
Chairmanship: Italy**1181st PLENARY MEETING OF THE COUNCIL**

1. Date: Thursday, 12 April 2018

Opened: 10.05 a.m.
Suspended: 12.50 p.m.
Resumed: 3.10 p.m.
Closed: 6.40 p.m.

2. Chairperson: Ambassador A. Azzoni

Prior to taking up the agenda, the Chairperson, on behalf of the Council, delivered a statement concerning the untimely death on 9 April 2018 of Mr. N. Terzić, member of the delegation of Switzerland, and offered condolences to his family and to the Swiss delegation to the OSCE. Switzerland paid tribute to Mr. Terzić and thanked the Chairperson and the Council for their expressions of sympathy and solidarity.

The Chairperson, likewise on behalf of the Permanent Council, extended condolences to France in connection with the terrorist attack in Carcassonne and Trèbes on 23 March 2018. He further extended condolences to Germany in connection with the van attack in Münster on 7 April 2018 and to Algeria (Partner for Co-operation) in connection with the plane crash on 11 April 2018. Finally, he reiterated his condolences to the Russian Federation in connection with the fire in Kemerovo on 25 March 2018.

3. Subjects discussed – Statements – Decisions/documents adopted:

Agenda item 1: ADDRESS BY THE DEPUTY MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF GEORGIA, H.E. DAVID DONDUA

Chairperson, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia (PC.DEL/431/18 OSCE+), Bulgaria-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Moldova and Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/395/18), Russian Federation

(PC.DEL/381/18), United States of America (PC.DEL/380/18), Turkey (PC.DEL/427/18 OSCE+), Switzerland (PC.DEL/416/18 OSCE+), Azerbaijan (PC.DEL/384/18 OSCE+), Canada (also on behalf of Norway), Ukraine (PC.DEL/389/18), Armenia (PC.DEL/435/18)

Agenda item 2: REPORT BY THE OSCE PROJECT CO-ORDINATOR IN UZBEKISTAN

Chairperson, OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan (PC.FR/7/18 OSCE+), Bulgaria-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Liechtenstein, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia, in alignment) (PC.DEL/394/18), Kazakhstan, United States of America (PC.DEL/382/18), Turkey (PC.DEL/409/18 OSCE+), Switzerland (PC.DEL/415/18 OSCE+), Turkmenistan, Russian Federation (PC.DEL/383/18), Canada, Norway (PC.DEL/424/18), Kyrgyzstan, France, Uzbekistan

Agenda item 3: REVIEW OF CURRENT ISSUES

Chairperson

- (a) *Russia's ongoing aggression against Ukraine and illegal occupation of Crimea:* Ukraine (PC.DEL/390/18), Bulgaria-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia and Moldova, in alignment) (PC.DEL/398/18), Switzerland (PC.DEL/417/18/Rev.1 OSCE+), Turkey (PC.DEL/428/18 OSCE+), United States of America (PC.DEL/385/18), Canada
- (b) *Situation in Ukraine and the need to implement the Minsk agreements:* Russian Federation (PC.DEL/387/18/Corr.1), Ukraine
- (c) *Desecration of monuments in Poland:* Russian Federation (PC.DEL/404/18) (PC.DEL/407/18), Poland (PC.DEL/429/18)
- (d) *Violations of the linguistic rights of national minorities in Latvia:* Russian Federation (PC.DEL/408/18) (PC.DEL/410/18), Latvia (PC.DEL/414/18 OSCE+)
- (e) *Violations of the rights of human rights defenders in the Russian Federation:* Bulgaria-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and

Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Georgia and Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/397/18), United States of America (PC.DEL/386/18), Canada, Russian Federation (PC.DEL/411/18)

- (f) *Enforced disappearances in Turkmenistan*: Bulgaria-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the European Free Trade Association country Iceland, member of the European Economic Area, in alignment) (PC.DEL/400/18), Canada (also on behalf of Switzerland), Turkmenistan
- (g) *Human rights and the rule of law in Turkey*: Bulgaria-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Armenia and Canada, in alignment) (PC.DEL/402/18), United States of America (PC.DEL/388/18), Turkey (PC.DEL/430/18 OSCE+)
- (h) *International Roma Day, observed on 8 April 2018*: Bulgaria-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association countries Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway, members of the European Economic Area; as well as Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/396/18), United States of America (PC.DEL/391/18), Holy See (PC.DEL/403/18/Corr.1 OSCE+), Turkey (PC.DEL/406/18 OSCE+)
- (i) *Police brutality in Kosovska Mitrovica and the illegal detention of Mr. M. Đurić, Director of the Office for Kosovo and Metohija, Government of the Republic of Serbia*: Serbia (PC.DEL/432/18 OSCE+) (PC.DEL/433/18 OSCE+), Bulgaria-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Montenegro; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; the European Free Trade Association country Norway, member of the European Economic Area; as well as Ukraine, in alignment) (PC.DEL/399/18/Rev.1), Albania (PC.DEL/423/18 OSCE+), Russian Federation (PC.DEL/412/18)
- (j) *Concerns about freedom of expression and the detention of Mr. K. Mirsaidov in Tajikistan*: United States of America (PC.DEL/392/18), Bulgaria-European Union (with the candidate countries Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia; the country of the Stabilisation and Association Process and potential candidate country Bosnia and Herzegovina; and the European Free Trade Association country Norway, member of the European Economic Area, in alignment) (PC.DEL/401/18/Rev.1), Tajikistan

Agenda item 4: REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
 CHAIRMANSHIP-IN-OFFICE

- (a) *Visit of the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process, Mr. F. Frattini, to Moldova from 26 to 28 March 2018:* Chairperson
- (b) *New-Med Conference on “Energy Trends and Opportunities: Mediterranean Perspectives”, to be held in Nicosia on 13 April 2018:* Chairperson
- (c) *2018 OSCE-wide Counter-Terrorism Conference, to be held in Rome on 10 and 11 May 2018 (CIO.GAL/16/18 OSCE+):* Chairperson

Agenda item 5: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL

- (a) *Visit of the Secretary General to Moscow from 1 to 5 April 2018:* Secretary General (SEC.GAL/61/18 OSCE+), France, Ukraine, Canada, Russian Federation, Chairperson
- (b) *Meeting of the Secretary General with the Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) on 23 March 2018:* Secretary General (SEC.GAL/61/18 OSCE+)
- (c) *Participation of the OSCE Senior Gender Adviser in the meeting of the Women, Peace and Security National Focal Points Network held in Berlin on 9 and 10 April 2018:* Secretary General (SEC.GAL/61/18 OSCE+)
- (d) *Workshop on the local implementation of UNSCR 1325, held in Yerevan on 22 and 23 March 2018:* Secretary General (SEC.GAL/61/18 OSCE+)
- (e) *Planned visits and meetings of the Secretary General:* Secretary General (SEC.GAL/61/18 OSCE+)

Agenda item 6: ANY OTHER BUSINESS

- (a) *Farewell to the Deputy Permanent Representative of Turkey to the OSCE, Mr. B. Güldere:* Turkey, Chairperson
- (b) *Parliamentary elections in Turkmenistan, held on 25 March 2018:* Turkmenistan, Russian Federation (PC.DEL/393/18)
- (c) *Midterm elections in the United States of America, culminating on 6 November 2018:* United States of America
- (d) *General election in Sweden, to be held on 9 September 2018:* Sweden
- (e) *Nerve agent attack in Salisbury, United Kingdom:* United Kingdom (Annex 1), United States of America (PC.DEL/418/18), Canada, Poland (PC.DEL/422/18), Russian Federation (PC.DEL/421/18/Rev.1), Germany,

Finland, Latvia, France, Sweden, Estonia (Annex 2), Denmark
(PC.DEL/426/18), Lithuania, Romania

4. Next meeting:

Thursday, 19 April 2018, at 10 a.m., in the Neuer Saal



1181st Plenary Meeting
PC Journal No. 1181, Agenda item 6(e)

**STATEMENT BY
THE DELEGATION OF THE UNITED KINGDOM**

Mr. Chairperson,

A month ago, on 15 March, I tabled at the Permanent Council the attack in Salisbury, Wiltshire, involving an undeclared Russian-developed nerve agent.

As a courtesy to participating States, I would like to update the Council on this attempted assassination, which left Mr. Sergey Skripal, his daughter Yulia and a British police officer hospitalized and in a critical condition.

Thankfully, Detective Sergeant Bailey has now been discharged from hospital and the Skripals' health is improving.

A painstaking and thorough UK investigation continues, working to identify the individuals involved in carrying out this attack and to establish potential criminal liability under the UK's 1996 Chemical Weapons Act.

In accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) deployed a team to the United Kingdom to collect environmental samples and to observe the taking of biomedical samples. These samples were sent to independent OPCW-designated laboratories for analysis, in order to confirm the identity of the chemical involved.

The OPCW has now finalized its report, distributed it to States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and published its executive summary of that report. I quote:

- “The results of analysis of biomedical samples ... demonstrate the exposure of the three hospitalised individuals to this toxic chemical;
- “The results of analysis of the environmental samples ... demonstrate the presence of this toxic chemical;
- “The results of analysis ... confirm the findings of the United Kingdom relating to the identity of the toxic chemical;” and

- “... the toxic chemical was of high purity.”

The name and structure of the identified toxic chemical contained in the full classified report to States Parties.

Mr. Chairperson,

I will remind the Council of the reasons for the UK Government’s conclusion that it was highly likely that the Russian State was culpable for this attack. These include:

- Identification of the Russian-developed nerve agent;
- The knowledge that the Russian Federation has produced this undeclared agent within the last 10 years, retains the capability to produce it, and has investigated ways of delivering nerve agents, it is likely, for use in assassinations;
- Russia’s record of State-sponsored assassinations; and
- Statements, including by the Russian President, indicating that certain people are seen as legitimate targets.

Also for clarity, and for the benefit of our Russian colleagues, I will explain why we use the phrase “highly likely”. This is because in the United Kingdom it is for a court of law to deliver a final verdict on responsibility for a criminal offence.

The use of an illegal nerve agent in a British city was a reckless act carried out without regard to the indiscriminate public health consequences. The United Kingdom has repeatedly asked the Russian Federation for a credible explanation of how a nerve agent came to be used on the streets of Salisbury, and to disclose the “novichok” programme to the OPCW.

What happened in Salisbury contravenes every rule in the international book, including the Chemical Weapons Convention and the fundamental tenets of the OSCE. This was a premeditated attack on the international rules-based order and, therefore, a challenge to us all.

Mr. Chairperson,

This organisation knows better than any other about a pattern of Russian behaviour that seeks to undermine stability and democracy in our region, in violation of international commitments and contrary to the principles of co-operation and common security. This is a pattern of disregard for sovereignty and territorial integrity, of attempts to damage the integrity of democratic institutions and the cohesion of democratic society, of cyberattacks, and of industrial-scale disinformation that cynically seeks to mislead, distract and confuse.

I wish to thank so many colleagues and partners for the support of their capitals over the past few weeks. The strength of international reaction to what happened in Salisbury – including the largest expulsion of Russian intelligence operatives in history – sends a message that States are ready to stand up for shared principles and for common security; that

attempts to undermine our region's stability and security have costs, and ; that enough is enough.

Mr. Chairperson,

On 15 March our distinguished Russian colleague asked the question, "Who benefits?"

The answer is clear: no-one benefits. Not the people of Salisbury, who have faced serious risk and disruption. Not the UK Government, dealing with the unprecedented use of an illegal nerve agent on British soil. Not the Russian people. Nor even, I would suggest, the Russian State, unprepared for the strength and resolve of the international reaction.

I do not believe any State seeks or enjoys confrontation with Russia or wants to throw away relationships and co-operation developed here and elsewhere over the past thirty years. Our challenge in the OSCE is to persuade our Russian colleagues to break the present cycle of disruption and destabilization, and to rebuild trust through a return to respect for shared commitments.

Mr. Chairperson, I ask that this statement be attached to the journal of the day.



**Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
Permanent Council**

PC.JOUR/1181
12 April 2018
Annex 2

Original: ENGLISH

1181st Plenary Meeting

PC Journal No. 1181, Agenda item 6(e)

STATEMENT BY THE DELEGATION OF ESTONIA

Mr. Chairperson,

Estonia thanks the delegation of the United Kingdom for providing us with an update on the attack in Salisbury involving an undeclared Russian-made nerve agent.

Mr. Chairperson,

Estonia condemns the use of chemical weapons, by anyone, anywhere, and in any circumstances. The reckless chemical attack that happened one month ago today in Salisbury is unacceptable and the perpetrators of this crime must be held accountable. I would like to reaffirm our solidarity with the Government and people of the United Kingdom.

As we heard from our British colleagues a few minutes ago, the report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was transmitted to the United Kingdom yesterday, confirming the United Kingdom's findings relating to the identity of the toxic chemical used in Salisbury, which severely injured three people. We have every confidence both in the UK's investigation and in the expertise of the OPCW Technical Secretariat.

On 22 March, the Heads of State or Government of the European Union agreed that it was highly likely that the Russian Federation was responsible and that there was no plausible alternative explanation. It is imperative that the Russian Federation begin to co-operate with the OPCW Secretariat. We support the calls by the United Kingdom and the international community to the Russian Federation to fully and completely disclose its "novichok" programme, and any other relevant programme, to the OPCW.

I kindly ask that this statement be added to the journal of the day.

Thank you, Mr. Chairperson.