist activity and organized crime. The principle of national integrity was emphasized;
- Threats as defined in the OSCE Strategy remained relevant — and an appeal was made for all participating States to sign the 13 UN universal protocols and conventions related to the fight against terrorism. The protection of borders, whether land, air or sea, was emphasized, and a reference was made to the proposed workshop on maritime border security tentatively planned for November 2007;
- The multilateral approach within the OSCE should be consolidated with a view to enhancing effective synergy and co-operation within the Organization.

Ambassador Sánchez noted the absence of any concrete proposal put forward during the Conference, and concluded that in this respect the 5th ASRC had followed a different course from that of previous conferences.

LIST OF SUGGESTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Opening session

Fighting terrorism, organized crime, illicit drugs, and trafficking in human beings while improving border security require new forms of co-operation and co-ordination, between participating States as well as with partner organizations.

Fight against terrorism is closely connected with the fight for human rights and tolerance, therefore a greater measure of outreach to civil society and to private sector is necessary.

A new security threat, cyber disruption, requires attention, and the OSCE countries should consider their possible roles in addressing this issue.

The OSCE should elaborate a new type of arms control based on the philosophy of inclusiveness and consolidation of international multilateral institutions.

The proposal to hold a special FSC meeting on prospects for arms control regimes and CSBMs this autumn received support.

The hopes were expressed that the dialogue between the States Parties of the CFE Treaty would be resumed soon.

The synergies between the OSCE and other multilateral organizations have to be exploited further.

The role of eminent intellectuals and thinkers should not be forgotten in preparing new initiatives and solutions in foreign and security policy.

Seeking a peaceful settlement to the protracted conflicts in the OSCE area remains an important task of the OSCE, and lots of work still has to be done.

Reviewing possible OSCE contributions to the international community's efforts in Afghanistan desires the Organization's attention.

Working session I: Review of the implementation of the OSCE Strategy to Address Threats to Security and Stability in the Twenty-First Century

International cooperation in combating the existing threats such as terrorism and organized crime, should be strengthened. Efforts in fighting the threat of illicit drugs should be enhanced. In all these areas, a long-term engagement is necessary.

Maintaining open political systems is the best way to address terrorism. Human rights and the rule of law, as essential components of any effective counter-terrorism strategy, should be promoted and protected.

Close cooperation between civil society, the business community and the government should be developed.

OSCE's efforts to fight discrimination and intolerance should be enhanced. The mandates of the Personal Representatives of the Chairman-in-Office to combat various forms of intolerance and discrimination should continue.

Terrorism should not be linked to any particular religion.

A clear and accurate definition of the term "victims of terrorism" is necessary. Such a definition should include military and security personnel who came to harm due to their duties in the fight against terrorism, as well as the relatives of such personnel.

Cyber-threats should be addressed. OSCE could make a significant and valuable contribution by addressing the rise of the Internet in terrorist recruiting and propaganda.

Any loophole that terrorism could take advantage of should be sufficiently checked. Not only land borders but also air and maritime borders have equal importance.

With a view to resolving protracted conflicts, which could also engender uncontrolled territories that provide breeding grounds for threats such as terrorism and organized crime, result-oriented and concerted action by the OSCE is needed.

Working session II: Challenges in the politico-military aspects of security dimension

The Forum for Security Co-operation should re-concentrate itself on its core business and core competencies, i.e., the area of security issues.

Priorities must be established in the FSC's security dialogue, discussions and consultations.

Participating States should retain the Organization's central *acquis*, strive to further improve the implementation of common agreements and address new challenges with adapted and/or new tools.

Concerning the future of the European security architecture, the OSCE should continue to be a major part of the ongoing debate.

The FSC should be more effective, and the agenda of the FSC should be revived through discussions on new CSBMs as well as the ABM issue.

A joint assessment of threats and risks in the missile sphere, and their impact on European security as well as the preparation of a list of contradictions with regard to missile defence and the start of a discussion with a view to eliminating all concerns and contradictions was proposed.

The proposed special session of the FSC in October should result in a joint assessment of the politico-military situation.

The OSCE should remain relevant. Discussions on security-related issues such as the CFE Treaty, the Vienna Document and missile defence should be pursued in utilizing the results of the ASRC.

The ASRC should give some impetus to the proposed special session of the FSC on prospects for arms control, and confidence- and security-building measures in the OSCE area.

The OSCE should continue working on arms control and explore all options for a political solution.

Working session III: A coherent approach towards the OSCE activities in relation to early warning, conflict prevention and resolution, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation

Continuing observation of human rights in combating terrorism is a prerequisite for the effectiveness of the latter.

Post-conflict stabilization, which at the same time is conflict prevention in the potential new cycle, would be secured by building a functioning State able and willing to protect its citizens.

Assisting fragile States plays a crucial role in maintaining stability and peace.

The current peacekeeping mechanism in one of the conflict regions should be replaced by the international civilian mission.

Equal application of international principles should be guaranteed when dealing with various conflicts.

If the OSCE consistently adhered to its norms and principles in all its field of activities, it might be better placed to deal with unresolved conflict.

Avoidance of biased labelling and categorizing of parties would contribute to a better understanding of the nature and roots of conflicts.

The possibility of the establishment of an expert commission to work out objective criteria for the evaluation of human rights, good governance, and the implementation of rule of law should be considered.